Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Underway]

If we are delivering a BG or CMBG to Europe (or the ME or Africa etc) we don't need the shipping itself to be RCN. It doesn't need to be military. I am having a hard time finding a plausible scenario where we are in an opposed-entry. It might be subjected to all sorts of things, but its not Juno Beach.

And there is the reason the Army didn't push for a BHS. Canada doesn't go anywhere without allies. That means the force structure (including the RCN one) must rely upon allies to create the situation where Canada can then deploy the follow-on forces, or we deploy to a benign enough environment where we can gradually build up forces or land them with a civilian chartered ship.

The only place I can see us strategically needing rapid deployment is within Canada. And given our infrastructure only the Arctic needs amphib. This means AOPS is good enough for the small unit operations we do in the arctic.

 

[Kirkhill]

Or, again, another Danish model.

New contract with Armed Forces

The Danish Armed Forces and DFDS enter into an agreement on providing ships for the transport of military equipment.

www.dfds.com

While it is true that we will never operate without allies (even, I suspect, in the Canadian Arctic) I do get a bit weary of every question being answered with "We don't really need that. Our allies will take care of it." That leads to Canada becoming Iceland and the Canadian Army not being able to justify anything. After all, if we're invaded, the Americans will take care of it.

I think we can do what we are organized to do. I think we make bad decisions, when we make decisions at all, and we focus too much on the number of people and not enough on the equipment they can manage.

 

[CBH99]

Totally agreed with several of the posts above from Kirkhill, T2B, Underway, etc.

Can we do what we are designed to do? Yes. Grouping all of the tanks together in one location is a smart move and would simplify things immensely - a more practical use of this resource which would make them a lot more useful.

With the odd exception, in defensive operations supporting efforts elsewhere, any force Canada deploys will be a follow-on force. Even if the action is still happening, we have the luxury of geography.

In that sense I was thinking of kit that would be still useful, while perhaps also easier and faster to deploy.

 

[GR66]

If a "pickup" truck is an acceptable transport for light forces then which variant?


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Lets assume that all the vehicles have equivalent powertrains, suspension, mobility and towing capacity.

Which one is more suitable for a 300 km march?

Whatever vehicle you pick it should be capable of mounting all of those various weapons systems that we've seen trialed on Humvee/JLTV-class vehicles. Avenger-type SHORAD RWS, ATGM launchers, 120mm mortar carrier, Multi-tubed UAV/loitering munition launchers, Multi-tubed/multi-munition rocket launchers, EW gear, counter-battery radar, etc.

If a light force is going to be anything more than unarmoured and quick-moving infantry then it needs to have all of those sense and strike capabilities to make a difference on the battlefield. C-130 transportability should be the goal....kind of what the original Stryker vehicle vision was for the US Army.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Striker blossomed because it was trying to protect 11 people. (16.47 tonnes)

The LAV 6.0 is trying to protect 10 people. (28.6 tonnes)

The TAPV is trying to protect 6 people (17.2 tonnes)

The Jackal minimally protects 5 people (6.7 tonnes)

The JLTV is trying to protect 4 people (4.7 tonnes)

Real question here.

If all "infantry" needs to be mounted, and bigger units require bigger vehicles, but smaller vehicles are easier to acquire and deploy, should the infantry be built around smaller sections? Or even around bricks/teams?

It isn't hard to find a transportable vehicle capable of mounting all the assets described by GR66. The problem arises in transporting troops in large numbers in a single vehicle under armour. Numbers = Volume. Volume = Surface Area. Surface Area = Mass.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

LAVs, while heavier than their name would indicate, are transportable. Within the context of FORCE 2025 one of the assumptions is that we are a LAV-based force. A LAV infantry battalion has all sorts of capability for peacekeeping, COIN and stability operations that light infantry lack. Working in TAPVs for some mission/terrain sets might also make sense. I spent a year in a blue baseball cap in Southern Lebanon. The battalions there had a mixture of LAV-types and what I would call TAPVs.

