Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Infanteer]

You guys really know how to kill a thread.

 

[PuckChaser]

 

[Good2Golf]

You guys really know how to kill a thread.

Well if it’s going to die, ironic that it would die on page number (CH-)147….

 

[Kirkhill]

You guys really know how to kill a thread.

Shoot! I thought it was just getting interesting.

 

[KevinB]

Going back to the SSE Mandate to the CAF.

• CONCURRENT OPERATIONS
  At any given time, the Government of Canada can call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to undertake missions for the protection of Canada and Canadians and the maintenance of international peace and stability. It will often call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to deploy on multiple operations at the same time. This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously:
  
  • defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities;
  • meet its NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas;
  • meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and
• contribute to international peace and stability through:

o two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel in two different theatres of operation, including one as a lead nation;
o one time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
o two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel;
o two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
o one Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support; and
o one Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation with scaleable additional support.

So based on that, considering that applies to the entire CAF - it's time to give a lot of people pink slips.

1,500+1,500+1,500+1,000+1000 = 6,500 personnel required (outside of DART and NEO tastings) for available peace and stability commitments.
and 3,000+3,000+1,000+1,000 =8,000 personnel required for rotation (1 on 2 off) for sustained operations.

14,500 personnel needed for minimum CAF operational commitments, plus whatever us needed for NORAD, and NATO.

so + 1 Heavy Bde to NATO, if you don't think that one would cull P&S OPs if there was a major NATO issue (so I don't see the need to actually count it separately) and whatever is for the RCN and RCAF for their obligations as well.



My Point is simply that SSE only really demands 14,500+ members of the CAF...


Dissecting it further - 6,500 Ready/Deployed Troops, and 8,000 spares - I'd look to a 9 month on 18 month off rotation for sustained operations (I'm not totally heartless).
+DART and NEO, and NORAD/NATO Commitments.

So TWO Regular Force Army Bde - and 4 Res.
Now due to the nature of what may be asked, it makes sense to me to have 3 Regular Force Bde - and 6 Res Force Bde.
1 Heavy Regular - with 2 Res --> 1 Cdn Armored Div
1 Medium Regular - with 2 Res --> 2 Cdn Mech Div
1 Light Regular - with 2 Res. --> 3 Cdn Light Div

But it requires a massive restructure - and a lot of missing equipment

 

[AvroArrow92]

Going back to the SSE Mandate to the CAF.

• CONCURRENT OPERATIONS
  At any given time, the Government of Canada can call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to undertake missions for the protection of Canada and Canadians and the maintenance of international peace and stability. It will often call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to deploy on multiple operations at the same time. This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously:
  
  • defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities;
  • meet its NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas;
  • meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and
• contribute to international peace and stability through:

o two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel in two different theatres of operation, including one as a lead nation;
o one time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
o two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel;
o two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
o one Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support; and
o one Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation with scaleable additional support.

So based on that, considering that applies to the entire CAF - it's time to give a lot of people pink slips.

1,500+1,500+1,500+1,000+1000 = 6,500 personnel required (outside of DART and NEO tastings) for available peace and stability commitments.
and 3,000+3,000+1,000+1,000 =8,000 personnel required for rotation (1 on 2 off) for sustained operations.

14,500 personnel needed for minimum CAF operational commitments, plus whatever us needed for NORAD, and NATO.

so + 1 Heavy Bde to NATO, if you don't think that one would cull P&S OPs if there was a major NATO issue (so I don't see the need to actually count it separately) and whatever is for the RCN and RCAF for their obligations as well.



My Point is simply that SSE only really demands 14,500+ members of the CAF...


Dissecting it further - 6,500 Ready/Deployed Troops, and 8,000 spares - I'd look to a 9 month on 18 month off rotation for sustained operations (I'm not totally heartless).
+DART and NEO, and NORAD/NATO Commitments.

