But we are talking about the Militia here. We are talking about recruiting and organizing people locally.
Those that want are free to join the Regs for full time pay.
The Regs and their requirements are not the same as those of the Militia. Which is at the heart of the problem with the Canadian Army. The Regs think the Militia exists to serve them.
This article from the National Post a couple of days ago is interesting. Primarily because it addresses the very question I had about the role of the Militia as a Provincial National Guard.
Military assistance to a provincial government or its police services to maintain public order does not require an agreement from the federal government
nationalpost.com
If the Provincial Solicitors General can "require", not "request" but "require" military assistance it can only be because the Provincial governments, in particular the Lieutenants Governor, have equal authority over the available military forces, including the Militia, as the Governor General.
The answer to the question concerning the lack of a Provincial National Guard is that the Provinces already have one, the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Militia.
The Militia does not exist to serve the Regs. The Regs, and the Militia, exist to serve the Provincial and Federal governments. At their discretion.
The Militia at this point in time exists to lick itself.
It is only viable currently in supporting the Regs in small numbers - now a lot of the fault of the Reg Force, or former Reg Force retirees, but it's not providing any units whatsoever to anyone.
Sure they have been Militia companies fielded with the Reg's for overseas deployment, but it hasn't been an actual unit -- its been troops gather from all over the country.
Until the Reserves are sorted - there is zero point to discussion them in Farce 2025.
The fact there are going to be 5 Divisions for an Army that doesn't have enough troops for 1 would be my first area of concern...
The Militia at this point in time exists to lick itself.
It is only viable currently in supporting the Regs in small numbers - now a lot of the fault of the Reg Force, or former Reg Force retirees, but it's not providing any units whatsoever to anyone.
Sure they have been Militia companies fielded with the Reg's for overseas deployment, but it hasn't been an actual unit -- its been troops gather from all over the country.
Until the Reserves are sorted - there is zero point to discussion them in Farce 2025.
The fact there are going to be 5 Divisions for an Army that doesn't have enough troops for 1 would be my first area of concern...
The Militia exists only so far as the Regs have left any breath in its bones.
The determination is to ensure that Sam Hughes never happens again. Unfortunately Canadian politicians and politics have changed less since Sam's day than the Generals have.
WRT the 5 divisions - I agree entirely
48 Infantry companies - 6 Infantry Regiments of 8 independent companies
48 AD troops - one per major port/urban centre
Add other troops to taste
6 Brigades for the country.
The Regs are the expeditionary force. See what money you can get out of parliament.
The Militia exists only so far as the Regs have left any breath in its bones.
The determination is to ensure that Sam Hughes never happens again. Unfortunately Canadian politicians and politics have changed less since Sam's day than the Generals have.
WRT the 5 divisions - I agree entirely
48 Infantry companies - 6 Infantry Regiments of 8 independent companies
48 AD troops - one per major port/urban centre
Add other troops to taste
6 Brigades for the country.
The Regs are the expeditionary force. See what money you can get out of parliament.
I've been on both sides of the Reg and Res coin, the Res in itself loves to shoot itself in the foot constantly.
Units should have been way more honest and their commanders and higher reserve commands should have made many of them downsize rather than trying to pretend they where still at WWII strength.
A Platoon doesn't need a Lt. Col. 5 Maj, and 21 Captains -- it needs a Lt/Capt and a WO.
Two Platoons don't need a Lt. Col etc.
Burning the Res CoC to the ground would free up a lot of PY's to actually have soldiers - and instead of the Col's and other senior officers burning up the budget - they could actually do things.
I've been on both sides of the Reg and Res coin, the Res in itself loves to shoot itself in the foot constantly.
Units should have been way more honest and their commanders and higher reserve commands should have made many of them downsize rather than trying to pretend they where still at WWII strength. A Platoon doesn't need a Lt. Col. 5 Maj, and 21 Captains -- it needs a Lt/Capt and a WO.
Two Platoons don't need a Lt. Col etc.
Burning the Res CoC to the ground would free up a lot of PY's to actually have soldiers - and instead of the Col's and other senior officers burning up the budget - they could actually do things.
I've been on both sides of the Reg and Res coin, the Res in itself loves to shoot itself in the foot constantly.
Units should have been way more honest and their commanders and higher reserve commands should have made many of them downsize rather than trying to pretend they where still at WWII strength.
