Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[ballz]

Well, if they folded the tents of both 39 CBG and 41 CBG HQs that would give you well over 100 full timers to choose from to help out a bit, I'm guessing.

You mean 100 full-timers to reside in Div HQ so they can draft and email us a drafted, unsigned order telling 1 CMBG HQ they're the OPI for Pres Project Management and the only coordinating instruction grants us them DIRLAUTH, and then go for their 3 hour lunch break.

 

[WestIsle]

I think the bigger point here is the amateur leadership of the Canadian Army and Forces in general over the decades has resulted in a full time element that cant and never has been able to support overseas operations alone, a complete lack of war stores, and a pittance reserve force that is not organized or utilized anywhere near where it should be like our allies.

The reserves are the way they are because a lack of vision and small minds thought that it was more important to have a "large" full time element that would somehow magically appear for war in Europe from across the ocean despite the fact as many have mentioned that historically this has not been the case for this country. There was no effort to retain people in reserve after WW2 despite the experiences endured from the last build up. While much of this could be seen as budget related the truth is no matter how much money the army has the reserves wont get any of this. When people talked about their ability to operate with their reg force peers how can they when all the tools they have had have been taken by the reg force. When we burn through the AVGP,LAV 2, and LAV 3 just in time to get new toys while throwing away the old leaving nothing for war stocks or the reserves. Maybe this all stems from the original sin of the Can Exp Force Battalions and the Minister of the Militia and the full time force feels they need to keep them down so they dont have a repeat or maybe its all about the full time headquarters because our CMBG are hollow with a battery pretending to be a regiment with all the staff fixings needed. But things need to change because its the army is nowhere where it needs to be.

Everyone seems to be pointing fingers at each other when really they should be pointing them at the people who refused to make any sort of cuts that might not be the best for them but would be for the institution. Hollow unit lines and hollow brigades across the board and the latest reshuffle makes sure that no headquarters are cut, the arty regiments are still battery's, we still have 5 "divisions", the reserves are still the reserves but now the brigades are really just large battle groups. We have people in Ottawa to fill out this army but the leadership doesn't want to make hard calls and save the place as its tradition to cut a chunk off the carcass every couple years to feed the creature that is headquarters.

 

[KevinB]

Is there a reason why you are keeping 38 CBG? Or is it that distance makes the heart grow fonder?

Is there a reason for keeping any Res HQ?

I mean there are already 10x more Reg HQ's than needed - they may as well do something.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Is there a reason for keeping any Res HQ?

I mean there are already 10x more Reg HQ's than needed - they may as well do something.

IMHO there's no reason to keep a full Res Bde HQ for anything other than succession management to General for Reservists, and to guarantee some lifetime duration Class B employment for Reservists.

At one time I thought they performed some kind of valuable leadership, coordination or training function, but I was clearly mistaken. Most 'collective training' events are downloaded to the units to lead anyways, with Bde staff 'tutt tutting' from the sidelines.

Any audit/ oversight role they perform on behalf of the CAF could likely easily be conducted by anyone else, from anywhere.

 

[KevinB]

IMHO there's no reason to keep a full Res Bde HQ for anything other than succession management to General for Reservists, and to guarantee some lifetime duration Class B employment for Reservists.

At one time I thought they performed some kind of valuable leadership, coordination or training function, but I was clearly mistaken. Most 'collective training' events are downloaded to the units to lead anyways, with Bde staff 'tutt tutting' from the sidelines.

Any audit/ oversight role they perform on behalf of the CAF could likely easily be conducted by anyone else, from anywhere.

My personal opinion, is that at Capt level, a Reservist should decide do they want to continue in the Army and progress upwards, or finish their time as Class A Support Personnel, with the occasional option for Class C, but if they want to progress further - then they need to join the Regular Army.
The same goes for Sgt.

One would need to make it easier to CT - but frankly I don't see the need to the HQ bloat, and these days it doesn't appear any Res units can field more than a Platoon.

Based on the Manning Levels of the CA, it seems to make a LOT more sense to consolidate the units under the Reg Brigades.
Worse case you will need some satellite entities from the Bde's, but that's hardly a deal breaker.

Preposition Equipment at Regional Training Centers - than can have a full time maintenance and support team in position - as well as training staff.

 

[Kirkhill]

Forgive my error. There are so many of them....

It is entirely understandable. Your inclusion of 41 CBG is commendable. There is Hope beyond the Port Mann Bridge.

