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Infantry Vehicles

Yeah I’m still not 100% on what the LAV really is ;) If it was conducting stuff in conjunction with the tanks and had an ATGM integral to the turret, I’d probably beat a drum for separating the trade. When it’s planned more as a battlefield taxi with fire support, I can see the logic in a small army to keeping it in a one Infantry trade bubble.

That said, I do feel strongly that at least 3 BN of the CA should have a Heavy Tracked IFV to conduct ops in a combined Tank team setting, which would make sense to then split the trade.


I know a poor guy who went from 2/75 Rangers to a Bradley unit as a PlSgt. It’s been a hard slog for him to get used to.
 
I’m not sure what the LAV is either, however my experience has always been with the LAV 3 and 6 integrated into a cbt team with MBTs and an Engr breeching capability acting in a manner very similar to a US Bradley Coy or a UK Armoured Inf Coy.

The dismounted actions were usually in support of the overall AFV advance. We did experiment with simulated ATGM capabilities on the LAVs during one portion of an Ex MR as well.

Those experiences colour my views towards 6/9 Bns fighting as Mech or Armoured Inf with a IFV even if the LAV is not ideal vs motorized Inf with a battle taxi.

I think 1 and 2 PPCLI trend more towards the IFV employment than the equivalent RCR and R22R Bns in my experience due simply due to the training areas the respective units generally use.
 
Admittedly going to combined MOSIDs in a unit is a more drastic change to increase the professionalism of the AFV crews. There are other options.
I would suggest though that the whole concept of backup crewman is an infantry corps culture. It’s not as much a thing in an armoured regiment from what I have seen.

I think it’s becoming a problematic part of the culture for the Mech Bns and it’s not a strength it once might have been. Look at where turrets and AFVs are going equipment and technology wise. The ability to train multiple people in a section to operate a M2 A4E1 turret comes at what cost in time and resources? How proficient while one be if out of the turret for months - years?

Those turret crews likely will share more in common with MBT crews than in dismounted riflemen.

If those crews can’t be armoured we might need a sub occupation in the infantry for IFV crewmen, so those skills and expertise can be built on and developed.

We currently make do but the Bns LAV crews are not as capable or professional as they could be due to the Corps personnel policies. Is the Army okay with that? Seems it is, so hey.
The replacement crews in the Armour Squadron are in the SHQ / SQ. They’re all crewmen first and if trooper Bloggins becomes a casualty guess where the new driver is coming from? Same as in the infantry, just across the section. I think it’s important to understand having back up crews is not a luxury, it’s a requirement. If that hide takes IDF and the driver or gunner is hit who’s taking over? Not just short term to get off the x but long term. You’ve talked about complexity and skill fade, but we do that with a dozen other weapons and have systems in place to combat that. It’s not different.
 
The replacement crews in the Armour Squadron are in the SHQ / SQ. They’re all crewmen first and if trooper Bloggins becomes a casualty guess where the new driver is coming from? Same as in the infantry, just across the section. I think it’s important to understand having back up crews is not a luxury, it’s a requirement. If that hide takes IDF and the driver or gunner is hit who’s taking over? Not just short term to get off the x but long term. You’ve talked about complexity and skill fade, but we do that with a dozen other weapons and have systems in place to combat that. It’s not different.
That's exactly what the reservists in Latvia are doing for the RCAC, they're A ech drivers who are getting AFV quals to fill holes as needed. It's a tried and true system. I can't see why the same system couldn't work in the RCIC just like you said.
 
Yeah I’m still not 100% on what the LAV really is ;) If it was conducting stuff in conjunction with the tanks and had an ATGM integral to the turret, I’d probably beat a drum for separating the trade. When it’s planned more as a battlefield taxi with fire support, I can see the logic in a small army to keeping it in a one Infantry trade bubble.

That said, I do feel strongly that at least 3 BN of the CA should have a Heavy Tracked IFV to conduct ops in a combined Tank team setting, which would make sense to then split the trade.


I know a poor guy who went from 2/75 Rangers to a Bradley unit as a PlSgt. It’s been a hard slog for him to get used to.

