Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

I've also come to that conclusion. I tend to find that much of the winter weeknight and even weekend training is less than optimal. If you reduce that you'll find the paid days to generate an extra week in the field. With between 45-50 days annual training (but all of it quality trg and focused on refresher and collective) you can keep a unit adequately trained over a three-four year cycle.

The difficulty is getting everyone out for it. That requires legislation that both protects jobs as well as mandates reservists be entitled to both the statutory time off for training (unpaid by the employer) and statutory time off for paid summer vacation with their family.

Or, respectfully, FJAG - increase the size of the pool of volunteers available. Accept the inefficiencies in the system and try to engage 100 people to generate a trained body of 10 to 20. Not all of those people will be available all of the time. And the faces of the 10 to 20 will change but likely include a solid knot of people that always turn out.

The fact that only 10 to 20 turn out does not mean that there is no value in the other 80 to 90 people. They too are willing - in the right circumstances.

If you had a pool of 1000 volunteers then the odds of fielding 100 improve considerably.

And the pairing of a Reg Force company, as suggested by GR66, is not incompatible with a largely volunteer Militia Regiment fielding a paid, active component of 100 Class A/B/C soldiers. Nor is it incompatible with pairing the same Militia Regiment with a Ranger Patrol or two.

 

[Kirkhill]

Except that most units don't have half those positions, or people who know how to do them properly, but yeah....

If Reserve units don't have those positions then why not?

The Adjt usually exist - He is responsible for ensuring that junior officers can promenade nicely in the appropriate footwear. He might have some time to spare for personnel issues. Having said that, it is a full time position regardless of whether the unit is a regular or reserve unit.

The Training Officer - surely she exists? There used to be one. The only problem was it was often assigned to a junior platoon officer as a secondary tasking. Like the Adjt she should be on the job full time. And especially aware of the particular problems of working with a group of volunteers that are only under discipline for as long as they so choose.

OC Adm is another position that needs to be full time position (or at least the RQMSM needs to be)


Those three positions are the heart and soul of any organization no matter what names, ranks, titles are given to them.



The CO and his OCs and their subordinates, assisted by the Sr NCOs supply an operational framework, a cadre if you like, that should be able to use the resources, including volunteers, to the best extent possible when given a tasking.


The Int O in a reserve unit can be a part time position even though it is a critical position for maintaining unit situational awareness. Most people on this site are already voluntarily doing what a reserve Int O should be doing. Staying on top of Open Source Intelligence and CF bulletins and disseminating them. He can keep his opinions to himself unless specifically requested.

The Sigs O does not have to be a Signaller. She just needs to know where to find one. And how to use her laptop, tablet, cell phone and a tactical radio. And maintain the Net.

 

[Kirkhill]

We just have to get rid of this silly notion of turning in your kit in the same state you found it, or get charged.

War is the ultimate in disposable enterprises. We have grown up in a disposable society. Nobody repairs lap tops or smart phones unless it is a very low cost repair. We buy new ones on credit. Or "on tick" as we used to say.

Cheaper to buy a new truck than maintain the maintainers necessary to maintain an old one. Likewise for a new rifle.

And if the person that broke it did it out of sheer bloody mindedness then you can always charge them for the replacement. On tick.

Why are we worried about repairing pistols and rifles in the field? Or radios?

If the CQ is toting around the batteries, ammunition, pyro, explosives, single shot weapons and alternate weapons (DMRs, LMGs, GPMGs, CGs, (mortars?)) then why not half a dozen or so spare 3 kg rifles?

 

[Kirkhill]

Another comment that caught my eye upthread related to career progression and the movement within trades from technician to manager.

I strongly believe that managers are created but that not everybody is cut out to be a manager.

I also strongly believe that a good manager in a technical field needs to have been a technician first. He has to know the requirements of the technical trade she is managing.

I also believe that being a technical adviser is a very different thing than being either a technician or a technical manager. An adviser is as much diplomat as SME.

Finally, having progressed through a career from technician, to technical manager, to technical adviser and watched the solutions available constantly change while the problems remain the same I have come to see my role as a senior to try to act as a calming influence. Let the youngsters know that this has happened before, that the problems were managed with the tools that were available, that those tools are still available. The problem can still be managed the old way. But with the new magic tools that the youngsters have at their disposal, and about which I have very little understanding and less facility, they can probably manage the problem differently and possibly better. But regardless there is an ancient fall back plan available if they need it. My job becomes a simple one of creating space to allow them to get on with their jobs.


Leadership is a separate issue entirely.

 

[KevinB]

Kevin, is the principal difference between the Armd and Inf the fact that one tends to fight on the move against moving targets while the other tends to fight from fixed positions against fixed targets? I accept that that is an over-simplification and that between those two extremes there is a universe of gray/grey.

That is why I asked at the beginning of this thread how many people you need in the crew. 2 or 3? I think the infantry can get away with 2 because once the GIBs dismount the LAVs are tied geographically to the ground on which the infantry is fighting. The turret becomes a relocatable machine gun post. The carriers then effectively become the battalion's MG platoon.

Meanwhile the Mounted soldiers, especially when mounted in lightly armoured vehicles see the need to keep on the move, use the ground and maintain situational awareness in a moving bubble at a constant rate of 60 mph.

More in how to support the troops on the ground - I am not a fan of running the LAV with 2 - regardless, the gunner alone doesn't have enough SA to control fire, give vehicle directions and communicate - it needs a CC.