So TWO Regular Force Army Bde - and 4 Res.
Now due to the nature of what may be asked, it makes sense to me to have 3 Regular Force Bde - and 6 Res Force Bde.
1 Heavy Regular - with 2 Res --> 1 Cdn Armored Div
1 Medium Regular - with 2 Res --> 2 Cdn Mech Div
1 Light Regular - with 2 Res. --> 3 Cdn Light Div

But it requires a massive restructure - and a lot of missing equipment

I would argue the need for that many brigade headquarters is unnecessary as well. The way I see it the Canadian Army needs at most 4 actual field deployable brigade groups. You can throw in the remaining class c reservist and some class b into reserve districts or the alike. I cannot not see the Canadian government every deploying more than divisional sized force in the next ten years, and even if they do it would be overseas. A domestic operation would not require a upwards of eight field deployable brigades, and if that was the case world war three just became a reality. Most command, logistics, and communications functions could be done through the divisional HQ as needed during an aid to civil power. The brigade group should be the building block for a field deployable formation not as a silo for a collection of reservists and boutique geographical isolated units. Ill try to expand my thoughts on the structure later hopefully but I would see the Canadian Army as something like this three years from now:

Canadian Army, 2025

-2 active mechanized brigade groups
-2 active-reserve motorized brigade groups
-1 active-reserve combat support services brigade
-1 active-reserve logistical brigade
-6 reserve territorial districts/ or equivalent

-1 active sof battalion (CSOR)
-1 active sf battalion (JTF2)

-1 static divisional command
-1 deployable divisional command

 

[KevinB]

I would argue the need for that many brigade headquarters is unnecessary as well. The way I see it the Canadian Army needs at most 4 actual field deployable brigade groups. You can throw in the remaining class c reservist and some class b into reserve districts or the alike. I cannot not see the Canadian government every deploying more than divisional sized force in the next ten years, and even if they do it would be overseas. A domestic operation would not require a upwards of eight field deployable brigades, and if that was the case world war three just became a reality. Most command, logistics, and communications functions could be done through the divisional HQ as needed during an aid to civil power. The brigade group should be the building block for a field deployable formation not as a silo for a collection of reservists and boutique geographical isolated units. Ill try to expand my thoughts on the structure later hopefully but I would see the Canadian Army as something like this three years from now:

I absolute hate additional HQ units - but I hate Ad Hoc piece meal even more.

Canadian Army, 2025

-2 active mechanized brigade groups
-2 active-reserve motorized brigade groups
-1 active-reserve combat support services brigade
-1 active-reserve logistical brigade
-6 reserve territorial districts/ or equivalent

It is my opinion that Logistics are more pressing that Cbt Arms troops - I am willing to allow a much larger portion of Reserve Slots to Cbt Arms than Support side operations.

The CAF current CMBG's are effectively Motorized Brigades - there is no heavy presence - tanks alone don't make an entity heavy.
Honestly I really question the sanity of anything who thinks the current CA allocation makes any sense
Tanks - some
LAV's - lots - none with an ATGM
Arty - towed
The tanks cannot be as effective as they could with a tracked IFV and tracked SPA (and other enablers) - as their off road mobility will be reduced if they allow the LAV's to keep up.

-1 active sof battalion (CSOR)
-1 active sf battalion (JTF2)

CANSOF doesn't belong to the CA - and the terms SF versus SOF have a variety of different connotations and meanings.
I'll also put out that the term BN and JTF-2 shouldn't be used together

-1 static divisional command
-1 deployable divisional command

I see zero use for any Static HQ - outside of a Joint Permanent Command entity.
Regardless of the likleyhood of deploying a DIV - you need to have a deployable entity - if you do -- or just get rid of the extra troops if you never are going to use them.

SSE is the bare minimum - if you just want to stick to that - then yes you don't even need ANY DIV forces - and can toss away most of the Bde HQ's and honestly most of the troops.

 

[Kirkhill]

Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 1 (Sustained) - 1000
Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 2 (Sustained) - 1000
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 1 (Sustained) - 300
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 2 (Sustained) - 300

Sustained Deployments - 2600 x 5 = 13,000

Ready Forces - DART = ???
Ready Forces - NEO = ???

Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 3 (Limited) - 1000
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 3 (Limited) - 300
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 4 (Limited) - 300


My understanding is that these are joint commitments of the entire CAF, not just the ground forces.

Also when the Cdn Govt says two of 500 to 1500 I am pretty sure that means one of 500 and one of a maximum of 1500. So an average of 1000 per deployment. Or less.

And I have heard the number 5 wrt rotations bandied about on this site for a long time.

So the commitments could be met with a supported RCAF squadron on permanent deployment, a Standing Naval Task Force, a Standing contribution to an allied Naval Task Force and an RCAF Helicopter Flight with ground support and security.

Leaving the option to deploy a fighter force with support and security and a couple of combat teams in support of a DART and a NEO operation.

Job done.

 

[KevinB]

Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 1 (Sustained) - 1000
Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 2 (Sustained) - 1000
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 1 (Sustained) - 300
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 2 (Sustained) - 300

Sustained Deployments - 2600 x 5 = 13,000

Ready Forces - DART = ???
Ready Forces - NEO = ???

Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 3 (Limited) - 1000
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 3 (Limited) - 300
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 4 (Limited) - 300


My understanding is that these are joint commitments of the entire CAF, not just the ground forces.

Also when the Cdn Govt says two of 500 to 1500 I am pretty sure that means one of 500 and one of a maximum of 1500. So an average of 1000 per deployment. Or less.

And I have heard the number 5 wrt rotations bandied about on this site for a long time.

So the commitments could be met with a supported RCAF squadron on permanent deployment, a Standing Naval Task Force, a Standing contribution to an allied Naval Task Force and an RCAF Helicopter Flight with ground support and security.

Leaving the option to deploy a fighter force with support and security and a couple of combat teams in support of a DART and a NEO operation.

Job done.

The problem is if you only plan for an average you get bit, yes you could shade it on the cheap - but it really doesn't affect the bottom line at the end of the day.
Yes it is CAF wide - but quite honestly the bulk of deployed forces for Stability Operations are from the Army.

 

[Kirkhill]

The problem is if you only plan for an average you get bit, yes you could shade it on the cheap - but it really doesn't affect the bottom line at the end of the day.
Yes it is CAF wide - but quite honestly the bulk of deployed forces for Stability Operations are from the Army.

All true Kevin. But that isn't what the Government of the Day signed up for as near as I can see.

 

[KevinB]

All true Kevin. But that isn't what the Government of the Day signed up for as near as I can see.

If you where the CCA, would you err on the side of caution?
I would go for more not less...

 

[Blackadder1916]

This part I disagree with. While the MND has responsibility for the whole department, the legislation as it was first written created a direct link as between the requisitioning AG and the CDS. The CDS was given the sole power to decide with what force to respond to the request. Kirkhill in his writings discusses the state and National Guard in it's state militia capacity and in fact I think this is exactly what the Canadian legislation was providing for - an ability of the provincial authorities to call out the military for assistance.

The prior legislation did not fetter the CDS's discretion on how to respond. The revised version mandates that he is fettered by the directions received from the MND.

I think what's important is that when called out in aid of the civil power, the military is no longer acting in its role of a national defence force but in the capacity of the administration of justice within the province and which is constitutionally a provincial power. The MND has no role with policing in a province.

Remember that this power goes back over a century to the Militia Acts where provincial AGs could requisition assistance from officers commanding the local Active Militia districts. If one goes back to s. 27 of the old 1868 Militia Act the officer responding was the Adjutant General of the district (or appropriate subordinate) and the requisition could come from the mayor or head of municipality or by two magistrates etc.

In each case there was a direct link as between the local official and the local military without reference to the federal government.

The 2004 amendment in my mind is an interference with the long-standing constitutional provision that recognizes the military's roles in the individual provinces before confederation and continued that relationship notwithstanding that all provincial militias had become a federal responsibility.

For Kirkhill: I mentioned that it was a Liberal government because I associate them with a government that a) doesn't respect old constitutional conventions; b) works hard to centralize power wherever it suits them; and c) doesn't trust their subordinate agencies to do their job without meddling in.