I know a guy who did that.

The biggest shock was the inability to RTU/ Mag to Grid the shitbags, apparently ;)
 
That's exactly what the reservists in Latvia are doing for the RCAC, they're A ech drivers who are getting AFV quals to fill holes as needed. It's a tried and true system. I can't see why the same system couldn't work in the RCIC just like you said.
It’s exactly what we do. There’s at least one spare driver and gunner in each section.
I’m honestly not concerned so much with replacement crew. I’m concerned where you are finding replacement vehicles…
I mean fair, but situations exist where the crew can be incapacitated and the vehicle isnt
 
I’m not opposed to back up crews and I don’t think the premise of backup crews precludes having a unit with two coys of one MOSID and another two coys of another MOSID nor does it preclude having additional MOSID sub occupations positions within the sub unit filling jobs in the Coy HQ or CQ stores. That is a very small number though only able to replace 1-2 crews without impacting other critical functions.

Backup crewman is inherently a limited element inside a sub unit or unit. It’s only a short term solution in peer on peer combat. You’re not going to be able to generate 15 new crews from a sub unit or unit. Those will have to come with vehicles from a theatre level organization if we desire to maintain cbt power overall.

The question is do we replace whole crews at a sub unit and unit level in combat or do we replace units once they hit a certain threshold.

The CA has a tendency culturally to try to deal with problems at a unit or sub unit level that are more appropriately dealt with at a Division, Corps or Theatre level.
 
The question is do we replace whole crews at a sub unit and unit level in combat or do we replace units once they hit a certain threshold.
This is not an either-or question. If we are serious, we do both. There need to be replacement holding units that can send crewed vehicle replacements and even formed platoon/troop to keep units in the fight, and there needs to be combat units in depth ready to take-up the fight.
 
Best practice based off of WW2 and post WW2 seems to be that you replace units and formations once they hit an unacceptable level of losses. They are replaced by depth units and the expended units are rebuilt with pers and equipment from holding units while out of contact.

It gives the units time to integrate the new personnel and conduct some training.

Replacing losses while still in close combat is certainly an option but it has not historically led to the replacements being able to integrate as effectively. Unit effectiveness is still lower even if they have the people and equipment.

There is likely a balance point, sending 0-5% replacements to a unit in contact every month could be acceptable. Every day less so, or needing to sent 25% or more, maybe that unit needs to be pulled off.
 
Best practice based off of WW2 and post WW2 seems to be that you replace units and formations once they hit an unacceptable level of losses. They are replaced by depth units and the expended units are rebuilt with pers and equipment from holding units while out of contact.
I'm not sure that I'm a 100% on here but it seems to me that the WW2 experience was one of individual augmentees. We formed five divisions (and two separate tank brigades) that essentially went into combat but the units never changed for the duration. Canada sent formed replacement battalions but on arrival in England they were usually broken up and troops sent forward as individual fills.
It gives the units time to integrate the new personnel and conduct some training.

Replacing losses while still in close combat is certainly an option but it has not historically led to the replacements being able to integrate as effectively. Unit effectiveness is still lower even if they have the people and equipment.
Not denying that's true, but in WW2 there were lulls during which refitting could take place. In WW1 and I think in Ukraine, as it stands, units are being rotated out of positions to rest, refit and recuperate.
There is likely a balance point, sending 0-5% replacements to a unit in contact every month could be acceptable. Every day less so, or needing to sent 25% or more, maybe that unit needs to be pulled off.
I'm not so sure that there is a hard and fast, or even approximate, rule. The modern Canadian way of doing things is much more ad hoc.

🍻
 
I'm not sure that I'm a 100% on here but it seems to me that the WW2 experience was one of individual augmentees. We formed five divisions (and two separate tank brigades) that essentially went into combat but the units never changed for the duration. Canada sent formed replacement battalions but on arrival in England they were usually broken up and troops sent forward as individual fills.

