Infantry Vehicles

[childs56]

Okay that’s fine but that needs to be assessed, and audited before contracted.

no different then they already do for third party contractors.

4-6 per Bn / Regt I think? I posted the ACSV numbers before. That’s obviously in addition to the HLVW wreckers. Their internal to units which is good. Now how that would be played out with AFVs across the country is a whole different question of course.

Hire as needed or buy more equipment to fit the need. I am sure the US Army would loan a few recovery vehicles if we asked them. When I was on exercise we had to use US Army recovery when on their range as we did not have our own anyways.

That wasn’t really my point. Not a lot of reservists will be able to give up 30 plus days a year just for those courses. We already make heavy use of simulators, in house ICS, for gunners but I think we can agree you need to actually drive to get a sense of the vehicles. Much like flight time is still required in addition to sim time.

Lots can and do give up those days, it kind of pilfered off when taskings and course disappeared at the last minute when leave from work and or school was already arranged. The Army use to say we don't guarantee taskings. That would make for not happy employers. A few had a bit of tolerance and finally they said you work for me or you go play Army. That was after the Army cancelling so many courses and taskings for their workers.

Would you, an an example, be able to take 30 days off for a driver course ?

I can and always have been able to. Did frequently at the last minute go on taskings.

“She’ll buff” failing to plan is planning to dial and all that.


God glad to hear it, how long is the m777 course ? Not sure not in any more. Never was qualified on the M777. The LG1 Conversion was a week long including live firing.

My point isn’t that I don’t think the reserves can fix the vehicles; I’m sure we can do some work around a to get it to work. It’s more that time and training would eat up every training day available to a reserve unit. Probably more if you have to break up the field portions into multiple weekends and account for travel.

So be it, train on the gear you have. It is pretty amazing what one can do on evening and weekend training when you have working equipment.

We use to do dry deployments, practicing coming into and out of action, going over direct fire drills, open actions and the whole game on evening training. Our Recce Teams would practice their survey and our Command Post/Comms crews practice radio stuff. (once we managed to get equipment) When we went on our weekend training for Dry deployments prior to live fire the crews I worked with were pretty switched on. When we went live fire there was not a lot of messing around with our Detachments. Some of the others took a bit to get back to speed.
We trained with what we had, and became proficient in the job at hand.

If we would have had Lavs would not of been any different. We would have trained with them and become proficient.

 

[daftandbarmy]

That wasn’t really my point. Not a lot of reservists will be able to give up 30 plus days a year just for those courses. We already make heavy use of simulators, in house ICS, for gunners but I think we can agree you need to actually drive to get a sense of the vehicles. Much like flight time is still required in addition to sim time.

Would you, an an example, be able to take 30 days off for a driver course ?

If delivered in the summer, you can definitely expect a Reservist to attend a 30 day course.

RESO, for example, is about 4 months long and Reservists attend all the time. There are other long courses covered in the summer too.

 

[FJAG]

The CAF's main output should be readiness - equipment that's ready, materiel that's ready, people who are ready.

That in turn suggests a bias in the Army's full time force towards those who generate that readiness - the techs and acquisition and other support personnel... and then a shift for the "pointy end" to less full-time, and more part-time.

I 'm not quite sure how to take that.

IMHO the CAF's (including the Army's) main output should be "tiered" readiness. The current managed readiness cycle does that in an indirect way in that formations on the "road to high readiness" and "reconstituting" are at progressively lower levels of readiness that the "high readiness" unit. The thing is, I see nothing here that really creates a logical readiness structure. Just a convenient one based on three symmetrical brigades each of which is tasked to provide everything from light to moderately above medium levels of forces.

When I go back and look at the original Army transformation process initiated by Jeffery, readiness was looked at a bit differently and more in line with the prior cold war defence mandated for tiered readiness elements. These slides go back to a 2003 presentation on Advancing with Purpose (or at the time the "Army Strategy")

Remember that the aim was to build battlegroups based on company sized-building blocks. Essentially the aim below is to build and deploy light battlegroups quickly and therefore would need to be maintained at high readiness, while a medium weight battle group would be built and deployed more slowly and one requiring a heavy component would take much longer to build and deploy.



The following slide shows the retention of a tank regiment and a medium artillery (i.e. M109) regiment. Incidentally, this is why Ross protected a regiment's worth of M109s from the cutting torch for several years while the Army was flinging itself off in a different directions (and, IMHO, had lost sight of the original aim which was to keep the one regiment of M109s until it could be replaced by an Archer-like wheeled medium howitzer)



The following slides show the contemplated brigade structures





It's interesting that 1 CMBG is the "heavy" brigade and 2 and 5 are the "lighter to medium" brigades.

