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India (Superthread)

Is there any plausible way this was just a colossal oops?
I suppose. Training standards may be “iffy” in that part of the world. The dude who actuated the fuel shutoffs, may actually have thought he was doing something else. We may never know for certain.
 
Photo of the cutoffs (directly below the throttles) i in this article:

 
Seeing as the switches have a 'stop-lock' safety (i.e. lift and re-position), it makes sense that it would have to have been a deliberate act since each switch must be manually held but probably a thumb and one finger to move. It is being reported that each switch went into cut-off about one second apart so it would seem a very quick and deliberate act.

The only unanswered question is whether the flight control computer has the ability to activate these switch. As we saw with the 737 Max series of incidents, an unintended response to inputs.
 
Seeing as the switches have a 'stop-lock' safety (i.e. lift and re-position), it makes sense that it would have to have been a deliberate act since each switch must be manually held but probably a thumb and one finger to move. It is being reported that each switch went into cut-off about one second apart so it would seem a very quick and deliberate act.

The only unanswered question is whether the flight control computer has the ability to activate these switch. As we saw with the 737 Max series of incidents, an unintended response to inputs.
It is guess work, but it is probably a mechanical system for a very good reason.

If, hypothetically, it was a computer error, how likely is it that they would have actuated at just about the same speed it takes a human to manually flip two swtiches?
 
Self loading cargo question: is there one central set of switches, or one set per seat?

Because it could be "guy who cut the switches asks the other guy why he did it to leave a false record on the recorder".

Like SKT noted, just one set. In the center console between the two pilots, and equally accessible.

Is there any plausible way this was just a colossal oops?

I don’t think so. I and a few folks here know of real-life examples, in particular one I know of where during an engine failure checklist response, the non-flying pilot (PM - pilot monitoring) mistakenly cut-off fuel to the good engine…at low level…like nap-of-the-earth low…15-20’ above the ground. Fortunately the pilot flying (PF) had a metric schiße-ton of experience and autorotated the helicopter to a smooth and successful autorotation. Apparently the troops on board thought it was the planned tactical disembarkation and they all split the scene after the helo came to a stop. Fixed-wing aircraft don’t have as many options as these guys did, sadly.

The only unanswered question is whether the flight control computer has the ability to activate these switch. As we saw with the 737 Max series of incidents, an unintended response to inputs.

No. This is a hard-wired circuit from the cockpit to each engine’s fuel control unit. It’s know as a discrete (analogue, energized or not) line…as opposed to being converted from an analogue signal into a digital signal and interleaved into a control bus with a bunch of other signals. I don’t know about Airbus, but having worked with their control systems engineers I’m certain that Boeing runs discrete control lines to all its aircraft’s engine controls, fixed-wing platforms or CH-47/AH-64/AH/MH-6.
 
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