Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Our training schedule focuses on the build up to Cmbt Team attacks, we sometimes call this a level 5 range. Our tasks, as a platoon, within a combat team context are as such (@Infanteer feel free to correct me here): clear enemy positions on the objective during a combat team attack, conduct hasty attacks and defile drills to clear the axis of advance, provide flank security on the advance.

FJAG's thought got me to wondering as well if there is an equivalent emphasis on the defence? Both static defence and manoeuvering?

 

[markppcli]

I am asking, not proposing, if there is a different way of organizing things.

I am asking if putting everything in the battalion up front in the LAVs, equally divided, is the only way to create an effective LAV Battalion. Is there an advantage to doing that?

What I am seeing from my distant perspective is vehicles that are crowded and capabilities that are distributed. When concentration of one, or any of those capabilities is required is that easily accomplished and regularly practiced.

When I said that the LAV 3.0 was Canada's Original Sin that was not a knock against the LAV. What I meant by that is that, in my opinion, it blurred the line between the RCAC roles and the RCIC roles.

The RCAC has a history that emphasises the vehicle in the operations. The RCIC history emphasises the man. There is no reason why both the RCAC and the RCIC can't be equipped with the same vehicle but I would expect them to use them differently.

The Armoured Recce used to keep their "infantry" in the rear of the Squadron/Regiment in as separate "assault" element to be called on when that capability was required. Just like they could call on their Troop/Squadron to add additional weight to their fires.

The infantry use to keep their support in the rear of the Platoon/Company/Battalion in separate weapons dets, sections, platoons, companies to be called on when required.

I have long argued that the LAV's stabilized turret overshadows the support weapons of the Canadian infantry battalion and renders many of them redundant. In my view when the LAV 3.0 was adopted it swung the Infantry Battalion away from the rifleman centred organization to something that was looking more like an RCAC Armoured Car Regiment.

Which is why I am wondering about seeing the Battalion as 2 or 3 Support Companies with a Rifle company attached rather than 2 or 3 Rifle Companies with a Support Company attached.

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t.me

Emphasis is still on the man, the LAVs get you there with fire and movement, and protection from fire.

@FJAG i would agree in general; but it takes a Bde to run a combat team range so functionally not much different.

 

[markppcli]

FJAG's thought got me to wondering as well if there is an equivalent emphasis on the defence? Both static defence and manoeuvering?

We do defensives on MR, and on Bde live exercises as well, usually as a “waiting” period.

 

[FJAG]

Emphasis is still on the man, the LAVs get you there with fire and movement, and protection from fire.

@FJAG i would agree in general; but it takes a Bde to run a combat team range so functionally not much different.

So that makes me wonder if the Army would be better served by CMTC becoming a traveling road show that takes well designed cbt tm level exercises around to the brigades?

I seem to be having a what could we do moment here now that the budget has been a disappointment.

 

[Kirkhill]

We do defensives on MR, and on Bde live exercises as well, usually as a “waiting” period.

Is it fair to say that you see your primary role as an offensive force? Carrying the fight to the enemy?

 

[Kirkhill]

So that makes me wonder if the Army would be better served by CMTC becoming a traveling road show that takes well designed cbt tm level exercises around to the brigades?

I seem to be having a what could we do moment here now that the budget has been a disappointment.

Or, what would it take to make Combat Team exercises the norm in the context of the existing Brigade training areas?

 

[markppcli]

Or, what would it take to make Combat Team exercises the norm in the context of the existing Brigade training areas?

They already are, it’s just it takes a Bde to get it going by the time you add all the pieces and range staffs.

 

[markppcli]

Is it fair to say that you see your primary role as an offensive force? Carrying the fight to the enemy?

Yes, but I’d argue that the training focus is largely a factor of where the skills get developed, maneuvering LAVs in a combat team formation vs digging a hole, and the relative complexity required for a live offensive range vs doing a dry defensives

 

[FJAG]

Or, what would it take to make Combat Team exercises the norm in the context of the existing Brigade training areas?

Most of our training areas are already adequate for live fire combat team exercises.