 

[Rifleman62]

The creation of 10 P Res "Bde HQ's" created 10 new Reg F LCol posns, and 20 new Reg F Maj posns among other changes to the HQ bloat.

DAP would know.

 

[Kat Stevens]

It is entirely understandable. Your inclusion of 41 CBG is commendable. There is Hope beyond the Port Mann Bridge.

... and Abbotsford, and Chilliwack, and Agassiz...

 

[Kirkhill]

My personal opinion, is that at Capt level, a Reservist should decide do they want to continue in the Army and progress upwards, or finish their time as Class A Support Personnel, with the occasional option for Class C, but if they want to progress further - then they need to join the Regular Army.
The same goes for Sgt.

One would need to make it easier to CT - but frankly I don't see the need to the HQ bloat, and these days it doesn't appear any Res units can field more than a Platoon.

Based on the Manning Levels of the CA, it seems to make a LOT more sense to consolidate the units under the Reg Brigades.
Worse case you will need some satellite entities from the Bde's, but that's hardly a deal breaker.

Preposition Equipment at Regional Training Centers - than can have a full time maintenance and support team in position - as well as training staff.

I like the administrative solutions and I agree they can work. I still think there needs to be some tension introduced into the decision making process that values the National Defence as much as it does Expeditionary Efforts.

We know that it is possible because of the existence of the SAR squadrons in the same Air Force that supplies NORAD overwatch and acts overseas when called on.

 

[Kirkhill]

... and Abbotsford, and Chilliwack, and Agassiz...

You forgot Aldergrove.... my home of 15 years.

 

[Kirkhill]

I like the administrative solutions and I agree they can work. I still think there needs to be some tension introduced into the decision making process that values the National Defence as much as it does Expeditionary Efforts.

We know that it is possible because of the existence of the SAR squadrons in the same Air Force that supplies NORAD overwatch and acts overseas when called on.

Here's a thought, how about we remove the administration of the militia units from the Areas/Divisions and hand them back to their parent corps's?

Make the Areas/Divisions Force Employers rather than Force Generators with the responsibility to keep an eye on the local situation and maintain a plan to utilize the assets available to it in the Area.

Then the RRCA, RCAC and RCIC can manage their own pipelines to support their expeditionary needs while creating long term domestic positions, other than Ottawa positions, that would allow long-serving members alternatives to constant movement and permit solid family lives.

At the same time the Purple Trades, and the Sigs and Engineers, who seem less afflicted by tribalism and are more immediately critical components of any Crisis Response Plan could be tasked with the maintenance of a dispersed inventory of assets. Dispersion being good for local support, speed of response and security of supply.

 

[KevinB]

I like the administrative solutions and I agree they can work. I still think there needs to be some tension introduced into the decision making process that values the National Defence as much as it does Expeditionary Efforts.

We know that it is possible because of the existence of the SAR squadrons in the same Air Force that supplies NORAD overwatch and acts overseas when called on.

I think thats easily done though, however I believe that National Defense is best solved by Expeditionary Armies, - and a robust RCN and RCAF.

The Regional "Depots" would be used for Domestic Support Missions, you should have the infrastructure in those to host a Bde+ HQ and Support Elements - even if those Depots aren't the native home to the Bde HQ.

 

[KevinB]

Then the RRCA, RCAC and RCIC can manage their own pipelines to support their expeditionary needs while creating long term domestic positions, other than Ottawa positions, that would allow long-serving members alternatives to constant movement and permit solid family lives.

I would saying that the OTO (Other than Ottawa) is a good idea, but if left regionally that it would just make more Regimental Mafia issues.

If I was King, I'd burn the Regimental System down - and frankly I think routine posting (4-5 years outside of command staff) is healthy and ensures you aren't creating cliques.

 

[ueo]

If you don't give them kit to work with and jobs to do it won't attract useful people.

We, the corporate one, tried this with Cougars and Grizzlys in the early/mid 80's. Lasted about 2 years or so with the vehicles finally being centralized, maintained and allocated for training by a dedicated fulltime staff. This worked well until NATO committments showed the RF shortfall and the majority were reissued to RF deployment units. After that the thought was to reestablish this militia support center. Meaford was to have been the model under LFRMP but that got overtaken by events with the project being almost given to the RF infantry as a basic trg loc with some reserve trg usually in the summer months. We have to make the PRes viable option for those desiring a part time career ($$$$) or turn it into another political money pit the yeilds little value.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think thats easily done though, however I believe that National Defense is best solved by Expeditionary Armies, - and a robust RCN and RCAF.