It's also interesting to note that the structure didn't go fully asymmetrical but left the light companies distributed to each battalion rather than concentrated. Personally I think that's a weakness to the system albeit that a) it keeps the infantry regimental mafias happy and b) its not really a big issue if your aim is truly to build and deploy battlegroups and not brigades.

Note the artillery structure. 1 Bde has a strong regiment quite capable of supporting a heavyish brigade while the other two are quite light for firepower. Remember this was the time that the mortar platoons disappeared from the battalions.

On a readiness scale, all three brigades could generate a rapid reaction light battle group and two medium readiness battle groups. Only 1 CMBG has the ability to generate low readiness tank squadrons and medium batteries. Frankly, with a 90 to 180 day readiness cycle, much of the tank and medium artillery force could be made up of reservists. Even with a 60-90 cycle, medium battle groups could have a reserve component. Only the light battalions would need to be close to 100% RegF.

Okay so where do the infantry vehicles fit in. In a model such as this - which I think is a valid readiness model - reservists fit into the low readiness portion of the force which requires that they be capable of using the equipment (read vehicles) of the low readiness force. We stand the concept on its head when we give the reserves no training in the low readiness equipment but leave them mostly equipped as light forces, a job that they can hardly ever fulfill.

We need a more logical RegF/ResF structure that is tied to readiness and the equipment reservists are more likely than not to be involved with. That means the appropriate training and support (including maintenance) system has to be part of the core structure. In short, I agree with you. In a properly structured "tiered" readiness system you can shift valuable RegF PYs to the support structure and relegate more properly conceived and trained ResF positions to the pointy end, which by a process of elimination is the "heavier" pointy end. (ie high readiness is generally light to medium)

Just as an aside, note the TA (STA) battery in the structure. At the time we were flirting with ISTAR but there were no arty STA projects in the Army's portfolio. That was to happen serendipitously by way of UORs a year later with the Kabul mission.

 

[IKnowNothing]

@FJAG ,

were the MGS/LAV TUA / MMEV originally conceived as fitting into the above force in their obvious slots and then later coopted into the direct fire trinity during the tank/ no tank fight?

 

[FJAG]

@FJAG ,

were the MGS/LAV TUA / MMEV originally conceived as fitting into the above force in their obvious slots and then later coopted into the direct fire trinity during the tank/ no tank fight?

That's a very good question. When I last talked with Jeffery he was indicating that the Advancing with Purpose agenda was more like a living document that was evolving and that one of his greatest challenges was creating "unity of effort" or what we could call consensus on the vision and methodology of achieving it.

The 2002 Army presentation on Advancing with Purpose, as you can see talks about a "tank" regiment. At the time the Army had the Leopard C2 as its MBT. At the time as well, it talked about an "Army of Today" (i.e. 2002) and the goal of an "Army of Tomorrow" (i.e. 2012)

In 2003, there was another presentation, this one given at a 2 CMBG study group. That refined the vision. We move from an Army of Today and Tomorrow structure to one of an Army of Today through an "Interim Model" (i.e. 2007) to the Army of Tomorrow. This slide accompanies the presentation with the text "UNTIL THE ARMY SECURES BETTER DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE THE LEOPARD C2 NEEDS TO BE RETAINED ALBEIT AT REDUCED READINESS AT LEAST UNTIL 2010."


When it comes to the Army of Tomorrow (i.e. the 2012 target) the following slide is used


You can see here that the thought process is to replace the tank with a lighter MGS and the M109 with something like the Bofors (which became the Archer) by 2012. There was a project being programmed for the MGS but no project for a new indirect fire capability.

Jeffery left in May of 2003 to be replaced by Rick Hillier who in turn was replaced by Marc Caron in Feb 2005 when Hillier became CDS.

Hillier worked to get MGS operational quickly and the project only died when a need for "real tanks" was identified for Kandahar in 2006 and the MGS money used to buy the Leopard IIs.

Training on the M109 was stopped in 2004 and divestment from the regiments quickly followed, without any replacement project in the works.

TUA existed well before this on the M113 chassis. These were ported to a LAV chassis in around 2004 to create the LAV TUA. I'm not sure how long these continued to be used but I believe around 2010 (I could be wrong on the date) the TUA system was removed from these LAVs and they were rebuilt as infantry section carriers.

