Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

So, I just finished six hours of the Artillery in Afghanistan interviews some dealing with deployed task forces and some with equipment procurements and the resultant issues of maintaining equipment bought under UORs and supplying things to the troops we don't have so that we needed to getting gifts of critical gear out of the kindness of our allies because Canada is to cheap to buy our own and, all-in-all, my cynic quotient continues to rise.

Did manage to rough in my 30/70 // 70/30 model which is built on the following criteria:

• the whole idea behind 30/70 is to force the integration of the Res F with the Reg F so that it is no longer possible for the Reg F to ignore the Res F development and training;
• The structure is built on the RFL levels put forward in Force 2025 and, since almost all units are one level of hybrid or another, are reflected down to the company level to show what companies within any given battalion are at what RFL level;
• I've designated two types of RFL 1 - one for a unit/subunit that is 100% Reg F another for a unit that is a 70/30 organization and can function at Level 1 with reduced numbers or will need to be augmented by other RFL 1 elements to reach full strength (somewhat how many TFs in Afghanistan were augmented by a company from another battalion);
• units types (like infantry) that are more likely to deploy in peacetime are generally staffed to a higher level of Reg F. Units less likely to deploy (like armour or artillery) are staffed to higher Res F levels;
• all RFL 1 and 2 units have a high Reg F leadership component to them even if most of their troops are Res F. This is to ensure a level of ownership by the Reg F and to generate an increase in the capability to deploy the units or parts of them. In no case is the ratio of Reg F leadership less than 10% of strength;
• Any unit/subunit marked as an RFL 1 is equipped. For example an RFL 2 Res F infantry battalion with a RFL 1 70/30 Inf coy will have that company fully equipped with LAV 6s for the purpose of training the whole battalion and being able to generate a single LAV company plus trained augmentees. Conversely a RFL 1 70/30 Reg F infantry battalion has only two companies of LAVs while the third coy made up of Res F personnel will not have LAVs and is expected to be trained on the other two companies' equipment;
• All equipment holdings are predicated on current equipment holdings and those forecast under Force 2025 (such as GBAD by 2027, new indirect fires by 2028 and ATGM by 2029 (Hopefully that's not too much wishful thinking by the Army's Force 2025 team;
• Note that there is now a mountain battlegroup on the West Coast and an amphibious battalion on the East. Airborne and Arctic capabilities exist within 2 CLBG as does a small public duties battalion to take care of Parliament Hill;
• The service support element is a bit weak because the direction that's going is a bit in flux. I've taken some elements out of their options to create two divisional Sustainment Brigade structures which includes some additional maintenance and transportation elements but quite frankly I don't think the manpower is there at this time to generate what is needed. Basically its aspirational and simplified. I have added the a static Div Sup Gp into the chart;
• Armoured Recce has been changed into a more diverse cavalry concept including recce, infantry, anti armour and drone based indirect fires;
• While the KOCR form a second armoured regiment under 1 CABG, their purpose is to be 32 CABG's armoured regiment and are located in Alberta to train with and share equipment with the LdSH and simplify armour maintenance;
• The existing Comms Regts will provide the brigade sigs squadrons and Res F battalion sigs troops/sects and round out a second EW/Cyber Regt while H Svcs Res F will consolidate into more robust Field Ambulances, one for each brigade and a divisional field hospital;
• All individual training has been put under the rubric of CADTC. Divisions are responsible only for collective training. Depot battalions with depot companies spread throughout the large urban centres will conduct all DP 1 and 2 training for both Reg F and Res F;
• I have, for the fun of it, allocated Res F units to specific unit/subunits but not gone too far. For example in 32 CABG I haven't allocated every battalion to a position. In effect though every Res F battalion will be made up of one company from three or four separate existing battalions. Every Res F battalion listed as being the lead battalion, however, will be commanded by, or have a 2i/c, who is Reg F. All other Res F battalions that will be required to provide companies will be commanded by Reg F majors or have a Reg F 2i/c who will be under the command of the lead battalion in all respects and be established at roughly 125% of those required to fill a company. I'm willing to leave each of them an honourary LCol for historical ties to the community and frankly do not care if each company continues to wear its own regimental dress;

Let the merriment proceed.

 

[KevinB]

To confirm I am reading this correctly -- you took all the SVC Bn's out of the Cbt Bdes, and stuck them in a SVC Bde?

 

[daftandbarmy]

To confirm I am reading this correctly -- you took all the SVC Bn's out of the Bde, and stuck them in a SVC Bde?

 

[Kirkhill]

CO Svc Bn is responsible for rear area security but this is not realistic. I am well aware of what doctrine says, I was part of the board that wrote CSS doctrine.

If there is a Maint Bn should the CO be responsible for maint as well as rear area security? The B ech / rear area is huge. it is not tens but it could be hundreds of km big with a significant amount of traffic that flows through it and that needs to be controlled.

For rear area security you either give the Svc Bn a D&S Coy to protect itself and perhaps perform some rear area security tasks; create a org to provide rear security or assign it to an existing Cbt Arms unit.

Thank God I'm retired now.

"Or" also implies "all of the above"

Dispersed Operations seem to demand Adaptation.

Dispersed Operations seem to me to be "Theater-in-the-Round". All backstage work has to be done in full view of the audience. Sometimes even in the midst of the audience. Even when it is a hostile audience.