A Platoon doesn't need a Lt. Col. 5 Maj, and 21 Captains -- it needs a Lt/Capt and a WO.
Two Platoons don't need a Lt. Col etc.
Burning the Res CoC to the ground would free up a lot of PY's to actually have soldiers - and instead of the Col's and other senior officers burning up the budget - they could actually do things.
Absolutely and entirely agree. That is why I am starting with Sub-Units. 200 on parade strength is a stretch but it is a lot closer to being doable than a battalion. And a slightly understrength company is a lot less silly than a ridiculously understrength battalion.
I would just as soon see the Captains and below be Militiamen. The Major and his MWO, together with their instructional cadre should be Reg Force Regimental Appointments. Admin is a Class B/C Militia function or even a civilian function.
But we're not really interested in a local defence organization which assembles spontaneously in response to enemy attack. We could get that for nothing by simply amending the Charter to include a right to keep and bear arms.
The historical purpose of providing a framework for mobilization has essentially vanished, because the framework always placed perpetuation of units according to some end state coming out of an old war over regularly tweaking the framework to ensure the numbers and types of units necessary to fill out the mobilization target of the army of the day.
Since too much of the Res F and the cadre of old warhorses who can't shut up and just enjoy the view of the paintings in the mess has never been able to lean into any useful reinforcement scheme except providing volunteers who don't have to start from being taught how to shape a beret, it will have to be forced into becoming a useful reinforcing component. A logical next step up from individual volunteers is attempting to fill small blank spaces left in Reg F establishments. But those needs are specific, not "however many people want to do trade X, may sign on to do trade X".
Sure. Resources are limited, and the list of things the Militia can do as modern soldiers without resources and training is pretty damn short, and consists mostly of menial tasks. What's the point of giving anything more complex than a Lee Enfield to a reservist if the Res F isn't going to aspire to be able to fit into employable units without somewhat less than the time needed to train a soldier from scratch? There are things that need to be done; the Reg F does almost all of them; the Res F has to be more than a drain on available resources.
Independent batteries exist for the usual reasons, political influence. Usually they were wartime regiments who couldn't manage to keep going at a strength big enough to form even a Militia regiment but unwilling to come under anyone's thumb.
A typical example is 116 Ind Fd Bty in Kenora which has for many decades had its exercises with 26 Fd Regt from Brandon in order to make up one battery. Kenora typically had less than 25 members and generally could furnish one gun det. Brandon was actually quite happy to not take them under their thumb because it didn't want the hassle of dealing with them administratively - poor return on investment. Now things have gotten so bad that 116 and 26 have to work together with 10th Fd Regt in Regina to make one good exercise - it's now termed 38 Canadian Brigade Group Artillery Tactical Group and they share one CO.
Long story short, they are anything but independent other than they have their own HLCol.
If the Provincial Solicitors General can "require", not "request" but "require" military assistance it can only be because the Provincial governments, in particular the Lieutenants Governor, have equal authority over the available military forces, including the Militia, as the Governor General.
Take note though that article does mention the 2004 amendment which inserts the phrase "subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province" into s 278. That does put a level of Federal government interference into the process.
Independent batteries exist for the usual reasons, political influence. Usually they were wartime regiments who couldn't manage to keep going at a strength big enough to form even a Militia regiment but unwilling to come under anyone's thumb.
A typical example is 116 Ind Fd Bty in Kenora which has for many decades had its exercises with 26 Fd Regt from Brandon in order to make up one battery. Kenora typically had less than 25 members and generally could furnish one gun det. Brandon was actually quite happy to not take them under their thumb because it didn't want the hassle of dealing with them administratively - poor return on investment. Now things have gotten so bad that 116 and 26 have to work together with 10th Fd Regt in Regina to make one good exercise - it's now termed 38 Canadian Brigade Group Artillery Tactical Group and they share one CO.
Long story short, they are anything but independent other than they have their own HLCol.
And I have no problem at all with "brigading/grouping/regimenting" companies - without an HLCol. Or HCol or Lt Col and RSM.
We are already talking about variably sized battalions, with ad hoc capabilities and the lack of an effective doctrine/dogma for at least 60 years. The Battalion has lost its centrality except as a political structure.
Time to revert to a collection of regimented companies that can be brigaded to meet the demands of the situation. The Battalion reverts to what it was - a battle organization.