Infantrymen turned LAV crew still know what it is like on the ground - and being part of that unit makes the relationship smoother.

The only time I would consider a non 031 Crew is for a district CAV grouping - where they are agnostic to their crew - and used more as Armored Transport than a fighting vehicle.
Truly the only role I see for a LAV in a Armored formation is running convoy escorts for non bleeding edge support - and that was my goal of the non Asymetrical Bde construct I came up with.

 

[KevinB]

Why are we worried about repairing pistols and rifles in the field? Or radios?

If the CQ is toting around the batteries, ammunition, pyro, explosives, single shot weapons and alternate weapons (DMRs, LMGs, GPMGs, CGs, (mortars?)) then why not half a dozen or so spare 3 kg rifles?

Some spares - but spare parts are needed for protracted conflicts.
If you are replacing action springs, buffers, extractors and extractor springs at 5k on a C8 - at some point in a conflict - you won't have enough weapons if you don't have parts and maintainers - the same goes for all items.

You need to have your Army setup for a protracted conflict -- or you end up in this ad hoc dumpster fire the CF is in now.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Even on our exercises to Yakima, as the QM, I always brought a toolbox of spare parts we had built up with the help of the weapons techs in Chilliwack, springs, screws, pins, firing pins, gas plugs, mag bodies, etc. You always ended up fixing at least one weapon per exercise.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Even on our exercises to Yakima, as the QM, I always brought a toolbox of spare parts we had built up with the help of the weapons techs in Chilliwack, springs, screws, pins, firing pins, gas plugs, mag bodies, etc. You always ended up fixing at least one weapon per exercise.

Dude, you just kicked over about a dozen rice bowls

 

[KevinB]

I've also come to that conclusion. I tend to find that much of the winter weeknight and even weekend training is less than optimal. If you reduce that you'll find the paid days to generate an extra week in the field. With between 45-50 days annual training (but all of it quality trg and focused on refresher and collective) you can keep a unit adequately trained over a three-four year cycle.

The difficulty is getting everyone out for it. That requires legislation that both protects jobs as well as mandates reservists be entitled to both the statutory time off for training (unpaid by the employer) and statutory time off for paid summer vacation with their family.

I think a better idea would be 1 Fall 10 day Ex (2 days to pre and deploy - 1 day to return and End Ex), 1 Summer 18 day (2 day prep and deploy - 14 days - 2 days return and End Ex) -- mainly because I do think that only 1 "real" ex a year isn't enough.

Nothing will fly in Canada without legislation - and public support - otherwise it is best to shutter the reserves and use the money to get the Reg force kitted out.

I do think for the CBT Arms Res - a lot of weeknight and weekend training can be done on Simulators - either vehicle - or in a dismounted VR Battlefield setting

 

[Kirkhill]

Some spares - but spare parts are needed for protracted conflicts.
If you are replacing action springs, buffers, extractors and extractor springs at 5k on a C8 - at some point in a conflict - you won't have enough weapons if you don't have parts and maintainers - the same goes for all items.

You need to have your Army setup for a protracted conflict -- or you end up in this ad hoc dumpster fire the CF is in now.

Even on our exercises to Yakima, as the QM, I always brought a toolbox of spare parts we had built up with the help of the weapons techs in Chilliwack, springs, screws, pins, firing pins, gas plugs, mag bodies, etc. You always ended up fixing at least one weapon per exercise.

Fair enough. Do what you can with what's available.

But to the point of a protracted war - surely it is likely that the production lines will be turning out assembled weapons at a high rate of knots? And given the relatively low mass and volume of a rifle doesn't it seem just as reasonable to have a whole new rifle Fed Exed to the CQ? A protracted war is not won from the stores or even the warehouse. It won from the factory production line. And a great transport and supply line.

I can see that that is not a realistic approach for all things. But most/many things used today are not fixable. It is difficult for the average citizen or soldier to repair a tablet. When it breaks a new one is bought.

That is why I was asking about Picatinny rails. Your 1945 vintage guns, Colin, were held together by precision threads. And often much disassembly was required to get at the ripped up piece of hardware you wanted to unbolt or replace. On the other hand the Picatinny, Plug'n'Play system kind of splits the difference between repair and replace.

 

[FJAG]

View attachment 66920
So the first swipe at my Napkin Army -- I got ambitious while I was doing this - and this isn't really my 2025 one - more of a 2030.

Definitely 2030. The IFVs will take you beyond that.

As I originally didn't have the AH Squadrons - and I have noted in the Armoured BDE that the vehicles where TLAV (interim), I also got ambitious with the Artillery.

I presume that your battalion level symbol on the aviation elements is meant to represent a squadron rather than a US level of Aviation Bn. We currently have six operational TacHel sqns while your construct calls for nine. At roughly 15 aircraft per squadron that means we have roughly a hundred plus. A US Divisional heavy CAB has roughly 110 helicopters and a bunch of UAVs. In short your construct is doable (albeit we have to decide what really makes an AH) as far as numbers go. I tend to strongly favour a single aviation brigade if for no other reason than the need to concentrate maintenance capabilities.

I am still working on the BDE HQ constructs - and detailed break downs on the BN's.
For purposes of this I have stuck all the Sigs (Comms), Sigs (EW), NBCW Recce, AND Air Defence) into the Bde HQ's (plus Div HQ), as well as the Aviation CS/CSS.