Different strategies -

1 The Roman One - build an elaborate "underworld" beneath the "Coliseum" and keep the audience guessing.
2 Shakespeare's Globe - adds a roof to the Coliseum and exploits the "overhead" as well as the Roman "underworld"
3 Modern Minimalism - reduce light levels, shroud everything in black cloths that isn't meant to be seen, use lights to spotlight the actor or distract the audience from shrouded activity
4 CGI effects - live action, green screens and computer generated imagery
5 Shades of all of the above.

At all events, regardless of the strategies adopted, the production is a risky venture. You can never be sure the audience won't turn on you and start chucking beer bottles. Or walk out. Or the run will be cancelled.

Or they might surprise and offer a standing ovation and the run is continued indefinitely.


I think I lean towards a focus on Modern Minimalism while exploiting all of the other options to the extent possible.

The first question is what to do with Scharnhorst's Axe. And the Carrier Pigeons. And the bucket of whitewash. There may be circumstances where all of them come in handy and there will be regret if they are not available. But how often are they required. Does every soldier need one? Or are they best limited to one per platoon, or company, or battalion, or brigade? Centrally held? Or Distributed? How best to exploit the CQ's local holding capacity?

Here I lean towards the soldiers being as lightly equipped as possible but with a little bit of everything within arm's reach.

Once the enemy is engaged it seems to me it will become apparent which are the most useful tools in the CQ's (or Platoon Warrant's) kit. They will be the ones that need to be replenished frequently and in large numbers. Then the question becomes how does the Brigade, or Division get those things from the manufacturer, through the system, to the CQ, And just about the time that has been resolved the enemy will have adapted resulting in a lesser demand for that piece of kit and a rushed effort by own troops to adapt to the enemy's adaptation resulting in new demands for or bits of kit in the inventory, or even new pieces of kit entirely. Some of which might actually work and be worth exploiting.


So military examples of "Theater-in-the-Round".

The Navy - always operating in isolation, applying force from packages - at best it only has to contend with distance and bad weather - stuck with sticking out like a sore thumb and moving at a snail's pace.

The Air Force - Big Wings replaced by individual F35s and Uninhabited Vehicles. The pilots-in-contact reliant on their instruments to describe the extent of the bubble in which they can safely operate, and to predict the effect of the weapons they have at their disposal. Some of which might actually be found on their aircraft. Others may be delivered direct to the target, from the "warehouse" by means of an uninhabited hypervelocity transport system, also known as an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile.

The Army - Afghanistan.

I don't think Afghanistan was the "exception". I don't think there will be a return to "real soldiering" now that that war has ended. Napoleon's linear battlefield may reappear at the tactical level but strategically, and operationally, as well as tactically, "Dispersed Operations" in A2AD environments will push the requirement to operate in small, agile, rapid, relocatable bubbles. Bubbles that can be shrouded in black cloths while the "audience" is misdirected by effective use of lights, CGI and the ancient feint.


Anciently people have operated in insecure environments. This is nothing new to us. It precedes the horse and the dog to the world of Shank's Mare.

First requirement was "If you can't hack it don't pack it" - only take the stuff you absolutely have to have - Do you really need that case of Coke and the Frozen Pizzas.

Second requirement was "Live off the land" - use the land to meet you needs as much as possible - for water and food, for warmth and shelter and to make things easy for you and hard for the enemy.

Third requirement was "Sacrifice" - be prepared to abandon anything and everything. Which brings us to the advantage of the horse, the camel, the ox, the dog and the pigeon. When all else fails you can kill them and eat them. And they are smart enough and fast enough to keep up with you on their own so there is always a spare on hand that you can hop on, or put into the traces.

Final requirement was "Pray to the gods for deliverance" - and hope that you have a direct line to your god, that your god is listening, and that she is effective and can deliver what you need or get you the heck out of there.



Horsemen conquered the world, in peace and war, exploiting these requirements. They are as useful to the soldier as the trader seeking new markets to exploit.

It is the antithesis of the requirement to Save Henry VIII's Ships, or his Guns, or his Colours.

Sometimes the right tactic is to hit the silk and watch another large chunk of Henry's bullion thunder in. And pray to your gods for deliverance.


At what point does it stop being productive to build ever larger, more complex, more expensive vehicles that demand the sacrifice of soldiers' blood to protect? With the loss of the vehicle putting a major dent in Henry's treasury reducing his ability to continue the fight?


Or putting it another way, when is the right answer not a mechanic but a chunk of C4 and cadging a ride off a buddy?

 

[FJAG]

To confirm I am reading this correctly -- you took all the SVC Bn's out of the Cbt Bdes, and stuck them in a SVC Bde?

Like I said, this is a form of one of the options being put forward by the Army's G4 as an early part of the Force 2025 CSS structure to deal with some of the issues they are facing - starting with that fact the managed readiness cycle is meaningless to CSS.

In my model, the service battalions do not actually move physically. Its a reorganization to create a coordinated approach to CSS taking advantage of the reduced number of overall manoeuvre brigades to reassign Res F service bns to specific functions such as maintenance or transport or special troops. Think of it like a US Brigade Support Battalion construct where all the manoeuvre battalions CSS is actually on strength to the BSB but the BSB has Forward Support Companies each one of which is especially tailored to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battalion that its assigned to and is generally collocated with.

