Informing the Army’s Future Structure - CAMO Discussion

[daftandbarmy]

This speaks to what I said earlier. War can bring in the adrenaline junky recruits. That's a different issue than maintaining the bench during largely peace time. Which is mostly what we have to construct here first.

Dude... during peace or war time 18 year old Infanteers are all adrenaline junkies... like their Company Commanders

 

[ytz]

How much of the curiculum of our BRT is made up of lets call if fluff ?

Do you think we could cull our curriculum in a time of need ?

More importantly. What is the the trade-off?

We all complaint about wasted time in training. But realistically, the rate at which skills are absorbed has a limit too. You can only cut so much before you start impacting their actual skill output.

So then the question becomes what's the trade-off between training time and effectiveness or training time and survivability. I would love to see those graphs.

 

[FJAG]

Boy. Some of the earlier posts today have me quite down. We seem to be settling into "no we can't do that' it's just too damn difficult" mood.

That's where we seem to differ. I not only think that we can but we need to do it because we are going to be running into conflicts that are no longer going to be optional.

I disagree with much of the army's current direction because I think some fundamental things are not being addressed which need to be in order to facilitate the direction of modernization but at least I firmly believe that mass will be needed and we need to build a practical method to get there. And by mass, I mean warfighting mass, not just a sandbag and fire rake wielding mass.

 

[ytz]

I don't mean to get you down. I very much respect the knowledge and experience base of this place. I'm just trying to understand how the circle can be squared given real constraints. Some of this is probably outside DND too. Casualty acceptance is going to a societal debate, for example.

Anyway, curious if the three COAs above are wrong or there's something I missed.

 

[Infanteer]

Variety of weapons and tools. Complexity of operations. You didn't have to teach a soldier how to evade a drone just to close with the enemy.

But you did teach protection from air threats. Old wine, new bottle.

Few points.

1) That 5 weeks is not all their getting before ending up in combat. Not today anyway.

2) Ukrainians have regularly said that NATO training is massively deficient and not suitable for their environment. Increasingly, they are setting up their own.

3) Wartime acceptance of losses is higher in a society at war on its soil. I don't think you'll find that Canadians are very amenable to the idea of training people for 5 weeks and then deploying them to fight the Russians in the Baltics or the Chinese in Taiwan.

Few points: For many of them during the first three years of fighting, it was. And this five week period was imposed by the Ukrainians, not by western trainers. And the training was not massively deficient, despite what some will claim for other reasons. I've been directly involved in both the design of training and actual training of Ukrainians, so feel free to dispute this if you wish.

FWIW, an infantry recruit in 1942 would do eight weeks basic training and nine weeks trade training, for a total of 15 weeks.

The point is not that you only need five weeks (the Ukrainians expanded their basic training to eight weeks last year), or eight weeks, or 15 or 26. The point is that you don't need an exorbitant amount of time to train people for frontline wartime tasks (technical trades are obviously different). If you do, you are not doing it right. Three to four months is enough time to produce a reasonably skilled soldier, and is something that can be achieved in peacetime with Reservists to build a strong pool for activation.

 

[Infanteer]

PS - pre-deployment training is not 6 months.

 

[PrairieFella]

Three to four months is enough time to produce a reasonably skilled soldier, and is something that can be achieved in peacetime with Reservists to build a strong pool for activation.

Even more important is a pool of instructors able to train that third, fourth, etc wave. If the old ways are deficient and outdated but there is still some wisdom in the force generation potential of a reserve force in a protracted war.

 

[Infanteer]

Also, I'm not understanding the tenor of this thread that seems to indicate that in the future the Reserves are going to be regulated to sitting on some powerplant. Opportunities for individual augmentees to deploy on expeditionary operations will still exist, as will training for combat operations.

What is changing is that the ARes formations and units are being assigned a mission and tasks, and the goal is to resource them appropriately. An evolution from the current state of "individual replacement pool" to "organizations with mandate and purpose" is a step up.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I disagree with much of the army's current direction because I think some fundamental things are not being addressed which need to be in order to facilitate the direction of modernization but at least I firmly believe that mass will be needed and we need to build a practical method to get there. And by mass, I mean warfighting mass, not just a sandbag and fire rake wielding mass.

