Infantry Vehicles

[Brad Sallows]

The Battalion of the 1980s was essentially a Battle Group in its own right. They were, when fully constituted, ready to go out the door as an independent force.

If definitionally a battle group is an augmented battalion, that stands regardless what capabilities a battalion has. An unaugmented unit is always just a unit.

Every organization - at whatever echelon (level) we choose - ought to have whatever capabilities are thought necessary to deal with customary tasks within the scopes of space and time for which the organization is expected to operate independently.

I figured out on my own long ago that some of knowledge passed onto me by older people was not grounded in any reference. (So I became a pam nerd...)

 

[ArmyRick]

Can I ask as to the nature and context of these observations and conversations? What were you observing and with whom were you conversing?

I joined in 1989 and so I was part of about 15 years of the army that had the full combat support companies. Combined arms training could always be improved, but I noticed no systemic problem linked to the infantry thinking they could go alone because they had combat support platoons. There was a great article from the 80s called "The Marriage of Two Solitudes" by an Infantry and Armour major about combat team quick attacks, but I don't think there was any systemic problem.

As a tank troop leader and BC we were often training with the infantry battalions in the CMBG, and they had TUA. The engineers were out there as well and the infantry had their pioneers. Recce Squadron worked for the Brigade, but the infantry battalions had their recce platoons.

The changes in 2004/05 were linked to falling manpower levels. Cut units or cut combat support/combat service support elements. There was also a somewhat mistaken understanding about changes to modern warfare, but it was really about manpower and units.

I first joined in '90 and was in reg force by '94 (2VP). I remember doing the square combat team training in Wainwright and Shilo in the 90s. I seem to remember that no one ever said the infantry battalion was meant to operate alone unless it was a really low intensity fight. The combat support platoons were there to augment the battalion with organic resources and took some of the burden off of brigade engineers, artillery, etc.

I was in anti-armour platoon for a very brief bit, and I do remember working with brigade recce squadron.

 

[Kirkhill]

Can I ask as to the nature and context of these observations and conversations? What were you observing and with whom were you conversing?

I joined in 1989 and so I was part of about 15 years of the army that had the full combat support companies. Combined arms training could always be improved, but I noticed no systemic problem linked to the infantry thinking they could go alone because they had combat support platoons. There was a great article from the 80s called "The Marriage of Two Solitudes" by an Infantry and Armour major about combat team quick attacks, but I don't think there was any systemic problem.

As a tank troop leader and BC we were often training with the infantry battalions in the CMBG, and they had TUA. The engineers were out there as well and the infantry had their pioneers. Recce Squadron worked for the Brigade, but the infantry battalions had their recce platoons.

The changes in 2004/05 were linked to falling manpower levels. Cut units or cut combat support/combat service support elements. There was also a somewhat mistaken understanding about changes to modern warfare, but it was really about manpower and units.

Fair question.

My association with you lot goes back to 1980, when the Calgary Highlanders agreed to take me on board and asked me if I wanted to become an officer. At that time there was a fair amount of interplay between the Highlanders and our stable mates the KOCR, as well as the Patricias at Currie and the Strats at Harvey by Sarcee.

The training was largely in house. Training materials were whatever the instructors could scrounge or create. Formal training was a couple of MITCP courses and a posting to Gagetown for Phase 3 that was curtailed due to a death in the family.

Since that time I have discovered an inability to disengage and have enjoyed a fair bit of discourse with folks from my past and people like yourself and the other denizens of this board. As well I have enjoyed the privilege of listening in on some really interesting arguments as well as being directed to all sorts of documents and histories.

From there I have had the luxury of drawing my own conclusions, secure in the knowledge that nobody will die due to my errors. A gadfly that is best ignored.

...

Having said all of that, sometimes I feel the need to press my case because I feel that my "lived experiences" have some applicability to the discussions that you folks are engaged in.

One field that is near and dear to my heart is the whole issue of the application of technology to problems. My entire civvy career has been about doing more with less, specifically less money and less workers and more automation. I have benefited from the decreasing cost of automation, especially in sensors and computing power.