For COA 1 the CSS folks were looking at an Army wide overarching CSS Division with CDSGs being the subordinate sustainment brigades under which svc bns are grouped. COA 2 was a concentration of CSS resources still under a CSS Division with CDSGs as brigade level structures with base facilities under command but a looser connection to svc bns that remained with the manoeuvre brigades. COA 3 cuts out the CSS division structure but left brigade level CDSGs under command of the existing divisions but with a refined division of base tech svcs v svc bn functions.

The key issues are to create better control over Army wide CSS, to strengthen continuous base support and to allow svc bns to focus on force generation tasks by way of scalable deployed structures.

I'll admit that I had some trouble puzzling myself through the details on this but understood the basic conundrum facing the CSS under the existing cockamamie Army Force generation module which focuses on turning out scalable and modular battle groups which deploy on short six month cycles. On the one hand you need an enduring static CSS structure that is relieved of outside tasks to allow it to function in a stable way to continuously provide quality support to the "at home" force. On the other hand you also need an organization that focuses more on its own training and the generation of deployed forces to support deployed BGs in the field.

Remember that in the construct put together above, the Div HQ for 2 and 3 Div are not deployable entities per se - its merely a force generation element. Similarly, the two divisional sustainment brigades are not seen as true deployable entities but merely the managers of CSS resources within the division including static Div Sup Gps and their various static base facilities as well as the of the deployable service bns. Essentially its the deployable svc and transport and maintenance battalions that create deployable elements to support up to a deployed brigade and even larger force. However, I think that there ought to be an oplan for the generation of a true deployable sustainment brigade headquarters in the unlikely event of the need for one. (Similarly, I do not see the CCSB or Arty bde headquarters to be deployable entities in the normal course of events but to have the ability to generate such a headquarters from within their resources with augmentation from organizations such as the Joint Comms Regt and the sustainment brigades.)

I've obviously thrown out COAs 1 and 2 calling for an overarching CSS Div structure and left the Army wide coordination of CSS resources at some form of Army HQ G4/COS Support level but accepted the creation of a brigade level structure at each of the two remaining FG divisions to manage overall CSS efforts across each of the divisions.

One thing that became abundantly clear in this little exercise is that there are far to few actual CSS personnel available for the job. If you want a stable static support structure you end up robbing the field units. That would lead to a larger reliance on the Res F but the Res F service bns are as weak in pers numbers as the line battalions are. We very definitely need a better system of generating CSS junior soldiers which in my mind can be done through leveraging much of the fundamental training of CSS pers through community colleges augmented by shorter and more focused conversion courses on specific military equipment. Leverage could be attained by paying for CC tuition (but not pay while at the CC), full paid summer DP 1 and 2 courses, all tied to periods of obligatory service which could be served out at static CSS facilities or at Res F CSS bns locally and with opportunities for a year or two of Class B service at a static CSS facility close to their civilian homes.

Incidentally, while I am still not a fan of lifelong Class B service as a way of bolstering Reg F establishments in static headquarters, I'm starting to think that we could do with two types of Reg F service. One type would be the thing we do now where they move to and live primarily at one of the three big (and a few small) bases. The other type would focus on the full-timers with Res F units in the larger urban communities who would not be posted outside of the urban region but could be moved between units, would still attend career courses and would be deployed on exercises and operations just as their counterparts on the larger bases are. Such a career profile would ameliorate some of the turmoil associated posting individuals into and out of high accommodation cost areas (I still think we should build small subdivisions of PMQs in the suburbs) and increase retention for people who value family stability. The same could be done for the Navy and Air Force as well.

That needs a lot more thought but considering the CAF is 10% understrength right now its getting obvious that our current model is becoming unsustainable. At the rate we're going even the crop of currently short sighted leadership will recognize that a paradigm shift in how we do "military" is desperately needed.

 

[Happy Guy]

Sorry. Having technical issues. I can't deleted this.

 

[KevinB]

Like I said, this is a form of one of the options being put forward by the Army's G4 as an early part of the Force 2025 CSS structure to deal with some of the issues they are facing - starting with that fact the managed readiness cycle is meaningless to CSS.

Understood - I would be concerned about removing a SVN BN from the command of it's supported Bde.
Frankly I would support increasing the Svc Bn's - as I don't think the current Svc Bn structure is robust enough to support a Bde on Operations.
*I think you also know how I feel the with entire Managed Readiness Cycle.

In my model, the service battalions do not actually move physically. Its a reorganization to create a coordinated approach to CSS taking advantage of the reduced number of overall manoeuvre brigades to reassign Res F service bns to specific functions such as maintenance or transport or special troops. Think of it like a US Brigade Support Battalion construct where all the manoeuvre battalions CSS is actually on strength to the BSB but the BSB has Forward Support Companies each one of which is especially tailored to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battalion that its assigned to and is generally collocated with.

Ack, I remember when they split the Svc Bn into Svn Bn and GS Bn - while I thought the rationale for that was pretty thin, it seemed the theory was the Svn Bn that was left was not enough to support an Bde - and regardless of the Command structure it falls under - the Svn Bn TO&E needs a major rework if it supposed to support a Bde worth of maneuver units.

For COA 1 the CSS folks were looking at an Army wide overarching CSS Division with CDSGs being the subordinate sustainment brigades under which svc bns are grouped. COA 2 was a concentration of CSS resources still under a CSS Division with CDSGs as brigade level structures with base facilities under command but a looser connection to svc bns that remained with the manoeuvre brigades. COA 3 cuts out the CSS division structure but left brigade level CDSGs under command of the existing divisions but with a refined division of base tech svcs v svc bn functions.