Let's say the Canadian Army had been tapped to send a Battle Group to Mali in 2016 wearing blue helmets. There would be a lot of effort getting a LAV (and TAPV) battle group there, but that is the cost of doing business. You don't go and build dedicated shipping under an RCN flag to handle the episodic movement of troops into theatres where you have an SPOD/APOD already.

 

[Underway]

For reference and discussion?

Strike Brigades - More than Just a Medium Weight Capability

Nicholas Drummond takes us on a deep dive into how the Strike concept can provide much more than just a medium weight capability.

wavellroom.com

Just finished reading this. This is literally the concept I think of when I look at CA capability. We are very close to this concept of a middleweight. It's interesting that the US grew this out of a Canadian shift to the LAV family. We just lack some of the capabilities to make it work properly.

 

[Kirkhill]

LAVs, while heavier than their name would indicate, are transportable. Within the context of FORCE 2025 one of the assumptions is that we are a LAV-based force. A LAV infantry battalion has all sorts of capability for peacekeeping, COIN and stability operations that light infantry lack. Working in TAPVs for some mission/terrain sets might also make sense. I spent a year in a blue baseball cap in Southern Lebanon. The battalions there had a mixture of LAV-types and what I would call TAPVs.

Let's say the Canadian Army had been tapped to send a Battle Group to Mali in 2016 wearing blue helmets. There would be a lot of effort getting a LAV (and TAPV) battle group there, but that is the cost of doing business. You don't go and build dedicated shipping under an RCN flag to handle the episodic movement of troops into theatres where you have an SPOD/APOD already.

And I agree.

That is why I posted the article about the Danish Ferry company DFDS and its Public Private Partnership with the Danish and German governments to supply ocean going RoRo ferries at "Notice To Move" from a bespoke fleet of seven.

I agree entirely that the RCN "doesn't have to". And I apologise for the misdirection I may have caused by yanking Underway's chain.

Certainly it would be nice if the Canadian Government and its military advisers could come to a more coherent inter-service plan. But the cat can be skinned many ways. And the Danish system is one method that does not require LHAs, LHDs, LPDs, LSDs or aircraft carriers. I offer it as an exploitable possibility that Canada has not exploited.

Some time back a chap name of Chretien was asked why he didn't by more air transports, before Harper bought the C17s, 130s and 147s. His response was that if we had them sitting on the runway someone might ask us to use them.

I guess we wouldn't want to make it to easy to use the Army either.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just finished reading this. This is literally the concept I think of when I look at CA capability. We are very close to this concept of a middleweight. It's interesting that the US grew this out of a Canadian shift to the LAV family. We just lack some of the capabilities to make it work properly.

And I think spending some cash on those missing capabilities and organizing a Danish DFDS type transport partnership would tie things up with a bow.

What is to stop the Government subsidizing BC Ferries, Marine Atlantic and Federal to supply surplus capacity that the Government could lease back at short notice?

 

[Kirkhill]

Just finished reading this. This is literally the concept I think of when I look at CA capability. We are very close to this concept of a middleweight. It's interesting that the US grew this out of a Canadian shift to the LAV family. We just lack some of the capabilities to make it work properly.

One other point that I took from the article was that the US brigade moved with a short logistical tail and kept 72 hours supplies on its own wheels. It exploited the difference between the needs of the Wheeled Brigade and the demands of the logistically encumbered heavy brigades.

One thing that intrigues me is my sense that the Canadian concept doesn't fully exploit the fact that each section vehicle is essentially a deuce and a half. We seem to see a need to attach a tail based on the armoured regiment to the wheeled unit thereby, it seems to me, losing some of the benefits that the LAV concept offers.

 

[FJAG]

For reference and discussion?

Those articles are fairly old Kirkhill. The real question is how has the new defence structure changed the concept to a Deep Strike Combat Team and how is it organized and expected to function.

If it is intended for the Canadian Army to fight in conventional operations then you need tanks. If the argument against tanks is that loitering munitions can kill tanks then surely that argument extends to everything else. While the lessons of the Azerbaijan/Armenian war are interesting, they also need some context.

