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Government hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

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I have long said that you could fund the CAF to 4 percent of GDP, but we would still lag behind in NATO and be much the same where we are.

It's never the money, it's politics. It's procedures. It's the pork-barreling in our defence spending that makes us a paper tiger in NATO.

My only hope in all of this for the CAF and the GoC, whatever the political stripe that may be, is that it will rouse them out of the "Peace Dividend" slumber. The world has been unstable since 1945. We have used geography, proximity, and association as a Defence Policy ever since. ICBMs don't care how close to the U.S. or how far from Russia/China we are.

Don't give us a dime more, but let us spend money on defence like it matters. The fact we follow the same rules for purchasing a fighter aircraft as we do for buying office furniture for a Service Canada office is disgraceful. Don't treat defense procurement as a stimulus package for Canadian Industry. There I said it.

We spend so much money, time, and effort trying to get that money to stay in Canada; be it by awarding contracts to companies with no capability to produce items without first "retooling" and"developing the production lines", or by hamstringing perfectly competent and competitive bidders by forcing the project to be made in St. Margaret de Poutain de Champignon, QC because the ruling government either lost the seat in the election, or won it with promises.

We spend so much money and staff hours jumping through TBS regulations that are great for other departments, but are terrible for defence procurement. Some items you have to sole source, because there are technologies and capabilities no one else makes. By doing the bid process, you get companies clamoring for a project they can't deliver on, but because they tick the bright boxes on the score sheet....

I truly and honestly belief we need to split from PSPC and legislate that its not beholden to TBS, only to the PBO/PCO. The guiding principles of this new Defence Procurement department should be "Off the shelf, from somewhere else" if there isn't an industry in Canada.

BOOTFORGEN has demonstrated how well we do when we are able to actually get what we need, instead of lining the pockets of a Canadian company that got lucky.

That, but with tanks, fighters, ships, weapons systems....
 
There was a short little story in Maclean's about the admirals revolt. But no, the country was swept up in the Flag debate and preparations for the Centennial Celebrations. Also there was the move to remove many of the trappings of being a colony, with Hellyer leading the Colonel Blimps into the brave new world.
A 100% clear, concise and accurate summary of the era ... and yeah, I was there, on regimental duty in Canada and then in Germany.
 
Not sure ‘OP HARRUMPH’ did much for the RCN’s cause. Sailors love to bemoan the ‘slight’ in disproportionately low number of Naval CDS…perhaps they brought it on themselves? Adms Hillborn-Falls (77-80), Anderson (12mos in 93) and McDonald (6wks in 2021) and VAdm Murray (Acting - 11 months 96/97)…so a command duty cycle of 11% (6/54yrs) since integration…is it because they ‘stood by their principles’ or because the Navy thinks it gets it, but doesn’t. McDonald and Baines probably won’t help that RCN-CDS duty-cycle for the next decade or so…

I'm not sure that has much to do with anything. Personally I don't know anyone who bemoans not having Naval CDS's. Honestly the CDS is rarely mentioned in conversation; but CRCN and RCN CPO, all the time.

A 100% clear, concise and accurate summary of the era ... and yeah, I was there, on regimental duty in Canada and then in Germany.

Was the Army and RCAF as compliant as Brock, and others, made them out to be ?

Id be interested to know your opinions and observations as you were in during that time. Admittedly that period in our history fascinates me.
 
Not sure ‘OP HARRUMPH’ did much for the RCN’s cause. Sailors love to bemoan the ‘slight’ in disproportionately low number of Naval CDS…perhaps they brought it on themselves? Adms Hillborn-Falls (77-80), Anderson (12mos in 93) and McDonald (6wks in 2021) and VAdm Murray (Acting - 11 months 96/97)…so a command duty cycle of 11% (6/54yrs) since integration…is it because they ‘stood by their principles’ or because the Navy thinks it gets it, but doesn’t. McDonald and Baines probably won’t help that RCN-CDS duty-cycle for the next decade or so…
Well the stink of being CDS (or not being CDS) hasn't been exclusively draped on the RCN has it? There is enough has-beens, near do wells, and boot lickers from all parts of the CAF to stink up all of Canada. In the end, what CDS has really moved the ball towards anything? We are hostages to the whims of the PMO and always will be.
 
Brock memoirs are by and large self serving ahh looking for a polite word .... Nope can't find one .
Let's just say you should take anything he says on almost any subject , especially if it concerns umm just about anything with a grain of salt.
It doesn't mean the two volumes aren't a great read they are. He had a marvelous grasp of the English language. Let's just say he may remember something's differently then some others.
 