The key issues are to create better control over Army wide CSS, to strengthen continuous base support and to allow svc bns to focus on force generation tasks by way of scalable deployed structures.

I always cringe when I hear Force Generation tasks...

I'll admit that I had some trouble puzzling myself through the details on this but understood the basic conundrum facing the CSS under the existing cockamamie Army Force generation module which focuses on turning out scalable and modular battle groups which deploy on short six month cycles. On the one hand you need an enduring static CSS structure that is relieved of outside tasks to allow it to function in a stable way to continuously provide quality support to the "at home" force. On the other hand you also need an organization that focuses more on its own training and the generation of deployed forces to support deployed BGs in the field.

Remember that in the construct put together above, the Div HQ for 2 and 3 Div are not deployable entities per se - its merely a force generation element. Similarly, the two divisional sustainment brigades are not seen as true deployable entities but merely the managers of CSS resources within the division including static Div Sup Gps and their various static base facilities as well as the of the deployable service bns.

The part that concerns me is it effectively makes another HQ function (the SP Bde), which to me is going to rob positions from the actual Bde's.
* and what I see is the fascination with HQ's

Essentially its the deployable svc and transport and maintenance battalions that create deployable elements to support up to a deployed brigade and even larger force. However, I think that there ought to be an oplan for the generation of a true deployable sustainment brigade headquarters in the unlikely event of the need for one.

For a deployable SP Bde to be required - I would think that the CF will have mobilized, and invoked conscription. Wouldn't the actually required personnel best be streamlined into 1 Can Div HQ -
The same aspect as to why I remain confused about the need for another Div Hq

(Similarly, I do not see the CCSB or Arty bde headquarters to be deployable entities in the normal course of events but to have the ability to generate such a headquarters from within their resources with augmentation from organizations such as the Joint Comms Regt and the sustainment brigades.)

Again - given the CF # pers, can the CF afford an Arty Bde HQ? Wouldn't Arty pers in 1 Can Div be sufficient?

I've obviously thrown out COAs 1 and 2 calling for an overarching CSS Div structure and left the Army wide coordination of CSS resources at some form of Army HQ G4/COS Support level but accepted the creation of a brigade level structure at each of the two remaining FG divisions to manage overall CSS efforts across each of the divisions.

One thing that became abundantly clear in this little exercise is that there are far to few actual CSS personnel available for the job. If you want a stable static support structure you end up robbing the field units. That would lead to a larger reliance on the Res F but the Res F service bns are as weak in pers numbers as the line battalions are. We very definitely need a better system of generating CSS junior soldiers which in my mind can be done through leveraging much of the fundamental training of CSS pers through community colleges augmented by shorter and more focused conversion courses on specific military equipment. Leverage could be attained by paying for CC tuition (but not pay while at the CC), full paid summer DP 1 and 2 courses, all tied to periods of obligatory service which could be served out at static CSS facilities or at Res F CSS bns locally and with opportunities for a year or two of Class B service at a static CSS facility close to their civilian homes.

The lack of CSS personnel has been a major issue in the CF since I believe Korea.
The low level of deployments, has given a very artificially low view of the need for these roles - and I think it is significantly to the detriment of the CF.

Incidentally, while I am still not a fan of lifelong Class B service as a way of bolstering Reg F establishments in static headquarters, I'm starting to think that we could do with two types of Reg F service. One type would be the thing we do now where they move to and live primarily at one of the three big (and a few small) bases. The other type would focus on the full-timers with Res F units in the larger urban communities who would not be posted outside of the urban region but could be moved between units, would still attend career courses and would be deployed on exercises and operations just as their counterparts on the larger bases are. Such a career profile would ameliorate some of the turmoil associated posting individuals into and out of high accommodation cost areas (I still think we should build small subdivisions of PMQs in the suburbs) and increase retention for people who value family stability. The same could be done for the Navy and Air Force as well.

That needs a lot more thought but considering the CAF is 10% understrength right now its getting obvious that our current model is becoming unsustainable. At the rate we're going even the crop of currently short sighted leadership will recognize that a paradigm shift in how we do "military" is desperately needed.

I have an outlandish napkin army I have been working on - I am a little leery of posting it but I think it would be a doable project for 2025, and given the current equipment state of the CF, I think it's fairly realistic.

It isn't symmetrical - and it's fairly ruthless to the Regimental System.

I am hoping to get it done in the next day or 2.

 

[Kirkhill]

A notion wrt Reserve Units (Battalions, Regiments, Battle Groups)

Key Elements

The Adjutant (Responsible for putting bodies on the armoury floor and keeping track of their skills)
Training Officer (Responsible for adding as many skills as possible to unit volunteers)

OC Adm (Responsible for ensuring that the unit has all the kit it is supposed to have, and it is in good working order)

Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills. May be able to fire a rifle safely.

Int O (Situational Awareness)

Sigs O (Comms in peace and war, to higher and lower - Signallers supplemented by unit communicators/runners)

CO/RSM,
OCs/CSMs

Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills. May be able to fire a rifle safely.

