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Informing the Army’s Future Structure - CAMO Discussion

Would you rather the PRes exist in a vacuum with no real task? They thumb their nose at being an augmentation force,
When did they thumb their nose at being an augmentation force? They seem to of provided many for the various tasks and roles over seas. I don't blame a soldier who takes time off from school or their work to augment the Regular Force on Training and such then get to kick the broom around. Or even the boys who deployed over seas to be told by the reg force warrant the Reserves were only good enough to provide gate guard so the real Soldiers could conduct patrols outside the wire.
didn't jump into the niche tasks (HUSAR, etc)
As soon as they get some nice gear, they tend to loose it right away along with the funding to maintain the skills and equipment.
and now you're thumbing your nose at Defense of Canada and DOMOPS?

If 2 Div is only capable of DOMOPS then the PRes leadership (yes, it's not the RSS' fault) has absolutely failed. This new structure provides a proper day to day mission task with a secondary task of full scale mobilization to keep the Regiment of Silly Hats crowd happy.
I think the direction maybe wrong. You need a Home Guard along with a deployable Reserve Force.
You have to equipment and fund both properly or you get nothing worth the effort in return.
 
They thumb their nose at being an augmentation force, didn't jump into the niche tasks (HUSAR, etc) and now you're thumbing your nose at Defense of Canada and DOMOPS?
Who is "they"? It's certainly possible Res F attitudes changed a lot since I released, but I recollect units (including senior leadership, including associations) being mostly chuffed that some of their soldiers were augmentees, and having no control over niche task assignments.
If 2 Div is only capable of DOMOPS then the PRes leadership (yes, it's not the RSS' fault) has absolutely failed.
Do you mean in the future? What happens if the CO is RSS?
 
Would you rather the PRes exist in a vacuum with no real task? They thumb their nose at being an augmentation force, didn't jump into the niche tasks (HUSAR, etc) and now you're thumbing your nose at Defense of Canada and DOMOPS?

If 2 Div is only capable of DOMOPS then the PRes leadership (yes, it's not the RSS' fault) has absolutely failed. This new structure provides a proper day to day mission task with a secondary task of full scale mobilization to keep the Regiment of Silly Hats crowd happy.
Funny, on my deployment as a reservist they always told us that they could never have succeeded without the 15-20% of the subunit that was reservists. I guess that really means we were thumbing our noses at them eh?
 
Funny, on my deployment as a reservist they always told us that they could never have succeeded without the 15-20% of the subunit that was reservists. I guess that really means we were thumbing our noses at them eh?

The point puck chaser is making is that if the reserve embraced that augmentation roll they'd adopt a structure optimized to perform it.
 
The point puck chaser is making is that if the reserve embraced that augmentation roll they'd adopt a structure optimized to perform it.
Thats not reasonable to put on the Reserve Force. The reserve structure is what Ottawa tells them to be. Maybe Im not quite on picture here but I fail to see how reserve units can reform themselves to improve augmentation outcomes without the orders and support from the top. Everything from kit, infrastructure, establishment limitations and overtraining considerations prevent reserve units from attaining what I think should be the ultimate goal, sending formed sub-sub-units and even sub-units.

The ARes is exactly as Army HQ wants it to be.
 
Would you rather the PRes exist in a vacuum with no real task?
Boy! Who hurt you this time? The answer to your question is in the highlighted words. The PRes and the ARes, in particular, hunger for real tasks.
They thumb their nose at being an augmentation force,
They didn't during Afghanistan. And the view was almost unanimous from both the RegF and the ARes that the system wouldn't have made it without them and that by the time they deployed the augmentees were indistinguishable from the Regs in the field. Unfortunately things chang during these peacetime deployments where quite often the augmentees are handed the scutt work.
didn't jump into the niche tasks (HUSAR, etc)
I presume you're talking about LUSAR, the CAF's second experiment with reservists as the disaster relief snakes and ladders people. This is the job that no one in the regular force, including the engineers, wanted. Try to picture yourself as an 18-year-old joining the ARes to do soldierly things and being given a chain saw to operate instead of a howitzer or an armoured personnel carrier like the grown-ups get. It was mostly a shit task albeit, I'll freely admit, some did enjoy it as a diversion.
and now you're thumbing your nose at Defense of Canada and DOMOPS?
Pardon me, but the ones who are thumbing their noses at defence of Canada and DOMOPS are the regular force who have segregated themselves into the "fun" division. My take on defence of Canada is that it is a vital task that needs a proper balanced force with considerable regular force involvement and a wide variety of complex equipment. The light brigade with a high para content would be perfect as a quick reaction force for Roto 0 defence of Canada missions.