The net effect, looking back over 40 years, is that the plants of today look very much like the plants I started in in terms of hardware. The operating schedules have increased radically from 4 days a week, 12 hours a day with an 8 hour maintenance day to 24/7 ops for 50 weeks a year. At the same time the number of people engaged has gone from two per unit process and multitudes of packagers to fully automated lines with 2 operators per shift supervising the receiving, production and filling of products which go into the warehouse on pallets.

Now the warehouses are losing their forklift drivers and pickers and becoming fully automated themselves.

...

Why does that subject exercise me? Because I am a strong believer, from my own observations and experience, that technology can do a lot more for a small army, or navy or air force than is commonly believed. While many of you have been forced to limp along with 1970s and 1980s vintage technologies due to constraints beyond your control a lot of fundamental changes have been happening, especially in the field of remote management of plants and processes that I believe would benefit you.

...
Now, my opinions are my opinions. And they are only opinions. And as like as not to be wrong as right.

...

This won't be the first time that I have thanked this board for the privilege it has given me. It also isn't the first time that I have begged indulgence. Nor is it likely to be the last.

I more often found myself begging forgiveness than requesting permission.

Cheers.

PS - Exercises with the Highlanders were at Sarcee, Bragg Creek (Forestry Reserve lands), Wainwright and Suffield.

 

[Kirkhill]

If definitionally a battle group is an augmented battalion, that stands regardless what capabilities a battalion has. An unaugmented unit is always just a unit.

Every organization - at whatever echelon (level) we choose - ought to have whatever capabilities are thought necessary to deal with customary tasks within the scopes of space and time for which the organization is expected to operate independently.

I figured out on my own long ago that some of knowledge passed onto me by older people was not grounded in any reference. (So I became a pam nerd...)

If a battle group is an augmented battalion I find it worth asking what that battalion on its own can do without augmentation. My sense is that the 4 company battalion was capable of covering off a lot of the tasks that today would demand the augmentation found in the Battle Group.

...

After being cornered in this discussion I've got to thinking that one of the things lost in the re-org that ditched the Combat Support elements is the ability, or desire, to liaise.

Although I said that the All Singing All Dancing Battalion (C) failed to appreciate the value of the supporting arms, after all they were only doing things that the infantry did as well, the design of the battalion meant that there were multiple attachment points where the supporting/supported arms could plug in. The most obvious example is the Mortar Platoon's FSCC to which the Gunners would attach. But the Pioneers did the same liaison for the Engineers and Recce did for the Recce and Int and the TOW platoon did for the Tanks. Those cells supplied in house knowledge of what was missing, what was possible and how to hook into the support nets.

 

[KevinB]

How so?

The CA has for years looked at the Light Battalions as Battalions without LAV's as opposed to LIB's.
Additionally the Para role has been neglected tremendously due to the fact a Jump Coy is considered to be acceptable method of retaining Para skills in a LIB.

The LAV Bn's also tend to believe they can do everything a LIB can do and more - which again comes down to an issue of time in the training day . A LAV BN can be a great Light Inf BN, but guaranteed they are going to be a shitty LAV BN, or at the minimum not as good a LAV BN as they would have been if focused on Mechanized Infantry combat roles.
*Accepting that the LAV is not a Bradley and is fought differently anyway.

I will note that down here the 11A trade isn't broken up - as Officers are expected to be both more flexible, but also not technical skills masters.

 

[FJAG]

The Battalion of the 1980s was essentially a Battle Group in its own right. They were, when fully constituted, ready to go out the door as an independent force.

I'll echo @Infanteer's and @TangoTwoBravo's comments above and will pile on a bit.

My most active time was in the 70's and into the early 80s. By that time we were down to 3 companies per battalion. While they all had mortars, anti-armour and pioneers, they were never considered a mini-battle group albeit their configuration was sufficient for many of the peacekeeping efforts at the time such as Cyprus. However, almost all of our training centred on Europe. The Combat Team Commander's Course was the foundation of how to fight there. Combat teams and battle groups were always built around armoured troops and squadrons, artillery batteries and engineer troops were the de rigour model we used throughout. (Engineer regiments hadn't been invented yet - each Combat Group had one engineer squadron)

Towards the end of the century we had deployed numerous rotos to the former Yugoslavia which had gone in various configurations; some with arty, some without - no tanks though. Those deployments were a huge drain on the army for personnel and a lower level of intensity combat training (we stopped doing divisional exercises and for the most part gave up brigade ones). That and the financial cuts of the 90s drove the transformation model that produced the Advancing with Purpose transformation agenda as modified by the subsequent Afghanistan experiences.