I've always thought that tactical "dry" exercises need to get off the ranges and into the terrain where we will need to actually fight as we did in 4 CMBG. Whether that's farmland and towns in Canada or Latvia or Poland is irrelevant although Europe is preferable on several levels.

This gets me back to force structures.

If you were to redesign CMTC and put it into Europe with a prepositioned combat team of equipment, you could fly over two-week training rotos on a single C17. That's up to 26 combat teams per year which equates fairly well with our 27 RegF rifle companies. If you break that into two one-week phases that could be run concurrently on alternating weeks then you could up to double the throughput and build in additional "break" times for maintenance etc. - you could couple that with the CMTC "travelling roadshow" to prep the deploying roto.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I doubt current manning problems can ever be solved by moving pieces around within the sub-units or even the units or trying to figure out ways to make the equipment suit the manning level.

 

[Kirkhill]

I doubt current manning problems can ever be solved by moving pieces around within the sub-units or even the units or trying to figure out ways to make the equipment suit the manning level.

So what do we do Brad? If "Despair is a sin".

 

[FJAG]

I doubt current manning problems can ever be solved by moving pieces around within the sub-units or even the units or trying to figure out ways to make the equipment suit the manning level.

I've always said that manning problems should lead to two effects:

1) the first is that you can/must train on what to do once you start taking LOBs and casualties and you have a reduced force to work with. That an incidental teaching point; and

2) the second is that it should teach the Army that it needs to have a viable plan to fill the blank files before deployments from other sources both RegF and ResF. We do both now but with long ramp up lead times which are not realistic in an emergency. We need, and need to exercise regularly, a plan on how to quickly round out the deploying force right up to the maximum sized force that our equipment holdings would allow us to deploy. Heck. Call it a mobilization plan. "Mobilization" is not really a dirty word. Ukraine just showed us how to do it.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Embrace the "doctrine" of managed readiness more fully. Accept that every mission going out the door will be a force that has been filled out and kitted out by taking people and equipment from elsewhere. And then add back into the doctrinal (paper) establishments all the positions and equipment taken out for "reasons" that were not really grounded in "we don't need that capability anymore", but were more along the lines of "we need to move some people" or "we want to go a bit more cheap on equipment".

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Regarding collective, in the interests of context the Canadian Army employs the following framework and terminology:

Level 2 - Section/Tank/Gun Det (because saying sub-sub-sub-unit is awkward)
Level 3 - Platoon/Troop
Level 4 - Company/Squadron/Battery (sub-unit)
Level 5 - Combat Team
Level 6 - Battle Group and Unit
Level 7 - Formation (Bde)

Training should be progressive - a unit should not try to start the training year with a Battle Group live-fire attack at night. You build up, and I have found that time invested at the lower levels pays dividends when you get to the higher levels. You know: crawl, walk run instead of run, stumble, fall.

The annual Operating Plan will direct the level of training that each formation (and unit) will achieve. These levels are driven by the managed readiness plan. Folks in the Build phase will train to higher levels. Basically we don't have the whole army trying to train to the same level every year.

Just because a unit is training at Level 3 does not mean that only a single Platoon or Troop is out in the field. The whole unit will likely be in the field, but the emphasis will be on the Platoons or Troops. We talk about Level 3 in a Level 4 context meaning there may well be Company level manouevre, but the OC is not the focus. His tactical plan is there to provide context for the Platoon commanders. If there are compromises to be made they are made at the Company level. A unit should run its own exercises to Level 4, although it would only validate itself to Level 3. We validate two levels down so an OC will validate Sections while the CO will validate the Platoons or Troops. Not all elements in the army will be Validated each year - that is generally reserved for the folks in the Build phase with exceptions as always for the unique units/capabilities. The unit HQ will likely conduct a CAX (Computer Assisted Exercise) each year and each Bde HQ will be part of Ex UNIFIED RESOLVE, although the level of participation by the HQ (and supporting unit HQs) will be driven by the phase that the Bde finds itself in.

Level 5 Live, Level 6 and Level 7 field training exercises (FTX) are generally reserved for the Build Phase. I have seen (and indeed run) such a thing as a Level 3.5 Live where you have a Platoon or Troop conducting a live fire with some combined arms elements included. Live fire is important but it can also be overly scripted. To me, we get diminishing marginal returns on live fire as the Level increases but some may fight me on that.