In around 2004, 4 AD Regt which had the M113 mounted ADATs started training in using their system in the ground role in conjunction with a composite LdSH regiment which contained a squadron of Leopard C1s (mimicking the MGS role), a Patricia company of LAV TUAs, and a battery of ADATS. These were proof of concept trials. This concept fell apart as we moved into Kandahar. The Patricia company - called E Company LdSH stood up in April of 2005 initially still using the M113 TUA. The LAV TUA was deployed to E Coy LdSH in 2006. I'm not sure when E Coy ceased to exist but by year-end, 2007 there was no report of its existence in The Patrician as the battalions turned to creating rifle comanpies for Afghanistan.

The MMEV project was stood up in 2005 with the purpose of effectively porting 33 of the ADATs weapon system (or one like it) to the LAV chassis. The project was cancelled in 2006 and the M113 ADATS continued in service until around 2011 when the air defence trade was slaughtered.

Effectively one has to look at Advancing with Purpose as an evolutionary process. Under Jeffery it had, what IMHO, was a more balanced view of an Army with at its core a medium weight LAV based force but with a light element at one end at a high state of readiness and a heavy element at the other end at a low state of readiness. There clearly was a concept as early as 2003 that by 2010, the heavy element (tanks and medium guns) would convert to wheeled counterparts albeit that only a part of that, the MGS was programmed and funded.

It's hard to put a finger on when exactly the whole composite MGS/LAV TUA/MMEV concept was initiated. ADATS of course preexisted as an AD resource, and TUA, at least in its M113 form as an infantry resource as well. I'm very confident that this was a Hillier initiative as the then DArty was quite clear that under Jeffery's concept, there was no plan to "de-mechanize the force" which is shown in the 2003 slide showing the tanks and guns to remain as part of the Interim Army until roughly 2010.

 

[IKnowNothing]

@FJAG

Thanks for that.

It seems like a greater commitment to that 2003 interim model would have prevented a lot of issues and capability loss over the last 20 years.

With a firm commitment to 5x Recce and 3x DF/Tank Squadrons the RCAC retains it's relevancy without poaching capabilities from infantry and artillery, the death of the MGS as the Tank regiment's mount doesn't claim the TUA and MMEV as collateral damage, the "tank" concept isn't threatened by TUA capability so it doesn't get sat on, Anti-armour platoons survive. MMEV gets its kinks worked out and its newness relative to the ADATS protects it from divestment. Artillery gets M1129's to provide the mortar batteries. The Leo 2 procurement is made with the clear objective of coming out with enough gun tanks of the same variant to outfit a homogenous regiment.

 

[dapaterson]

The Army having a plan does not necessarily translate into that plan being fully resourced for new equipment identified as necessary within that plan.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Army having a plan does not necessarily translate into that plan being fully resourced for new equipment identified as necessary within that plan.

Poulter Plan of 2012 - some swings and misses.

 

[Kirkhill]

I’d point out that all of those vehicles are able to fire in self defence. A notable omission in the sentinel.

Back to this one Mark - I agree firmly on the need for self-defence. And I wonder what is the minimum necessary.

How easy is it to swat Mavic 3 Quadcopters out of the sky with 25mm SAPHEI-T from a LAV? Or do they work better against larger "drones"?
If the Ukrainians are claiming success with pintle mounted machine guns.....

Do you need lots of rifle caliber bullets or lots of pellets? 57/40/35/30 all have Programmable Air Burst Munitions. The 30 is currently available for the 30mm Bushmasters used on the Strykers.

Got me to wondering what is possible with the 25mm Bushmaster

The 25mm is a fantastic weapon, depending on ammunition it can chew up pretty much anything. I don’t suspect that UKR will get APFSDS-DU rounds (a U.S. only item) though so killing the T-80 and T-90’s frontally isn’t going to occur easily. But standard APFSDS will make a mess out of most T-72 and earlier tanks. Plus HEI-T will just wreck any light vehicles and troops.

TOW-2B are plentiful and while a wire guided system that requires the gunner to be stationary and guide the missile in, it has a top attack mode as well so one can fly over the tank and punch through the roof.
OS range of 4.5km, but the longest distance I know of a successful TOW engagement from a Bradley is slightly over 5.2km

One of the biggest bonuses to the Bradley is the Fire Control, the thermal sights and LRF will allow very selective targeting — right now nothing Ukraine has is even close to the degree of capability that the Bradley offers.

And got me drifting through CG84 ABMs, FCS13 REs, HK GMGs, NAMMO 40mm grenades, and the XM25 support weapon.