Note as well the experiments in the latter 00s towards an "optimized battle group" which was an attempt to design standing battle groups which required less ad hoc configuring. Those never panned out. I'm firmly in the camp of those who feel that the basic division of the army into infantry, armour, artillery and engineers as the backbone with additional attached services is the proper model developed in over a century of conflict. Yes there is a need to update doctrine from time to time as new weapon systems are developed, but there is no need to fundamentally radically change the components. Each of the existing components can quite easily incorporate and adapt to revisions in doctrine.

I find it goofy that we would consider two different occupations based on the drivetrain of a vehicle that may or may relevant to the tactical task.

I don't think its the drive train that matters in @KevinB's viewpoint. His view, and mine. is that a proper infantry/armour combined arms team requires the infantry component to fight differently than a light or mech infantry component that does not operate with tanks. I'm not sure as to whether you agree or disagree with that proposition. My opinion comes with having been a FOO working with mech (M113 no tanks) inf in Pet and on the CTCC (M113 and Centurion) and German Panzergrenadiers in Shilo (Leos and Marders). In each case different small unit level tactics were employed that directly impacted on how the sections and platoons worked notwithstanding that they all had tracks.

Our view is solely that the tracks on an IFV facilitates the ability of the infantry to keep up to the pace of the tanks which might not be as easy with a wheeled IFV regardless of how well it is armed and armoured. The tracks ought not to affect the tactics the infantry uses, but merely makes it more possible to do them effectively.

In my mind I see an basic infantry course that teaches a recruit everything that applies to all infantrymen and then have them have a small package that is divided into light, mech and combined arms. Whether done at a school, regional battle school or at the unit is immaterial to me. What is the issue is whether it is all taught on the basic course - and thus lengthen the course - or in finite specific packages that can also be taught to people transferring from one type of unit to the other, is the real issue.

 

[KevinB]

I'll echo @Infanteer's and @TangoTwoBravo's comments above and will pile on a bit.

My most active time was in the 70's and into the early 80s. By that time we were down to 3 companies per battalion. While they all had mortars, anti-armour and pioneers, they were never considered a mini-battle group albeit their configuration was sufficient for many of the peacekeeping efforts at the time such as Cyprus. However, almost all of our training centred on Europe. The Combat Team Commander's Course was the foundation of how to fight there. Combat teams and battle groups were always built around armoured troops and squadrons, artillery batteries and engineer troops were the de rigour model we used throughout. (Engineer regiments hadn't been invented yet - each Combat Group had one engineer squadron)

Towards the end of the century we had deployed numerous rotos to the former Yugoslavia which had gone in various configurations; some with arty, some without - no tanks though. Those deployments were a huge drain on the army for personnel and a lower level of intensity combat training (we stopped doing divisional exercises and for the most part gave up brigade ones). That and the financial cuts of the 90s drove the transformation model that produced the Advancing with Purpose transformation agenda as modified by the subsequent Afghanistan experiences.

Note as well the experiments in the latter 00s towards an "optimized battle group" which was an attempt to design standing battle groups which required less ad hoc configuring. Those never panned out. I'm firmly in the camp of those who feel that the basic division of the army into infantry, armour, artillery and engineers as the backbone with additional attached services is the proper model developed in over a century of conflict. Yes there is a need to update doctrine from time to time as new weapon systems are developed, but there is no need to fundamentally radically change the components. Each of the existing components can quite easily incorporate and adapt to revisions in doctrine.

Agreed

I don't think its the drive train that matters in @KevinB's viewpoint. His view, and mine. is that a proper infantry/armour combined arms team requires the infantry component to fight differently than a light or mech infantry component that does not operate with tanks. I'm not sure as to whether you agree or disagree with that proposition. My opinion comes with having been a FOO working with mech (M113 no tanks) inf in Pet and on the CTCC (M113 and Centurion) and German Panzergrenadiers in Shilo (Leos and Marders). In each case different small unit level tactics were employed that directly impacted on how the sections and platoons worked notwithstanding that they all had tracks.