The Arty is one Regiment of many batteries - some of which are grouped together. Likewise for the Engineers.
The Service Support elements are similarly composed.
Take note though that article does mention the 2004 amendment which inserts the phrase "subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province" into s 278. That does put a level of Federal government interference into the process.
Since too much of the Res F and the cadre of old warhorses who can't shut up and just enjoy the view of the paintings in the mess has never been able to lean into any useful reinforcement scheme except providing volunteers who don't have to start from being taught how to shape a beret, it will have to be forced into becoming a useful reinforcing component.
What's the point of giving anything more complex than a Lee Enfield to a reservist if the Res F isn't going to aspire to be able to fit into employable units without somewhat less than the time needed to train a soldier from scratch? There are things that need to be done; the Reg F does almost all of them; the Res F has to be more than a drain on available resources.
I guess I'm failing in my duties as an old warhorse in that since I retired I haven't spent one day in the mess enjoying the paintings. As for not shutting up part - guilty as charged.
Look, I don't for a minute hold the ResF blameless. Reserves 2000 has done as much harm as it has done good - and yes they did some good.
The real problem, however, is that everything that the ResF is or isn't comes from the RegF: their pay, their organization; their equipment; their mission - or more accurately their lack of all of these. ResF leaders, regardless of their rank command and control very little in the way of people, resources and, least of all, influence.
If a given reservist is only capable of shaping his beret then that's because of the resources and training system that the RegF has laid on that soldier. And yes, the haphazard training system that the ResF has is the way it is because of the way the RegF resources it.
The RegF has created a two tier system that it should be ashamed of and held accountable for. It can be fixed and easily fixed and the fact that it hasn't is institutional negligence of the worst order. Blaming the ResF for its state over the last half century is for the most part victim shaming.
We agree in general that there remains a role for company sized sub-units can and should exist in smaller rural centres. Where we disagree is on the next level.
Your presentation puts forward a mode of employment of independent action with a possibility of some vague regimenting into groups as required. My view is that from square one they need to belong to a tactical command structure that trains and employs the companies. We already have such a structural model in the brigade groups (real brigade groups not the administrative ones that are there now). We don't need to invent a new structure. We just need to properly implement the existing one. It can handle all natures of missions from the smallest company action on up.
You misunderstood me. The section only requires that the MND consult with the attorney general who raised the requisition and any attorney general of a province that is affected. One should note that this was the Martin Liberal government.
We agree in general that there remains a role for company sized sub-units can and should exist in smaller rural centres. Where we disagree is on the next level.
Your presentation puts forward a mode of employment of independent action with a possibility of some vague regimenting into groups as required. My view is that from square one they need to belong to a tactical command structure that trains and employs the companies. We already have such a structural model in the brigade groups (real brigade groups not the administrative ones that are there now). We don't need to invent a new structure. We just need to properly implement the existing one. It can handle all natures of missions from the smallest company action on up.
Agreed that independent entities eventually fall under something. And that is a good thing.
As to mixed trades?
7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train? Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.
7 armoured ? - 7 drivers and VCs - 4 vehicles with GPMGs/GMGs
7 gunners? - 7 mortarmen (7 infanteers with 2 tubes)
7 engineers? - 7 pioneers (7 infanteers that can blow things up real good)
7 medics? - 7 combat aid types (7 infanteers that can patch up people)
7 comms? - 7 signallers (7 infanteers that can communicate (and drive))
1 Vehicle tech? - excellent - somebody to keep the running gear running
2 Weapons techs? - ideal -
7 infantry - well, its a start. useful scouts if nothing else.
And if that lot can't train themselves with on line resources, a couple of officers and some RSS, and keep themselves busy then I don't know what would engage them.
All of the members have a foot on the rung to their next corps transfer.
And by the way, my expectation is of 200 to 250 on the rolls for each local sub-unit.
I just took the bodies he gave me, with the trades he assigned and asked myself what I could do with that motley assortment. It turned out, in my fevered mind at least, that there is a small, functional capability even at that level of absurdity. I would still be playing for a larger structure. A company combat team, perhaps, or a company with a strong weapons platoon (including 81mm tubes) or, as also suggested, something like a CAR Commando. Or, the Strike Company of the RM.
An entity that can train independently within itself, with its own resources, learning how to exploit capabilities beyond direct fire, but which can be grouped into a larger formation, and possibly separated from its support.