Fair enough although I would tend to put AD under the arty and everyone else under something else. The US uses the Engr bn as a catch all for the purpose of providing the unit administrative support to all those disparate elements - it relieves the Bde HQ from having to look after the admin minutiae of keeping everyone fed and fueled and ammo'd up and the BSB's forward support company for the Engr bn is scaled to look after all those needs. I think that's a more practical solution than creating a Bde HQ Bn

My goal was PY Neutral - but a increase in the actual "fieldable" force - and major gains to support structures.
Also looking at the size of the CA, I opted for 1 DIV as both the admin side of the Army - and with a Deployable HQ portion if needed).

Each Bde has 4 INF BN's - but pay attention to any Regimental names , each Bde has 2 Gun Regt, Armored Bde and Mech Bde have 2 Gun Regt and 1 Rocket Regt (and eventually all will have 1 LR PF Regt)
Inf BN 4x Line Coy, 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
Armored Reg't 4x Tank Sqn, 1x ARV Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
Armored Car/CAV BN - 4 LAV Coy (Crew only) 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
Engineer Regt 3x Fd Sqn, 1x C-IED/EOD Sqn, 1x Cbt Spt Sqn, 1 Maint Sqn, 1 Trans Sqn, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Sqn
Artillery Regt 3x8 gun Bty, 2x STA/UAV Bty, 1 Maint Bty, 1 Trans Bty, 1 HHQ Bty, 1 Admin Bty

Doing some meatball math based on 100 pers per company and the 9 companies per bn/regt set out multiplied by 61 (57 units plus four bde HQ) brings us to 55,000 all ranks not counting the training and static base support infrastructure.

1 CDN Para BDE (CFB Petawawa - off base units noted in their description)
I opted for a Para Bde - simply because it allows for force employment worldwide rapidly. This is a 70/30 Reg/Res construct.

My gut reaction was "what the hell". Then I thought about it and said "why not?" I like the use of the 30/70//70/30 construct. IMHO without something like (plus some legislative/regulatory changes) that our Res F will never reach its full potential.

1 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) of Armoured Recce (Airborne capable) - a very light tracked vehicle - I am agnostic to what - but all terrain capable of high speeds - low on armor - high on stealth and surveillance.
1 Sqn of Light UH, and 1 Sqn of Chinooks (plus my dreamed AH Squadron) - these are direct BDE assets, I didn't get into naming the Tac Hel Sqn's - as the fight for those is such bigger than what they are called).

CDN Para Regiment
1-4 BN's of Paras (1&2 Para have secondary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 Para have Mountain taskings)
1 Para is 100% Reg Force
2 Para (CFB Trenton) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - Ottawa, Kingtson, and Toronto Res units)
3 Para (CFB Merrit or somewhere in BC) is 100% reg force
4 Para (CFB same as 3 Para) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Alberta/ Eastern BC Mountain Res Units)

I try to avoid new infrastructure. Edmonton is close enough to the mountains and the north and there was a reason why the Airborne started there.

1-2 CER
1 CER - 70/30 - same recurring zone as 2 Para
2 CER *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para

1-2 RCHA
1 RCHA 70/30 - same recruiting as 2 Para
2 RCHA *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para

1 FSB 100% Reg
2 FSB 100% Reg
1 MSB 100% Reg

FSBs and MSBs take us back to a Cold War US divisional organization which is fair enough as I see each of your brigades at around 10 - 12,000 folks which is a mini-div in and of itself. Let me add that I think some of your support structure could be 30/70 and 70/30 as well. Maint should definitely be 100%. Supply could probably manage in peacetime at around 70/30 and Tn could probably function at 30/70. It all depends on how you see the normal peacetime operational deployment cycle working.

One thought on artillery. In every brigade I would make one regt the close support regiment and concentrate all the FSCCs and FOOs required for the bde in one OP Bty. The same for all STA and STACC and ASCC resources. The second regiment could be pure general support and simply provide more fire delivery units (whether guns or rockets or UAVs) The CS Regt could be 70/30 while the GS Regt would be 10/90.

2 CDN Light BDE (CFB Gagetown - off base units noted in their description)
This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.

2 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) of Armoured Recce (I missed the "Armoured in my unit symbol above) - same vehicle and orbit - minus jump tasking as 1CLH
1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)

CDN Light Infantry
1-4 BN's of CLI (1&2 CLI have a primary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 CLI have Amphibious taskings)
1 BN CLI is 70% Reg Force - 30% Res
2 CLI (CFB North Bay) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - other Ontario Res units, not tasked to the Paras)
3 CLI (CFB Vancouver or somewhere in BC) is 50% reg force 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Western BC Res Units)
4 CLI is 50% Reg - 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Maritime Res Units)

I like the way the light bns specialize in airborne, mountain arctic and amphibious. My only question is: should the arctic role go to the para brigade so that there is a capability to jump into the Arctic. That could leave two of the leg light battalions to specialize in ... let's say urban ops.

1-2 Bn Cdn CAV Regiment (CFB Wainwright) 20/80% Reg/Res)
LAV BN without troops - for mobility/protection tasks - otherwise assisting with 3 CAB training.