To bring this back to the start, the troops in the sections and panzers may find a Level 7 exercise somewhat underwhelming with lots of time spent in battle procedure and waiting around. In theory, those troops have already been put through their paces in the previous exercises. CAXs are great for BG, Bde and Div HQs and are my preference for ironing out HQ procedures and tactics; but there is absolutely value in actually moving and sustaining an actual brigade in the actual field. A long-dead German guy said simple things are hard sometimes.

Anyhoo.

 

[Brad Sallows]

1) the first is that you can/must train on what to do once you start taking LOBs and casualties and you have a reduced force to work with. That an incidental teaching point; and

Full agreement. To me it's pointless to fret over whether vehicles should/can be crewed by 2 rather than 3, or how many dismounts should be formally assigned to a section. That's of interest mainly to people designing "buy lists" for DYO tactical wargame scenarios. Day-by-day and mission-by-mission,leaders are going to be restructuring and juggling whatever they happen to have in hand, which is with very few exceptions going to be less than "full". What's more important is that all the people in a sub-unit (at least) are a tight community capable of working with each other even if suddenly reassigned.

 

[GR66]

So what do we do Brad? If "Despair is a sin".

I'll take a shot...

We consolidate.

1 x Heavy Brigade in the West. 1/2/3 PPCLI all LAV Battalions and LdSH a Cavalry Regiment along the lines being discussed in the Armoured Recce threads (Tanks & Recce elements). 1RCHA would get a 3rd Battery (from 5RALC) and be equipped with SP 155mm.

1 x Light Brigade in the East with 1RCR (Petawawa)/1R22eR (Valcartier)/2RCR (Gagetown) all Light Battalions. The infantry, RCD, 2RCHA, 2 CER and 2 Service all equipped to be air transportable as our Rapid Reaction Force. 2RCHA would get a 3rd Battery (from 5RALC) and be equipped with M777s.

The following units would move to the Canadian Combat Support Brigade and be re-roled and re-equipped as follows:

• 12RBC - Re-roles as a Sense/Strike Regiment with LAV LRSS and LAV-UAV/Loitering Munitions vehicles.
• 2R22eR - Re-roles as an AT Battalion with LAV-ATGMs
• 3R22eR - Re-roles as an AA Battalion with LAV-SHORAD (vehicles from 2RCR)
• 5RACL - HQ and STA Batteries remain. 2 x Reg Force Gun Batteries to 1RCHA and 2RCHA. Gains 3 x Reserve Gun Batteries equipped with SP 155mm. Regiment to act as General Support artillery for any deployed Brigade Group.
• 5CER - Becomes the Combat Engineer Regiment for the CCSB
• 5Svc - Becomes the Service Battalion for the CCSB

3RCR would be disbanded and the troops distributed to the 6 x remaining Infantry Battalions (along with the surplus infantry troops from 2 & 3R22eR as the specialized battalions will not require as many personnel as an Infantry Battalion).

Consolidate the Reserves into 3 x Reserve Light Infantry Brigade Groups. The Infantry Regiments from each existing Reserve Brigade would be consolidated into a single Infantry Battalion. The Armoured, Artillery, Combat Engineer and Service Regiments/Battalions would be composite units from across all the existing Brigades.

• 3 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 31/32/33 Brigades)
• 4 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 38/39/41 Brigades)
• 5 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 34/35/36/37 Brigades)

All this can be done with minimal new equipment. SP 155's are already part of an indirect fire program. The LAV-AT, LAV-SHORAD and LAV-UAV's can all be obtained by using existing LAV hulls plus the same RiWP Remote Weapon Station with different weapon mounting options, but as a short-term expedient these specialty units could still be re-roled using MANPAD AT/SAM/UAV launchers until dedicated vehicle upgrades are possible.

Not a perfect solution, but a good short-term solution to reduce manning pressures, HQ overhead and key capability gaps.

 

[markppcli]

What role do you see for an AT Bn? I don’t see that in our or any other NATO doctrine. AT should be held by Bns or Bde at highest.

