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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Part of the problem is the SBCT's used them like IFV's in Afghanistan and Iraq (they had either Mk19 or M2 in the RWS) - because it wasn't a Peer/Near Peer threat - the same way the CF ran the LAV in Afghanistan.

The US Army at least codified their doctrine as they acknowledged that it wasn't an IFV based on their experiences with the Bradley - which the M2A3 is a pretty potent IFV.

I think the CF having never had an IFV, hasn't fully understood how vulnerable the LAV is.

They have AH's ;)
Which IMHO is better than a tank

.... For short periods of time in favourable weather conditions during permissive air superiority windows :)
 
I've only ever read about 2 Inf Div's 5th SBCT adventure in Afghanistan in 2009/10. This is actually a good booklet on events there:

A lot of their problems stemmed from really poor leadership.

As far as Canada was concern the difference in attitude was that for the US, the Stryker is an interim middle-weight solution while for Canada its an agile, all-singing, all-dancing, full spectrum top of the line tool.


And that, sir, is the real issue which we just can't seem to get our heads around. I'm not so sure how they'd fare in a proper peer conflict these days but there's a definite advantage in them until we get all the appropriate autonomous ground and air vehicles up and running.

🍻
Given the power than some EW systems can put out -- unless it's a massively shielded totally IA user independent system - I wouldn't put a ton of faith in any autonomous systems.
 
There are a lot of things that you and I agree on but on this issue - no way.

I view our Res F structure as fundamentally flawed. Pretty much every occupation/classification in the Army these days is much more complex than it was fifty years ago. Each one of them needs a fairly detailed individual training regime and a system of regular refresher training as well as advanced collective training (and by advanced I mean at the company level for the vast bulk of reservists and at bn level for a selected group)

We are utterly unable to do that with a "come when you feel like it" philosophy. Increasing the pool might - maybe - increase that pool of available folks but I think that when you are already falling short of your manning levels then you will never achieve the numbers that you need. To create those additional numbers (assuming that you can even get them) places a massive burden on the system which starts with the clear increase in pay for the new candidates but much more so in the administrative burden placed on the training and administrative cadre that is needed to feed them through the system. If you plan to increase your pool ten fold then you will need a ten fold training and admin effort just for starters.

Sometimes when you see a problem you have to come to the realization that the only way through it is an unpopular path. For me the solution comes down to a very tightly controlled system of obligatory training that balances the needs of the military with that of the civilian employer and the soldiers family.

I break that into phases. The first is to use the young soldiers student status to the utmost by using every spare summer school break session to the utmost to train them to Reg F DP 1 standards while giving them a maximum summer job. Secondly you leverage financial support for university and community college courses to off-load critical skills training (mechanics, medics, truckers, administrators, food services) onto civilian instructors while giving the soldier a marketable civilian qualification and locking them into a period of obligatory service.

Once fully trained as an individual to DP 1 and some DP 2 standards you move to phase 2 whereby you cut back on the obligatory activities they are required to participate in to the minimum necessary to maintain those skills and to keep the unit (I put that at roughly 45 days annually) This is where the balancing act is critical because you want to maintain a critical core of leadership especially at the senior NCO level.

Fundamental to any system like this is the need for a much greater integration of Reg F leadership in actually leading at the Res F level and a much greater involvement by Reg F personnel in all of the training of the Res F. Simply put, training the Res F must be part and parcel to every Reg F units annual training cycle.

The concept of predeployment training that was developed for the Afghan War is simply ludicrous. If one has six months to deploy, one could take civilians off the street and have them trained to a DP 1 rifleman or gunner or crewman standard in time for deployment. You do not need a Res F for that. The issue is that we shouldn't need six months. We should have a pool of people who can go on deployments with one or two months of theatre specific training because they already have a known and acceptable basic standard. And when the chips are really down, they should be able to get on a plane within 48 hours and be useable by the time that they land.

Sorry, K. We'll never agree on your model. We need to aim much higher. Like I said, the path ahead is not a popular one but it is a necessary one. This is one pig where a coat of lipstick just isn't going to cut it. We've been trying and failing since the fifties.

🍻

I understand that we won't come to terms with this. But I'm going to make an effort to put my thoughts in a coherent form.

That may take a day or two.

In the meantime I came across this factoid which I thought worth sharing.

In the US, the National Guard is the well regulated militia funded by the State and at the disposal of the Governor. I trust we can agree on that.

The National Guard is in part funded by, and equipped by the Federal Government. In return for that support the National Guard agrees to be "federalized", in whole or in part, when the President signs the appropriate papers.

The armies of the individual states are then united in support of the federal army.

Somebody will correct me when I swerve, I know.



So.

In looking at the Militia model a came to the conclusion that the critical roles are not the CO and the OCs Rather the critical roles are the Adjutant and, as I described it, the OC Adm. And as usual I am a dollar short and a day late.