110%

Our view is solely that the tracks on an IFV facilitates the ability of the infantry to keep up to the pace of the tanks which might not be as easy with a wheeled IFV regardless of how well it is armed and armoured. The tracks ought not to affect the tactics the infantry uses, but merely makes it more possible to do them effectively.

My other point on this is that a lot of Mech forces run 6-7 dismounts per squad/section, and because their vehicles are a "firebase" they dont always have all the extra Platoon Support Weapons, whereas a lot of other Infantry run 10-14 man squad/sections with more dismounted firepower, but they also need to be ready to walk it -- I view it as a totally different mindset toward the combat 'model'.

In my mind I see an basic infantry course that teaches a recruit everything that applies to all infantrymen and then have them have a small package that is divided into light, mech and combined arms. Whether done at a school, regional battle school or at the unit is immaterial to me. What is the issue is whether it is all taught on the basic course - and thus lengthen the course - or in finite specific packages that can also be taught to people transferring from one type of unit to the other, is the real issue.

Agreed

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll echo @Infanteer's and @TangoTwoBravo's comments above and will pile on a bit.

My most active time was in the 70's and into the early 80s. By that time we were down to 3 companies per battalion. While they all had mortars, anti-armour and pioneers, they were never considered a mini-battle group albeit their configuration was sufficient for many of the peacekeeping efforts at the time such as Cyprus. However, almost all of our training centred on Europe. The Combat Team Commander's Course was the foundation of how to fight there. Combat teams and battle groups were always built around armoured troops and squadrons, artillery batteries and engineer troops were the de rigour model we used throughout. (Engineer regiments hadn't been invented yet - each Combat Group had one engineer squadron)

Towards the end of the century we had deployed numerous rotos to the former Yugoslavia which had gone in various configurations; some with arty, some without - no tanks though. Those deployments were a huge drain on the army for personnel and a lower level of intensity combat training (we stopped doing divisional exercises and for the most part gave up brigade ones). That and the financial cuts of the 90s drove the transformation model that produced the Advancing with Purpose transformation agenda as modified by the subsequent Afghanistan experiences.

Note as well the experiments in the latter 00s towards an "optimized battle group" which was an attempt to design standing battle groups which required less ad hoc configuring. Those never panned out. I'm firmly in the camp of those who feel that the basic division of the army into infantry, armour, artillery and engineers as the backbone with additional attached services is the proper model developed in over a century of conflict. Yes there is a need to update doctrine from time to time as new weapon systems are developed, but there is no need to fundamentally radically change the components. Each of the existing components can quite easily incorporate and adapt to revisions in doctrine.


I don't think its the drive train that matters in @KevinB's viewpoint. His view, and mine. is that a proper infantry/armour combined arms team requires the infantry component to fight differently than a light or mech infantry component that does not operate with tanks. I'm not sure as to whether you agree or disagree with that proposition. My opinion comes with having been a FOO working with mech (M113 no tanks) inf in Pet and on the CTCC (M113 and Centurion) and German Panzergrenadiers in Shilo (Leos and Marders). In each case different small unit level tactics were employed that directly impacted on how the sections and platoons worked notwithstanding that they all had tracks.

Our view is solely that the tracks on an IFV facilitates the ability of the infantry to keep up to the pace of the tanks which might not be as easy with a wheeled IFV regardless of how well it is armed and armoured. The tracks ought not to affect the tactics the infantry uses, but merely makes it more possible to do them effectively.

In my mind I see an basic infantry course that teaches a recruit everything that applies to all infantrymen and then have them have a small package that is divided into light, mech and combined arms. Whether done at a school, regional battle school or at the unit is immaterial to me. What is the issue is whether it is all taught on the basic course - and thus lengthen the course - or in finite specific packages that can also be taught to people transferring from one type of unit to the other, is the real issue.

Pile on at will. As I noted I am offering an opinion, informed or otherwise.

I accept the notes on doctrine and doctrinal terminology.

I will stand by my opinion that the 4 company battalion, which in 1980 was still being taught as the doctrinal solution, as was the 10 man section with the section driver being no. 11, had much to offer.