Which 'Canadian Army' are you talking about... I'm afraid you're going to have to be more clear

 

[ytz]

For many of them during the first three years of fighting, it was. And this five week period was imposed by the Ukrainians, not by western trainers. And the training was not massively deficient, despite what some will claim for other reasons. I've been directly involved in both the design of training and actual training of Ukrainians, so feel free to dispute this if you wish.

Fair enough. But as you note yourself, the Ukrainians took that training to 8 weeks. Presumably they didn't think the old 5 weeks was sufficient either. Obviously wartime exigencies are at play. And every day in training must be traded off against one less body in the fight.

The point is that you don't need an exorbitant amount of time to train people for frontline wartime tasks

Sure. But as it presently stands we don't design our training to produce a soldier with a limited frontline skillset exclusively. We train for a substitutable product in that a reservist should be able to sub in for a regular. I don't know if that's right or wrong, but that is how it is right now, so that probably rules out the training model you suggest.

Three to four months is enough time to produce a reasonably skilled soldier, and is something that can be achieved in peacetime with Reservists to build a strong pool for activation.

Don't we basically do this now with student reservists? Train them in two summers?

The problem comes with designing a system that can train someone who doesn't have two summers to give.

For the record, I do agree that we should be able to train a basic soldier in one summer. And heck that should be the foundation of the CAF.

PS - pre-deployment training is not 6 months.

Sure. But it's still months for somebody who is fully trained. That's what I was getting at. Pretty rare that we ramp up a trained member and just ship them over unless they are in an HRU.

 

[ytz]

Also, I'm not understanding the tenor of this thread that seems to indicate that in the future the Reserves are going to be regulated to sitting on some powerplant. Opportunities for individual augmentees to deploy on expeditionary operations will still exist, as will training for combat operations.

What is changing is that the ARes formations and units are being assigned a mission and tasks, and the goal is to resource them appropriately. An evolution from the current state of "individual replacement pool" to "organizations with mandate and purpose" is a step up.

I think some people don't like the idea of the ARes being given a more distinct mission. I think it makes sense.

I'm not going to drive surf. I'm curious if you know how ARes training and readiness will change in this new construct?

 

[Infanteer]

Don't we basically do this now with student reservists? Train them in two summers?

The problem comes with designing a system that can train someone who doesn't have two summers to give.

For the record, I do agree that we should be able to train a basic soldier in one summer. And heck that should be the foundation of the CAF.

It can be done in one with some home unit training on either side of the summer.

Sure. But it's still months for somebody who is fully trained. That's what I was getting at. Pretty rare that we ramp up a trained member and just ship them over unless they are in an HRU.

We don't, and never have. That being said, the training time required to prepare an element for operations shouldn't be overestimated. A good chunk of that time is administrative in nature, to include using leave.

 

[Halifax Tar]

PS - pre-deployment training is not 6 months.

I was over a year for me in during my last AFG roto TF1-10. What's it at now ?

 

[Infanteer]

I was over a year for me in during my last AFG roto TF1-10. What's it at now ?

Yes, I remember those days. Ridiculous. To be honest, we were overtrained.

At last glance, Army policy is reservists join 60 days prior to deployment - it has been extended to 90 days on some occasions due to calendar issues requiring some more time. Sometimes, it is also individual qualification requirements and not unit training time that necessitates earlier arrival.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Yes, I remember those days. Ridiculous. To be honest, we were overtrained.

At last glance, Army policy is reservists join 60 days prior to deployment - it has been extended to 90 days on some occasions due to calendar issues requiring some more time. Sometimes, it is also individual qualification requirements and not unit training time that necessitates earlier arrival.

A huge improvement, IMHO...

 

[PrairieFella]

Yes, I remember those days. Ridiculous. To be honest, we were overtrained.

At last glance, Army policy is reservists join 60 days prior to deployment - it has been extended to 90 days on some occasions due to calendar issues requiring some more time. Sometimes, it is also individual qualification requirements and not unit training time that necessitates earlier arrival.

All the other reservists and I had to report 6 months ahead for Op Reassurance, however some of us had courses to do prior, like ACSV gunnery for me for example.

 

[FJAG]

@ytz, its not just your posts its a number of them from earlier this morning. Yours have left me wondering exactly what you are arguing for. I think @Infanteer has brought some order into the discussion with his recent posts albeit there are elements he hasn't touched on.