The appropriate terms are well enough known as Adjutant and Quartermaster. Whodathunkit.

The Adj handles recruiting. personnel records, pay, surgeons and chaplains

He is assisted by the QuarterMaster who handles quarters (armouries), uniforms, kit and vehicles.


The next two critical positions, as I came to see them, were the Training Officer and the Int O with honourable mention going to the Sigs O.



Now if you have a bunch of units you need a bunch of Adjs. A bunch of Adjs equals a Corps. Once you have a Corps you need a General. Likewise for the QM, the QM Corps and the QM General.

Peculiarly the British adopted this system in the early 1900s, using 18th century terminology, while the US Army adopted the Prussian system. Something to do with a misplaced loyalty to a chap name of von Steuben, perhaps.

Interestingly the National Guard, at least in some states, seem to have adhered to the more venerable terminology.

And thus this bit of promised info from Washington State.


Lo and behold the senior officer in charge of the National Guard is ..... the Adjutant-General

And his first duties are, as "he commands all Washington Army and Air National Guard forces" to act as "Director of the State’s Emergency Management and Enhanced 911 programs." General Daugherty also serves as Homeland Security Advisor to the Governor of Washington and as State Administrative Agent for all United States Department of Homeland Security grants awarded to Washington’s state, local, tribal and non-profit agencies and organizations.

That is his day job. Which explains


For most of its history, the National Guard’s mission was focused primarily on the homefront

"The guard’s dual mission at home and abroad means that equipment and training that can pull double-duty is particularly important. Federal missions — which often mean war, or training for it — come first, but the logistics, skills, and structure needed in domestic emergency response can mirror those on the battlefield, or in an overseas humanitarian response. Things like setting up a security perimeter, clearing a route, or moving into an area quickly and setting up shop have some basic similarities, whether troops are fighting insurgents in Afghanistan, responding to an earthquake in Haiti, or preparing for a hurricane in New Orleans, Benton says.

“The template that says, ‘Build the tents, bring the shower, and have the portalets,’ can be a mobile hospital, or it can be an engineer village for a levee breach, or it could be any security mission,” Benton says. “Those templates don’t change. Those become muscle memory.”

The same thing goes for equipment. Both the guard and the reserves prize gear that can be used at war or in a domestic emergency — everything from aircraft and cargo trucks to things like bulk water tank racks. The Army’s modernization priorities focus on air and land combat equipment and soldier lethality. According to a recent DOD report, the Army Guard’s air and weapons capabilities are generally more modern, in keeping with these priorities. Areas like engineering, logistics, and transportation, which are critical for responding to natural disasters, have more older equipment or shortages of this dual-use gear, the report says. But as Covid continues to surge, and climate change brings more extreme weather, the guard’s domestic missions, and its reliance on gear like this, are unlikely to abate.

Over the last two years, the National Guard’s “Swiss army knife” capabilities were on display somewhere else: back home.



5f32eedb7e378


The Adjutant General, Washington​

Maj. Gen. Bret D. Daugherty​



Major General Bret D. Daugherty assumed duties as The Adjutant General, Washington on July 28, 2012. As The Adjutant General, he commands all Washington Army and Air National Guard forces and is Director of the State’s Emergency Management and Enhanced 911 programs. General Daugherty also serves as Homeland Security Advisor to the Governor of Washington and as State Administrative Agent for all United States Department of Homeland Security grants awarded to Washington’s state, local, tribal and non-profit agencies and organizations.

General Daugherty attended Seattle University where he was awarded an Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarship. Upon graduating as a Distinguished Military Graduate in June of 1980, he was commissioned as a Regular Army Second Lieutenant. He left active duty in 1989 and joined the Washington Army National Guard in 1990.



Education:​

  • 1980 Seattle University, Bachelor of Science, Psychology, Seattle, Washington
  • 1986 American Technological University, Master of Science, Counseling Psychology, Killeen, Texas
  • 1989 Seattle University, Master of Public Administration, Seattle, Washington
  • 2000 United States Army War College, Master of Science, Strategic Studies, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
  • 2009 Joint Task Force Commander Training Course, Certificate, United States Northern Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado
  • 2011 Dual Status Commander Qualification Program, Certificate, United States Northern Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado

Assignments:​

  • June 1980 - October 1980, Student, Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, Kentucky
  • October 1980 - July 1981, Student, Initial Entry Rotary Wing, Fort Rucker, Alabama
  • July 1981 - May 1985, Attack Helicopter Platoon Leader, Troop B, 7/17 Cavalry (Attack), 6th Air Cavalry Combat Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas
  • June 1985 - August 1989, Assistant Professor of Military Science (Recruiting Team Chief), 4th Reserve Officers' Training Corps Region, Fort Lewis, Washington
  • August 1989 - February 1990, United States Army Reserve Control Group (Reinforcement), Saint Louis, Missouri
  • February 1990 - February 1991, Assistant S-4, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
  • February 1991 - September 1992, Commander, Headquarters Company, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
  • September 1992 - July 1993, Executive Officer, 1-168 Aviation Battalion (Attack), Fort Lewis, Washington
  • July 1993 - December 1993, Student, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
  • December 1993 - September 1995, Executive Officer, 1-168 Aviation Battalion (Attack), Fort Lewis, Washington
  • September 1995 - July 1996, Assistant S-3, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
  • July 1996 - July 1999, Commander, 1-168 Aviation Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington
  • July 1999 - June 2000, Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
  • July 2000 - September 2001, State Aviation Officer, Headquarters State Area Regional Command, Camp Murray, Washington
  • September 2001 - March 2002, Executive Officer, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
  • March 2002 - August 2002, Commander, Task Force United States Army Forces Command, Border Support -Washington, Camp Murray, Washington
  • August 2002 - February 2003, Director of Security and Intelligence, Headquarters State Area Regional Command, Camp Murray, Washington
  • February 2003 - March 2004, Deputy Commander, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
  • March 2004 - June 2005, Deputy Commander (Rear), 81st Brigade Combat Team, Fort Lewis, Washington,
  • June 2005 - May 2008, Commander, 205th Regiment (Leadership), Camp Murray, Washington
  • June 2008 - June 2009, Commander, 66th Theater Aviation Command, Camp Murray, Washington
  • June 2009 - July 2012, Assistant Adjutant General - Army, Washington National Guard, Camp Murray, Washington
  • August 2012 - Present, The Adjutant General of the State of Washington, Camp Murray, Washington

Flight Information:​

Rating: Senior Army Aviator
Flight Hours: More than 1,300
Aircraft flown: TH-55, UH-1, AH-1, OH-58, UH-60
Pilot wings from: Fort Rucker, Alabama

Awards and Decorations​

  • Legion of Merit
  • Meritorious Service Medal (with 3 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
  • Army Commendation Medal (with 1 Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
  • Army Achievement Medal (with 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
  • Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (with 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
  • National Defense Service Medal (with 1 Bronze Service Star)
  • Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
  • Humanitarian Service Medal
  • Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Silver Hourglass and M Device)
  • Army Service Ribbon
  • Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon
  • Washington National Guard Commendation Medal
  • Washington State Emergency Service Medal (with 4 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
  • National Guard Service Ribbon
  • Senior Army Aviator Badge
  • Parachutist Badge

Civilian Occupation:​

The Adjutant General, Washington Military Department

Professional Memberships and Affiliations:​

  • National Guard Association of the United States
  • Reserve Officer's Association
  • Army Aviation Association of America
  • Army War College Alumni Association

Effective Date of Promotions:​

(Current as of November 2012)

  • Second Lieutenant 28 May 1980
  • First Lieutenant 28 November 1981
  • Captain 1 March 1984
  • Major 20 October 1992
  • Lieutenant Colonel 4 June 1997
  • Colonel 3 September 2002
  • Brigadier General (Line) 7 November 2008
  • Major General




You are short of bodies. You can't get sailors to fill berths. You can't get soldiers to fill the billets available in even your small battalions. You need bodies.

Even when you open the ranks to the general population you can't get women through the armoury doors. Or natives. Or minorities. Or the youngsters generally.

Perhaps, as Bread Guy has noted, more people would be attracted if the job were more local.



Or put it another way. How do we Canadianize the National Guard model?
 
Or put it another way. How do we Canadianize the National Guard model?
In short we don't.

Basically the Adjutant General's Corps in most armies is the one responsible for personnel. Effectively Canada's most reasonable facsimile would be Chief Military Personnel.

As far as the Adjutant Generals of the State National Guards are concerned, this goes back to the US Federal Militia Act of 1792. The purpose of this act was to standardize the Militias of the several states. Article VI provides:

VI. And be it further enacted, That there shall be an adjutant general appointed in each state, whose duty it shall be to distribute all orders for the Commander in Chief of the State to the several corps; to attend all publick reviews, when the Commander in Chief of the State shall review the militia, or any part thereof; to obey all orders from him relative to carrying into execution, and perfecting, the system of military discipline established by this Act; to furnish blank forms of different returns that may be required; and to explain the principles of which they should be made; to receive from the several officers of the different corps throughout the state, returns of the militia under their command, reporting the actual situation of their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, their delinquencies, and every other thing which relates to the general advancement of good order and discipline: All which, the several officers of the division, brigades, regiments, and battalions are hereby required to make in the usual manner, so that the said adjutant general may be duly furnished therewith: From all which returns be shall make proper abstracts, and by the same annually before the Commander in Chief of the State.


Each State's constitution therefore creates such a position and makes the AG responsible to the State's Commander in Chief who is the Governor. As you can see the position is highly administrative in nature.

You should note as well that the same Act provided for the call out of State Militias on Federal Service.