You misunderstood me. The section only requires that the MND consult with the attorney general who raised the requisition and any attorney general of a province that is affected. One should note that this was the Martin Liberal government.
Take note though that article does mention the 2004 amendment which inserts the phrase "subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province" into s 278. That does put a level of Federal government interference into the process.
You misunderstood me. The section only requires that the MND consult with the attorney general who raised the requisition and any attorney general of a province that is affected. One should note that this was the Martin Liberal government.
I read that section somewhat differently from you.
278 On receiving a requisition in writing made by an attorney general under section 277, the Chief of the Defence Staff, or such officer as the Chief of the Defence Staff may designate, shall, subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province that may be affected, call out such part of the Canadian Forces as the Chief of the Defence Staff or that officer considers necessary for the purpose of suppressing or preventing any actual riot or disturbance or any riot or disturbance that is considered as likely to occur.
My take (as I have bolded) is that the subjecting to and the consulting with rests with the CDS and that the inclusion of the Minister did not introduce governmental interference in the process. Rather it codified reality, and recognized that the military is responsible to civilian oversight. Or as noted in the summary to the legislation that amended that part of the NDA:
Access all information related to this legislation on CanLII.
canlii.ca
Part 13 amends the National Defence Act to allow for the identification and prevention of the harmful unauthorized use of, or interference with, computer systems and networks of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces, and to ensure the protection of those systems and networks. The amendments also clarify the provisions dealing with active service and the definition of “emergency”. In cases of aid to the civil power, the amendments allow the Minister to provide direction to the Chief of the Defence Staff on how to respond to provincial requisitions. The amendments provide for a member of the reserve force who is called out on service during an emergency to be reinstated with their former employer at the conclusion of the period of call out. The amendments also establish the Reserve Military Judges Panel, thus making it possible to increase, according to the needs of the military justice system, the number of officers who can be selected to hear military cases.
Firstly, you are absolutely correct that I misstated the consultation process. It's the CDS that consults with the provincial attorney(ies) general and not the MND.
My take (as I have bolded) is that the subjecting to and the consulting with rests with the CDS and that the inclusion of the Minister did not introduce governmental interference in the process. Rather it codified reality, and recognized that the military is responsible to civilian oversight.
This part I disagree with. While the MND has responsibility for the whole department, the legislation as it was first written created a direct link as between the requisitioning AG and the CDS. The CDS was given the sole power to decide with what force to respond to the request. Kirkhill in his writings discusses the state and National Guard in it's state militia capacity and in fact I think this is exactly what the Canadian legislation was providing for - an ability of the provincial authorities to call out the military for assistance.
The prior legislation did not fetter the CDS's discretion on how to respond. The revised version mandates that he is fettered by the directions received from the MND.
I think what's important is that when called out in aid of the civil power, the military is no longer acting in its role of a national defence force but in the capacity of the administration of justice within the province and which is constitutionally a provincial power. The MND has no role with policing in a province.
Remember that this power goes back over a century to the Militia Acts where provincial AGs could requisition assistance from officers commanding the local Active Militia districts. If one goes back to s. 27 of the old 1868 Militia Act the officer responding was the Adjutant General of the district (or appropriate subordinate) and the requisition could come from the mayor or head of municipality or by two magistrates etc.
In each case there was a direct link as between the local official and the local military without reference to the federal government.
The 2004 amendment in my mind is an interference with the long-standing constitutional provision that recognizes the military's roles in the individual provinces before confederation and continued that relationship notwithstanding that all provincial militias had become a federal responsibility.
For Kirkhill: I mentioned that it was a Liberal government because I associate them with a government that a) doesn't respect old constitutional conventions; b) works hard to centralize power wherever it suits them; and c) doesn't trust their subordinate agencies to do their job without meddling in.
The Militia at this point in time exists to lick itself.
It is only viable currently in supporting the Regs in small numbers - now a lot of the fault of the Reg Force, or former Reg Force retirees, but it's not providing any units whatsoever to anyone.
Sure they have been Militia companies fielded with the Reg's for overseas deployment, but it hasn't been an actual unit -- its been troops gather from all over the country.
Until the Reserves are sorted - there is zero point to discussion them in Farce 2025.
