Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

[Kirkhill]

You should note several issues about 25 Div which is an active army unit based in Hawaii.

First it only has two brigades but both of these are converting to the lighter, leaner MBCT format. There's been a lot of movement as between Hawaii, Washington state and Alaska as to the units there and their role vis-a-vis Korea. I'm not sure if any particular active or ARNG BCT is currently tasked to round out 25 ID.

Note the establishment below which shows what an MBCT based US army infantry division now looks like (albeit most will have three BCTs and three arty battalions and their light brigade support battalions are in fact organic to the divisional sustainment brigade)

Note that it is 2-11 FAR that is the HIMARS battalion.

I think that this is, in particular even more important than rerolling a battalion to HIMARs.

Note the inclusion of the 125th Intelligence & Electronic Warfare (I&EW) battalion to the DivArty establishment. This is a relatively new battalion (perhaps more like reactivated as divisional intelligence assets were downsized in 2005) There is a recent article about I&EW here:
Note that not all divisions include the I&EW battalion with div arty - see the converted 101 Airborne Div establishment here.

IMHO, the I&EW battalion is a critical component in any division structure. I've included something like them in my own Napkin forces and called the Pan-domain regiments which I describe as follows:



I'm of the view that the I&EW (or pan-domain) battalion ought to be centred in the arty brigade and in fact become the fires hub.

The 25th is one of the experimental Divs.

For me one of the critical points about it and its sister div, the 11th, is that both divs have a full array of div support assets but they only support 6 inf battalions and no cavalry units. In addition some of the references I have seen suggest that two of the six infantry units are re-roled cavalry units that were/are ISTAR focused.

The MBCTs are reduced in strength to 1900 effectives from 4500.

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13128

Continuing an American tradition of sending a bullet instead of a man.

The Area of influence of those few, and small, battalions is massive.

 

[FJAG]

The MBCTs are reduced in strength to 1900 effectives from 4500.

The numbers are a bit misleading. Remember that the IBCT is losing its artillery, its engineers and its brigade support battalion but these are not disappearing, they are merely moving to the div structure.

They aren't actually losing all of their cavalry either as there is a new Multi-functional recce company. It's a downsized structure more in keeping with the brigade's size and reach.

I'm generally a fan of leaner brigades. The issue, IMHO, is that smaller divisions should translate into more smaller divisions (or more corps general support enablers with the same aggregate manpower) and not the same number of smaller divisions (with less aggregate manpower).

 

[Kirkhill]

The numbers are a bit misleading. Remember that the IBCT is losing its artillery, its engineers and its brigade support battalion but these are not disappearing, they are merely moving to the div structure.

They aren't actually losing all of their cavalry either as there is a new Multi-functional recce company. It's a downsized structure more in keeping with the brigade's size and reach.

I'm generally a fan of leaner brigades. The issue, IMHO, is that smaller divisions should translate into more smaller divisions (or more corps general support enablers with the same aggregate manpower) and not the same number of smaller divisions (with less aggregate manpower).

Point taken but the fact remains that boots on the ground are a lesser priority than effects delivered at range, novel effects and situational awareness.

A case tha number of us have been arguing a whiles now.

Or Expeditionary Forces would be better contributors with the things the locals don't have enough of. And they have lots of close combat forces. They are short of combat and service support. Just like the rest of us.

 

[FJAG]

Or Expeditionary Forces would be better contributors with the things the locals don't have enough of. And they have lots of close combat forces. They are short of combat and service support. Just like the rest of us.

I guess one can take a bit of a Trumparian view of this in that it's their country and they should bear the primary burden of defending it including providing the stocks of expensive consumables.

Integrating a combat support and combat service support structure in a multinational organization is far from easy. Some parts are just dependant on training but too many are complicated by incompatible resources.

Most often its best to have national units of action (like a brigade or division) that are self sustaining.

 

[Kirkhill]

I guess one can take a bit of a Trumparian view of this in that it's their country and they should bear the primary burden of defending it including providing the stocks of expensive consumables.

Integrating a combat support and combat service support structure in a multinational organization is far from easy. Some parts are just dependant on training but too many are complicated by incompatible resources.

Most often its best to have national units of action (like a brigade or division) that are self sustaining.

The Trumparian view would be to not deploy at all. And there are a fair few Canadians that would agree with that stance.

Strangely enough they are often the most stringent objectors to Trumparian isolationism and his America First tendency.

If we want to do the other thing, make friends, go out into the world, be co-operative, then we should exploit our material resources and the wealth we could generate from them, and minimize our human contributions from our small, aging and shrinking population.

In fact the word I am looking for is "productive". In both the military and commercial realms the key is making the most of the people we have, not adding more people we don't have.