All of which led me to

Programmable Munitions: Projectiles 'Evolved' For The Modern Era - Overt Defense

Programmable munitions are increasingly important for engaging air and ground targets. But how do they work? We take an indepth look.

www.overtdefense.com

And

A 25 x 137mm Programmable Air Burst Munition from Orbital ATK (Northrop Grumman)

So, as usual, me playing catch up, does a 25mm PABM exist, does Canada field it, and how effective, generally is the LAV/25mm combination against micro-uavs and slow and low aerial targets?

 

[KevinB]

Back to this one Mark - I agree firmly on the need for self-defence. And I wonder what is the minimum necessary.



Do you need lots of rifle caliber bullets or lots of pellets? 57/40/35/30 all have Programmable Air Burst Munitions. The 30 is currently available for the 30mm Bushmasters used on the Strykers.

Got me to wondering what is possible with the 25mm Bushmaster



And got me drifting through CG84 ABMs, FCS13 REs, HK GMGs, NAMMO 40mm grenades, and the XM25 support weapon.

lol you said XM-25…

Projectile payload is a primary issue - one reason the XM-25 failed so miserably in Afghanistan Operational T&E.

LV 40mm (M203 type) munitions and below simply have a very limited payload for fixing and effects. The more advanced the fuzing the more limited the payload. @AmmoTech90
Can give a lot more than me on the various aspect of that.

All of which led me to

Programmable Munitions: Projectiles 'Evolved' For The Modern Era - Overt Defense

Programmable munitions are increasingly important for engaging air and ground targets. But how do they work? We take an indepth look.

www.overtdefense.com

And

A 25 x 137mm Programmable Air Burst Munition from Orbital ATK (Northrop Grumman)

So, as usual, me playing catch up, does a 25mm PABM exist, does Canada field it, and how effective, generally is the LAV/25mm combination against micro-uavs and slow and low aerial targets?

1) Yes
2) Doubt
3) Again two major issues.
A) Payload issues for the 25mm mean that isn’t not going to do much unless it’s a small Micro UAS
B) Unless things changed very very recently neither of those turrets (LAV or Bradley) FCS can reliably use stab to track a flying object as the stab system is setup for platform movements not target movements. Which means the LAV/Bradley don’t track those well and it’s going to require on the gunners steady hand for the most part…

 

[Kirkhill]

A) Payload issues for the 25mm mean that isn’t not going to do much unless it’s a small Micro UAS

How about a barrage of 5 to 10 rounds on a predicted path?

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

B) Unless things changed very very recently neither of those turrets (LAV or Bradley) FCS can reliably use stab to track a flying object as the stab system is setup for platform movements not target movements. Which means the LAV/Bradley don’t track those well and it’s going to require on the gunners steady hand for the most part…

Does the LAV sight do predictive fire offsets? As found in the FCS 13 RE and the NLAW? Would it stand a better chance of hitting an aerial target while stationary? And if all else failed, what about mounting a GMG on top, if it proved to be an effective MUAS counter?

 

[Kirkhill]

An interesting graphic showing all current British Army vehicles to scale.

It is part of an article that argues for a continuation of the CVR(T) family.

CVR(T)s, Stormers and Vikings .... num, num

Anglo Engineering Concepts - Think Defence

A proposal from Anglo Engineering Concepts to meet British Army vehicle capability gaps and drive down support costs by adopting system engineering thinking

www.thinkdefence.co.uk

More pertinently it argues for a more engaged governmental engineering department.

The effect the closures of the Establishment had on UK defence equipment design was fundamental. The MOD assumed the industry would perform all the work previously done by the Establishments, but cheaper!

Of course, it didn’t.

The industry is not a charity; unless there’s a high probability of a good return on its investment, it does nothing. Without a cast-iron contract, or a winnable competition for one, or at least a clear indication from MOD that they have a clearly defined requirement for a specific capability, there will be no design effort in the industry.

And as soon as the opportunity expires all design effort stops. Dead. There should be no surprise that since the 1990s, nearly every armour bid has been based upon previously fielded products minimally modified to tick the latest requirement boxes, or on products imported from afar, developed on their own nation’s taxpayers’ money.

This is perfectly summarised in one simple quote from William Suttie’s book ‘The Tank Factory’, where he is looking back at the 1920s.

“The decision to focus tank design in industry and run down the experienced and innovative Department of Tank Design (DTD) was a significant factor that resulted in Britain becoming a backwater in tank design until the Chertsey Establishment was established.”

 

[markppcli]

How about a barrage of 5 to 10 rounds on a predicted path?

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

Does the LAV sight do predictive fire offsets? As found in the FCS 13 RE and the NLAW? Would it stand a better chance of hitting an aerial target while stationary? And if all else failed, what about mounting a GMG on top, if it proved to be an effective MUAS counter?

GMG on top? No. GMG rounds are very very slow.