The fact there are going to be 5 Divisions for an Army that doesn't have enough troops for 1 would be my first area of concern...
Damn, pulled me into comment. I just wanted to read this thread in peace Lol
The Army Reserve provides the CAF what it wants it to provide based on its current structure and equipment, under-resourced and inefficient as it is. Something like 8000 PRes and CRs for Op Laser, thousands for Op Lentus over the past few years, say nothing of those on overseas operations. We will never be the like the US national guard, it’ll always be composite units.
Ok here’s a controversial opinion, but main problem with the ARes is not it’s structure. Don’t mistake that I am here to argue to retain every cap badge or unit in its current role. Disbanding CBG HQs, firing half the COs and RSMs and making bigger regiments will not increase the number of soldiers on the parade square. There is no shortage of people wanting to join however there seems to be an upper limit on the average reserve unit’s strength. Few units exceed 250. The whole process of recruiting and getting a troop to DP 1 faster than others are departing out the other side needs to go back to first principles. Taking recruiting from CFRC was a decent first step. Letting go of the need to do every DP1 course at the CDTC was another.
Damn, pulled me into comment. I just wanted to read this thread in peace Lol
The Army Reserve provides the CAF what it wants it to provide based on its current structure and equipment, under-resourced and inefficient as it is. Something like 8000 PRes and CRs for Op Laser, thousands for Op Lentus over the past few years, say nothing of those on overseas operations. We will never be the like the US national guard, it’ll always be composite units.
Ok here’s a controversial opinion, but main problem with the ARes is not it’s structure. Don’t mistake that I am here to argue to retain every cap badge or unit in its current role. Disbanding CBG HQs, firing half the COs and RSMs and making bigger regiments will not increase the number of soldiers on the parade square. There is no shortage of people wanting to join however there seems to be an upper limit on the average reserve unit’s strength. Few units exceed 250. The whole process of recruiting and getting a troop to DP 1 faster than others are departing out the other side needs to go back to first principles. Taking recruiting from CFRC was a decent first step. Letting go of the need to do every DP1 course at the CDTC was another.
I have recollections of the Calgary Highlanders being denied the opportunity to sign on more than some 200 troops or being allowed to open remote platoons in the 80s. Drumheller as considered as one possible site.
I also have recollections of parade nights being cut due to lack of available funds.
Damn, pulled me into comment. I just wanted to read this thread in peace Lol
The Army Reserve provides the CAF what it wants it to provide based on its current structure and equipment, under-resourced and inefficient as it is. Something like 8000 PRes and CRs for Op Laser, thousands for Op Lentus over the past few years, say nothing of those on overseas operations. We will never be the like the US national guard, it’ll always be composite units.
I don't accept that answer. The USNG wasn't always like that - it was looked at as a joke for years, a way to avoid RVN etc service.
Only a very few USNG units where activated for 1991 Desert Shield - Desert Storm, not because they where not wanted or needed, but because their training/numbers etc was abysmal.
Ok here’s a controversial opinion, but main problem with the ARes is not it’s structure. Don’t mistake that I am here to argue to retain every cap badge or unit in its current role. Disbanding CBG HQs, firing half the COs and RSMs and making bigger regiments will not increase the number of soldiers on the parade square.
Few of us are saying bigger Regiments are needed - because frankly right now I wouldn't Trust the Res to run anything over a Platoon without max supervision. I think the Capbadge mafia needs to be killed with fire (in the Regs too).
Which is great - an operational company - and a training company. Because lets face it a lot of the Res numbers are are Pte's who are summer students and a large amount drop off the face of the planet by October.
The whole process of recruiting and getting a troop to DP 1 faster than others are departing out the other side needs to go back to first principles. Taking recruiting from CFRC was a decent first step. Letting go of the need to do every DP1 course at the CDTC was another.
When I joined the Reserves in 1987 - recruiting was done internally and Recruit and Basic where done that way too.
Recruit on Weeknights (Mon and Wed) and Weekends - and then oddly our basic trade training - and then basic (was very weird for those of us who hadn't finished basic not to be able to wear our capbadges at the end, and needed to complete Basic to be able to wear them.
I do think that in order to better integrate the Reg and Res structures that courses need to be the same - and Res promotions slowed down.
Nothing is more frustrating that working for someone a few months later when you taught their ISCC that summer. There is also an experience depth often missing from some Res O and NCO's who haven't done Class C Deployments, as they often do not know how to deal with soldiers in a 24/7 environment.