I understand the need to prepare for the worst case of peer to peer warfare, and in Canada's case such warfare will be expeditionary. (Assuming that the Arctic is considered an Expeditionary Theatre).

But we continue to confront the question of what do you do with unemployed soldiers? For starters, we want unemployed soldiers. And we want lots of them, all of them qualified. We don't want to have all of our qualified soldiers employed overseas. You can't keep training the same bunch of soldiers over and over again or they become bored and stale. This is the real value of the Reserves. Not the Militia but the Reserves - trained soldiers that we want to hang on to for a time after they have decided that the grind of garrison is too much for them.

The Militia may be a Reserve Force, a Reserve Capability but its soldiers are not Reserves in the sense that most of the world uses it. I think there is value in the separate Militia/Home Guard/National Guard when accepted on its own terms. But it is not a Ready Reserve for the Expeditionary Forces.

The Regional "Depots" would be used for Domestic Support Missions, you should have the infrastructure in those to host a Bde+ HQ and Support Elements - even if those Depots aren't the native home to the Bde HQ.

That I like.

I might quibble on the continued use of the term "Brigade". That pushes us into discussions of Divisions and Generals. I'm becoming partial to the terms Area, District and Group to emphasise that these administrative and ad hoc relations are separate from the Field Army formations and their command structure.

 

[KevinB]

I understand the need to prepare for the worst case of peer to peer warfare, and in Canada's case such warfare will be expeditionary. (Assuming that the Arctic is considered an Expeditionary Theatre).

But we continue to confront the question of what do you do with unemployed soldiers? For starters, we want unemployed soldiers. And we want lots of them, all of them qualified. We don't want to have all of our qualified soldiers employed overseas. You can't keep training the same bunch of soldiers over and over again or they become bored and stale. This is the real value of the Reserves. Not the Militia but the Reserves - trained soldiers that we want to hang on to for a time after they have decided that the grind of garrison is too much for them.

The Militia may be a Reserve Force, a Reserve Capability but its soldiers are not Reserves in the sense that most of the world uses it. I think there is value in the separate Militia/Home Guard/National Guard when accepted on its own terms. But it is not a Ready Reserve for the Expeditionary Forces.



That I like.

I might quibble on the continued use of the term "Brigade". That pushes us into discussions of Divisions and Generals. I'm becoming partial to the terms Area, District and Group to emphasise that these administrative and ad hoc relations are separate from the Field Army formations and their command structure.

I used Brigade intentionally - I view it as a field formation, and to continue to use the same entity to employ the forces internally or externally. They don't (and IMHO shouldn't) need to be ad hoc.

Area, etc just adds a layer of HQ that is not really needed. I'd rather have LO's at the Province - and even Municipal level - than form more HQ's.


For Example -- lets say we move 3 VP back to BC. for purposes of this discussion we will call it a 30/70 Mountain unit.
It has 1 Regular Force Rifle Coy, 3 Res Rifle Coy's, a Mixed Combat Support Coy, Reg Admin & Maint Coy and a mostly Reg Leadership Cadre.
They run training at the central depot for all BC Army Reserves for Recruit&Basic - as well as Infanteer specific trade course to the ISCC level, and non trade specific secondary trade courses (Comms, DrvWhl etc.).

That Deport also houses various Support and Training Personnel from other trades - and maybe Reg Force Sub-Units, but the Depot is run by Maj who while not in the CO of 3VP direct chain - does support him, and other lodger units.
Now because it is a small garrison - it won't have some of the support feature of the larger bases (no Base Hospital, Dental etc) - and that would need to be worked out with the Province.


When 3 VP goes on IRU, they offer 60 day Class C contracts to their personnel - and backfill from other Res units across BC.
In the event of a Regional issue - the IRU is deployed - and while other Res are called up - Reg units can be moved in - staged out of the Depot - and the Deport be used as a base for the Higher HQ that comes in if needed.

In 2022, I find it hard to believe that one needs any layers between - it should be entirely possible to do 90% of recruiting virtually - so you don't even need a significant recruiting PY allocation.

 

[FJAG]

Is there a reason for keeping any Res HQ?

I mean there are already 10x more Reg HQ's than needed - they may as well do something.