Canadian Militias developed differently and basically borrowed off the UK's Militia systems. There's a fairly detailed history of them here:


Long story short, and as you well know, all of Canada's military, Reg and Res, is federal but with several provisions which provide for assistance to provincial authorities when requested or requisitioned. Both countries have had two centuries of their particular system and it seems to be working for each of them. If anyone needed to change the system it was the US whose little adventure in 1861-5 should have resulted in changes - but didn't.

Add to that our constitution which firmly puts defence and residual powers into the hands of the feds and sure as shootin' there will never be a way to Guardize our Reserves. The best we can do is structure our Reserves like the Guard with formed and equipped units and formations and an appropriate legislative framework which provides good job protection. I've been advocating that for decades without success.

🍻
 
I will stipulate that you are legally correct.

But my point doesn't go to the question of ranks, titles and paraphernalia so much as the field organization they represent. As a result of their organization they manage to store large amounts of useful kit (predominantly logistical stuff like Humvees, Trucks, Helicopters, Hercs, Generators, Water Purifiers and Fire Fighting Gear) in depots across the country within arms reach of willing local volunteers. Local Volunteers that are also available to bolster the Federal forces against all enemies foreign and domestic.

We have a 2% of GDP target that we can't sell to the population or the politicians.

As a marketing ploy I would suggest pledging to spend the difference between the current budget and the two percent on the missing logistical support and distribute it nationally in depots accessible to the local Territorial Groups. That would relieve the regs of domestic emergency response, supply a body of militia that could be dragooned (if you so require) into support of the regs, and might even get you some kudos and the enthusiastic support of people willing to sign a limited "local" contract with Her Majesty.

Meanwhile the rest of the budget gets to be focused on the Regular Force, and its highly trained and specialized technicians.

(Add in shelters, kitchens, ambulances, field hospitals and CBRN facilities to the list of goodies on hand)
 
Just for the fun of it I randomly selected Ohio (its not far from me) to see what their NG budget is.

They have roughly 17,000 Army and Air Guard and their annual budget for 2018 was US$666 million. Of that there was a direct federal allotment of US$616 million leaving the Ohio to pony up US$49 million. Of that the Feds gave Ohio a further grant of US$37.3 million (primarily for the maintenance and operation by Ohio of various military facilities) leaving to come up with US$10.4 million from General Revenue and another US$1.7 million from something called a Dedicated Purpose.


So we have about a net inflow into Ohio of over US$600 million. A large chunk of that is pay which benefits the State. Undoubtedly there are ammo costs as well which probably doesn't. But then there is fuel and numerous other supplies from State businesses. Lima, Ohio has a nice tank plant. Long story short Fed military money makes a big impact in the State ... which means that the Governor, senators and representatives will be big boosters and advocates for their Guard.

Ohio has a population of 11.7 million. Quebec hits 8.5 million and Ontario 15.5 million and generate by the last info available to me 4,200 and 5,300 reservists - probably a couple of hundred air reserve and probably a goodly share of some 5,000 Naval Reservists (13 of 24 divisions). So roughly 2/3 of the number of folks for a little over twice the population.

I sincerely doubt as to whether anyone in Quebec's or Ontario's government has a clue as to what dollar value their reservists bring into the local economy. I also expect no one has an interest to find out until there is a threat of an armoury closing at which point we're dealing with tiny dollars. I'm pretty sure the Feds don't know either because they tend to allocate every nickel they can against the reserve budget even if it doesn't impact the reserves. The last figures I saw with any level of credibility was the 2016 Auditor General report on reserves which said the Army budgeted CA$335 million for 21,000 reservists - roughly CA$202 million for 19,500 part-time reservists, CA$91 million for 1,500 full-timers and CA$41 million for operating costs. Think about it. Half the money for all Canada's Army reserves as is spent on a roughly equal number of Ohio's NG. And we spent 1/3 of the pay budget on 7% of the reservists who are basically doing the job that should legally be done by the Reg F (continuous full-time service = Reg F).

I'm afraid I'm starting to ramble here but my point is if you ever convince anyone to pony up 2% of GDP (which we both know its a pipe dream) then the robber barons running the Forces will spend it on another 7,000 cubicles at Carling Campus. These are the folks that are getting CA$50 million annually for the next five years to combat sexual misconduct. They won't spend any new funds on anything as valuable as equipment or storage depots of any nature whatsoever. How did that whole national stockpile of medical supplies for a pandemic work out?

:mad:
 
Some spares - but spare parts are needed for protracted conflicts.
If you are replacing action springs, buffers, extractors and extractor springs at 5k on a C8 - at some point in a conflict - you won't have enough weapons if you don't have parts and maintainers - the same goes for all items.

You need to have your Army setup for a protracted conflict -- or you end up in this ad hoc dumpster fire the CF is in now.
Our amount of techs works for a low intensity conflict, and that's about it. Example, I comfortable supported 14 courses during the summer of 2020 in Wainwight because little was breaking at a pace I could easily keep up with. Recent tours over seas have only one or two techs for a company plus, because the break down in weapons is not at combat levels. If it were you would need atlesst 2 sections of techs.
 