Firstly, you are absolutely correct that I misstated the consultation process. It's the CDS that consults with the provincial attorney(ies) general and not the MND.
This part I disagree with. While the MND has responsibility for the whole department, the legislation as it was first written created a direct link as between the requisitioning AG and the CDS. The CDS was given the sole power to decide with what force to respond to the request. Kirkhill in his writings discusses the state and National Guard in it's state militia capacity and in fact I think this is exactly what the Canadian legislation was providing for - an ability of the provincial authorities to call out the military for assistance.
The prior legislation did not fetter the CDS's discretion on how to respond. The revised version mandates that he is fettered by the directions received from the MND.
I think what's important is that when called out in aid of the civil power, the military is no longer acting in its role of a national defence force but in the capacity of the administration of justice within the province and which is constitutionally a provincial power. The MND has no role with policing in a province.
Remember that this power goes back over a century to the Militia Acts where provincial AGs could requisition assistance from officers commanding the local Active Militia districts. If one goes back to s. 27 of the old 1868 Militia Act the officer responding was the Adjutant General of the district (or appropriate subordinate) and the requisition could come from the mayor or head of municipality or by two magistrates etc.
In each case there was a direct link as between the local official and the local military without reference to the federal government.
The 2004 amendment in my mind is an interference with the long-standing constitutional provision that recognizes the military's roles in the individual provinces before confederation and continued that relationship notwithstanding that all provincial militias had become a federal responsibility.
For Kirkhill: I mentioned that it was a Liberal government because I associate them with a government that a) doesn't respect old constitutional conventions; b) works hard to centralize power wherever it suits them; and c) doesn't trust their subordinate agencies to do their job without meddling in.
Given your background, and as well read as you are, I suspect that this book will not be a revelation to you. On the other hand it is a new discovery to me.
1. The Constitutional Force for the Defence of the realın is the Militia . By an early statute every freeman between the ages of fifteen and sixty years was obliged to be provided with armour to preserve the peace ; but he was protected from leaving his county or shire , “ save upon the coming of strange enemies into the realm . ” 2
1 This word originated with the controversy which the force itself , namely , the Trained Bands — gave rise to . The first entry in the Commons Journal in which the word is used , is under date of 31st of Jan. , 1641. ( See vol . ii . pp . 316 and 406 ) . “ I do heartily wish , " said Whitlock , addressing the Commons , on 1st March 1641 , “ that this great word — this new word — the Militia — this harsh word , might never have come within these walls . ” — 4 Rush . , Coll . , p . 525
The Militia Ordinance was passed by the Parliament of England on 15 March 1642. By claiming the right to appoint military commanders without the king's approval, it was a significant step in events leading to the outbreak of the First English Civil War in August.[1]
The 1641 Irish Rebellion meant there was widespread support in England for raising military forces to suppress it.[2] However, as relations between Charles I and Parliament deteriorated, neither side trusted the other, fearing such an army might be used against them.[3]
The only permanent military force available were the Trained bands, or county militia, controlled by Lord lieutenants, who in turn were appointed by the king. In December 1641, Sir Arthur Haselrige introduced a militia bill giving Parliament the right to nominate its commanders, not Charles, which was passed by the House of Commons.
All of which, in my mind puts the 2004 ruling as yet one more power play in a discussion that is more than 800 years old, predating the Edward I's Statutes of Westminster of 1285.
The Crown's Lieutenants, be they Lords-Lieutenant, Lieutenants Governor or Governors are by history, law and tradition the agents of the Crown and are responsible for the maintenance of Peace, Order and Good Governance, as we have it in Canada. The Crown is advised by the Executive Council, now democratically elected, but it is the Crown that holds the authority. That authority includes the right to administer justice and to call out the entire male community, between the ages of 15 and 60 to support the Crown.
That body, by 1641, had come to be known as a militia. And by 1869, two years after Confederation, while British Law was still the controlling law in Canada, Clode was comfortable stating, unequivocally, "The Constitutional Force for the Defence of the realın is the Militia".
That position was the accepted position, even in Canada, until the innovations of the 1940s and the establishment of the Sedentary, Non-Permanent Active, and Permanent Active Militias as the Canadian Army (Regular) and the Canadian Army (Reserve). The Militia resurfaced briefly as an Army Reserve between 1954 and 1968.