CO/RSM,
OCs/CSMs


Dogs Bodies and Jr Officers - do what they can with what they have when so ordered


Everybody trained to use a rifle safely and with confidence.
Everybody trained to drive in a military fashion
Everybody trained to communicate in a military fashion

Long service riflemen/drivers with the skills and inclination trained in heavy, crew-served and special weapons as well as capabilities like defences, patrolling, reconnaissance, breaching, counter-mobility and mobility

 

[daftandbarmy]

A notion wrt Reserve Units (Battalions, Regiments, Battle Groups)

Key Elements

The Adjutant (Responsible for putting bodies on the armoury floor and keeping track of their skills)
Training Officer (Responsible for adding as many skills as possible to unit volunteers)

OC Adm (Responsible for ensuring that the unit has all the kit it is supposed to have, and it is in good working order)

Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills. May be able to fire a rifle safely.

Int O (Situational Awareness)

Sigs O (Comms in peace and war, to higher and lower - Signallers supplemented by unit communicators/runners)

CO/RSM,
OCs/CSMs

Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills. May be able to fire a rifle safely.

CO/RSM,
OCs/CSMs


Dogs Bodies and Jr Officers - do what they can with what they have when so ordered


Everybody trained to use a rifle safely and with confidence.
Everybody trained to drive in a military fashion
Everybody trained to communicate in a military fashion

Long service riflemen/drivers with the skills and inclination trained in heavy, crew-served and special weapons as well as capabilities like defences, patrolling, reconnaissance, breaching, counter-mobility and mobility

Except that most units don't have half those positions, or people who know how to do them properly, but yeah....

 

[FJAG]

Understood - I would be concerned about removing a SVN BN from the command of it's supported Bde.
Frankly I would support increasing the Svc Bn's - as I don't think the current Svc Bn structure is robust enough to support a Bde on Operations.
*I think you also know how I feel the with entire Managed Readiness Cycle.

Ack, I remember when they split the Svc Bn into Svn Bn and GS Bn - while I thought the rationale for that was pretty thin, it seemed the theory was the Svn Bn that was left was not enough to support an Bde - and regardless of the Command structure it falls under - the Svn Bn TO&E needs a major rework if it supposed to support a Bde worth of maneuver units.

I can see that concern although I'm not advocating a return to a US Army DISCOM. I tend to like artillery grouping terminology and in that respect I see a bde svc bn under command of the Sust Bde but in direct support of the manoeuvre bde. What one wants to establish and maintain is the relationship as between the two although I think that becomes less of an issue when bns in garrison rely on the static support elements for their day-to-day 2nd line and above support requirements. With our current NES system svc bns are constantly being raided for pers to deploy without an overly strong concern for how that effects the bde. In a perfect world a deployed battlegroup would have an NSE from its svc bn anyway. (actually in a perfect world there would be no NSE's but a composite company from the svc bn to support the battle groups organic CSS coy)

I always cringe when I hear Force Generation tasks...

The part that concerns me is it effectively makes another HQ function (the SP Bde), which to me is going to rob positions from the actual Bde's.
* and what I see is the fascination with HQ's

I'm with you on that. Think of it this way. Right now we have 4 non deployable division headquarters, 3 bde HQ capable of deployment and 11 incapable of it. My construct is 2 non deployable division hqs, 3 bde headquarters capable of high readiness deployment, 2 of low readiness deployability and 3 non deployable except with augmentation. That's reducing 18 headquarters into 10 all while increasing bde hq deployability amongst them from 3 to 5. That's still a win-win situation.

For a deployable SP Bde to be required - I would think that the CF will have mobilized, and invoked conscription. Wouldn't the actually required personnel best be streamlined into 1 Can Div HQ -
The same aspect as to why I remain confused about the need for another Div Hq

There are some command hq that simply do not need to be deployable but are very much needed for coordinating functions and continuous force generation after the deployable force has gone.

I have no problem seeing 1 Div as a hq that concerns itself with day to day operational force employment while having a capability to deploy a portion of itself as an operationally deployed HQ and having two divisional hq solely concerned with force generation. (four I have big problems with - for an army of our size, two is optimal)

Again - given the CF # pers, can the CF afford an Arty Bde HQ? Wouldn't Arty pers in 1 Can Div be sufficient?

There may be gunners spread throughout 1 Div HQ but I don't believe that there is a functional Div Arty HQ - I could be wrong but I think that disappeared around the time we stood down 4 CMBG. On the other hand, one of the responsibilities of 4 GS Regt in Gagetown is to augment 1 Cdn Div HQ in order to create a Fires Coord Centre. That's adequate when, like today, all you have is 24 guns in total to coordinate (That used to be 3/4s of a regiment when I started in this game). However, if one is looking down the road to re-establishing more guns in the regiment, adding air defence and possibly a HIMARSish capability and more STA (as you should) then something more robust is needed to coordinate those units in peacetime and to bolster 1 Div in wartime.

The lack of CSS personnel has been a major issue in the CF since I believe Korea.
The low level of deployments, has given a very artificially low view of the need for these roles - and I think it is significantly to the detriment of the CF.

That's plagued the guns as well. The folks running this hockey sock grew up during the post cold war era when artillery and tanks and all the things you need to fight weren't a necessity. The result is deploying into Afghanistan with no tanks when they were definitely useful and a handful of artillery but frequently running low on ammo because people just didn't understand that shit. Just did an interview with some folks where one of the infantry company commanders grew very skillful at using his company as "beaters" to push the Taliban into artillery kill zones. Betcha he didn't learn that on his combat team commanders course but picked it up pretty quickly once he saw how things worked in real life. There a distinct difference between our method of warfare where fires support manoeuvre and Russian tactics where manoeuvre supports fires. This is why a Russian brigade has four smallish manoeuvre bns and 2 arty gun bns, one arty rocket launcher bn, one arty anti-tank battalion and two arty AD battalions. I don't think that gets analyzed near enough amongst our infantry centric leadership.