The fourth company offered depth which assisted man-management, supplying a pool of reliefs, a QRF or simply a slush fund to manage course requirements.

The specialist platoons, as I noted earlier, became attachment points for the battalion within the brigade and division. There was enough of every skill set to enhance local training, and permit a degree of autonomy, while at the same time making people familiar with the path they had to travel to get more of whatever they were looking for. If you want rations - go to the QM, guns - go to the Mortars, tanks - go to the TOW platoon, etc. They'll know how to get a hold of the support and how to use it.

The battalion didn't need the brigade to train, and, as I suggested, it was capable of acting independently under appropriate conditions.

The modern battalion, or at least the Millenium Battalion, had reverted to the single trade battalion the pre-dated 1914 and WW1..... although not quite the pre WW1 battalion at least had Pioneers.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll echo @Infanteer's and @TangoTwoBravo's comments above and will pile on a bit.

My most active time was in the 70's and into the early 80s. By that time we were down to 3 companies per battalion. While they all had mortars, anti-armour and pioneers, they were never considered a mini-battle group albeit their configuration was sufficient for many of the peacekeeping efforts at the time such as Cyprus. However, almost all of our training centred on Europe. The Combat Team Commander's Course was the foundation of how to fight there. Combat teams and battle groups were always built around armoured troops and squadrons, artillery batteries and engineer troops were the de rigour model we used throughout. (Engineer regiments hadn't been invented yet - each Combat Group had one engineer squadron)

Towards the end of the century we had deployed numerous rotos to the former Yugoslavia which had gone in various configurations; some with arty, some without - no tanks though. Those deployments were a huge drain on the army for personnel and a lower level of intensity combat training (we stopped doing divisional exercises and for the most part gave up brigade ones). That and the financial cuts of the 90s drove the transformation model that produced the Advancing with Purpose transformation agenda as modified by the subsequent Afghanistan experiences.

Note as well the experiments in the latter 00s towards an "optimized battle group" which was an attempt to design standing battle groups which required less ad hoc configuring. Those never panned out. I'm firmly in the camp of those who feel that the basic division of the army into infantry, armour, artillery and engineers as the backbone with additional attached services is the proper model developed in over a century of conflict. Yes there is a need to update doctrine from time to time as new weapon systems are developed, but there is no need to fundamentally radically change the components. Each of the existing components can quite easily incorporate and adapt to revisions in doctrine.


I don't think its the drive train that matters in @KevinB's viewpoint. His view, and mine. is that a proper infantry/armour combined arms team requires the infantry component to fight differently than a light or mech infantry component that does not operate with tanks. I'm not sure as to whether you agree or disagree with that proposition. My opinion comes with having been a FOO working with mech (M113 no tanks) inf in Pet and on the CTCC (M113 and Centurion) and German Panzergrenadiers in Shilo (Leos and Marders). In each case different small unit level tactics were employed that directly impacted on how the sections and platoons worked notwithstanding that they all had tracks.

Our view is solely that the tracks on an IFV facilitates the ability of the infantry to keep up to the pace of the tanks which might not be as easy with a wheeled IFV regardless of how well it is armed and armoured. The tracks ought not to affect the tactics the infantry uses, but merely makes it more possible to do them effectively.

In my mind I see an basic infantry course that teaches a recruit everything that applies to all infantrymen and then have them have a small package that is divided into light, mech and combined arms. Whether done at a school, regional battle school or at the unit is immaterial to me. What is the issue is whether it is all taught on the basic course - and thus lengthen the course - or in finite specific packages that can also be taught to people transferring from one type of unit to the other, is the real issue.

In my mind the difference is not the vehicle in which the infanteers ride so much as whether or not the vehicle has a turret with permanently mounted guns requiring that the vehicle be fought as a whole. I see medium tanks supported by light tanks. The troops in the back, once in contact, could just as easily be walking in the ruts behind the tanks behaving like infantry. But both the light and the medium tanks will move very differently than the infantry.