The two Canadian Army components that were previously PAM and NPAM were renamed following World War II as Canadian Army Regular Force and Canadian Army Reserve Force respectively. However in 1954, the Reserve Force was once again renamed Canadian Army (Militia) as a result of the Kennedy Report on the Reserve Army.[29] Following the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968, the Canadian Army became Mobile Command, with its reserve component becoming Mobile Command (Reserve). In 1993, Mobile Command (Reserve) was renamed Land Force Command (Reserve), changing its name to match its Regular Force counterparts (also renamed Land Force Command). In 2011, the service elements of the Canadian Armed Forces reverted to their pre-1968 names, with Land Force Command (Reserve) reverting its name to the Canadian Army Reserve.
Since the unification of the armed forces in 1968, the term militia has not been used to formally describe a Canadian military force. However, the term is used colloquially in Canada in reference to the Canadian Army Reserve.[30][31]
The related problem is: "who has the authority to call out the "Militia"" regardless of what it is called. The historical, traditional, answer is that the Crown's agent, specifically its Lieutenant (either Lord-Lieutenant or Lieutenant-Governor) or its Attorney (the Attorney General) and the Attorney's deputy, his Solicitor (the Solicitor General) have the authority to raise the Militia in defence of the Peace, Order and Good Governance within the realm.
On January 1 1867 Canada was not a realm. A collection of realms, each with their own Crown Lieutenant, Attorney and Solicitor, and their own Executive Council capable of making laws and advising their Crown Lieutenant, all permitted to arm and equip their citizenry to defend themselves and keep order, were debating how much sovereignty to cede to John A MacDonald and his proposed government.
John A. was determined to have a powerful central government. The Provinces demurred.
Regardless John A. managed to establish his authority under his own Crown Lieutenant. His Crown Lieutenant, his Lieutenant-Governor, however, was to be titled Governor-General. His intent was that this would the First Among Equals and be the senior Crown Lieutenant in Canada. That was the official position until 1882
A ruling by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1882 altered this view,[3] establishing that the lieutenant governors represented the Queen in the provinces as much as the governor general did in the federal jurisdiction.[4][6][17]
Despite the wishes of the Federal Government and Wikipedia, the Provinces, their Lieutenants Governor, their Attorneys and Solicitors General, and their Executive Councils and Legislators, and their Militias, are not subordinate to Federal Authority. They are Co-Equal. And that includes maintaining the ability to call out the Miliitia, even when that Militia is centralized as a common good, renamed as the Canadian Forces, and jointly commanded by the Chief of the Defence Staff who finds him/her self in the invidious position of having to serve 11 masters.
It would be an interesting day at the office if the Quebec Attorney General called out the Army to support the Surete de Quebec at the same time as the Attorney General of Canada called out the Army to support the RCMP over a dispute in the Province of Quebec.
No doubt the 2004 ruling, concurrent with the debates over Quebec sovereignty, was influenced by considerations of that thought. But what appears to by a minor administrative change is actually a major rebalancing of the Crown authority within Canada.
The definition of sovereignty is the arrogation of lethal force in support of the government. Prior to 2004 and this modification it was clear that the Provinces had sovereign authority, even if they were temperate in how they interpreted that. After the modification they had been stripped of that sovereign authority and now had to justify their claim to the Federal government.
The could no longer "requisition". They could only "request". The CDS was no longer their employee. He served strictly as an employee of the Federal government.
Note -
One problem I have with the study of history in Canada, especially as perceived by modern community, is the failure to teach context. Especially historical context. Laws do not arise out of nothingness. They are created in a specific time and place to address a specific problem.
Three examples that engage me are slavery, religion and the militia. I regularly hear the discussion about both and their isolated impacts in the modern world of Canada, or the US, or the UK or France etc. But all of them are mixed over time and space and do not respect borders.
There were slavers and abolitionists of all religions and under all governments in all places. There were French and Irish protestants as much as there were English Roman Catholics. And the Militia Act of 1855 was not a purely Canadian Bill, it was part of an Empire wide response to concerns about Louis Napoleon and his desire to re-establish French Empire - a desire that manifested itself in the French-Mexican wars and support of the Vatican against the "liberal" forces of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel of Savoy.