While the EFP has multi-national groupings at below unit level, this is not the norm for combat operations. Counting on getting a tank sub-unit attached from another nation is a much different matter than counting on fire support/CSS from another nation.

Maintenance budgets are expensive - so cut less important budgets. Move the tanks to Gagetown so they are all in one place and we spend less money moving them back and forth. Stop viewing the tank squadrons as training aids for every platoon/company commander to do foundation training. It is true that they are not in Latvia. The point remains that they could be. They could have sailed there and back many times. The priority would be EFP, not Maple Resolve. The Leopard 2A6Ms are pretty much the only capability in the CA that are ready for prime time. Having said that, leaving them in Canada does mean that you can form the armour component of a BG or CMBG for commitment anywhere.

Agree almost fully with that. I agree we should have at least half of our tanks in EFP (not sure if that's two full squadrons or not these days) and build our force around that with the mech infantry elements from other countries.

Where we differ is the location of the remainder of our tanks which in my opinion should be with 1 CMBG so that 1 CMBG can develop all the tank expertise and supply the rotos to EFP (Not to mention that Wainwright is a good range for tank training). Whatever other tank related training that is done at Gagetown (from individual crewman training to combat team commander training should be moved to 1 CMBG as well so that the equipment can be centrally maintained and shared. We will never be able to exercise at a collective level if the Canadian based tanks are centralized in Gagetown. As long as we are this limited in tank numbers they need to be with a single unit which would be tasked to provide all tank related training.

And there is the reason the Army didn't push for a BHS. Canada doesn't go anywhere without allies.

The issue isn't so much that we have a BHS, the issue is we need a plan to do expeditionary deployments by whatever means floats your boat (pun intended) and to exercise that plan on a regular basis.

 

[daftandbarmy]

And I think spending some cash on those missing capabilities and organizing a Danish DFDS type transport partnership would tie things up with a bow.

What is to stop the Government subsidizing BC Ferries, Marine Atlantic and Federal to supply surplus capacity that the Government could lease back at short notice?

Customer demands and unions, for two...

I sailed on DFDS ferries a fair bit during various Norway winter deployments. The only reason they were available IIRC is because ridership was down in the winter time, hence 'ships taken up from trade' STUFT ships were a dime a dozen.

 

[Underway]

Certainly it would be nice if the Canadian Government and its military advisers could come to a more coherent inter-service plan. But the cat can be skinned many ways.

It's not like we don't talk. The AOPS design was heavily influenced by an ongoing discussion with the Army on how it does arctic operations and what it would like to see for support from the RCN. Similarly, the 127mm gun and the "land attack" flexibility of the CSC come directly from our experiences in Libya, off the coast of the Balkans, conversations with CANSOFCOM and the Army.

One day the army will be able to rely upon Canadian ships providing fire support from just offshore.

One other point that I took from the article was that the US brigade moved with a short logistical tail and kept 72 hours supplies on its own wheels. It exploited the difference between the needs of the Wheeled Brigade and the demands of the logistically encumbered heavy brigades.

One thing that intrigues me is my sense that the Canadian concept doesn't fully exploit the fact that each section vehicle is essentially a deuce and a half. We seem to see a need to attach a tail based on the armoured regiment to the wheeled unit thereby, it seems to me, losing some of the benefits that the LAV concept offers.

I'm not entirely sure that this is the case. LAV companies move with a pretty short tail. Fuel seems to be the limiting factor. A lot of stuff can be stored in the side bins, usually full of IMPs and the section's sleeping gear. Jerry cans as well, just in case.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll stipulate that my perceptions can be wrong.

Customer demands and unions, for two...

I sailed on DFDS ferries a fair bit during various Norway winter deployments. The only reason they were available IIRC is because ridership was down in the winter time, hence 'ships taken up from trade' STUFT ships were a dime a dozen.

But, with respect to availability, I think that is the point. The Danish government ensures that there is more supply than demand by making sure that there are more hulls than the market requires for strictly commercial purposes. It is not trying to run a profitable service. It is running a public service - kind of like a road over water.