Here's my thought which I've already floated a month or so ago.

The Army has enough folks for about two divisions or so and enough equipment for one if everyone and everything was mobilized and deployed at once. So from a tactical viewpoint do we need more than one deployable divisional headquarters? No. Do we need administrative headquarters below Army level? - probably, 40,000+ folks need to be broken up in clumps so how many clumps can Army HQ manage. 40,000 folks add up to about 8 brigade size clumps (based on a brigade being roughly 3-5,000 folks depending on type). Can one headquarters control 8 clumps. Sure they can - it's a bit over optimum but quite doable and in not having an intermediate headquarters you have tighter control (not to mention saving the resources of the intermediate headquarters).

Based on manpower authorizations (ignore standards of training for the time being) we have people for roughly 4 equipped RegF brigades and 4 ResF underequipped ones.

So why bother keeping a ResF brigade headquarters at all? Well here's where I go in a different direction based, not on mobilization needs, but based on day to day Army deployment roles during peacetime.

Afghanistan built us a model where we deploy individual battlegroups supervised by brigade headquarters for periods of six months and nine months. SSE says we need to be able to deploy simultaneously two sustained battlegroups and one short duration battlegroup as well as two sustained and one short term force of less than battlegroup size. That's the potential for up to six elements simultaneously which means we need a generous command and control capability.

Canada currently has three (and one CS) bde HQs and 12 battle group HQ which are adequately staffed and trained for deployments. The other ten brigades and seventy some odd battalion HQs are entirely inadequate for that. That's not enough to sustain the SSE model adequately without much ad hocery and wearing out people. On the other hand, with a total of eight properly staffed brigades and 24 or so properly staffed battlegroup HQs we double that peacetime deployment capability. The key here is "properly staffed". That means full-time Reg F leadership and staffs.

Just one aside here. I do not see all the brigades and battle groups here as manoeuvre ones. If we properly analyze our defence needs and structure, I see retaining three Reg F manoeuvre brigades with 12 battlegroups, two Res F brigades with 8 battlegroups. one RegF CS brigade with one battlegroup, one ResF CS brigade with one battlegroup and one ResF CSS brigade with one battlegroup (the colocation of battlegroups with the CS and CSS brigades is mostly due to geographic factors and existing locations of sufficient combat arms reservists in those locals)

Again, a key here is "battlegroup HQs" as these are the entities we wish to be the C&C elements on deployment. I do not think that a given RegF battlegroup needs a full complement of RegF manoeuvre companies. Again, Afghanistan has given us a model of building block battlegroups formed by company size elements from a disparate group of battalions. IMHO in order to be a properly trained battlegroup headquarters it needs: a mostly fully staffed full-time headquarters; at least one full-time company to train and generate career development through and to provide a rapid reaction force; at least one ResF company to be augmented from and to provide additional company HQ staff to allow exercising at battle group level; access to appropriate battle group CSS elements to train with and draw on for deployment; access to appropriate CS elements to train with and draw on for deployment.

The point here is that with enough full-time brigade, battlegroup and company level staff you can train for all natures of operations even when many of the troops themselves are part-time reservists who only train and deploy occasionally. It's kind of a TEWT thing but with enough troops to add an additional layer of complexity. In effect the full-time Bde and BG HQs and Reg F Coy leadership form the backbone while RegF and ResF companies form the flesh in varying ratios.

This effectively is where the 70/30 concept comes from - every brigade and battalion has a deployable headquarters and at least one deployable sub-unit. Headquarters and deployable RegF subunits are fully equipped and share their equipment with their ResF counterparts. There are no longer any administrative bde or battalion HQs. Generally speaking, RegF 70/30 units have two RegF deployable subunits and a larger share of CS and CSS while ResF 30/70 units have one deployable RegF subunit and a lesser share of CS and CSS elements. Sub units become plug and play elements added to a given mission. In a major emergency, the entire force can be mobilized in whole or in part with the only real limitation being equipment available. The overall objective should be to start acquiring new equipment on a scale to equip ever larger elements of the total force and thereby enhance deployability. And I should mention that "deployable" is not synonymous with "expeditionary". Any unit should be capable of deploying internationally or domestically using its core RegF personnel as well as either volunteer or mobilized ResF members from its own or other units.