 

[Infanteer]

His view, and mine. is that a proper infantry/armour combined arms team requires the infantry component to fight differently than a light or mech infantry component that does not operate with tanks. I'm not sure as to whether you agree or disagree with that proposition. My opinion comes with having been a FOO working with mech (M113 no tanks) inf in Pet and on the CTCC (M113 and Centurion) and German Panzergrenadiers in Shilo (Leos and Marders). In each case different small unit level tactics were employed that directly impacted on how the sections and platoons worked notwithstanding that they all had tracks.

Our view is solely that the tracks on an IFV facilitates the ability of the infantry to keep up to the pace of the tanks which might not be as easy with a wheeled IFV regardless of how well it is armed and armoured. The tracks ought not to affect the tactics the infantry uses, but merely makes it more possible to do them effectively.

I don't agree, having commanded tank/infantry elements in both peace and war as part of both mech and light infantry bns. Tank/infantry cooperation is not black magic, and light forces should be expected to work with tanks if they are available as operational analysis has shown the synergy will lower friendly casualties and improve chances for success.

The "keeping up" argument only goes so far - most of the tank/infantry ground game is done when the infantry are on their feet. Doesn't matter what type of infantry battalion they are coming from as long as they've had a few days to establish some interarm skills and drills.

Kevin was right in pointing out that a Mech Bn could be a good Light Bn but it'd be a sh**ty Mech Bn. This is because the difference between the two, which I've long maintained, is based on two factors - planning and sustainment. This is primarily done by WOs and above, who all generally have some form of light/mech experience (the Inf Sch teaches both for WO and above) so the requirement for separate occupations based on the way to get to work isn't required. What is required is teaching those planners and sustainers the differences between the two, something our Army hasn't always been very good at.

In my mind I see an basic infantry course that teaches a recruit everything that applies to all infantrymen and then have them have a small package that is divided into light, mech and combined arms. Whether done at a school, regional battle school or at the unit is immaterial to me. What is the issue is whether it is all taught on the basic course - and thus lengthen the course - or in finite specific packages that can also be taught to people transferring from one type of unit to the other, is the real issue.

Not required as the current model works. Just teach the basic infantry course and the infanteers get the flavour of their day through collective training at the unit. Today, a Reg Force Infanteer will achieve DP1 without ever seeing a LAV, but learns pretty quick when arriving in battalion and integrating into a section.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If a battle group is an augmented battalion I find it worth asking what that battalion on its own can do without augmentation. My sense is that the 4 company battalion was capable of covering off a lot of the tasks that today would demand the augmentation found in the Battle Group.

Any unit with more sub-units can cover off more tasks. My sense is that the 4-company establishment persisted because that was the way it had "always" been.

 

[Infanteer]

A unit with any amount of sub-units can only manage as many tasks as its Comd and HQ can process.

The Infantry Battalion had four companies because in 1912 it was decided to merge the existing eight coys in an Infantry Battalion to form "double companies" better suited for open order "Boer" tactics.

 

[quadrapiper]

A unit with any amount of sub-units can only manage as many tasks as its Comd and HQ can process.

The Infantry Battalion had four companies because in 1912 it was decided to merge the existing eight coys in an Infantry Battalion to form "double companies" better suited for open order "Boer" tactics.

Would a return to smaller companies, either splitting the equipment currently assigned to a company, or doubling company-level gear, be useful?

 

[Infanteer]

Sure, if we were fighting in red outfits in one big extended line with rifles.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Sure, if we were fighting in red outfits in one big extended line with rifles.

Have you written that up for the Infantry Journal? You could be on to something…

 

[KevinB]

Would a return to smaller companies, either splitting the equipment currently assigned to a company, or doubling company-level gear, be useful?

Remember we have doubled, tripled and more both individual soldier gear, and supporting equipment.

Additionally added more and more requirements for the Section/Squad, Platoon and Company.

Nothing is getting smaller, and a lot of those are growing in personnel.

If you go from a 10 soldier section/squad to 14 it generally requires a second vehicle, and if that is a Mechanized unit, then another vehicle crew — or you need a much larger vehicle, and realistically your dismounts didn't really change all that much, or the section/squad got even bigger.
Which was part of the desire for the OPMV down here to not increase the Squad size drastically but have more potentially available dismounts - while the vehicle is still involved in the fight.

