www.defensenews.com
www.defensenews.com
www.army.ca
www.thedefensepost.com
USMC - Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Adaptive Dispersed Operations.
A model for a national defence Militia? Predicated on supplying a force of small security dets for remote locations - specifically the North Warning Sites. Not necessarily because there is an imminent threat but because there is a potential threat against critical infrastructure. And, I believe, the model is useful, reproducible and scaleable, and can be effectively employed by Militia in a low threat environment. This would also supply a training and organization basis that would allow the Regular Force to exploit Militia personnel within their ranks.
47 North Warning Sites to defend.
Consider assigning a Platoon to each one of them. Each Platoon comprising 3x Sections/Squads/Groups of 16 (including Medic). One Squad assigned to a two week rotation. The other Squads back at home. The Platoon to be activated when the threat level demands. Annual training to include one Section/Squad/Group at the site for a week or two.
Particular interest in the Carl Gustav.
Back to the Swedish Pansar model for a moment. The Carl Gustav represents the basal element for the organization. It is useful, flexible, compact, light and reloadable. A great, inexpensive, training device that has operational value.
However, in the Swedish organization, the CG84 can be replaced with its single-shot cousin, the AT-4, or the larger more effective single-hot N-LAW system. Or, and this gets to the heart of my issue, it can be replaced by something like the Javelin issued from Battalion stocks.
Which leads my wandering mind back to this article and the notion that the Javelin CLU could also be employed with the Stinger missile. Or, fevered speculation, the 70mm APKWS - with the flechette warhead? As an anti-drone option?
Raytheon launches Stinger missile from Javelin launcher
Raytheon has successfully demonstrated firing a Stinger missile from a Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Unit (LWCLU) in a test that saw the missile engage and defeat an uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV). This could have potential for the CF. In addition to hand-held Javelin launchers they are...
If a, lets call it Group, of 16, is on independent security tasking in the north, are they more likely to encounter tanks, or drones? Would the Group CG-84 operator be better provided with the Stingers? Or even, in flight of fancy, Flechette loaded APKWs? Either shoulder launched or launched from a UGV?
Or
Rheinmetall unveils Mission Master UGV armed with Warmate combat drone
Rheinmetall adds tube-launched Warmate loitering UAV munitions to its modular Mission Master autonomous unmanned ground vehicle system
What, no flamethrowers?
The Thing | The Blood Test
I see two issues.
I see two issues.
The first is that I don't really feel a need to build 47 bespoke platoons to defend North Warning Sites. The sites biggest vulnerability is to EW or missile strikes and not sabotage or Spetsnaz raids. At what point in a warning phase do you deploy your six battalions up there and how many more battalions would you need to maintain reasonable rotations. If we do need a physical armed presence there can it be with enhanced Canadian Ranger forces?
The second deals with establishment. Like it or not six of our nine Reg F infantry battalions are LAV mounted and LAVs come with a space limitation that is significantly exceeded by a fifteen man section. Effectively you would need two LAVs per section which means a section in total (including each LAV's 3 man crew) would need to be 21 folks. That's a small platoon in its own right (and your platoon would grow to in excess of 70 personnel).
The answer might be to have two separate establishments: one for a LAV battalion and another for your USMC-like non-LAV "light" platoons albeit one still needs to work out the light platoons' vehicle structure. That's doable but does somewhat limit the usability of the leadership (and to an extent, the rank and file) of the non-LAV folks vis-a-vis operating as augmentees/replacements in a LAV-based unit because the section organizations and platoon tactics will be quite different. That's not to say it can't be overcome but it creates an unnecessary difficulty.
I tend to favour an infantry section organization that is identical in its basic numbers and in weapon configuration to that of the dismounts that will fit in a LAV. Those seven or eight people become both type of platoons' standard manoeuvre elements.
The first level where I see a difference is just above the dismounted rifle section in what constitutes the organic fire support availability of the two different platoons.
In a LAV platoon that fire support is based on the four LAVs and their three-man crews as well as the platoon's small weapons' detachment.
In a light platoon that fire support should be based on a much larger and fairly robust heavy weapons section that's organic to the light platoon (essentially one could add the equivalent the 12 LAV crewmen to the light platoon's weapons section which would end up in having both types of platoon with the same number of personnel). (To go a step further, if a light platoon's weapon section were to be cross-trained in LAV operation and a LAV platoon's LAV crew cross-trained as a dismounted weapons section, then converting from one type of platoon to the other type would be a fairly simple process)
The key here is that the rifle sections are identical and work the same way regardless of whether they are LAV dismounts or a light platoon's rifle sections while the LAV platoon's LAVs and weapons' det and the light platoon's weapons' section perform similar functions making the tactical handling of the two platoon types very similar and easily adaptable/convertible.
That last one is closer to reality then you think for the PRes
CRCAF used that term (including when he was the AFG ATF Comd) in the past, so I’d say it’s more an issue with light-blue hotel dwellers getting all pissy over a term that all our Allie’s implicitly understand with great clarity.Don't let the rest of the RCAF catch you saying those words!
www.forsvarsmakten.se
Soldiers from the Swedish Home Guard and U.S. Special Forces assigned to 10th Special Forces Group Airborne conduct mission planning during a bilateral exercise in Sweden, on November 25, 2020. The Home Guard is part of the Swedish Armed Forces and comprises nearly half of the Swedish Armed Forces’ body of personnel who are designed to operate across the entire conflict scale from providing peacetime assistance to society in times of crisis, to armed struggle in wartime. (U.S Army photo by Sgt. Patrik Orcutt)
Sweden
Home Guard
The Home Guard is designed to operate across the entire conflict scale – from providing peacetime assistance to society in times of crisis, to armed struggle in wartime. The Home Guard is part of the Swedish Armed Forces and comprises nearly half of the..
Denmark