Training facilities and base infrastructure is consolidated under Army HQ. I would have CADTC control all recruiting and training through it's existing facilities as well as through depot battalions located at each of the current training centres and who also command depot companies, platoons and detachments down to local armoury level - one overarching individual and collective training system. Similarly all infrastructure remains under Army HQ. In a worse case scenario, an entire brigade could pack up and deploy and yet the training and support infrastructure would remain in place and be capable of recruiting and generating a new brigade insitu.

 

[KevinB]

Here's my thought which I've already floated a month or so ago.

The Army has enough folks for about two divisions or so and enough equipment for one if everyone and everything was mobilized and deployed at once.

You are a lot more generous than me.
I don't see equipment for 2 Brigades - let alone a Div.
Which is why I don't honestly see 1 Cdn Div ever being deployable.

So from a tactical viewpoint do we need more than one deployable divisional headquarters? No. Do we need administrative headquarters below Army level? - probably, 40,000+ folks need to be broken up in clumps so how many clumps can Army HQ manage. 40,000 folks add up to about 8 brigade size clumps (based on a brigade being roughly 3-5,000 folks depending on type). Can one headquarters control 8 clumps. Sure they can - it's a bit over optimum but quite doable and in not having an intermediate headquarters you have tighter control (not to mention saving the resources of the intermediate headquarters).

Based on manpower authorizations (ignore standards of training for the time being) we have people for roughly 4 equipped RegF brigades and 4 ResF underequipped ones.

Would you accept 1 Equipped Reg Bde - 3 Under Equipped - and 4 Res non equipped

So why bother keeping a ResF brigade headquarters at all? Well here's where I go in a different direction based, not on mobilization needs, but based on day to day Army deployment roles during peacetime.

Afghanistan built us a model where we deploy individual battlegroups supervised by brigade headquarters for periods of six months and nine months. SSE says we need to be able to deploy simultaneously two sustained battlegroups and one short duration battlegroup as well as two sustained and one short term force of less than battlegroup size. That's the potential for up to six elements simultaneously which means we need a generous command and control capability.

SSE also promised a Heavy Div to NATO for Europe, color me not impressed with a lot of the SSE demands, when compared to the actual reality of the CA on the ground.

Canada currently has three (and one CS) bde HQs and 12 battle group HQ which are adequately staffed and trained for deployments. The other ten brigades and seventy some odd battalion HQs are entirely inadequate for that. That's not enough to sustain the SSE model adequately without much ad hocery and wearing out people. On the other hand, with a total of eight properly staffed brigades and 24 or so properly staffed battlegroup HQs we double that peacetime deployment capability. The key here is "properly staffed". That means full-time Reg F leadership and staffs.

Looking at the PY's - the current Cdn CMBG model allows for 2 of those to be filled with Regular Force personnel - yes it is bloated and x1.5-2 of what most other Bde consist of - but even if you have 8 properly staffed Bde's - you don't have any troops to fill them.
All I see is the CA HQ Cart attempting to pull a horse.

Just one aside here. I do not see all the brigades and battle groups here as manoeuvre ones. If we properly analyze our defence needs and structure, I see retaining three Reg F manoeuvre brigades with 12 battlegroups, two Res F brigades with 8 battlegroups. one RegF CS brigade with one battlegroup, one ResF CS brigade with one battlegroup and one ResF CSS brigade with one battlegroup (the colocation of battlegroups with the CS and CSS brigades is mostly due to geographic factors and existing locations of sufficient combat arms reservists in those locals)

Again, a key here is "battlegroup HQs" as these are the entities we wish to be the C&C elements on deployment. I do not think that a given RegF battlegroup needs a full complement of RegF manoeuvre companies. Again, Afghanistan has given us a model of building block battlegroups formed by company size elements from a disparate group of battalions. IMHO in order to be a properly trained battlegroup headquarters it needs: a mostly fully staffed full-time headquarters; at least one full-time company to train and generate career development through and to provide a rapid reaction force; at least one ResF company to be augmented from and to provide additional company HQ staff to allow exercising at battle group level; access to appropriate battle group CSS elements to train with and draw on for deployment; access to appropriate CS elements to train with and draw on for deployment.

The point here is that with enough full-time brigade, battlegroup and company level staff you can train for all natures of operations even when many of the troops themselves are part-time reservists who only train and deploy occasionally. It's kind of a TEWT thing but with enough troops to add an additional layer of complexity. In effect the full-time Bde and BG HQs and Reg F Coy leadership form the backbone while RegF and ResF companies form the flesh in varying ratios.