Risking further accusation as a thread killer (though not objecting to the splitting and creation of a separate thread, since I don't have to provide the labour), I'll respond.

While you raise some good points, I think that the "legislation as first written" was as much because of the limitations in communication for the time as it might have been to acknowledge separation of powers. Much further research would be necessary to provide detailed comment about the incremental changes that led from mayors and magistrates requesting call-out from the local militia commander (who would've most likely been part of the "local establishment" with already existing personal and/or working relationships with the requestor) who was required to provide troops (in the absence of ability to refer to higher) "at the expense of the municipality/county" to the current situation of AGs requisitioning through the CDS with the butcher's bill landing on the MND's desk.

With that limitation, I'll impart what I was able to glean about the circumstances that resulted in the NDA amendment in question. The legislative summary from the Library of Parliament provides some background about Bill C-7 which was an omnibus bill known as the Public Safety Act 2002 and amended 23 existing acts. While the change to S. 278 wasn't the most innocuous it was surely among the least discussed or questioned.

On 11 February 2004, the Honourable Tony Valeri, Minister of Transport, introduced in the House of Commons Bill C-7, An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public safety – known as the Public Safety Act, 2002. The Bill is the former Bill C-17, and was reinstated as C-7 pursuant to the motion adopted by the House of Commons on 10 February 2004.(1) It was referred to the Senate the same day.

The former Bill, C-17, in turn, had replaced Bill C-55,which died on the Order Paper when the first session of the 37th Parliament ended on 16 September 2002. Bill C‑55, in turn, replaced Bill C‑42, which was given first reading on 22 November 2001. Bill C-42 received significant criticism, however, and the Government did not proceed with it. Significant differences between Bill C-7 and its predecessors will be noted in this document. The Bill is one of three in the Government’s legislative response to the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act, most provisions of which received royal assent on 18 December 2001, was the first. On 28 November 2001, the House of Commons unanimously consented to a motion to delete from Bill C-42 section 4.83 in clause 5 amending the Aeronautics Act. The same day, that section was introduced as Bill C-44 in order to provide for speedier passage than consideration as part of Bill C-42 would have allowed for. It received royal assent on 18 December 2001.

Bill C-7 amends 23 existing Acts, and enacts a new statute to implement the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which entered into force on 26 March 1975.

The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the various aspects of the Bill. In general, the statutes being amended will be discussed in the alphabetical order in which they appear in the Bill. A number of statutes, however, are amended in a similar manner to provide for the making of interim orders if immediate action is required and these have been grouped together. The two parts dealing with information sharing in relation to immigration matters are also discussed together.​

The summary addresses the specific amendment to s.278 with;

Clause 79 amends section 278 in Part VI (Aid to the Civil Power), which deals with the call-up of the Canadian Forces “for the purpose of suppressing or preventing any actual riot or disturbance or any riot or disturbance that is considered as likely to occur.” At the present time, when the attorney general of a province requests the help of the Forces to aid the civil power, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) (or an officer designated by the CDS) can call up the number of military personnel and units considered necessary to deal with the actual or likely riot or disturbance. Clause 79 amends section 278 by adding the words “subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province that may be affected …” The purpose of the amendment is to allow the Minister of National Defence to give some direction to the CDS when dealing with a request for assistance from a provincial attorney general, for example in the case of simultaneous requests for aid from other provinces.​

With Bill C-7 introduced in the House, gone through three readings and committee (of the whole), passed and the same happening in the Senate all on the same day, there isn't much record of debate. Thus, one has to go back to the earlier session and Bill C-17 to find what was discussed re this particular amendment. In the one committee meeting where witnesses from DND provided evidence the following attended from the department; Hon. John McCallum, Minister of National Defence, Colonel Dominic McAlea, Deputy Legal Advisor (Military), Office of the National Defence and Canadian Forces Legal Advisor; Colonel Robert Leitch, Commander, Canadian Forces Information Operations Group.

