I'll believe it when I see it.
Keir Starmer is wasting his time trying to defeat Putin’s army
Instead of focusing on increasing defence spending, the UK should prioritise on fighting Russia’s ‘active measures’
Harlan Ullman
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30 May 2025 4:09pm BST
If he is not careful, British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer could find himself metaphorically riding alongside Lord Cardigan astride his horse Ronald in a modern day version of the Light Brigade’s disastrous cavalry charge.
For Starmer, it is not the valley of death in Balaclava he faces, which was brilliantly described in Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem of tribute to the brigade’s immortal six hundred men.
Instead, this “valley of death” is the concept of a “defence dividend” the Labour Party is counting on to remove itself from political life support. Unlike the promised “peace dividend” arising from the end of the Cold War that was never delivered, Starmer’s defence dividend is intended to supercharge Britain’s economic growth, and thus save the Labour Party from an ignominious defeat.
In 2027, the UK will increase defence spending to 2.5 per cent of its GDP. This stimulus, the public has been told, will strengthen both the British military and provide hundreds of thousands of jobs to build a new arsenal of democracy.
However, as with Cardigan, this charge has more than a few problems that must be fixed if Labour is to retain power. Consider three.
This increase in defence spending, according to currently serving senior British military officers, will not sustain the already tiny UK force, most likely bringing further reductions.
Along with the submarine nuclear deterrent, the Royal Navy has two aircraft carriers and sixteen surface combatants. The Army is down to about 70,000 soldiers. The Royal Air Force musters 137 Typhoon fighter-bomber jets and with the RN 35 F-35B’s scheduled to be increased to 74 by 2033.
As former UK Chief of Defence General The Lord David Richards notes, the brigade he commanded (about 5-7,000 soldiers) in Germany during the Cold War had more firepower than the British Army has today. So unless a new strategy or real change is imposed, the defence dividend will not improve the state of the UK military.
Second, if history matters, more defence spending is unlikely to empower the substantial economic growth Labour needs to become competitive. Under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, large defence spending increases were made. But the economic impact was minor and huge budget deficits accrued.
Third, the most important consequence is strategic. Increasing defence spending will do nothing to address the most dangerous threat currently posed by Russia. Devastated by losses in Ukraine, a Russian military attack on Western Europe or even the threat of one should not be the principal strategic focus.
That Russia is supposedly stiffening defences on its 1400 mile border with Finland is meant to justify the threat to the West. An example is a small decrepit hospital being upgraded near that border. Almost certainly, the hospital is being renovated to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of wounded Russians as far from public view as possible. Yet, who in power in the West will argue that the likelihood of a Russian attack West is practically zero?
No one can win or would fight a nuclear war. It will take five and probably double that number of years for the Russian military to recover from the thrashing it is taking in Ukraine – the US military needed about a decade to rebuild after Vietnam. So what does Vladimir Putin do? The answer is “active measures,” often mischaracterised as “hybrid, asymmetric war or grey zone operations.”
Active measures include espionage; infrastructure and cyber attacks; mis- and disinformation; psychological operations; assassinations and intimidation; and massive propaganda among other tools from Lenin’s playbook. Clearly the West is not ignorant of this threat. But complaints are not action.
Can some of this defence dividend be used to counter Russia’s “active measures” beyond whatever resources are currently allocated? Rather than spend a bit more to defend against active measures, money will go to deterring a distant conventional military threat that may never fully materialise.
Active measures cannot be countered with what the defence dividend and spending on traditional forces will buy: ships, aircraft, expensive combat systems and vehicles.
And, frankly, when the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is released, do not count on it addressing this issue. So can this strategic disconnect with Russian active measures be repaired?
Putin must be thinking what a geostrategic windfall this is for him. Putin knows that reconstituting his forces takes time. But the US and its European allies are convinced that the Russian army still represents a potent military threat to Nato. Thus, Putin can run virtually unchecked in exploiting active measures. Is anyone in Number 10 listening?