Functionally I agree though we need to rationalize the number of units we have with the number of people we are allotted. We’ve expanded the number of PYs in the forces because we’ve take Class B for granted and now we’re unwilling to case a Bns colours to keep core capabilities.

 

[Kirkhill]

A follow on question?

What constitutes a Level 5 Combat Team?

In some armies it could be half of one of our Tank Squadrons with an attached LAV Platoon and a FOO Det. Or a LAV Company minus plus a Tank Troop and a FOO Det. They usually have some sort of GBAD capability as well.

It strikes me from following conversations here that our Combat Team, with 20 tanks, and 15 LAVs and maybe a Recce Troop, but minus FOO/FACs (???) is more akin to what some armies would consider a Battalion.

The presence of a Heavy Armoured Car (DFS) to supplement the Tank (something like the new Italian Centauro 2) - would that change the possibilities?

I'm thinking that the larger the Combat Team the larger the training area required. If small Combat Teams could be organized within the Brigade's resources then the interactions between the RRCA/RCAC/RCIC could become more frequent and more "natural"?

Full agreement. To me it's pointless to fret over whether vehicles should/can be crewed by 2 rather than 3, or how many dismounts should be formally assigned to a section. That's of interest mainly to people designing "buy lists" for DYO tactical wargame scenarios. Day-by-day and mission-by-mission,leaders are going to be restructuring and juggling whatever they happen to have in hand, which is with very few exceptions going to be less than "full". What's more important is that all the people in a sub-unit (at least) are a tight community capable of working with each other even if suddenly reassigned.

You and I were typing at the same time Brad.

The primary difference between your prescription and my thought is that that community should extend outside of the Regiment. The thought is the same though. The community (ies) needs to regularly work together in multiple configurations on multiple tasks with the equipment avaialable.

 

[markppcli]

A follow on question?

What constitutes a Level 5 Combat Team?

In some armies it could be half of one of our Tank Squadrons with an attached LAV Platoon and a FOO Det. Or a LAV Company minus plus a Tank Troop and a FOO Det. They usually have some sort of GBAD capability as well.

It strikes me from following conversations here that our Combat Team, with 20 tanks, and 15 LAVs and maybe a Recce Troop, but minus FOO/FACs (???) is more akin to what some armies would consider a Battalion.

The presence of a Heavy Armoured Car (DFS) to supplement the Tank (something like the new Italian Centauro 2) - would that change the possibilities?

I'm thinking that the larger the Combat Team the larger the training area required. If small Combat Teams could be organized within the Brigade's resources then the interactions between the RRCA/RCAC/RCIC could become more frequent and more "natural"?



You and I were typing at the same time Brad.

The primary difference between your prescription and my thought is that that community should extend outside of the Regiment. The thought is the same though. The community (ies) needs to regularly work together in multiple configurations on multiple tasks with the equipment avaialable.

A Cmbt Team is defined in Canada as either a Tank Sqn or an Infantry company supported by other arms. That usually takes the form of an infantry company supported by half a tank Sqn, an engineer tp, and foo det. Plus CSS of course.

 

[GR66]

What role do you see for an AT Bn? I don’t see that in our or any other NATO doctrine. AT should be held by Bns or Bde at highest.

Functionally I agree though we need to rationalize the number of units we have with the number of people we are allotted. We’ve expanded the number of PYs in the forces because we’ve take Class B for granted and now we’re unwilling to case a Bns colours to keep core capabilities.

I see an AT Battalion as a replacement for a Tank Regiment which we are extremely unlikely to get.

We have a total of 82 tanks (of various standards). As noted in a previous thread, not even enough to equip a Canadian equivalent of a single ABCT even if we reduced our Squadron size to 15 from 19. And that leaves us with ZERO replacements, etc.

Equipping a single Cavalry Regiment with 2 x Tank Squadrons leaves enough for a training squadron and an additional squadron worth of spares. maintenance losses, etc.

An ATGM-equipped AT Battalion could have Companies issued out to deployed Brigades to fill a defensive AT role similar to what a Tank Squadron would in a properly equipped mechanized Army.