Just for the fun of it I randomly selected Ohio (its not far from me) to see what their NG budget is.

They have roughly 17,000 Army and Air Guard and their annual budget for 2018 was US$666 million. Of that there was a direct federal allotment of US$616 million leaving the Ohio to pony up US$49 million. Of that the Feds gave Ohio a further grant of US$37.3 million (primarily for the maintenance and operation by Ohio of various military facilities) leaving to come up with US$10.4 million from General Revenue and another US$1.7 million from something called a Dedicated Purpose.



So we have about a net inflow into Ohio of over US$600 million. A large chunk of that is pay which benefits the State. Undoubtedly there are ammo costs as well which probably doesn't. But then there is fuel and numerous other supplies from State businesses. Lima, Ohio has a nice tank plant. Long story short Fed military money makes a big impact in the State ... which means that the Governor, senators and representatives will be big boosters and advocates for their Guard.

Ohio has a population of 11.7 million. Quebec hits 8.5 million and Ontario 15.5 million and generate by the last info available to me 4,200 and 5,300 reservists - probably a couple of hundred air reserve and probably a goodly share of some 5,000 Naval Reservists (13 of 24 divisions). So roughly 2/3 of the number of folks for a little over twice the population.

I sincerely doubt as to whether anyone in Quebec's or Ontario's government has a clue as to what dollar value their reservists bring into the local economy. I also expect no one has an interest to find out until there is a threat of an armoury closing at which point we're dealing with tiny dollars. I'm pretty sure the Feds don't know either because they tend to allocate every nickel they can against the reserve budget even if it doesn't impact the reserves. The last figures I saw with any level of credibility was the 2016 Auditor General report on reserves which said the Army budgeted CA$335 million for 21,000 reservists - roughly CA$202 million for 19,500 part-time reservists, CA$91 million for 1,500 full-timers and CA$41 million for operating costs. Think about it. Half the money for all Canada's Army reserves as is spent on a roughly equal number of Ohio's NG. And we spent 1/3 of the pay budget on 7% of the reservists who are basically doing the job that should legally be done by the Reg F (continuous full-time service = Reg F).

I'm afraid I'm starting to ramble here but my point is if you ever convince anyone to pony up 2% of GDP (which we both know its a pipe dream) then the robber barons running the Forces will spend it on another 7,000 cubicles at Carling Campus. These are the folks that are getting CA$50 million annually for the next five years to combat sexual misconduct. They won't spend any new funds on anything as valuable as equipment or storage depots of any nature whatsoever. How did that whole national stockpile of medical supplies for a pandemic work out?

:mad:


Which rather raises the advantages of competition.


The Forces are responsible to the sovereign authority of Governor-General. MacDonald wanted the provinces subordinate to the federal government. That required the Lieutenant Governors (or Lieutenants Governor) of the Provinces to be subordinated to the Governor General. But the Lieutenants Governor ante-dated the Governor-General as did their powers over their autonomous charges. The Lieutenants Governor were appointed by the Crown and granted all the powers of the Crowns Lieutenants.

"A lord-lieutenant (UK: /lɛfˈtɛnənt/[1]) is the British monarch's personal representative in each lieutenancy area of the United Kingdom. Historically, each lieutenant was responsible for organising the county's militia. In 1871, the lieutenant's responsibility over the local militia was removed. However, it was not until 1921 that they formally lost the right to call upon able-bodied men to fight when needed.[2]"

Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (UK: /lɛfˈtɛnənt/[n 1]), or more formally Lieutenant General and General Governor of Ireland, was the title of the chief governor of Ireland from the Williamite Wars of 1690 until the Partition of Ireland in 1922. This spanned the Kingdom of Ireland (1541–1800) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (1801–1922). The office, under its various names, was often more generally known as the Viceroy, and his wife was known as the vicereine.[n 1] The government of Ireland in practice was usually in the hands of the Lord Deputy up to the 17th century, and later of the Chief Secretary for Ireland.



Apparently, however (you're the lawyer), a couple of decisions in 1882 and 1892 confirmed that the Lieutenants-Governor were equal to the Governor-General in their separate Provinces. This was subsequently confirmed in 1931, 1947 and 1982.

Also confirmed was that when King George VI devolved his sovereign authority in 1947 he did it directly and severally to the Governor-General with respect to the federal government and to each, individual Lieutenant-Governor of each separate Province. That would seem to suggest that Canada's Provinces are autonomous, co-equal entities, equal to the federal government and not creatures of them. I seem to recall hearing that point being argued in the press once or twice.