Maybe the Navy can do the same Army's 'best kept secret' floatsThese are not things that could be fixed with a new rank group. Compensation problems will not be solved with a new rank class. Imposing of career development requirements (courses & postings) beyond core technical competencies will not go away with a new rank class. Commanders ignoring technical expertise will not stop because of a new rank class. Crappy HR systems and practices will not go away with a new rank class. Some of these problems are even likely to be exacerbated.
We have doctors who think they should have access to more GSO jobs through careers to build competitiveness for access to more GOFO jobs at the end of their careers … because that’s just fair. If elements of the medical community can lose focus on why they exist to that degree, we are not insulting other specialists from the same mistakes.
Create a US style WO class and our egalitarian views will quickly decide that they should have access to CO positions because they are capable of doing the job so it is fair that they should have a path to do that (and, the template US WO class already has that path). But then that path becomes core to the occupation, and we start pulling people away from the technical functions for which the occupation exists so they can attend courses and experience jobs to one day be ready to fill a position that does not require the exquisite competencies that the individual actually embodies (and for which they an appropriate paycheque).
Took a tour on one of those in the late 70s at Ft Eustis. An interesting concept. At the time the US Army had several "Terminal" battalions which are used to unload ships to shore including over the beach operations.Maybe the Navy can do the same Army's 'best kept secret' floats
How about a rank of Technical Sergeant with about a dozen or more pay levels.Why does "new rank class" have to solve so many problems? I can see the point of bringing in helicopter pilots or physician's assistants or IT/comm/EW geeks with no expectation that they will ever "command" much beyond a small team. No commission needed. Waste of years to advance from Pte(R) to whatever NCM rank is thought to be competitive for compensation.
Whether or not some people might in future agitate for additional responsibilities isn't relevant; it's just made-up fear. The universe of made-up fears is approximately infinite. Which do we allow into the estimate, and which are excluded? Is the institution incapable of saying "No, the lane for this rank class is what it is"?
Maybe the Navy can do the same Army's 'best kept secret' floats
The more I think about it and the more I read I get the rather serious apprehension that even in an emergency.I suspect it lacks the personal for a full CMBG anyway.
The Army needs to focus on where and how to generate operational outputs. Units in the part time force need proximity to training areas and support for their assigned roles. This means revisiting and changing roles for units. Perhaps artillery is a bad for for Sault Ste Marie and they could be made an infantry platoon. Maybe the BCD should be a transportation company. And so on through the units to identify meaningful, realizable roles.
Too many combat arms in the Army Reserve. Need a lot more support - truckers and MMTs and cooks.Re-roll the Dragoons into infantry and merge them with the Rocky Mountain Rangers, rename them the “British Columbia Rangers” (BC Rang), done!
I’ll accept my consulting fee in cash or cheque.
Dragoons are mounted infantry, so keep the names as battalions of the Western Infantry Regiment.Re-roll the Dragoons into infantry and merge them with the Rocky Mountain Rangers, rename them the “British Columbia Rangers” (BC Rang), done!
I’ll accept my consulting fee in cash or cheque.
Pay and bennies is most certainly part of the solution. Not the whole, but I would argue a 1/3 of the solution.
All trainable through the Community College System with a short Mil specific conversion course. Truckers and Cooks (and their trucks and kitchens) are a particularly good ARes fit. MMTs to an extent but we really need more as full-timers. Maybe train them up as reservists, give them a two year Class B contract to be basic labour and apprentices then on Class A reserve status for 3 mandatory years.Too many combat arms in the Army Reserve. Need a lot more support - truckers and MMTs and cooks.
Except, those people want full time employment, not a few weekends a year, and some "training" nights.All trainable through the Community College System with a short Mil specific conversion course.
I'm not a fan of "training nights." I am of a weekend a month and two weeks in the summer focusing on active military skills. I want just enough payback to allow them to have a proper civilian career with minimal interference from the military. I'm looking for a base of people who can be mobilized in a hurry in the event of a major crisis.Except, those people want full time employment, not a few weekends a year, and some "training" nights.