As to the unions, well, if necessary, withdraw the union crews and replace them with willing mariners, or reservists, or even RCA types. Or, write up a contract comparable to that used by Federal for the Asterix crew.

 

[lenaitch]

What is to stop the Government subsidizing BC Ferries, Marine Atlantic and Federal to supply surplus capacity that the Government could lease back at short notice?

Not a sailor but wondering how much use a fleet of near-shore ferries would be to the CAF.

According to Wiki, of FedNav's 64 owned vessels, only two are registered in Canada; the rest sail under flags of convenience (Barbados & Marshall Islands). I don't know if there would be any legal issues pressing those flags into military or conflict service.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not a sailor but wondering how much use a fleet of near-shore ferries would be to the CAF.

According to Wiki, of FedNav's 64 owned vessels, only two are registered in Canada; the rest sail under flags of convenience (Barbados & Marshall Islands). I don't know if there would be any legal issues pressing those flags into military or conflict service.

Also not a sailor, but I have sailed. And it isn't so much the distances the ship sails as the sea-states in which they operate. I have been on board the Digby - St John Ferry across the Bay of Fundy when it shipped green water.

The Baltic Ferries operated by DFDS generally operate short hauls but are capable of trans-oceanic runs.

As to Flagging. That is a matter between the Government and the Owner. If the contract stipulated Canadian flags then the ships would likely be flagged in Canada. Ships reflag.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

One other point that I took from the article was that the US brigade moved with a short logistical tail and kept 72 hours supplies on its own wheels. It exploited the difference between the needs of the Wheeled Brigade and the demands of the logistically encumbered heavy brigades.

One thing that intrigues me is my sense that the Canadian concept doesn't fully exploit the fact that each section vehicle is essentially a deuce and a half. We seem to see a need to attach a tail based on the armoured regiment to the wheeled unit thereby, it seems to me, losing some of the benefits that the LAV concept offers.

You can have a "light" tail if you are driving through an operational theatre where there is an in-place force and use their logistics. You could drive across Canada if you rely on gas stations and restaurants.

You do realize that a Deuce and a Half does not replenish itself as it rolls along. The fuel, rations and water (not to mention ammo) need to come from somewhere. The echelon is the link between the LAV at the end of the grease pencil arrow on the map and the "somewhere" that commodities come from. The Ech is a big as needs to be and as small as it can.

 

[Kirkhill]

I realize.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Also not a sailor, but I have sailed. And it isn't so much the distances the ship sails as the sea-states in which they operate. I have been on board the Digby - St John Ferry across the Bay of Fundy when it shipped green water.

The Baltic Ferries operated by DFDS generally operate short hauls but are capable of trans-oceanic runs.

As to Flagging. That is a matter between the Government and the Owner. If the contract stipulated Canadian flags then the ships would likely be flagged in Canada. Ships reflag.

I'm no expert but I'm guessing that the BC Ferries are vastly inferior in bad weather performance to the DFDS ships.

We had almost all of 45 CDO embarked on one of them, with all of our vehicles and that baby was ploughing through arctic winter gales, with big combers rocketing over the bows, like a hot knife through Danish pastry.

Even better, I discovered that I could stay at the bar in the forward part of the ship much longer than most of my Royal Marines colleagues, most of whom had to slink away to their grots to a chorus of 'Who's the real commando now boys?' from me

 

[lenaitch]

Also not a sailor, but I have sailed. And it isn't so much the distances the ship sails as the sea-states in which they operate. I have been on board the Digby - St John Ferry across the Bay of Fundy when it shipped green water.

The Baltic Ferries operated by DFDS generally operate short hauls but are capable of trans-oceanic runs.

As to Flagging. That is a matter between the Government and the Owner. If the contract stipulated Canadian flags then the ships would likely be flagged in Canada. Ships reflag.

Shipping companies use flags of convenience to save costs (taxation, labour, regulatory compliance, etc.). I would imagine the companies would expect the government to pay the net differences upfront and ongoing, just for being available. Then again, we the people might determine that is an acceptable strategic cost.

Also, regarding the coastal ferries, I wonder what their range would be.