From the outset, the vice-regal offices were created to protect the greater interests
of unity while at the same time permit a greater autonomy and self-governance. Thus, the
Lieutenant Governors were appointed by and expected to be agents of the Dominion
government in Ottawa, while the Governor General was appointed by and expected to be
an agent of the Imperial government in London. This arrangement, however, officially
changed due to two separate events. The first occurred in 1892 when the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court in the British Empire, ruled that in the
case of The Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v The Receiver General of New
Brunswick, “the Lieutenant Governor…as much the representative of His Majesty for all
purposes of Provincial Government as the Governor General himself is, for all Dominion
Government.
”7 This ruling went clearly against Macdonald’s dream of a centrist nation,
as the law lords declared that the crown of the provinces was equal to, rather than
subordinate to the federal crown;
no longer would the Lieutenant Governors be agents of
the federal government. 8
Section 12 of the British North America Act essentially transfers all of the powers
of the former Governors and Lieutenant Governors of the former colonies to their
respective federal and provincial governors in the new Canadian confederation. But the
vagueness of the office seems to arise in the provision which reads, “By the Governor
General with the Advice, or with the Advice and Consent of or in conjunction with the
Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, or any member thereof, or by the Governor General
individually.”10 J.R. Mallory notes that, “the power of the Governor General, as set in the
Constitution [especially Section twelve], are formidable, though vague…it is by no
means clear where the line is between powers exercised on advice and on the
responsibility of the government of the day and powers the Governor General may
exercise on his or her discretion.”11

I gather that the assertion has not been successfully challenged.

Effectively Canada is a free association of sovereign Provinces who jointly agreed to follow the rules of the Club they established in Ottawa.

And each of the separate Lieutenants-Governor independently retains the original reserved sovereign powers of the Crown as the Governor-General. All the Governors, Lieutenant and General are equally loyally subject to the Canadian Crown.

Am I swerving too much yet?



The reserved powers are not without limitation. They are limited by convention, as I understand it, and public opinion, but


while convention is a quite powerful ‘understanding’ in the minds of
political players, the conventional rules of the constitution have no legal standing
. In fact,
the Supreme Court ruling, Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1
S.C.R. 753, stated that;

In contradistinction to the laws of the constitution, they [constitutional conventions] are not
enforced by the courts…Perhaps the main reason why conventional rules cannot be
enforced by the courts is that they are generally in conflict with the legal rules which they
postulate and the courts are bound to enforce the legal rules…As a matter of law, the
Queen, or the Governor General or the Lieutenant Governor could refuse assent to every
bill passed by both Houses of Parliament or by a Legislative Assembly as the case may be.
But by convention they cannot of their own motion refuse to assent to any such bill on any
ground, for instance because they disapprove of the policy of the bill. We have here a
conflict between a legal rule which creates a complete discretion and a conventional rule
which completely neutralizes it. But conventions, like laws, are sometimes violated. And if
this particular convention were violated and assent were improperly withheld, the courts
would be bound to enforce the law, not the convention. They would refuse to recognize the
validity of a vetoed bill…This conflict between convention and law which prevents the
courts from enforcing conventions also prevents conventions from crystallizing into laws,
unless it be by statutory adoption.23

Thus, while in many respects, convention curtails the power of Canada’s vice-regals,
convention is not legally enforceable.




So what are the reserved powers of the Governors? As I understand it

It is the Governor General that to appoints Senators as well as the Speaker of the Senate. The Governor General summons and dissolves sessions of
Parliament and “any Vote, Resolution, Address or Bill for the Appropriation of any Part
of the Public Revenue, or of any Tax or Impost,” must first be recommended by the
Governor General beforehand.13 Also, Section 55 clearly states that a bill may only
become law after it receives Royal Assent from the Governor General.
In regards to the Lieutenant Governors, the British North America Act provides
Executive Councils to fulfil the role of the Privy Council in the provinces and the Act
clarifies their role in the provincial legislative branches. In essence, Section 90 bestows
many of the same powers granted to the Governor General to the Lieutenant Governors in
respect to their province.


As discussed previously, the British North America Act, 1867 permits Canada’s
vice-regals to disallow or refuse Royal Assent to bills and to reserve the legislation for
the jurisdiction above. For example, Lieutenant Governors may reserve legislation for the
review of the Governor General, and the Governor General may reserve legislation for
the Queen. In fact, upon;

…Confederation an explicit restraint on Canadian autonomy took the form of eight classes
of legislation upon which the governor general’s instructions required him to reserve the
royal assent; that is, to refer bills in question to Britain for a decision on assent. The items
so affected included, among other subjects, divorce, legal tender, imposition of differential
duties, and control of the military.


So, to try and wrap this up, there doesn't seem to me to be much to stop each of the Crown's Lieutenants governing in Her Majesty's Provinces from exercising their pre-existing responsibility to raise a Militia for the protection of the separate provinces under their governance. With the conventional approval of the local legislature of course.

And all of this can be done under the umbrella of

"I ......... (full name), do swear (or for a solemn affirmation, "solemnly affirm") that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her heirs and successors according to law. So help me God."