Given your background, and as well read as you are, I suspect that this book will not be a revelation to you. On the other hand it is a new discovery to me.
All of which, in my mind puts the 2004 ruling as yet one more power play in a discussion that is more than 800 years old, predating the Edward I's Statutes of Westminster of 1285.
The Crown's Lieutenants, be they Lords-Lieutenant, Lieutenants Governor or Governors are by history, law and tradition the agents of the Crown and are responsible for the maintenance of Peace, Order and Good Governance, as we have it in Canada. The Crown is advised by the Executive Council, now democratically elected, but it is the Crown that holds the authority. That authority includes the right to administer justice and to call out the entire male community, between the ages of 15 and 60 to support the Crown.
That body, by 1641, had come to be known as a militia. And by 1869, two years after Confederation, while British Law was still the controlling law in Canada, Clode was comfortable stating, unequivocally, "The Constitutional Force for the Defence of the realın is the Militia".
That position was the accepted position, even in Canada, until the innovations of the 1940s and the establishment of the Sedentary, Non-Permanent Active, and Permanent Active Militias as the Canadian Army (Regular) and the Canadian Army (Reserve). The Militia resurfaced briefly as an Army Reserve between 1954 and 1968.
The related problem is: "who has the authority to call out the "Militia"" regardless of what it is called. The historical, traditional, answer is that the Crown's agent, specifically its Lieutenant (either Lord-Lieutenant or Lieutenant-Governor) or its Attorney (the Attorney General) and the Attorney's deputy, his Solicitor (the Solicitor General) have the authority to raise the Militia in defence of the Peace, Order and Good Governance within the realm.
On January 1 1867 Canada was not a realm. A collection of realms, each with their own Crown Lieutenant, Attorney and Solicitor, and their own Executive Council capable of making laws and advising their Crown Lieutenant, all permitted to arm and equip their citizenry to defend themselves and keep order, were debating how much sovereignty to cede to John A MacDonald and his proposed government.
John A. was determined to have a powerful central government. The Provinces demurred.
Regardless John A. managed to establish his authority under his own Crown Lieutenant. His Crown Lieutenant, his Lieutenant-Governor, however, was to be titled Governor-General. His intent was that this would the First Among Equals and be the senior Crown Lieutenant in Canada. That was the official position until 1882
Despite the wishes of the Federal Government and Wikipedia, the Provinces, their Lieutenants Governor, their Attorneys and Solicitors General, and their Executive Councils and Legislators, and their Militias, are not subordinate to Federal Authority. They are Co-Equal. And that includes maintaining the ability to call out the Miliitia, even when that Militia is centralized as a common good, renamed as the Canadian Forces, and jointly commanded by the Chief of the Defence Staff who finds him/her self in the invidious position of having to serve 11 masters.
It would be an interesting day at the office if the Quebec Attorney General called out the Army to support the Surete de Quebec at the same time as the Attorney General of Canada called out the Army to support the RCMP over a dispute in the Province of Quebec.
No doubt the 2004 ruling, concurrent with the debates over Quebec sovereignty, was influenced by considerations of that thought. But what appears to by a minor administrative change is actually a major rebalancing of the Crown authority within Canada.
The definition of sovereignty is the arrogation of lethal force in support of the government. Prior to 2004 and this modification it was clear that the Provinces had sovereign authority, even if they were temperate in how they interpreted that. After the modification they had been stripped of that sovereign authority and now had to justify their claim to the Federal government.
The could no longer "requisition". They could only "request". The CDS was no longer their employee. He served strictly as an employee of the Federal government.
Note -
One problem I have with the study of history in Canada, especially as perceived by modern community, is the failure to teach context. Especially historical context. Laws do not arise out of nothingness. They are created in a specific time and place to address a specific problem.
Three examples that engage me are slavery, religion and the militia. I regularly hear the discussion about both and their isolated impacts in the modern world of Canada, or the US, or the UK or France etc. But all of them are mixed over time and space and do not respect borders.
There were slavers and abolitionists of all religions and under all governments in all places. There were French and Irish protestants as much as there were English Roman Catholics. And the Militia Act of 1855 was not a purely Canadian Bill, it was part of an Empire wide response to concerns about Louis Napoleon and his desire to re-establish French Empire - a desire that manifested itself in the French-Mexican wars and support of the Vatican against the "liberal" forces of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel of Savoy.
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