3-4 CER
3 CER - 50/50 Reg/Res - (Arctic Task) same recruiting zone as 2 CLI
4 CER *CFB same as 3 CLI 50/50 Reg/Res (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI

3-4 RCHA
3 RCHA 30/70 - (Arctic Task) same recruiting as 2 CLI
4 RCHA *CFB same as 3 CLI 30/70 (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI

Having served in both 2 and 3 RCHA as well as two Res F regts and one bn I welcome the reappearance of the 3rd Herd. That said, the fact that sometime in the 1950's some twit decided that the Reg F fd regts (79 and 81 Fd Regt RCA) should become 3 and 4 RCHA has always rankled me. I actually liked the fact that 5 RALC was RALC and not RCHA. While I'm not fond of the Reg F infantry cabals I do think that we shouldn't throw out the fine wartime lineage/history and connection to local regions that many of our Res F bns/regts have. I know this is just a napkin org but whenever I do this game I like to throw traditional units into the mix. (I could never understand why there are now eight Rifles and seven Scots and four each Mercs and Lancs and Yorks - like I said, cap badges are cheap)

Had to get that off my chest.

3 FSB Arctic Task 100% Reg
4 FSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task 100% Reg
3 MSB 100% Reg
4 MSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task

If you take your amphibious force to the east coast you can leverage 2 RCR and a whole bunch of Maritimes inf bns and their infrastructure already there. Same if you put your Mountain troops into Vancouver/Edmonton.

3 CDN Armored BDE (CFB Wainwright) - off base units noted in their description)
This is a 20/80 Reg/Res construct.
Reg Force Housed at CFB Edmonton - with Simulators - vehicles held in Wainwright - Res Recruiting from Prairie provinces


3 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon - ideally a small tracked Recce Vehicle - but using LAV for now.

OPCON (CFB Edmonton) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)

1-2 Regiment Canadian Dragoons (no Royal)

4 Sqn x Regt

CDN Infantry Regiment
1-4 BN's of CI
1-2 in a IFV - tracked heavy gun/missile system (modern Bradley)
3-4 in LAV or TLAV (until entire Bde converted to Heavy IFV)

I'm with you on IFVs albeit that's a road the Army tends to continuously screw up. Scrapping the project in 2013 (I might be a bit off on my date) was one of the most shortsighted moves. Any one who thinks the LAV 6 was an adequate replacement - well I won't say more.

I'm also on for maintaining the TLAVs. There a perfectly adequate vehicle for dozens of roles and we already have them. Maintenance of them isn't the problem. Lack of maintainers is. Divestment isn't the solution. Creating a viable recruiting and training stream for maintainers and a viable and sustainable parts supply system is the solution and should be one of the top priorities for the CAF across the board. Personally I'd take 2,000 PYs out of NDHQ for that but if push came to shove I'd convert two or three Reg F bns/regts to Res F for that.

5-6 CER

1 ADATS Regiment

Call it GBAD

5-7 RCHA (5/6 RCHA with SPA, 7 with Armored Tracked Rocket system like MLRS)



5 FSB 100% Reg
6 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
5 MSB 100% Reg
6 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res

4 CDN Mechanized BDE (CFB Valcartier) - off base units noted in their description)
This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.
Res Recruiting from Quebec, and surrounding provinces if needed

I think you might want to up the Reg F ratio. I see these folks pretty busy on deployments once we get over our Afghan shock. For me, a mech force like this is the right force for the peacekeeping/support to nation building that our politicians so dearly love to get into. I'd up the ratio on the inf bns, recce and engrs to around 70/30 and cut back the ratio on the heavy weapons to 10/90

4 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon -

OPCON (CFB Valcartier) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)


CDN Infantry Regiment
LAV BN's (3x) naming continues 5-7 from the Armoured CIR

CDN Light Infantry
1 x BN

3rd Cdn CAV Bn



8-10 RCHA (8/9 RCHA with SPA Wheeled, 10 with Armored wheeled Rocket system like MLRS/HIMARS)



7 FSB 100% Reg
8 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
7 MSB 100% Reg
8 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res




So much more - but this was a pretty brutal wall of text -and I still have 7 more slides with more verbal diarrhea to go

I'm glad to see the integration and weighing of the Reg F/Res F ratios as well as the asymmetry.

I think our biggest difference lies in the number of brigade headquarters. Your bdes have a larger number of units which, I suppose is based on the idea that only a portion of the brigade deploys and the rest are used to generate augmentees or replacements within the brigade. While there is a div HQ it would be hard to make it deployable unless one generated the divisional enablers by taking enablers from the brigades.

I tend to create more bde HQs (5 v 4) to facilitate deploying an additional manoeuvre bde if necessary and putting enablers into support brigades so that there is flexibility in either augmenting deployed brigades to tailor them to a given situation or to facilitate the deployment of a full division if that should ever become necessary.

I think I would also stay with the two Div FG headquarters to allow one to build an "in case of war, break glass" force which is heavily weighted towards Res F and the other to build a lighter "day-to-day ops" force a bit more weighted to full-timers. I'm not sure that can be done with just one FG Div HQ. Whether we keep 1 Cdn Div as the CJOC based deployed forces HQ or not is another question for another day.

 

[KevinB]

Definitely 2030. The IFVs will take you beyond that.

I am sure the US Army would toss a few hundred cheap to the CF if they would go to forward deployed Bde in Europe...
Plus a bunch of M1A2 that the USMC is divesting.

I presume that your battalion level symbol on the aviation elements is meant to represent a squadron rather than a US level of Aviation Bn. We currently have six operational TacHel sqns while your construct calls for nine. At roughly 15 aircraft per squadron that means we have roughly a hundred plus. A US Divisional heavy CAB has roughly 110 helicopters and a bunch of UAVs. In short your construct is doable (albeit we have to decide what really makes an AH) as far as numbers go. I tend to strongly favour a single aviation brigade if for no other reason than the need to concentrate maintenance capabilities.