So a citizen serving in the CAF could freely transfer their services to a Provincial Militia (and back again) without breaking their oath. There command would shift from Her Majesty's federal Commander-in-Chief of Her armed forces, the Governor-General, to one, or any, of Her Majesty's provincial Commanders-in-Chief, her Lieutenants-Governor.


Now, to be clear, I am not recommending the establishment of separate Provincial militias. I am suggesting that there seems to be a workable path to the establishment of a Provincial Guard after the fashion of US National Guards.

And now you are looking at 10 (or is it 13) Premiers angling for more federal dollars and more federal presence to bolster their voters abilities to manage and survive local emergencies.

(Wow! I out did myself - Time for you to give me a proper schooling on constitutional law ) ;)
1f37b.png
1f37b.png
.

Cheers.

 
Which rather raises the advantages of competition.


The Forces are responsible to the sovereign authority of Governor-General. MacDonald wanted the provinces subordinate to the federal government. That required the Lieutenant Governors (or Lieutenants Governor) of the Provinces to be subordinated to the Governor General. But the Lieutenants Governor ante-dated the Governor-General as did their powers over their autonomous charges. The Lieutenants Governor were appointed by the Crown and granted all the powers of the Crowns Lieutenants.







Apparently, however (you're the lawyer), a couple of decisions in 1882 and 1892 confirmed that the Lieutenants-Governor were equal to the Governor-General in their separate Provinces. This was subsequently confirmed in 1931, 1947 and 1982.

Also confirmed was that when King George VI devolved his sovereign authority in 1947 he did it directly and severally to the Governor-General with respect to the federal government and to each, individual Lieutenant-Governor of each separate Province. That would seem to suggest that Canada's Provinces are autonomous, co-equal entities, equal to the federal government and not creatures of them. I seem to recall hearing that point being argued in the press once or twice.




I gather that the assertion has not been successfully challenged.

Effectively Canada is a free association of sovereign Provinces who jointly agreed to follow the rules of the Club they established in Ottawa.

And each of the separate Lieutenants-Governor independently retains the original reserved sovereign powers of the Crown as the Governor-General. All the Governors, Lieutenant and General are equally loyally subject to the Canadian Crown.

Am I swerving too much yet?



The reserved powers are not without limitation. They are limited by convention, as I understand it, and public opinion, but











So what are the reserved powers of the Governors? As I understand it







So, to try and wrap this up, there doesn't seem to me to be much to stop each of the Crown's Lieutenants governing in Her Majesty's Provinces from exercising their pre-existing responsibility to raise a Militia for the protection of the separate provinces under their governance. With the conventional approval of the local legislature of course.

And all of this can be done under the umbrella of



So a citizen serving in the CAF could freely transfer their services to a Provincial Militia (and back again) without breaking their oath. There command would shift from Her Majesty's federal Commander-in-Chief of Her armed forces, the Governor-General, to one, or any, of Her Majesty's provincial Commanders-in-Chief, her Lieutenants-Governor.


Now, to be clear, I am not recommending the establishment of separate Provincial militias. I am suggesting that there seems to be a workable path to the establishment of a Provincial Guard after the fashion of US National Guards.

And now you are looking at 10 (or is it 13) Premiers angling for more federal dollars and more federal presence to bolster their voters abilities to manage and survive local emergencies.

(Wow! I out did myself - Time for you to give me a proper schooling on constitutional law ) ;)
1f37b.png
1f37b.png
.

Cheers.

Excuse my ignorance, but is there an actual Force 2025 doc that I can get my hands on, or is it a concept wrapped within Army Future Force models
 
Excuse my ignorance, but is there an actual Force 2025 doc that I can get my hands on, or is it a concept wrapped within Army Future Force models

This article suggests it's 'Advancing with Purpose'



When Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre assumed command of the Canadian Army in August 2019, numerous initiatives were underway to modernize the force. With the release in January 2021 of Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy, those initiatives are now aligned and knitted together under “one umbrella” providing a five-year change agenda. In the Fall 2020 issue, LGen Eyre spoke about the strategy and one of it’s two key initiatives, an adapted Managed Readiness Plan to inform how forces are generated. Shortly before he was named Acting Chief of the Defence Staff in February, he spoke with editor Chris Thatcher about the second, Force 2025, a wide-ranging effort to analyze force structure.

nadianarmytoday.com/force-2025-informing-the-armys-future-structure/


Viz:

Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy​



 
Yeah. The armoured corps is a bit of a puzzle starting with the fact that there aren't any in Edmonton to start with. That's why the KOCR is 32 CABG's armoured regiment rather than various units from Ontario.
SALH
 
Part of the problem is the SBCT's used them like IFV's in Afghanistan and Iraq (they had either Mk19 or M2 in the RWS) - because it wasn't a Peer/Near Peer threat - the same way the CF ran the LAV in Afghanistan.