A 100% clear, concise and accurate summary of the era ... and yeah, I was there, on regimental duty in Canada and then in Germany.
I was but a tyke waving my tiny Centennial Flag during the Dominion Day parade being led by the pied piper Bobby Jimbee (sic) during that time. But I had an inkling of what was happening. I vaguely remember watching the RCN gun run in Brandon, or could it just be figment of my imagination.
But you would of had a front row seat on the shenanigan's for sure!
 
I found VAdm (R) Brock's book "The Thunder and the Sunshine Memoires of a Sailor" to have some good insight into the unification era and the resistance. Its been a while since I have read them but if memory serves me he is firm in his position the the RCAF were onside with it, the Army was ok with and it was the RCN who was the most in resistance.




Again, in the reading I have done that sense didn't seem to be dominant in RCN 1.0, but I am sure it existed to some extent. But I wasn't there...

HMC Dockyard in Halifax was lined with Civis and Sailor alike to wish Landymore fair seas when he was finally subdued.
The perception was, in many places ~ especially where I was serving ~ that we were adopting the RCAF's organization and management principles. There was considerable angst in the Army about the centralization of many support functions into bases. The fear, which proved to be at least partially true, was that it would weaken unit cohesion.

The unified command structure ~ Mobile Command for me and most of my friends ~ was popular with the Army. We, officers and soldiers on regimental duty, liked the idea of organic aviation ~ including "our own" fighters ... OK, they were only CF-5s. but they were "our own" organic, close air support.

Some Air Force noses were out of joint because Air Transport Command and Air Defence Command were "lesser" in command ranks and status than were Maritime and Mobile Commands.

I guess I understood the Navy's feelings about the "jolly green jumper," I cannot recall any of my friends who actually liked Mr Hellyer's new uniform, but most of us didn't;'t understand all of the Navy's objections and I, at least, thought that Maritime Command was, like Mobile Command, a step in the right direction.
 
Not sure ‘OP HARRUMPH’ did much for the RCN’s cause. Sailors love to bemoan the ‘slight’ in disproportionately low number of Naval CDS…perhaps they brought it on themselves? Adms Hillborn-Falls (77-80), Anderson (12mos in 93) and McDonald (6wks in 2021) and VAdm Murray (Acting - 11 months 96/97)…so a command duty cycle of 11% (6/54yrs) since integration…is it because they ‘stood by their principles’ or because the Navy thinks it gets it, but doesn’t. McDonald and Baines probably won’t help that RCN-CDS duty-cycle for the next decade or so…
McDonald-Baines-Edmundson

The Axis of Weasels? 😀
 
Brock memoirs are by and large self serving ahh looking for a polite word .... Nope can't find one .
Let's just say you should take anything he says on almost any subject , especially if it concerns umm just about anything with a grain of salt.
It doesn't mean the two volumes aren't a great read they are. He had a marvelous grasp of the English language. Let's just say he may remember something's differently then some others.

Interesting. What draws you to these conclusions ?
 
The perception was, in many places ~ especially where I was serving ~ that we were adopting the RCAF's organization and management principles. There was considerable angst in the Army about the centralization of many support functions into bases. The fear, which proved to be at least partially true, was that it would weaken unit cohesion.

The unified command structure ~ Mobile Command for me and most of my friends ~ was popular with the Army. We, officers and soldiers on regimental duty, liked the idea of organic aviation ~ including "our own" fighters ... OK, they were only CF-5s. but they were "our own" organic, close air support.

Some Air Force noses were out of joint because Air Transport Command and Air Defence Command were "lesser" in command ranks and status than were Maritime and Mobile Commands.

I guess I understood the Navy's feelings about the "jolly green jumper," I cannot recall any of my friends who actually liked Mr Hellyer's new uniform, but most of us didn't;'t understand all of the Navy's objections and I, at least, thought that Maritime Command was, like Mobile Command, a step in the right direction.

Thanks for the info.

Looking back on it, do you maintain the same opinions and positions ? If not how have the changed and why ?
 
The perception was, in many places ~ especially where I was serving ~ that we were adopting the RCAF's organization and management principles. There was considerable angst in the Army about the centralization of many support functions into bases. The fear, which proved to be at least partially true, was that it would weaken unit cohesion.

The unified command structure ~ Mobile Command for me and most of my friends ~ was popular with the Army. We, officers and soldiers on regimental duty, liked the idea of organic aviation ~ including "our own" fighters ... OK, they were only CF-5s. but they were "our own" organic, close air support.

Some Air Force noses were out of joint because Air Transport Command and Air Defence Command were "lesser" in command ranks and status than were Maritime and Mobile Commands.

I guess I understood the Navy's feelings about the "jolly green jumper," I cannot recall any of my friends who actually liked Mr Hellyer's new uniform, but most of us didn't;'t understand all of the Navy's objections and I, at least, thought that Maritime Command was, like Mobile Command, a step in the right direction.
The East Coast Admiral (who was in charge of Maritime Command) was ecstatic that he was getting control of Greenwood. I guess there was a plethora of Flight Lieutenants (Capts) who weren't doing much and he went in there with a scythe and cut a lot of the deadwood. According to the publications I've read at least.
 