I have an outlandish napkin army I have been working on - I am a little leery of posting it but I think it would be a doable project for 2025, and given the current equipment state of the CF, I think it's fairly realistic.

It isn't symmetrical - and it's fairly ruthless to the Regimental System.

Symmetry is just plain stupid and based on regimental narcissism. That's one of the many reasons I'm putting 1/3 of the Reg F into Res F battalions and having them change cap badges. Quite frankly, if I were king, several of the current Reg F battalions would revert to QOR, RHR, and CanGds and maybe a few others so that there would be no more than one battalion of each regiment. Cap badges and accoutrements are dirt cheap compared to the proper field equipment. I just want to break up the cabals that are currently running the brigades.

Quite frankly I'd happily give up the odd Reg F infantry bn in order to create more maintainer, artillery and cyber PYs.

I am hoping to get it done in the next day or 2.

Looking forward to it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Symmetry is just plain stupid and based on regimental narcissism. That's one of the many reasons I'm putting 1/3 of the Reg F into Res F battalions and having them change cap badges. Quite frankly, if I were king, several of the current Reg F battalions would revert to QOR, RHR, and CanGds and maybe a few others so that there would be no more than one battalion of each regiment. Cap badges and accoutrements are dirt cheap compared to the proper field equipment. I just want to break up the cabals that are currently running the brigades.

Quite frankly I'd happily give up the odd Reg F infantry bn in order to create more maintainer, artillery and cyber PYs.

Looking forward to it.

Build it and they will come.

And if 'it' happened to be connected to personal ego enhancement in some way, then it will be even more effective

 

[Kirkhill]

Except that most units don't have half those positions, or people who know how to do them properly, but yeah....

And thereby hang the complete works of Grimm's tales.

A notion wrt Reserve Units (Battalions, Regiments, Battle Groups)

Key Elements

The Adjutant (Responsible for putting bodies on the armoury floor and keeping track of their skills)
Training Officer (Responsible for adding as many skills as possible to unit volunteers)

OC Adm (Responsible for ensuring that the unit has all the kit it is supposed to have, and it is in good working order)

Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills. May be able to fire a rifle safely.

Int O (Situational Awareness)

Sigs O (Comms in peace and war, to higher and lower - Signallers supplemented by unit communicators/runners)

CO/RSM,
OCs/CSMs

Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills. May be able to fire a rifle safely.

CO/RSM,
OCs/CSMs


Dogs Bodies and Jr Officers - do what they can with what they have when so ordered


Everybody trained to use a rifle safely and with confidence.
Everybody trained to drive in a military fashion
Everybody trained to communicate in a military fashion

Long service riflemen/drivers with the skills and inclination trained in heavy, crew-served and special weapons as well as capabilities like defences, patrolling, reconnaissance, breaching, counter-mobility and mobility

As I understand it there is difficulty recruiting drivers. There also seems to be difficulty training drivers. Why?

Once upon a time troopers were only hired if they could ride already. This was expecially true of the Mounties, Mounted Rifles, Scouts, Lord Strathcona's, Aussie Light Horse and various other irregulars.

These people drive vehicles recreationally. They do it in extreme conditions trying very very hard not to die and not to break their vehicles.

How do you recruit them? Give them opportunities to do what they want to do with good kit? Have the local units sponsor trials teams? Sponsor trials events?

When discussing the Adjutant's role and keeping track of the skills of the volunteers in the unit the individual records should reflect the totality of their skills, regardless of which seminary they attended and what catechism they learned.




8x8 Off Roader Trials Competition

Climbing Walls in a Jeep

Quads Rock Crawling

Motorcycle Trials - no time limits - penalties for putting your feet down - fewest penalties wins

And recoveries

So how do you get people like these through the armoury doors?

And how much training do you need to give them?

It might be a bit difficult to get them to start whitewashing rocks. But regardless they might come in handy.

 

[KevinB]

And thereby hang the complete works of Grimm's tales.



As I understand it there is difficulty recruiting drivers. There also seems to be difficulty training drivers. Why?




So how do you get people like these through the armoury doors?

And how much training do you need to give them?

It might be a bit difficult to get them to start whitewashing rocks. But regardless they might come in handy.

You don't recruit them -- you hire them to put on classes.
BSR operated the Assault Hummer Driver Course - I don't think anyone outside of JTF-2 went from the CF, but it was a fantastic class - the CF should have had something like that run for GWagon drivers before deploying etc.

 

[Kirkhill]

You don't recruit them -- you hire them to put on classes.
BSR operated the Assault Hummer Driver Course - I don't think anyone outside of JTF-2 went from the CF, but it was a fantastic class - the CF should have had something like that run for GWagon drivers before deploying etc.

Plausible idea Kevin. But expensive. And this being Canada, and me being a Scot, I want to do national defence on the cheap.

I want to exploit the self-interest of others. It is to my benefit if people volunteer to do the things I want them to do. And if it requires a bit of enticement, in the form of training spaces and a bit of regulation to create "a well regulated militia" then that's fine.

I don't want to buy kids off the street that know nothing and then have to hire instructors to show them how to tie their boots. I'd sooner people tied their boots any which way that kept the boots on their feet. Talking to their mates about important stuff like boot laces while having a beer will result in uniformity (except for that man Jones who insists on being different).