Then is the Section/Squad gets bigger the Platoons get bigger, and on and on.

We get into span of control issues at a point as well.

The US Army attempts to solve that by additional NCO’s in the Squad, but frankly the Commonwealth approach is IMHO better, by simply having more experienced soldiers. The USMC is sort of a hybrid between the two approaches.

The E-6 Staff Sergeant leading an Infantry Squad down here typically has 5-7 years service, while it wasn’t not uncommon in the 80’s to early 200’s for the Canadian Infantry section to have several Cpl’s in that section with the same experience levels in trade (I’m not sure what the typical experience level is currently) . The Team Leaders are E-5’s with 3-5 years in.

So the current US Army Bradley dismounted Squad has a SSGT and under him two SGT’s who each have three people in their fire team.

Note there is no Pl Wpns Det in a Mech Inf Squad, but one fire team in 2 of the 3 Squads has a Javelin, and the other one a Stinger - plus there is a M240 than can be dismounted as needed as well. C-UAS is not yet doctrinally enshrined - but several systems issued at the Platoon and Squad level.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Sure, if we were fighting in red outfits in one big extended line with rifles.

Have you written that up for the Infantry Journal? You could be on to something…

.... while being one of the more relevant articles

 

[Fabius]

The US Army attempts to solve that by additional NCO’s in the Squad, but frankly the Commonwealth approach is IMHO better, by simply having more experienced soldiers. The USMC is sort of a hybrid between the two approaches.

The E-6 Staff Sergeant leading an Infantry Squad down here typically has 5-7 years service, while it wasn’t not uncommon in the 80’s to early 200’s for the Canadian Infantry section to have several Cpl’s in that section with the same experience levels in trade (I’m not sure what the typical experience level is currently) . The Team Leaders are E-5’s with 3-5 years in.

The long service professional is an interesting capability to plan around. For peacetime operations just short of large scale combat operations it has a lot of merits but when looking at both the casualty rates and mobilization requirements for LSCO the long service professional armies have not historically been able to maintain that experience base much past around 12 months in contact before it’s been heavily depleted and diluted.

I think that is something to consider if your designing your force for LSCO vs small actions at the edges of an empire.

I find it somewhat difficult to quantify the experience level of the Canadian Infantry right now but a broad perspective is highly suggestive of an overall decline in experience compared to the early and mid 2000s.

 

[Blackadder1916]

Sure, if we were fighting in red outfits in one big extended line with rifles.

Or forming square.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

If a battle group is an augmented battalion I find it worth asking what that battalion on its own can do without augmentation. My sense is that the 4 company battalion was capable of covering off a lot of the tasks that today would demand the augmentation found in the Battle Group.

...

After being cornered in this discussion I've got to thinking that one of the things lost in the re-org that ditched the Combat Support elements is the ability, or desire, to liaise.

Although I said that the All Singing All Dancing Battalion (C) failed to appreciate the value of the supporting arms, after all they were only doing things that the infantry did as well, the design of the battalion meant that there were multiple attachment points where the supporting/supported arms could plug in. The most obvious example is the Mortar Platoon's FSCC to which the Gunners would attach. But the Pioneers did the same liaison for the Engineers and Recce did for the Recce and Int and the TOW platoon did for the Tanks. Those cells supplied in house knowledge of what was missing, what was possible and how to hook into the support nets.

I will ask again, on what are you basing your assertion that the 80s/90s infantry battalion failed to appreciate the value of supporting arms? There was always mess banter between units/branches, but units that went to the field worked with other arms all the time.

To your point about "attachment points", TOW platoon was not how an infantry battalion would liase with tanks. This was done by commanders at all levels. Now, the anti-armour platoon commander would help the CO lock-down the anti-armour plan in the defence which would likely include any attached tanks, but combined arms was/is a command function. Recce Platoon could certainly conduct handovers from Recce Squadron, but the coordination would be done on higher nets. In any case Recce Platoon was retained in the post-2004 structures. I don't want to speak too much for the Engineers, but if they are going to support a Battalion with a squadron then they are going to arrive with leadership and a coord centre to plug into the supported battalion.

Having said all that, the infantry battalions post-2004 should have retained their mortars and integral anti-armour weapons (TOW etc).