The Minister's opening statement included this discussion of the s.278 amendment.

Evidence - C-17 (37-2) - No. 4 - House of Commons of Canada

Evidence - C-17 (37-2) - No. 4 - House of Commons of Canada

www.ourcommons.ca

The third point I'd like to address is aid of the civil power. Something else that is part of this new security environment is the increased potential for the government to have to manage multiple requests from the provinces for aid of the civil power. In fact, we've already learned that this could be a real possibility when we were planning for the Canadian Forces response to the anticipated year 2000 problem.

While such a situation did not occur in that case, it is not difficult to imagine the scenario where we would have less time to plan and more demands to respond to. This amendment would therefore allow the Minister of National Defence to provide appropriate direction to the Chief of the Defence Staff, particularly in circumstances when there were multiple and simultaneous requests for assistance from the provinces. And in doing so this would ensure that the Government of Canada had the ability to respond effectively to multiple demands from the provinces.

I would note, however, that requests for aid of the civil power would continue to be made directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

And during later questioning, this was the only reference of "aid to the civil power".

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Minister, I have just a quick question.

In your speech here, when you say “aid of the civil power”, we know that in order for the army, or the Canadian Armed Forces, to go into a province, the Minister of Justice or the Solicitor General from that province has to make a request to the Minister of National Defence. If we were to need American help to go into a province, who asks the Americans to come over? Is it the province, or do you do it?

Mr. John McCallum: The request comes from the provincial government, actually not to me, the minister, but to the Chief of Defence Staff, who then consults.... Well, under the new legislation I, the minister, would have to approve what the response would be, but on the recommendation of the chief.

In the unlikely event that the situation is so grave that we want to call upon the Americans, then the request would come from the Government of Canada, through I'm not sure exactly which individual, but it would not go from the province to the United States. It would come from the Government of Canada to the Government of the United States, requesting that U.S. military assistance. It would have to be approved by the Government of Canada.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: And they would be allowed to go into whichever province has made the request.

Mr. John McCallum: Yes, but we're already assuming that the province has made the request, and should it be grave enough--

Mr. Robert Bertrand: The Canadian Armed Forces.

Mr. John McCallum: Yes.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: But not for the Americans.

Mr. John McCallum: The request would have to go from the Government of Canada to the American side, if we wanted to go as far as that.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Okay.

That's the extent (as far as I've been able to ascertain) of legislators' concern about this particular amendment, despite many criticisms (usually from opposition members) of many other aspects of the omnibus bill.

No doubt the 2004 ruling, concurrent with the debates over Quebec sovereignty, was influenced by considerations of that thought. But what appears to by a minor administrative change is actually a major rebalancing of the Crown authority within Canada.

A couple of points, it was not a ruling in 2004 but passage of legislation and when the first bill (that later died, but not because of this clause) that included this amendment was introduced in the House, it was December 2001 and Quebec sovereignty was not the consideration of the day, but 9-11.

Debates (Hansard) No. 123 - December 3, 2001 (37-1) - House of Commons of Canada

Debates (Hansard) No. 123 - December 3, 2001 (37-1) - House of Commons of Canada

www.ourcommons.ca

 

[FJAG]

Risking further accusation as a thread killer (though not objecting to the splitting and creation of a separate thread, since I don't have to provide the labour), I'll respond.

To keep it short, this doesn't change anything. It's an amendment which overturns 140 years of previous practice for the purpose of imposing federal government direction into a process that used to be strictly between the province and the military. Does anyone really think that the CDS is not able to deal with multiple circumstances without the MND having to give directions? Bull feathers.

 

[Blackadder1916]

To keep it short, this doesn't change anything. It's an amendment which overturns 140 years of previous practice for the purpose of imposing federal government direction into a process that used to be strictly between the province and the military. Does anyone really think that the CDS is not able to deal with multiple circumstances without the MND having to give directions? Bull feathers.