So. To address your points.

Exactly my point. To go to a war which was essentially optional, we picked trained people and put them on months of training before deploying. This is not a realistic model for near-peer war which escalates quickly and chews through personnel faster than we're used to.

To reiterate. We do not need a mass army for optional wars. We need one for when war is no longer optional. I also disagree with the idea that near-peer-war escalates quickly. It takes months or years of preparation for near-peer-war. The problem is that the defender frequently deludes himself about the fact that those preparations are ongoing or, worse yet, that they are already engaged in the initial phases of a war.

I presume you meant these three COAs

This leads to three options (as I see it):

1) Increase the acceptance of losses. Let's call this the Russian option. Few weeks and you're off to the front. We won't expect you to survive.

That's the throw away COA. We both know that.

2) Increase cost. Spend enough so that we can incentivize enough service commitment out of a part timer to get them fully trained with months of full time service. This is going to need substantial compensation to make up for the disruption to their regular life. Let's call this the American option (throw money at the problem).

This is at the heart of the regular/reserve debate. Turning a tiny, under-resourced professional army into a large mass capable of MCO will cost more. That's a given. The real issue is how do you structure that force to be as cost effective as possible while still build a credible mass for the myriad of tasks that the nation will face?

3) Reduced scope.

There are two problems here.

We accept that we aren't going to the the WWI/WWII thing if deploying hundreds of thousands again.

This is not an option. We obviously aren't developing a WWI/WWII type of military, but that doesn't mean we won't need hundreds of thousands of people or that we don't need an industrial complex to provide them with the necessary arms.

We tell the allies that our contribution will be higher skilled and higher value assets that are harder for them to generate and they bring the mass. I call this the MBA option (only a cold nerd would think this way).

That brings me to the fundamental issue which is that Canada needs to prepare for a non optional war that will require mass at home as much as abroad. We may have an option about what we give to our allies but any reduction in the type of assistance that they value will have negative consequences in the relationship. "Higher skilled and higher value assets" and "mass" are no longer either/or options to choose from. They are part of the same team. To tell Latvia we'll send you an air defence regiment and you bring the cannon fodder doesn't build viable teams.

Let me sum up my view - and again, the posts are coming fast and furious so somethings I'm saying now have been said before.

IMHO the Canadian defence structure must have the following basic:

1) an industrial base capable of providing all of the armaments the country needs at a rate to equip it over a period of three years, to maintain a rate of production to keep it equipped and on the road indefinitely thereafter and capable of scaling up to wartime levels of production within six months;

2) a full-time military component large enough to provide a) administrative and logistics oversight and services to the entire system b) a force-in-being component large enough to experiment and develop doctrinal concepts and to maintain a core of expertise in all core skills, essentially a body of SMEs c) a force-in-being large enough to meet foreseeable peacetime roles and to provide the career development of a large body of personnel to form the leadership core of the fully mobilized force. d) a force-in-being large enough the form the leadership and training core for hybrid units and formations of full-time and part-time members;

3) a part-time, fully equipped, military component larger than the full-time force trained to work in hybrid units and formations capable of full spectrum MCO missions either at home or abroad. The career path of this force will top out at the company command level, every element has a distinct MCO role to prepare for regardless if it is for expeditionary or defence of Canada;

4) a part-time, fully equipped military component larger than 2) and 3) combined and capable of performing security missions short of MCO and other tasks inside Canada.

5) terms of service that retains former military members of the above for recall to the colours for a reasonable time.

I've deliberately left numbers off as these are political considerations. I've also not gone into detail here because my aim is to point out that I do not see the full-timers as the MCO fighting force. In my mind their role is to limited to an expandable leadership core and sufficient troops to develop and maintain doctrine and an available small high-readiness combat force.

The primary MCO force comes from the hybrid units and must therefore be equipped and trained to an acceptable standard keeping in mind that these units will have a significant full-time core element. The ratio of full-time to part-time must be variable as between different types of units and the army, navy and air force themselves because of the nature of roles, equipment and technical skills involved.

Finally, I see a need for a large, lightly trained and relatively inexpensive national security force which is mostly independent of the MCO capable force. More than anything else I keep them separate from the MCO element because their roles are very different. In most respects they are not much different from civilians