Yes - I wish it was larger - but 2030 wouldn't give the time.

Fair enough although I would tend to put AD under the arty and everyone else under something else. The US uses the Engr bn as a catch all for the purpose of providing the unit administrative support to all those disparate elements - it relieves the Bde HQ from having to look after the admin minutiae of keeping everyone fed and fueled and ammo'd up and the BSB's forward support company for the Engr bn is scaled to look after all those needs. I think that's a more practical solution than creating a Bde HQ Bn.

In the same way the Tac Hel crowd takes it from both the CA and RCAF, the RAC tend to bend over the AD side - so I chose to divest it from the Field Arty.

Doing some meatball math based on 100 pers per company and the 9 companies per bn/regt set out multiplied by 61 (57 units plus four bde HQ) brings us to 55,000 all ranks not counting the training and static base support infrastructure.

I started running out of PY's admittedly - which was why I was rather ruthless on HQ's
No Res forces above a Platoon -

My gut reaction was "what the hell". Then I thought about it and said "why not?" I like the use of the 30/70//70/30 construct. IMHO without something like (plus some legislative/regulatory changes) that our Res F will never reach its full potential.

Agreed - and neither will the Reg Force - as it cannot sustain operations without the Res.

I try to avoid new infrastructure. Edmonton is close enough to the mountains and the north and there was a reason why the Airborne started there.

You may remember elsewhere where I suggested Edmonton as the Light Bde center - and was heavily criticized.

FSBs and MSBs take us back to a Cold War US divisional organization which is fair enough as I see each of your brigades at around 10 - 12,000 folks which is a mini-div in and of itself. Let me add that I think some of your support structure could be 30/70 and 70/30 as well. Maint should definitely be 100%. Supply could probably manage in peacetime at around 70/30 and Tn could probably function at 30/70. It all depends on how you see the normal peacetime operational deployment cycle working.

Yeah I always viewed the ideal Bde as a Mini Div - mainly as the troop levels Canada has had since WW2 don't support Multi Div's - and I think the Bde needs to be viewed as the Basic Deployable structure - pieces of it can be deployed - but it should be self sufficient for the most part.

One thought on artillery. In every brigade I would make one regt the close support regiment and concentrate all the FSCCs and FOOs required for the bde in one OP Bty. The same for all STA and STACC and ASCC resources. The second regiment could be pure general support and simply provide more fire delivery units (whether guns or rockets or UAVs) The CS Regt could be 70/30 while the GS Regt would be 10/90.

I will default to you on that - I grew up as the FOO Party as part of the Bty so I just defaulted to that - but whatever works best.

I like the way the light bns specialize in airborne, mountain arctic and amphibious. My only question is: should the arctic role go to the para brigade so that there is a capability to jump into the Arctic. That could leave two of the leg light battalions to specialize in ... let's say urban ops.

I put the Airborne as a secondary Arctic Task -- mainly I see them getting up quickly in times of crisis - but long term it is a waste as they lost their mobility, and other "Light" Inf can be better equipped for that.

Having served in both 2 and 3 RCHA as well as two Res F regts and one bn I welcome the reappearance of the 3rd Herd. That said, the fact that sometime in the 1950's some twit decided that the Reg F fd regts (79 and 81 Fd Regt RCA) should become 3 and 4 RCHA has always rankled me. I actually liked the fact that 5 RALC was RALC and not RCHA. While I'm not fond of the Reg F infantry cabals I do think that we shouldn't throw out the fine wartime lineage/history and connection to local regions that many of our Res F bns/regts have. I know this is just a napkin org but whenever I do this game I like to throw traditional units into the mix. (I could never understand why there are now eight Rifles and seven Scots and four each Mercs and Lancs and Yorks - like I said, cap badges are cheap)

Had to get that off my chest.

If you take your amphibious force to the east coast you can leverage 2 RCR and a whole bunch of Maritimes inf bns and their infrastructure already there. Same if you put your Mountain troops into Vancouver/Edmonton.

I wanted an Amphibious force on each coast - just to force Jointness with the other services - and I think the PANASIAN area is more likely for an Amphibious tasking - so regular work with the West Coast RCN Fleet

I'm with you on IFVs albeit that's a road the Army tends to continuously screw up. Scrapping the project in 2013 (I might be a bit off on my date) was one of the most shortsighted moves. Any one who thinks the LAV 6 was an adequate replacement - well I won't say more.

I'm also on for maintaining the TLAVs. There a perfectly adequate vehicle for dozens of roles and we already have them. Maintenance of them isn't the problem. Lack of maintainers is. Divestment isn't the solution. Creating a viable recruiting and training stream for maintainers and a viable and sustainable parts supply system is the solution and should be one of the top priorities for the CAF across the board. Personally I'd take 2,000 PYs out of NDHQ for that but if push came to shove I'd convert two or three Reg F bns/regts to Res F for that.

I absolutely despise the TLAV - mainly as how some project office folks tried to sell it - but it does offer better mobility in a lot of terrain than the LAV - so until a real IFV can be acquired I would suggest it be retained - and even after it can have uses - even if kicked to mothballs to be used by a LI entity if they need some moderate protected mobility later.

Call it GBAD

I said ADATS because I wanted to remind the CA that it criminally lost that.