The initial iteration of Maritime Command would have been great, the Navy had been advocating for control of the MPA community for years. But as per all the other maneuvering and backstabbing post Hellyer, the Air Force mafia was able to wrest control of all the flying communities from the Army and Navy.

In the end, a whole lot of churn and burn for not much return.
 
I read them and did a wee bit of digging . I enjoyed them immensely to be honest . Like I said he's a great writer.
His biggest problems seems to be his ego tended to get in the way and the venom directed at all and sundry at those who opposed him
Well I guess that's what memoirs are for .
 
Thanks for the info.

Looking back on it, do you maintain the same opinions and positions ? If not how have the changed and why ?

I still remain 100% convinced that Mr Hellyer's unified (joint) commands are much, Much, MUCH better than anything that has come since.

I thought the formation of Air Command in 1975 was an act of policy vandalism perpetrated by a bunch of short-sighted, vainglorious military wannabes which was allowed to succeed only because the commanders of Maritime and Mobile Command (Turcot, Milroy and Waters) were weak, narrow-minded old men who never put their organic Army and Navy Aviation arms on an equal footing with their ships and guns and tanks.

Mr Hellyer was wrong about several things, but his organizational model, of "functional" (his word) unified commands was better than anything we've had before or since.
 
I read them and did a wee bit of digging . I enjoyed them immensely to be honest . Like I said he's a great writer.
His biggest problems seems to be his ego tended to get in the way and the venom directed at all and sundry at those who opposed him
Well I guess that's what memoirs are for .

How so though ? He defiantly help no punches in his distain for the politicians and officers who pushed the unification program. Feel free to PM is if you wish. The period of unification fascinates me so I tend to pick that subject when I get the chance.
 
I still remain 100% convinced that Mr Hellyer's unified (joint) commands are much, Much, MUCH better than anything that has come since.

I thought the formation of Air Command in 1975 was an act of policy vandalism perpetrated by a bunch of short-sighted, vainglorious military wannabes which was allowed to succeed only because the commanders of Maritime and Mobile Command (Turcot, Milroy and Waters) were weak, narrow-minded old men who never put their organic Army and Navy Aviation arms on an equal footing with their ships and guns and tanks.

Mr Hellyer was wrong about several things, but his organizational model, of "functional" (his word) unified commands was better than anything we've had before or since.

Would that have more to do with HQ bloat ?
 
I still remain 100% convinced that Mr Hellyer's unified (joint) commands are much, Much, MUCH better than anything that has come since.
Similar to the USN? Even though the Marines are a "separate" service, they are so integrated with the Navy that their operations are seemless.
 
Similar to the USN? Even though the Marines are a "separate" service, they are so integrated with the Navy that their operations are seemless.

I have it in my head that Hellyer wanted us to be an organization similar to the USMC. Truth ? Or did I fabricate that ?
 
Well the stink of being CDS (or not being CDS) hasn't been exclusively draped on the RCN has it? There is enough has-beens, near do wells, and boot lickers from all parts of the CAF to stink up all of Canada. In the end, what CDS has really moved the ball towards anything? We are hostages to the whims of the PMO and always will be.

Don’t get me wrong; I don’t think that being CDS is by any means the be all to end all. Some have been complete bootlicks, others unimpressive, some influential.

McDonald-Baines-Edmundson

The Axis of Weasels? 😀

Ah yes, forgot the third horseman of the RCN Apocalypse… 😆 Shame on me.

The initial iteration of Maritime Command would have been great, the Navy had been advocating for control of the MPA community for years. But as per all the other maneuvering and backstabbing post Hellyer, the Air Force mafia was able to wrest control of all the flying communities from the Army and Navy.
I don’t have any real insight/experience on a would-be post-integration Fleet Air Arm, but will say that from the green side, there is (or more accurately was) much visible bemoaning by FMC about the poor state of support by Air Command, and yet for the actual “Deeds, Not Words” bit, FMC threw aviation under the bus several tomes; first ‘giving’ the green CF-5s to Air Command (no meaningful pushback when AIRCOM stated they’d be transferring the CF-5s from 10 TAG to FG), then deciding to not fund the CH-147’s upgrade from C to D-models, which was followed with FMCS decision (it funded aviation at the time) to let the Chinook be decommissioned; then the infamous CH-146 purchase in 1992 (again, FMC still had the funding means and decision for tactical aviation).

So, while many will romanticize the “parent service as proponent for component aviation”, the reality (at least in the green side) was that environmental aviation is just one more card in the deck and doesn’t always (often) make the cut compared to core environmental capabilities.
 
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