That would be so if in that 140 years there had been no mention of the Minister in the part of the NDA dealing with aid to the civil power. However, in the National Defence Act 1950 (pp. 92-96 of pdf), consultation with, and agreement of the Minister was required if resources of the RCAF and/or RCN were deemed necessary.

 

[FJAG]

That would be so if in that 140 years there had been no mention of the Minister in the part of the NDA dealing with aid to the civil power. However, in the National Defence Act 1950 (pp. 92-96 of pdf), consultation with, and agreement of the Minister was required if resources of the RCAF and/or RCN were deemed necessary.

I was really wanting to bail this discussion from this thread, but ...

As of 1950 there were three separate services. The Army dealt with aid of the civil power and within the Army there was no need to consult the MND on a requisition and the MND had no legislative authority to give the Army directions.

Aid of the Civil Power concerns riots and disturbances of the peace. The need to use RCAF or RCN would be a very unusual force but more importantly the Army chain of command had no authority to call out either the RCN or the RCAF. Accordingly if the Army needed either RCAF or RCN involvement they would need to go through the MND to coordinate what would now be a joint op.

What is important here though is that as of the 1950 Act there is still no power in the MND to give directions to the Army district commander or Chief of General Staff as to the use of the Army during the operation. The MND's power was limited to call out such elements of the RCN or RCAF he considered appropriate.

 

[dapaterson]

With at least one current premier convicted of killing someone while driving drunk, perhaps it's for the best that MND can intervene to provide some level of adult supervision.

 

[McG]

to provide some level of adult supervision.

So, your specifically talking about the current MND.

 

[Kirkhill]

Effectively the government of the day inserted itself into the process so that it can ration the resources available to the provinces through the Chief of Defence Staff. Much of a sameness with the current Covid response.

Rather than maintaining the resources necessary to manage a broad emergency the federal government, who took on the responsibility for managing the Militia on behalf of the Provinces in 1868, has reneged on its obligations and decided to ration resources rather than pay for the necessary resources.

I appreciate the depth of Blackadder's research, and I take note that the legislation came in the wake of 9/11. On the other hand I would note that the Quebec Referendum of 1995, the Quebec General Election of 1998 and the Clarity Act of 1999 were recent events in 2001-2003 and probably not completely overshadowed by 9/11 when discussing terrorism, counter-terrorism and public safety in a Canadian context.

As for Federal ministers offering better supervision than Provincial ministers, I hope tongue was firmly in cheek. Fluffy hair and my daughter's socks on my Prime Minister don't inspire my confidence.

I side with FJAG on this one wrt to precedence.

The Army is not just the government's diplomatic plaything. It has real domestic responsibilities. Responsibilities it owes to the provinces to fulfil the roles of the state National Guards in the US.

The Provinces should be ensuring that the federal government provisions the Army with the necessary resources to meet their needs. Like, during a pandemic, supplying enough field hospitals and ambulances to augment the standard level of health care. Or, during floods and washouts, supplying emergency transport, shelter, beans and bandages.

And Kevin, if I were CDS, I would be preparing for the unexpected to the extent I could, but if the PM isn't funding him there isn't a lot of preparing he can do.

 

[KevinB]

And Kevin, if I were CDS, I would be preparing for the unexpected to the extent I could, but if the PM isn't funding him there isn't a lot of preparing he can do.

When you look at the CAF budget - one could and should field a lot more that one what has.

The issue is that the CAF seems to be told what to get - as we have seen with the Griffon, and the 1 Million LAV Army.
I gather no one wants to die on their sword about fixing the acquisition process with PSPC, but they should at least make an attempt to reform the Military into a viable force.

Right now neither number you or I have thrown out is currently supported.
Even the bare min with a 1 on 1 off rotation isn't supported with key equipment, admittedly even the Roto 0 doesn't have the equipment needed...

 

[MilEME09]

speaking of resources, i think the CAF is living in a pipe dream right now for wanting two RFL2 rifle coy's coming out of 38,39,and 41 CBG to support ops. unless there is some major changes going on over the next few years getting two platoons out of the reserves will be a hard battle, let alone two companies.