On the other hand, heavy combat trades that are only needed fully for wartime like armour, mechanized infantry and artillery could easily be done by a force largely composed of part-timers in less expensive hybrid units where everyone is specifically trained and equipped for those roles. Instead we have some 20,000 full timers in a division which basically does rotos for around 2,000 positions in Latvia (and even that calls for a 20% ARes contingent of augmentees).

And DOMOPS - which group is actually saying it shouldn't be interrupt in its training to handle things like DOMOPS? Braaap. Wrong! The answer is the RegF. Instead they expect that civilian workers and students will drop everything in their lives to go and fight fires and floods. Institutional arrogance is the word that I would use here.
If 2 Div is only capable of DOMOPS then the PRes leadership (yes, it's not the RSS' fault) has absolutely failed.
2 Div will do the job it's given. If it's not a worthwhile job the troops will vote with their feet. And by the way, a good RSS team will pick up the load when reserve leadership is weak. That's what caring about the troops means. And that's coming from a guy who did RSS. If RSS don't pick up the slack then the system is sending the wrong folks to RSS or it has the wrong theory of leadership.
This new structure provides a proper day to day mission task with a secondary task of full scale mobilization to keep the Regiment of Silly Hats crowd happy.
Here's the thing. Silly hats do not create institutional rot. If the Silly Hat crowd were the problem then the army's leadership should have sorted that out decades ago. Instead it treated a valuable human resource with, at best, benign indifference.

The problem is that the central CAF leadership is too wrapped up in their own world and their own careers and their own day-to-day problems that they won't take the time to fix the fundamental "systemic" problems that keeps the ARes from meeting its full potential. When much of the RegF sees the ARes all that they see are the funny hats; OTOH when I see the ARes I see the criminal waste of a valuable resource.

Here's my problem with the CAMO. I actually do see defence of Canada as a significant and important job. It's so important that I believe many of Canada's best RegF troops should be on the task along side their ARes counterparts. In the same way that I think many ARes personnel should be specifically trained and equipped to augment and reinforce the expeditionary division with part time augmentees and fully equipped units which are ordinarily not needed during peacetime on a day-to-day basis. I see what ought to be a true force structure with a strong mobilization capability for home and abroad.

What I don't see is Inflection Point 2025 or the CAMO building that. I see an ad hoced structure that was slapped together on a Friday afternoon as an afterthought once someone had decided to put almost the whole regular force army into one bloated division to continue the force generation of rotos fetish they are used to rather than taking some time to build a balanced well thought out "One Army." There's a promise that they will figure it out some time this year. I don't doubt that they will try, but by shaping 1 Div the way they have, the job becomes almost impossible even if some of the army's best minds were put to the task.

There are two place where the modernization program tells me its spinning bullshit:

1) When it touts a "One Army" concept where the "Regular Force, Army Reserve, Canadian Rangers, Defence Civilian Team operate together seamlessly," and then goes on to form two distinct divisions that completely separate these components on two separate missions; and

2) When it states that the "CA must also develop ARes self-sufficiency in terms of training, operations and sustainment to accomplish the needed capacity support to support modernization efforts." What are they smoking? The ARes hasn't been able to accomplish that since the Korean War. What wonderful magic formula have the folks at Army HQ discovered but not yet revealed?

Mate. I've been in the CAF for 44 years - RegF, ARes and CAF reserve - and I've followed the system for 16 years since then. The CAF in general and the army in particular are institutional masters at avoiding dealing with the root issues on this brief. Instead they undertake superficial shit that makes no progress whatsoever. What's worse is that while I totally agree with CAMO's overall vision of an army capable of deploying, fighting and supporting a division in combat at home and abroad, I, unfortunately, see the direction the army is going as a regressive step. I honestly hope that I'm wrong. Based on the army's past track record with ARes reform and army structure I'm betting that I'm not.