The US Army at least codified their doctrine as they acknowledged that it wasn't an IFV based on their experiences with the Bradley - which the M2A3 is a pretty potent IFV.

I think the CF having never had an IFV, hasn't fully understood how vulnerable the LAV is.

They have AH's ;)
Which IMHO is better than a tank
The LAV is an IFV, while the lines can be fuzzy, the definition in the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe is pretty clear on it. The vulnerability... eh, its about as well protect as anything else out there when it's up armoured, especially in the 6 variant, size notwithstanding. I'd agree we don't treat them the way we should, the lessons learned coming out of Ukraine point out that running IFVs into each other is going to the a slaughter.
 
The LAV is an IFV, while the lines can be fuzzy, the definition in the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe is pretty clear on it. The vulnerability... eh, its about as well protect as anything else out there when it's up armoured, especially in the 6 variant, size notwithstanding. I'd agree we don't treat them the way we should, the lessons learned coming out of Ukraine point out that running IFVs into each other is going to the a slaughter.

And, sadly, this is sometimes the only way we manage to do the right thing - after a few hundred combat arms kids are KIA.
 
And, sadly, this is sometimes the only way we manage to do the right thing - after a few hundred combat arms kids are KIA.
Agreed, now that being said, the difference in protection between BTRs / BMP2s/ MTLBs / any BMD/ ect and a western IFV is pretty shocking.

@FJAG sorry i responded before seeing the change, my bad
 
Which rather raises the advantages of competition.

...

Now, to be clear, I am not recommending the establishment of separate Provincial militias. I am suggesting that there seems to be a workable path to the establishment of a Provincial Guard after the fashion of US National Guards.

And now you are looking at 10 (or is it 13) Premiers angling for more federal dollars and more federal presence to bolster their voters abilities to manage and survive local emergencies.

(Wow! I out did myself - Time for you to give me a proper schooling on constitutional law ) ;)
1f37b.png
1f37b.png
.

Cheers.

Wow. You did outdo yourself. Far be it for me to argue with a paper from the Canadian Political Science Association.

I'll just leave it here from the British North America Act.

Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom:

...

Be it therefore enacted and declared by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, as follows:

Powers of the Parliament.

Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, --

7. Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence.
....
29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.

These of course are legislative powers and the Federal government has already legislated expensively in the field of national defence and militias.

Note in particular s. 70 of the Criminal Code:
70 (1) The Governor in Council may, by proclamation, make orders
(a) to prohibit assemblies, without lawful authority, of persons for the purpose
(i) of training or drilling themselves,
(ii) of being trained or drilled to the use of arms, or
(iii) of practising military exercises; or
(b) to prohibit persons when assembled for any purpose from training or drilling themselves or from being trained or drilled.
(2) An order that is made under subsection (1) may be general or may be made applicable to particular places, districts or assemblies to be specified in the order.
(3) Every person who contravenes an order made under this section is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

I'm not aware as to whether or not any such OiC specifically exists (a cursory search didn't pick one up) but in the event that any Lieutenant Governor attempted to use whatever residual power there might be, the Feds could shut the system down instantly.

So a citizen serving in the CAF could freely transfer their services to a Provincial Militia (and back again) without breaking their oath

Just a reminder: The NDA provides -

23 (1) The enrolment of a person binds the person to serve in the Canadian Forces until the person is, in accordance with regulations, lawfully released.
30 (1) Except during an emergency, an officer or non-commissioned member who is not on active service is entitled to be released at the expiration of the term of service for which the officer or non-commissioned member is enrolled or re-engaged.

Accordingly, a CAF member cannot "transfer their service" by a unilateral act. There is no provision, legally enacted by the Feds that would permit any such transfer.

An interesting theory, Kirkhill, but the constitutional structure of the country and the laws enacted under it would tend to make a "provincial militia" highly unlikely unless the Feds agreed to it.

🍻
 
This article suggests it's 'Advancing with Purpose'
Specifically Line of Effort 4 - Initiative 4.1 at pages 45 and 46 set the parameters

Advancing with Purpose 4th Edition

Things have progressed beyond that mission statement, however, and there are a number of documents that have been circulating since then many of which, to my understanding, are readily available on the DWAN (which, as a retired nobody, I no longer have access to)

By the way, I also found Initiative 4.3 on International Engagement interesting

The Canadian Army will achieve an integrated level of interoperability with its ABCANZ partners by 2027, focusing on a Canadian Army brigade in a multinational division and a multinational battle group in a Canadian Army brigade.27
27 The Canadian Army seeks interoperability with allies and partners to better secure success on operations. The Canadian Army recognizes three levels of interoperability: de-conflicted, compatible, and integrated. De-conflicted integration exists when forces can co-exist but do not interact together. Compatible integration denotes circumstances where forces are able to interact in the same geographic area in pursuit of a common goal. Integrated interoperability occurs when forces are able to merge seamlessly and are interchangeable.

:cautious:
 
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