I spend a fair amount of time talking to people in the food service industry... None of them want a "part-time" job with the CAF on top of their three other jobs. Imagining otherwise is just militia myth fantasy.
I love where you're coming from, but based on my very recent experiences talking to the kind of people we want, they don't want another burden/job.I'm not a fan of "training nights." I am of a weekend a month and two weeks in the summer focusing on active military skills. I want just enough payback to allow them to have a proper civilian career with minimal interference from the military. I'm looking for a base of people who can be mobilized in a hurry in the event of a major crisis.
I don't want them looking at the ARes as a "part-time" job. I want them to look at having a full-time civilian job with "part-time" military adventure that you don't get as a civilian - firing rifles, "camping in the woods", throwing grenades, learning combat casualty care etc. - with a bit more pay, a modest pension at the end, and some additional education benefits further on in their career.
I plan to get them in the door by offering to pay for their tuition for their full-time civilian career, offering them full-time paid summer employment in between semesters as they convert their civilian skills to military ones, and keeping them for a few years after that by way of obligatory service of such a mild nature that it isn't a problem for them or their employers and families. I plan to keep some around after that by offering a modest reenlistment bonus that's just enough to be interesting for a bit more obligatory service, pension and education benefits.
For those in special categories where we have a full-time need I would offer some full-time service in their field after DP 1 training is completed which allows them to build a resume, gain experience and earn some cash before again keeping them on a part-time service while they go off to develop a full-time civilian career.
Just looking at "food services." I'm looking at am army structure that would have some 48 hybrid battalions of all natures. That's roughly 130-150 ARes company-sized sub-units of all natures. At roughly 3 cooks per sub-unit that means we're looking for 400-450 ARes cook positions across the board. It's hard to get numbers but some that I've seen indicated there are some 20,000 students in food service programs including apprenticeships at any given time. Based on an obligatory service program I expect that after 4 years, The ARes will probably keep one in three, have one in three go RegF and lose the third one outright. That means we need to have a replacement rate of roughly 300 per year across the country. I do not see that as a major challenge if we run the system right instead of having the haphazard shit show we have now.
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I don't see the correlation between housing and the ARes.Until the GoC cracks the housing problem, the PRes problem is unlikely to be resolved, regardless of what ideas we come up with.
Again, I see what you're going for, but I don't think the current generation has an appetite for what you're offering. If the PRes can at best offer a crappy part-time job with a lot of expectations, why would anyone waste their time?I don't see the correlation between housing and the ARes.
My first four years in the army were in the Militia in Toronto and I lived at home while going to school. That's where I think our targets should be - young folks in school, unmarried and living at home in bigger cities.
We need to be geared to high volume turnover but should also have terms of obligatory service to get buy back for the training investment - that and retention incentives. Turnover is a way of life but that turnover needs to be managed. If we lose them after three or four years as they get married, get a more demanding job etc - that's okay. Enough will stick to become the next set of young officers and NCOs and quite a few move on to the RegF which is also okay.
The ARes should always be predominantly a pool of young folks. We don't need or want messes full of old retired LCols and RSMs. Use the RegF for that. And I do agree. If we want proper urban hybrid units then the CAF had better ensure that adequate PMQs are available in the cities at a reasonable subsidized rent for the RegF component of those units.
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Where else do you get to fire automatic rifles every year?Again, I see what you're going for, but I don't think the current generation has an appetite for what you're offering. If the PRes can at best offer a crappy part-time job with a lot of expectations, why would anyone waste their time?
Why sign on for restrictions when you can live at home, working part time elsewhere, and have zero obligations?
I like how you still know how the ammo budget really works….Where else do you get to fire automatic rifles every year?
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I love where you're coming from, but based on my very recent experiences talking to the kind of people we want, they don't want another burden/job.
When people are working 2+ jobs to keep the lights on, and a roof over their head, the reserves aren't even a consideration.
Until the GoC cracks the housing problem, the PRes problem is unlikely to be resolved, regardless of what ideas we come up with.