I think you might want to up the Reg F ratio. I see these folks pretty busy on deployments once we get over our Afghan shock. For me, a mech force like this is the right force for the peacekeeping/support to nation building that our politicians so dearly love to get into. I'd up the ratio on the inf bns, recce and engrs to around 70/30 and cut back the ratio on the heavy weapons to 10/90

I am unsure if in the Post Afghan world - we shall see the same interest, but I think that if that CMBG was needed - the first rotation would be mostly reg - and further done by Res -

I'm glad to see the integration and weighing of the Reg F/Res F ratios as well as the asymmetry.

I think our biggest difference lies in the number of brigade headquarters. Your bdes have a larger number of units which, I suppose is based on the idea that only a portion of the brigade deploys and the rest are used to generate augmentees or replacements within the brigade. While there is a div HQ it would be hard to make it deployable unless one generated the divisional enablers by taking enablers from the brigades.

Oh I have a ton of Div level enablers - but most are 10/90 as I see the likelihood of the CF deploying a Div in peacetime as low

I tend to create more bde HQs (5 v 4) to facilitate deploying an additional manoeuvre bde if necessary and putting enablers into support brigades so that there is flexibility in either augmenting deployed brigades to tailor them to a given situation or to facilitate the deployment of a full division if that should ever become necessary.

I think I would also stay with the two Div FG headquarters to allow one to build an "in case of war, break glass" force which is heavily weighted towards Res F and the other to build a lighter "day-to-day ops" force a bit more weighted to full-timers. I'm not sure that can be done with just one FG Div HQ. Whether we keep 1 Cdn Div as the CJOC based deployed forces HQ or not is another question for another day.

As far as the Div goes --- if it needed to deploy - then there is war time measures - and recruiting and maybe conscription/draft.

So at same time it would be deploying, the Bde's would be getting filled by new recruits - and you could swell "one up" so the Div would be a Corps - and the Bde Div's, and so on.

My Bde would have a 1* as Brigade Commander - a COL as COS, and S-3 - and POST Command LCOL's as the other Staff positions.
That way by the time one makes COL they should have a pretty solid grip on both the Leadership/Command and Staffing Requirements.

I would also have 1 Div as a MG (as CCA) and the CDS as a 3* - so I saved a slew on GOFO's so I can get a bunch more PY at the PTE/CPL level

 

[FJAG]

Or, respectfully, FJAG - increase the size of the pool of volunteers available. Accept the inefficiencies in the system and try to engage 100 people to generate a trained body of 10 to 20. Not all of those people will be available all of the time. And the faces of the 10 to 20 will change but likely include a solid knot of people that always turn out.

The fact that only 10 to 20 turn out does not mean that there is no value in the other 80 to 90 people. They too are willing - in the right circumstances.

If you had a pool of 1000 volunteers then the odds of fielding 100 improve considerably.

And the pairing of a Reg Force company, as suggested by GR66, is not incompatible with a largely volunteer Militia Regiment fielding a paid, active component of 100 Class A/B/C soldiers. Nor is it incompatible with pairing the same Militia Regiment with a Ranger Patrol or two.

There are a lot of things that you and I agree on but on this issue - no way.

I view our Res F structure as fundamentally flawed. Pretty much every occupation/classification in the Army these days is much more complex than it was fifty years ago. Each one of them needs a fairly detailed individual training regime and a system of regular refresher training as well as advanced collective training (and by advanced I mean at the company level for the vast bulk of reservists and at bn level for a selected group)

We are utterly unable to do that with a "come when you feel like it" philosophy. Increasing the pool might - maybe - increase that pool of available folks but I think that when you are already falling short of your manning levels then you will never achieve the numbers that you need. To create those additional numbers (assuming that you can even get them) places a massive burden on the system which starts with the clear increase in pay for the new candidates but much more so in the administrative burden placed on the training and administrative cadre that is needed to feed them through the system. If you plan to increase your pool ten fold then you will need a ten fold training and admin effort just for starters.

Sometimes when you see a problem you have to come to the realization that the only way through it is an unpopular path. For me the solution comes down to a very tightly controlled system of obligatory training that balances the needs of the military with that of the civilian employer and the soldiers family.

I break that into phases. The first is to use the young soldiers student status to the utmost by using every spare summer school break session to the utmost to train them to Reg F DP 1 standards while giving them a maximum summer job. Secondly you leverage financial support for university and community college courses to off-load critical skills training (mechanics, medics, truckers, administrators, food services) onto civilian instructors while giving the soldier a marketable civilian qualification and locking them into a period of obligatory service.

Once fully trained as an individual to DP 1 and some DP 2 standards you move to phase 2 whereby you cut back on the obligatory activities they are required to participate in to the minimum necessary to maintain those skills and to keep the unit (I put that at roughly 45 days annually) This is where the balancing act is critical because you want to maintain a critical core of leadership especially at the senior NCO level.

Fundamental to any system like this is the need for a much greater integration of Reg F leadership in actually leading at the Res F level and a much greater involvement by Reg F personnel in all of the training of the Res F. Simply put, training the Res F must be part and parcel to every Reg F units annual training cycle.

The concept of predeployment training that was developed for the Afghan War is simply ludicrous. If one has six months to deploy, one could take civilians off the street and have them trained to a DP 1 rifleman or gunner or crewman standard in time for deployment. You do not need a Res F for that. The issue is that we shouldn't need six months. We should have a pool of people who can go on deployments with one or two months of theatre specific training because they already have a known and acceptable basic standard. And when the chips are really down, they should be able to get on a plane within 48 hours and be useable by the time that they land.