This effectively is where the 70/30 concept comes from - every brigade and battalion has a deployable headquarters and at least one deployable sub-unit. Headquarters and deployable RegF subunits are fully equipped and share their equipment with their ResF counterparts. There are no longer any administrative bde or battalion HQs. Generally speaking, RegF 70/30 units have two RegF deployable subunits and a larger share of CS and CSS while ResF 30/70 units have one deployable RegF subunit and a lesser share of CS and CSS elements. Sub units become plug and play elements added to a given mission. In a major emergency, the entire force can be mobilized in whole or in part with the only real limitation being equipment available. The overall objective should be to start acquiring new equipment on a scale to equip ever larger elements of the total force and thereby enhance deployability. And I should mention that "deployable" is not synonymous with "expeditionary". Any unit should be capable of deploying internationally or domestically using its core RegF personnel as well as either volunteer or mobilized ResF members from its own or other units.

I fully embrace the 70/30 or 30/70 outlook, but I don't see the Bodies available for more than 4 Bde total.

Training facilities and base infrastructure is consolidated under Army HQ. I would have CADTC control all recruiting and training through it's existing facilities as well as through depot battalions located at each of the current training centres and who also command depot companies, platoons and detachments down to local armoury level - one overarching individual and collective training system. Similarly all infrastructure remains under Army HQ. In a worse case scenario, an entire brigade could pack up and deploy and yet the training and support infrastructure would remain in place and be capable of recruiting and generating a new brigade insitu.

I agree there.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Here's my thought which I've already floated a month or so ago.

The Army has enough folks for about two divisions or so and enough equipment for one if everyone and everything was mobilized and deployed at once. So from a tactical viewpoint do we need more than one deployable divisional headquarters? No. Do we need administrative headquarters below Army level? - probably, 40,000+ folks need to be broken up in clumps so how many clumps can Army HQ manage. 40,000 folks add up to about 8 brigade size clumps (based on a brigade being roughly 3-5,000 folks depending on type). Can one headquarters control 8 clumps. Sure they can - it's a bit over optimum but quite doable and in not having an intermediate headquarters you have tighter control (not to mention saving the resources of the intermediate headquarters).

Based on manpower authorizations (ignore standards of training for the time being) we have people for roughly 4 equipped RegF brigades and 4 ResF underequipped ones.

So why bother keeping a ResF brigade headquarters at all? Well here's where I go in a different direction based, not on mobilization needs, but based on day to day Army deployment roles during peacetime.

Afghanistan built us a model where we deploy individual battlegroups supervised by brigade headquarters for periods of six months and nine months. SSE says we need to be able to deploy simultaneously two sustained battlegroups and one short duration battlegroup as well as two sustained and one short term force of less than battlegroup size. That's the potential for up to six elements simultaneously which means we need a generous command and control capability.

Canada currently has three (and one CS) bde HQs and 12 battle group HQ which are adequately staffed and trained for deployments. The other ten brigades and seventy some odd battalion HQs are entirely inadequate for that. That's not enough to sustain the SSE model adequately without much ad hocery and wearing out people. On the other hand, with a total of eight properly staffed brigades and 24 or so properly staffed battlegroup HQs we double that peacetime deployment capability. The key here is "properly staffed". That means full-time Reg F leadership and staffs.

Just one aside here. I do not see all the brigades and battle groups here as manoeuvre ones. If we properly analyze our defence needs and structure, I see retaining three Reg F manoeuvre brigades with 12 battlegroups, two Res F brigades with 8 battlegroups. one RegF CS brigade with one battlegroup, one ResF CS brigade with one battlegroup and one ResF CSS brigade with one battlegroup (the colocation of battlegroups with the CS and CSS brigades is mostly due to geographic factors and existing locations of sufficient combat arms reservists in those locals)

Again, a key here is "battlegroup HQs" as these are the entities we wish to be the C&C elements on deployment. I do not think that a given RegF battlegroup needs a full complement of RegF manoeuvre companies. Again, Afghanistan has given us a model of building block battlegroups formed by company size elements from a disparate group of battalions. IMHO in order to be a properly trained battlegroup headquarters it needs: a mostly fully staffed full-time headquarters; at least one full-time company to train and generate career development through and to provide a rapid reaction force; at least one ResF company to be augmented from and to provide additional company HQ staff to allow exercising at battle group level; access to appropriate battle group CSS elements to train with and draw on for deployment; access to appropriate CS elements to train with and draw on for deployment.