As I understand it, British and Commonwealth organizations included what they called a "first reinforcement." These were usually the size of one or two platoons, with a few spare junior officers, and were made up of individuals who belonged to their parent unit but were left out of battle and held back in the echelon. As casualties were suffered the first reinforcement would be used to make good on the losses.

The first reinforcement was replenished by sending replacements forward from a Reinforcement Depot, which was usually held at an Army or higher level. This was in turn replenished by the national training system.

Minor casualties could be made good by the reinforcement drafts. Losses that exceeded the size of the unit's own reinforcement pool would invariably require some sort of consolidation or reconstitution.
 
The Personnel Replacement System in the US Army

This is an interesting read of the US Army Personnel Replacement Systems from the Continental Army through to WW2.
The system in WW2 was one of individuals but they tried to send the replacements to the units during pauses in combat when the units could be rotated rearward to assimilate and train the personnel coming from the replacement depots.

It was not always possible during some more intense periods but it was preferred to integrate personnel out of contact even if only for 2-3 days.
 
For a Canadian perspective I recommend Arthur Gullachsen's An Army of Never-ending Strength. I made a thread a couple of years ago here:

An Army of Never-Ending Strength: Reinforcing the Canadians in NW Europe 44-45

The Canadian Army had a very robust personnel and equipment replacement system in place for the Normandy campaign. Typically, the echelon system was used for individual replacements to be worked forward to the line companies. This allowed for some acclimatization. Vehicle casualties could be by two fundamental methods: crewed replacement or vehicle replacement. There were dedicated units for that system.

B-GL-312 has our current doctrine, which is very similar. Our current doctrine states that if a unit needs to have a sub-unit replaced then it should pulled into reserve and undergo reconstitution. Reconstitution including replacement, re-equipping and training is the responsibility of the Corps by our doctrine. It speaks to the role of theatre, Corps etc, but we have to keep in mind that we operate at the level we are at. So of course our current practices will see things done at lower levels. The Canadian NCE/NSE, regardless of size of contingent, would control the flow.

Anyhoo.
 
Since I think we've generally agreed that wheeled DFS vehicles like the US MGS are definitely NOT tanks I'm posting these here:



So at least the Italians and Taiwanese continue to see the value in wheeled DFS vehicles to support their infantry.

In light of what we're seeing in Ukraine do people see a DFS capability like this as a worthwhile investment for our LAV Battalions?
 
Since I think we've generally agreed that wheeled DFS vehicles like the US MGS are definitely NOT tanks I'm posting these here:



So at least the Italians and Taiwanese continue to see the value in wheeled DFS vehicles to support their infantry.

In light of what we're seeing in Ukraine do people see a DFS capability like this as a worthwhile investment for our LAV Battalions?
The cost of these things is not far off the cost of a proper tank. IMHO, they do have uses but I'd prefer to see the money invested in a real tank before we allocate $ for a wheeled DFS vehicle.

The tradeoff between speed, armament and protection is under scrutiny right now because of the success of drone borne anti armour munitions against lighter tanks which lack proper air defence and active protection. That may be a false lesson. IMHO, lighter tanks with unmanned turrets, such as those recently shown in France, have a very major role in a future "heavy" force and they stack up well even with wheeled IFVs. The old air transportability and road move argument is, and always has been, a red herring.

Personally, I prefer to see one single fleet of tanks with unmanned turrets, such as the Leo 3 (there. I've said it) or Abrams-X, fill all the tube launched direct fire tasks.

Edited to add: While I'm making wishes, I'd wish for a common tank chassis with the engine and driver up front and the turret towards the rear (a la Booker but heavier) so that it could form a common chassis for a heavy IFV and SP and related support vehicles.

🍻
 
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Since I think we've generally agreed that wheeled DFS vehicles like the US MGS are definitely NOT tanks I'm posting these here:



So at least the Italians and Taiwanese continue to see the value in wheeled DFS vehicles to support their infantry.

In light of what we're seeing in Ukraine do people see a DFS capability like this as a worthwhile investment for our LAV Battalions?
Well given the fantastic combat abilities and histories that those armies have…
 
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