Sorry, K. We'll never agree on your model. We need to aim much higher. Like I said, the path ahead is not a popular one but it is a necessary one. This is one pig where a coat of lipstick just isn't going to cut it. We've been trying and failing since the fifties.

 

[KevinB]

Also I

Fair enough. Do what you can with what's available.

But to the point of a protracted war - surely it is likely that the production lines will be turning out assembled weapons at a high rate of knots? And given the relatively low mass and volume of a rifle doesn't it seem just as reasonable to have a whole new rifle Fed Exed to the CQ? A protracted war is not won from the stores or even the warehouse. It won from the factory production line. And a great transport and supply line.

I can see that that is not a realistic approach for all things. But most/many things used today are not fixable. It is difficult for the average citizen or soldier to repair a tablet. When it breaks a new one is bought.

That is why I was asking about Picatinny rails. Your 1945 vintage guns, Colin, were held together by precision threads. And often much disassembly was required to get at the ripped up piece of hardware you wanted to unbolt or replace. On the other hand the Picatinny, Plug'n'Play system kind of splits the difference between repair and replace.

Look at it more this way -- that Tablet - that might be part of the FCS or the entire thing, but not the entire LAV...
As the cost/scale of the item increases, the more it requires modular replacement, as opposed to sheer replacement.

Most new equipment is designed for modular replacement - it requires a tech for the most part, but the entire item isn't disposable.

 

[FJAG]

More in how to support the troops on the ground - I am not a fan of running the LAV with 2 - regardless, the gunner alone doesn't have enough SA to control fire, give vehicle directions and communicate - it needs a CC.

Infantrymen turned LAV crew still know what it is like on the ground - and being part of that unit makes the relationship smoother.

The only time I would consider a non 031 Crew is for a district CAV grouping - where they are agnostic to their crew - and used more as Armored Transport than a fighting vehicle.
Truly the only role I see for a LAV in a Armored formation is running convoy escorts for non bleeding edge support - and that was my goal of the non Asymetrical Bde construct I came up with.

I fully agree. We in Canada have given our infantry carriers a much bigger role then they merit since we first gave M113s to the mech bns. It was a battle taxi and not an adequate fighting support vehicle. Being given a LAV with a 25mm upped the ante on that but it's still far short of being an IFV. I get drawn to FM 3-96 respecting the BCT which says this about the SBCT:

SBCTs balance combined arms capabilities with significant mobility. The SBCT primarily fights as a dismounted Infantry formation that includes three SBCT Infantry battalions.

Whether the Stryker bns still have a "combined arms" capability since the MGSs have been withdrawn is questionable but they certainly still come with a much more powerful mortar and anti-armour capability then our mech bns. Admittedly they don't have the 25mm but that is changing.

 

[KevinB]

I fully agree. We in Canada have given our infantry carriers a much bigger role then they merit since we first gave M113s to the mech bns. It was a battle taxi and not an adequate fighting support vehicle. Being given a LAV with a 25mm upped the ante on that but it's still far short of being an IFV. I get drawn to FM 3-96 respecting the BCT which says this about the SBCT:

SBCTs balance combined arms capabilities with significant mobility. The SBCT primarily fights as a dismounted Infantry formation that includes three SBCT Infantry battalions.

Part of the problem is the SBCT's used them like IFV's in Afghanistan and Iraq (they had either Mk19 or M2 in the RWS) - because it wasn't a Peer/Near Peer threat - the same way the CF ran the LAV in Afghanistan.

The US Army at least codified their doctrine as they acknowledged that it wasn't an IFV based on their experiences with the Bradley - which the M2A3 is a pretty potent IFV.

I think the CF having never had an IFV, hasn't fully understood how vulnerable the LAV is.

Whether the Stryker bns still have a "combined arms" capability since the MGSs have been withdrawn is questionable but they certainly still come with a much more powerful mortar and anti-armour capability then our mech bns. Admittedly they don't have the 25mm but that is changing.

They have AH's
Which IMHO is better than a tank

 

[FJAG]

I really have to get on with doing other things today.

No Res forces above a Platoon

I could see some in Coy HQ and even the odd company commander and CSM assuming he's taken the requisite courses and has worked his way through the lower command positions.

You may remember elsewhere where I suggested Edmonton as the Light Bde center - and was heavily criticized.

I think what we criticized was taking the armour out of Edmonton/Wainwright. You could always squeeze in another light battalion. What makes it trickier now is that the RCAF no longer has Hercs in Edmonton. But that's a problem everywhere except eastern Ontario.

Yeah I always viewed the ideal Bde as a Mini Div - mainly as the troop levels Canada has had since WW2 don't support Multi Div's - and I think the Bde needs to be viewed as the Basic Deployable structure - pieces of it can be deployed - but it should be self sufficient for the most part.

We agree on the concept if not the methodology

I will default to you on that - I grew up as the FOO Party as part of the Bty so I just defaulted to that - but whatever works best.

Things have changed since your day. I actually think creating an observation battery and reducing the gun batteries to "just guns" is one of the positive moves made. Unfortunately we've only gone part way. While all the FOOs and their teams are in one battery, we've left the BCs and their FSCCs with the gun batteries. That makes no sense tactically but was designed to leave majors in charge of each battery. This is what you get when you can't get over yourself and accept the fact that with the FOOs gone, a senior Battery Captain could very easily run the battery and that senior captains would also work quite well as fire support coordinators at the bn FSCC. But then that would have upset the rank pyramid.