The legacies that I wish to exploit are the bowmen of Agincourt, Crecy and Poitiers who were encouraged to do what they were going to do any way. The laws demanding that every man learn to use a bow were easy to enforce because every man in the countryside already had a bow. The bigger problem was poaching. Better to divert their energies through competitions and Wappenschaws (Weapon Shows) to being useful to the King.

The Victorian follow on to that was Bisley. My Scots grandfather was particularly proud of that English medal for shooting he had won as a Boys Brigade Cadet in about 1919. Bisley, and Baden Powell, and the Territorials were the height of Sam Hughes's well regulated militia. Adam Ferguson would have approved. My other grandfather, from Devon, he joined the Territorials about 1907. He was about 15 at the time. He joined the Cyclist Battalion of the local County Regiment, the Devons. The bicycle, with its spoked wheels and its Dunlop pneumatic tyres was the latest high tech toy. It permitted the common man, and woman, to exploit their need for speed and travel great distances. His Devon battalion eventually ended up patrolling the coast of Yorkshire on their bicycles. (He met his wife while doing it).

The other legacy I want to exploit is that which Wolseley exploited. When he went up the Nile to relieve Gordon at Khartoum he hired Canadian boatmen because of what he had seen them do on the seasonal rivers of the Prairies with canoes, York boats and stern wheelers.

And finally wagon trains have historically been civilians brought into military service.



In many ways Canada's formative war was an aberation. WW 1 sticks out in history for the massive change in technology it heralded.

Going into WW 1 the country side all over the world was powered by horses. Every country man, and most women, could ride a horse, put it into the traces of a wagon, and drive a pair of them. Nobody knew how to drive a truck. Or for that matter use a telegraph. Or a machine gun. But most knew which end of the rifle to point to the enemy.

The army had to train people to operate this science fiction stuff that HG Wells had been going on about. And what was a Tank anyway?

Clydesdale horses reached their apex just in time to be totally replaced by the tractor. The army having provided millions of spare engines and trained driver-mechanics.

By WW2 most inductees were at least familiar with motor vehicles and required very little training in that area.


These days there isn't a Canadian, or American youngster (at least outside of the cities) that doesn't know how to drive. And many enjoy it. And many more waste their time and money on gas or diesel, and parts, to keep them running.


I want to give them a local ground for them to play on and hone their skills. I want to give them a "parking lot" where they can practice sliding in the snow, do doughnuts, drifting, hand-brake turns. Just the same way I want to give them a range where they can waste their time plinking at targets.

I figure, in the long run, it is cheaper to keep the youngsters supplied with bullets and gas, and to replace the occasional broken truck or rifle, than it is to put them on the payroll to teach them how to do those things.

The good ones can be hired as trainers. The useful ones can be appealed to to fill the ranks of the active forces when the Government has needs of qualified manpower - even if it just to pull their neighbours out of a flood.


Beatty called for 90,000 volunteers. We pay 19,000 volunteers. Those two figures are not incompatible, nor mutually exclusive. Just like the 10/90, 30/70, 50/50, 75/25, 90/10, 100/0 units are not mutually exclusive. Supp List, Class A, Class B, Class C, Full Time, Duty bonuses, special service pay, contract, career..... it becomes difficult to separate the flyshit from the pepper. The spectrum of volunteers extends to the CANSOFCOM regs. I argue it should also extend to cover the willing, unpaid volunteer.

It works for many other organizations including government organizations.


We just have to get rid of this silly notion of turning in your kit in the same state you found it, or get charged.

War is the ultimate in disposable enterprises. We have grown up in a disposable society. Nobody repairs lap tops or smart phones unless it is a very low cost repair. We buy new ones on credit. Or "on tick" as we used to say.

Cheaper to buy a new truck than maintain the maintainers necessary to maintain an old one. Likewise for a new rifle.

And if the person that broke it did it out of sheer bloody mindedness then you can always charge them for the replacement. On tick.

 

[Kirkhill]

By the way. Can you put a Picatinny Rail on to a Rheinmetall Rh-120 L/44 120mm, or an M126 howitzer cannon?

 

[KevinB]

By the way. Can you put a Picatinny Rail on to a Rheinmetall Rh-120 L/44 120mm, or an M126 howitzer cannon?

Why?
Anything is possible - 1913 rails where added to the Hk21's and PSG-1's for some folks, which had a lot less metal -- the tank gun would be easy - as the muzzle has the boresight collimator - and one could add that to the shroud for that easily - but I am not sure of the why -- the M126 cannon on the M109 has a large muzzle break that could be used for a mount - but both would be very susceptible to the shock - as they recoil under firing - and I suspect the load would be a tad rough on most mounted items -

 

[Kirkhill]

Why?
Anything is possible - 1913 rails where added to the Hk21's and PSG-1's for some folks, which had a lot less metal -- the tank gun would be easy - as the muzzle has the boresight collimator - and one could add that to the shroud for that easily - but I am not sure of the why -- the M126 cannon on the M109 has a large muzzle break that could be used for a mount - but both would be very susceptible to the shock - as they recoil under firing - and I suspect the load would be a tad rough on most mounted items -

Because 1970s technology integrated everything into a fixed, unchanging package. If one part broke the whole system was out of commission and had to be withdrawn from the field.