🍻
 
Thats not reasonable to put on the Reserve Force. The reserve structure is what Ottawa tells them to be. Maybe Im not quite on picture here but I fail to see how reserve units can reform themselves to improve augmentation outcomes without the orders and support from the top. Everything from kit, infrastructure, establishment limitations and overtraining considerations prevent reserve units from attaining what I think should be the ultimate goal, sending formed sub-sub-units and even sub-units.

The ARes is exactly as Army HQ wants it to be.

That is objectively untrue. Reserve units have lobbied, are lobbying, and will continue to lobby to resist restructure. There is a reason why 2 Can Div has 10 Brigades.

Reserves have, infact, deployed sub units and sub sub units. It just takes a Brigade or two to deploy a sub unit. Case it point our mortar platoon in 2020 required not just the reserve unit tasked to provide mortars but several others to get 30 deployable people. Its WO was Reg force, just like the FP Platoon 5 Div sent to Latvia in 2025. I'll admit for the sub unit you have to go back to 2003. Now if you mean a single reserve unit deploying a formed sub unit - well none frankly have enough people and while tactical grouping may fix that, theres strong resistance to doing it.
 
That is objectively untrue. Reserve units have lobbied, are lobbying, and will continue to lobby to resist restructure. There is a reason why 2 Can Div has 10 Brigades.

Reserves have, infact, deployed sub units and sub sub units. It just takes a Brigade or two to deploy a sub unit. Case it point our mortar platoon in 2020 required not just the reserve unit tasked to provide mortars but several others to get 30 deployable people. Its WO was Reg force, just like the FP Platoon 5 Div sent to Latvia in 2025. I'll admit for the sub unit you have to go back to 2003. Now if you mean a single reserve unit deploying a formed sub unit - well none frankly have enough people and while tactical grouping may fix that, theres strong resistance to doing it.
I’m not sure where that resistance is happening. 32 and 31 have basically done it. 34 and 35 have and 33 has been tactically grouping for some time. I can’t speak to western or Atlantic brigades though.

There is some growing pains and there is griping. But most of that is about the logistics of the whole thing.
 
I guess I was kind of hoping that the Reg Div and the Res Div split was a Phase 1 planning tool. One that allowed staff to get their ducks in rows and figure out what they have, what they need and where the gaps are.

I still hope that that is the case.

In my opinion both "Divisions" still look more like planning constructs than tactical formations.

On the Reg side a bunch of kit gaps have been identified, for the politicians, bureaucrats and accountants if not the soldiers who recognized them a long time ago.

But the "Div" has too many formations with too many roles to be a tactically effective organization. As a lot of you have pointed out it can benefit from becoming a Corps with two or even three deployable tactical Divisions under it. Some of which could be tasked to assist the Domops side of the house.

The Res Div seems also to have been key to getting the politicians to grapple with the real costs of mobilization, starting with scale.

A conversation about tripling the size of the Primary Reserve from 30,000 to 100,000 has been started in the public domain.

Concurrently there seems to be an implicit recognition, again, by the politicians and the public, that that "massive" scale-up is still only a down payment on the real task which will require at least another 300,000 people.

Those 400,000 new people will obviously require a plan and an organizational structure to gainfully employ them in a suitable and timely manner.

That will then, in my opinion, likely result in a tiered readiness structure some part of which may be indistinguishable from regular service but without the requirement to deploy outside our borders or, even, away from home station.

Given where we were, and even where we are, there is an awful long journey ahead of us as a society.

I am hopeful because there is a recognition of the need for change and an appetite for change and that should not be under-valued.

It is patently obvious to me that an organization designed to manage 30 to 60,000 bodies is going to have to generate whole new levels to manage 400 to 500,000.

So, in my mind, the current structure can't be anything more than a sorting device and a planning tool.

It will have to evolve into something different.

In the meantime, there has to be mechanisms in place to manage the real world events that keep intruding and disrupting the planning process.

2 cents.🫤
 
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