Which brings us back to the question of what is the difference between a Class C Reservist and a Regular Soldier.
So the answer to the question of the difference between the Class C Reservist (Militiaman) and the Regular Soldier (Permanent Active Militiaman) is that they are both full time employees but employees of two separate, competing, institutions. And the Militia is reliant on support from an entity that would rather not be reminded that the other exists and would prefer that it didn't have to support it.
It sees every dollar spent on the Militia as a dollar lost to the "Real" Army, the regular force of the Permanent Active Militia.
I don't agree with your Militia premise.
I think today's Reg F / ResF dichotomy arises from Gen Guy Simonds when he was appointed Chief of the General Staff in 1952. At that time the UN had just committed to Korea and the Western European countries, the US and Canada felt that they were on the brink of war with Russia. Eisenhower came to Canada and asked for a commitment of two divisions for Europe which Canada agreed to. Simonds was of the view then and maintained the view that it would be impossible to send such a force to Europe when a war started so it was necessary to have it there before hand. The "forces in being concept" was formed which led to the inexorable rise of the RegF and a consequential degradation of the importance of the Militia. Canada eventually deployed a full-time air division of 12 squadrons and a full mechanized brigade to BAOR. Concurrently 1 Cdn Div HQ was reactivated and two additional brigades were built in Canada effectively creating the two divisions called for (one air, one land) albeit no more than one brigade was ever stationed in Europe.
The "forces in being" concept remained our focus through the Sixties and even after reductions in the RegF structure started happening in that decade and throughout the 70s and 80s as long as the Soviets were our primary threat. As RegF numbers were reduced, the CF - and the Army in particular - scrambled to maintain "forces in being" capabilities. This naturally favoured RegF entities and equipment. As budgets became tighter the disparity grew. The budget crunch on equipment acquisition essentially negated the "mobilization" concept. Individual augmentation became the budget conscious alternative. Even maintaining older equipment as a reserve became impractical as the costs of such maintenance jeopardized new equipment funding. The "divestment" concept became and remains the standard. All of this is comes with the risk that the "force in being" is based on the equipment we can man which is limited to the equivalent of two underequipped mechanized and one light brigade regardless of how many people, RegF or ResF, we actually have. Mobilization is an impossibility under the current construct and in fact we're at the point where we are hard pressed to fully man those three brigades at any time. In fact during Afghanistan we were hard pressed to maintain a battlegroup in the field without ResF augmentation (in fairness we would have been far less stressed if we'd gone to 12 to 15 month rotos like the US.)
The RegF attitudes remain rooted in the 'forces in being" concept. It values anything that is immediately available for utilization to meet defence policy requirements. It accepts as a risk (or possibly ignores the risk) that the force cannot grow. Unfortunately, it is also hamstrung by a bureaucracy mentality when it comes to management. The standard solution for virtually any issue within DND is to create an agency to handle it. As a result we have grown the headquarters above brigade level at a faster rate than the force itself. In fact as the field force shrinks the headquarters continue to grow.
Your question is: what is the difference between a Class C and a RegF soldier? The answer is that after having done his tour the Class C soldier reverts to a much less expensive Class A soldier while the RegF continues to cost full price. But you are asking the wrong question. The real question is, how much of the RegF personnel and equipment can be reasonably transferred to a part-time, low-cost Class A reserve status and how much must be retained as full-time RegF "forces in being". (Not to mention how many people can we realistically fire out of higher headquarters.)
I have no issue whatsoever with the Class C reservist. He/she is fulfilling the duty of being a low cost part-time asset that fills a full-time need when required.
My issue is with the Class B concept as we use it to bulk up thousands of full-time butts in cubicles and as a result degrade part-time capabilities both directly and indirectly. (and don't even get me started on the travesty that is ten brigade headquarters, some 130 or so ResF battalions each of which is stressed to marshal a platoon on exercises)
The system is dysfunctional to the point of corruption. That said, a proper ResF system is vital to a peacetime army that wants to save costs yet have the ability to mobilize to defend the country's interest when it becomes necessary. Our ResF system and the RegF and the ResF attitudes towards it need to change drastically. I'm wondering whether or not the current Russian belligerence will create a wake-up call on Parliament Hill and, more importantly, in the twin towers.