I absolutely despise the TLAV - mainly as how some project office folks tried to sell it - but it does offer better mobility in a lot of terrain than the LAV - so until a real IFV can be acquired I would suggest it be retained - and even after it can have uses - even if kicked to mothballs to be used by a LI entity if they need some moderate protected mobility later.

Even when I worked with German Leopard and Marder bns there were always a herd of M113s swarming around filling a lot of B Veh roles. It was always fun to watch them fall behind because they simply couldn't keep up with tanks and IFVs even on bald-ass prairie.

I said ADATS because I wanted to remind the CA that it criminally lost that.

I am unsure if in the Post Afghan world - we shall see the same interest, but I think that if that CMBG was needed - the first rotation would be mostly reg - and further done by Res -

Oh I have a ton of Div level enablers - but most are 10/90 as I see the likelihood of the CF deploying a Div in peacetime as low

As far as the Div goes --- if it needed to deploy - then there is war time measures - and recruiting and maybe conscription/draft.

So at same time it would be deploying, the Bde's would be getting filled by new recruits - and you could swell "one up" so the Div would be a Corps - and the Bde Div's, and so on.

Not so sure that there'd be time.

My Bde would have a 1* as Brigade Commander - a COL as COS, and S-3 - and POST Command LCOL's as the other Staff positions.
That way by the time one makes COL they should have a pretty solid grip on both the Leadership/Command and Staffing Requirements.

You'd need that for the size and complexity of these organizations. Almost thinking that your G4 should be a Col who would also run all of the static base infrastructure.

I would also have 1 Div as a MG (as CCA) and the CDS as a 3* - so I saved a slew on GOFO's so I can get a bunch more PY at the PTE/CPL level

I'm still of the view that you could take 10,000 folks out headquarters above brigade level and not suffer any ill effects as long as you massively revise the processes and all the decision making minutiae that Ottawa refuses to delegate to the appropriate lower command levels.

 

[KevinB]

Part of my BDE HQ Construct.
I stuck the Bde Recon Assets into the MI - and grew it to a BN - as I feel UAV's need to be part of the Int package - as well as all the other ISR assets - so they can be better monitored - and used more seamlessly by the G2 and G3

@FJAG you now see my mini Div horror show -- I was still working on the Sig's Reg't layout - but as I am not being paid for a TO&E - I think this gets my point across without a bunch more time devoted to pictograms

 

[KevinB]

I really have to get on with doing other things today.

Me too

I could see some in Coy HQ and even the odd company commander and CSM assuming he's taken the requisite courses and has worked his way through the lower command positions.

Agreed - but I was doing the Crawl - Walk - Run.
So at the start I was just going to ground level Platoons.

I think what we criticized was taking the armour out of Edmonton/Wainwright. You could always squeeze in another light battalion. What makes it trickier now is that the RCAF no longer has Hercs in Edmonton. But that's a problem everywhere except eastern Ontario.

A C17 should be able to get to Edmonton in 3.5hrs - which should be enough time to demo the FIBUA block house and the range gate - and have it land on the base runway
As much as I would love to have a Coy on IRU at <60min NTM - I think that needs to fall under CANSOFCOM - I think 1 Coy on 4hrs NTM is able for a Para Reg't - and that allows for the C-17 to fly across Canada to get them if need be - while they draw mission items.

We agree on the concept if not the methodology

Things have changed since your day. I actually think creating an observation battery and reducing the gun batteries to "just guns" is one of the positive moves made. Unfortunately we've only gone part way. While all the FOOs and their teams are in one battery, we've left the BCs and their FSCCs with the gun batteries. That makes no sense tactically but was designed to leave majors in charge of each battery. This is what you get when you can't get over yourself and accept the fact that with the FOOs gone, a senior Battery Captain could very easily run the battery and that senior captains would also work quite well as fire support coordinators at the bn FSCC. But then that would have upset the rank pyramid.

Roger - I see it now.

You'd need that for the size and complexity of these organizations. Almost thinking that your G4 should be a Col who would also run all of the static base infrastructure.

Good point - plus it makes for 3 Col competing for 1 BGen Command slot.

I'm still of the view that you could take 10,000 folks out headquarters above brigade level and not suffer any ill effects as long as you massively revise the processes and all the decision making minutiae that Ottawa refuses to delegate to the appropriate lower command levels.

I totally agree

 

[FJAG]

Part of the problem is the SBCT's used them like IFV's in Afghanistan and Iraq (they had either Mk19 or M2 in the RWS) - because it wasn't a Peer/Near Peer threat - the same way the CF ran the LAV in Afghanistan.

The US Army at least codified their doctrine as they acknowledged that it wasn't an IFV based on their experiences with the Bradley - which the M2A3 is a pretty potent IFV.

I think the CF having never had an IFV, hasn't fully understood how vulnerable the LAV is.

I've only ever read about 2 Inf Div's 5th SBCT adventure in Afghanistan in 2009/10. This is actually a good booklet on events there:

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/StrykersInAfghanistan.pdf

A lot of their problems stemmed from really poor leadership.

As far as Canada was concern the difference in attitude was that for the US, the Stryker is an interim middle-weight solution while for Canada its an agile, all-singing, all-dancing, full spectrum top of the line tool.

They have AH's
Which IMHO is better than a tank

And that, sir, is the real issue which we just can't seem to get our heads around. I'm not so sure how they'd fare in a proper peer conflict these days but there's a definite advantage in them until we get all the appropriate autonomous ground and air vehicles up and running.