The point here is that with enough full-time brigade, battlegroup and company level staff you can train for all natures of operations even when many of the troops themselves are part-time reservists who only train and deploy occasionally. It's kind of a TEWT thing but with enough troops to add an additional layer of complexity. In effect the full-time Bde and BG HQs and Reg F Coy leadership form the backbone while RegF and ResF companies form the flesh in varying ratios.

This effectively is where the 70/30 concept comes from - every brigade and battalion has a deployable headquarters and at least one deployable sub-unit. Headquarters and deployable RegF subunits are fully equipped and share their equipment with their ResF counterparts. There are no longer any administrative bde or battalion HQs. Generally speaking, RegF 70/30 units have two RegF deployable subunits and a larger share of CS and CSS while ResF 30/70 units have one deployable RegF subunit and a lesser share of CS and CSS elements. Sub units become plug and play elements added to a given mission. In a major emergency, the entire force can be mobilized in whole or in part with the only real limitation being equipment available. The overall objective should be to start acquiring new equipment on a scale to equip ever larger elements of the total force and thereby enhance deployability. And I should mention that "deployable" is not synonymous with "expeditionary". Any unit should be capable of deploying internationally or domestically using its core RegF personnel as well as either volunteer or mobilized ResF members from its own or other units.

Training facilities and base infrastructure is consolidated under Army HQ. I would have CADTC control all recruiting and training through it's existing facilities as well as through depot battalions located at each of the current training centres and who also command depot companies, platoons and detachments down to local armoury level - one overarching individual and collective training system. Similarly all infrastructure remains under Army HQ. In a worse case scenario, an entire brigade could pack up and deploy and yet the training and support infrastructure would remain in place and be capable of recruiting and generating a new brigade insitu.

Just sayin'....

In my business we are able to work with a couple of dozen clients concurrently across Canada, using email, Zoom and/or MS Teams, for fairly complex large scale projects involving high levels of change management and business performance improvement.

My clients, large, geographically and culturally diverse organizations, do the same in their businesses. Many of them have more employees than all of the reservists in Alberta and BC combined - that's full time employees.

I have no idea why we need hundreds of full time staff to keep tabs on a couple of dozen part time units that already have, embedded, full time Reg F/ Class B staff in their HQs.

 

[FJAG]

But we continue to confront the question of what do you do with unemployed soldiers? For starters, we want unemployed soldiers. And we want lots of them, all of them qualified. We don't want to have all of our qualified soldiers employed overseas. You can't keep training the same bunch of soldiers over and over again or they become bored and stale. This is the real value of the Reserves. Not the Militia but the Reserves - trained soldiers that we want to hang on to for a time after they have decided that the grind of garrison is too much for them.

The Militia may be a Reserve Force, a Reserve Capability but its soldiers are not Reserves in the sense that most of the world uses it. I think there is value in the separate Militia/Home Guard/National Guard when accepted on its own terms. But it is not a Ready Reserve for the Expeditionary Forces.

That I like.

We already have such a force in the Supplementary Reserve. The problem is that it is mostly unused and voluntary. One could easily change that by making it a term of service that any retired RegF or Primary Reserve soldier must serve in the Supplementary Reserve for X years. That's the easy part. The hard part is finding a role and the requisite equipment for them. (There's also that NDA provision which says that they can't be called out for training or duty unless they first consent or are placed on active service)

They are valuable for bulking up the Army when its committed full in and strapped for resources but it seems we've avoided situations like that since WW2.

For me the limitation is infrastructure and equipment. Unless you are looking at a pure labour pool activated Supp reservists must have task to fulfill and equipment to do it with. I'm hard pressed to find a use for them beyond the filling in in combat or CS or CSS units that are short on manpower.

I might quibble on the continued use of the term "Brigade". That pushes us into discussions of Divisions and Generals. I'm becoming partial to the terms Area, District and Group to emphasise that these administrative and ad hoc relations are separate from the Field Army formations and their command structure.

I'm not and that's primarily because I think every element of the Army should be capable of combat and, if so, it should use terminology commensurate with that of our allies. It avoids confusion.

We already have LOs assigned to Provincial EMOs and Army, Bde and CJOC staff that have op plans to support domestic ops within their assigned territories. We are not a large enough organization to either need or afford separate administrative staffs solely for that function.