The Picatinny system, as applied to small arms means that people can do silly things like replacing perfectly good bayonets with a forestock hand grip . But they can also swap Red Dots for other EO magicry. Or just replace a broken one with a new one. In the field. During the fight. From their webbing. Or from the CQ. Or added to disposable single shot weapons like the AT4 or the N-LAW.

 

[Kirkhill]

And to further structural discussion

Light Infantry at work in Ukraine

 

[markppcli]

The main thing we are lacking is a mission, of course. As a result, any direction becomes the right one, and generally drifts towards 'train to excite'.

Whether or not 'excited' soldiers are successfully accomplishing our national defense mandate is not clear to me, however.

What we're actually doing is train to validate, Majors have to become Lt Cols of course, which means that despite what @KevinB says about our training relative our allies, there has been a serious decline in the complexity of ranges from the section and platoon perspective. Troops don't get those ply wood houses as objectives, because the end state is the successful execution of a breach by the combat team, not the development of soldiers skills. Of course this is totally unrelated to our retention, obviously troops are getting out because no one wants a guaranteed income during a pandemic... but I digress.

 

[markppcli]

So, I just finished six hours of the Artillery in Afghanistan interviews some dealing with deployed task forces and some with equipment procurements and the resultant issues of maintaining equipment bought under UORs and supplying things to the troops we don't have so that we needed to getting gifts of critical gear out of the kindness of our allies because Canada is to cheap to buy our own and, all-in-all, my cynic quotient continues to rise.

Did manage to rough in my 30/70 // 70/30 model which is built on the following criteria:

• the whole idea behind 30/70 is to force the integration of the Res F with the Reg F so that it is no longer possible for the Reg F to ignore the Res F development and training;
• The structure is built on the RFL levels put forward in Force 2025 and, since almost all units are one level of hybrid or another, are reflected down to the company level to show what companies within any given battalion are at what RFL level;
• I've designated two types of RFL 1 - one for a unit/subunit that is 100% Reg F another for a unit that is a 70/30 organization and can function at Level 1 with reduced numbers or will need to be augmented by other RFL 1 elements to reach full strength (somewhat how many TFs in Afghanistan were augmented by a company from another battalion);
• units types (like infantry) that are more likely to deploy in peacetime are generally staffed to a higher level of Reg F. Units less likely to deploy (like armour or artillery) are staffed to higher Res F levels;
• all RFL 1 and 2 units have a high Reg F leadership component to them even if most of their troops are Res F. This is to ensure a level of ownership by the Reg F and to generate an increase in the capability to deploy the units or parts of them. In no case is the ratio of Reg F leadership less than 10% of strength;
• Any unit/subunit marked as an RFL 1 is equipped. For example an RFL 2 Res F infantry battalion with a RFL 1 70/30 Inf coy will have that company fully equipped with LAV 6s for the purpose of training the whole battalion and being able to generate a single LAV company plus trained augmentees. Conversely a RFL 1 70/30 Reg F infantry battalion has only two companies of LAVs while the third coy made up of Res F personnel will not have LAVs and is expected to be trained on the other two companies' equipment;
• All equipment holdings are predicated on current equipment holdings and those forecast under Force 2025 (such as GBAD by 2027, new indirect fires by 2028 and ATGM by 2029 (Hopefully that's not too much wishful thinking by the Army's Force 2025 team;
• Note that there is now a mountain battlegroup on the West Coast and an amphibious battalion on the East. Airborne and Arctic capabilities exist within 2 CLBG as does a small public duties battalion to take care of Parliament Hill;
• The service support element is a bit weak because the direction that's going is a bit in flux. I've taken some elements out of their options to create two divisional Sustainment Brigade structures which includes some additional maintenance and transportation elements but quite frankly I don't think the manpower is there at this time to generate what is needed. Basically its aspirational and simplified. I have added the a static Div Sup Gp into the chart;
• Armoured Recce has been changed into a more diverse cavalry concept including recce, infantry, anti armour and drone based indirect fires;
• While the KOCR form a second armoured regiment under 1 CABG, their purpose is to be 32 CABG's armoured regiment and are located in Alberta to train with and share equipment with the LdSH and simplify armour maintenance;
• The existing Comms Regts will provide the brigade sigs squadrons and Res F battalion sigs troops/sects and round out a second EW/Cyber Regt while H Svcs Res F will consolidate into more robust Field Ambulances, one for each brigade and a divisional field hospital;
• All individual training has been put under the rubric of CADTC. Divisions are responsible only for collective training. Depot battalions with depot companies spread throughout the large urban centres will conduct all DP 1 and 2 training for both Reg F and Res F;
• I have, for the fun of it, allocated Res F units to specific unit/subunits but not gone too far. For example in 32 CABG I haven't allocated every battalion to a position. In effect though every Res F battalion will be made up of one company from three or four separate existing battalions. Every Res F battalion listed as being the lead battalion, however, will be commanded by, or have a 2i/c, who is Reg F. All other Res F battalions that will be required to provide companies will be commanded by Reg F majors or have a Reg F 2i/c who will be under the command of the lead battalion in all respects and be established at roughly 125% of those required to fill a company. I'm willing to leave each of them an honourary LCol for historical ties to the community and frankly do not care if each company continues to wear its own regimental dress;

View attachment 66908
View attachment 66909

Let the merriment proceed.

small point, but the extra Strat squadron should be co located in Edmonton, so they can make use of existing simulators and maximize their training time.