When I said self defence I still mean against a terrestrial threat. An RWS or at least a pintle and a hatch.

 

[AC 011]

How about a barrage of 5 to 10 rounds on a predicted path?

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

FCS™ Series

This video demonstrates the counter defilade capability of the FCS13RE and the Nammo 40mm HV RF Air burst grenade.

share.vidyard.com

Does the LAV sight do predictive fire offsets? As found in the FCS 13 RE and the NLAW? Would it stand a better chance of hitting an aerial target while stationary? And if all else failed, what about mounting a GMG on top, if it proved to be an effective MUAS counter?

Sort of... it applies a predictive offset for lead only in azimuth. For the capability you're describing, the existing sight heads would have to be replaced with either a dual axis sight head, or a 2 axis modular sight.

 

[AmmoTech90]

A few points:

EW or kinetic kills are the way to down flying things when you can use lethal measures. Nets, birds, string, rubber bands all suck.

Humans with body armour and helmets are pretty resilient to small frag. Even unarmoured peeps. Think big sky, small frag that slows down fast. You might slice right through the femoral, more likely you'll miss; if you do hit it'll be in large muscle group. I've seen folks hit with a couple of shotgun pellets pretty much ignore them, I've seen someone shot with an AK round from long range and they didn't show any effects until they started bleeding- then shock set in.

Following on from this payload size is king. More HE means a larger container which means more frag, larger container means better shaping of frag as you can generate larger frag carrying more momentum. In the last week (or two) I saw a video that boasted about how great an AGL was being used against some russians who were advancing. What I saw was a bunch of Russians with small explosions nearby or very close and they kept moving. There were a couple of obvious casualties but much less than what I would expect from HE rounds functioning five to ten feet from people. The Russians retreated, probably due to the AGL fire, but with minimal casualties. I guess that's effective, but UAS don't get scared. You need a K-kill not a M-kill (morale).

You need a good FCS to track air targets unless you have massed AAA a la WWII. This is becoming more and more possible for every APC, but I don't think Canada is there yet. If we do get an EO/IR tracker that can pass range, speed and heading to the FCS to calculate lead, FAPDS could work for larger targets. I've seen FAPDS fired at full sized air frames- they get messed up with very few rounds- even one. Otherwise, in my opinion, an AHEAD like round is needed to get a decent frag cloud near the very small target. These need further mods to the weapons to measure MV and then program the fuze as the projectile leaves the barrel, further complications.

Given all that, small quadcoptors are pretty fragile and generally don't have redundant systems. A small piece of frag will down one. I've crashed them, I've had bird rip off the GPS antenna, I've landed them hard. First and last were repairable, bird attack one flew away never to be seen again. However you have to make that small frag and the UAV collide and that's hard math- or lots of luck- or skill. I would say that a shotgun would work well, but you have to be pretty close and by then you've probably been seen and may have bigger problems on the way.

 

[AmmoTech90]

An interesting graphic showing all current British Army vehicles to scale.

WTF is wheeled armour when talking about Warrior? Oh wait, that's the legend. As a graphic artist in training that image makes my head hurt. Anglo Engineering needs to hire a designer.

 

[McG]

Not to my knowledge. The ACSV will replace the MRTs, Bison (not LAV) CPs and AMBs. The E LAV is fairly new I can’t see it being replaced.

I would assume the Engineer ACSV would be for their more specialized roles and be replacing the TLAVs they already hold or even the Cougars but I can’t say for certain.

The ACSV will replace the MTVE, so the engineers will have two types of section carriers - a LAV 6 engineer section carrier and an ACSV section carrier. Both vehicles are intended for the exact same job, but I suspect the newer combat skyscraper is less suited to be with a combat team.

The Cougar is not (but should be) currently in line for replacement. Hell, there is a new variant being fielded now by a project ordered from VCDS in 2007ish.

 

[markppcli]

The ACSV will replace the MTVE, so the engineers will have two types of section carriers - a LAV 6 engineer section carrier and an ACSV section carrier. Both vehicles are intended for the exact same job, but I suspect the newer combat skyscraper is less suited to be with a combat team.

The Cougar is not (but should be) currently in line for replacement. Hell, there is a new variant being fielded now by a project ordered from VCDS in 2007ish.

Interesting. ACSV is outrageously tall

https://twitter.com/x/status/1609113952927059968

 

[suffolkowner]

Interesting. ACSV is outrageously tall

https://twitter.com/x/status/1609113952927059968

huge

 

[KevinB]

huge

Somewhere there is a graphic of it against a Queen Mary and it dwarfs the QM.