Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[markppcli]

In all honesty I think that training is one thing that we do well.

Agree to disagree, but it’s probably outside the topic here.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yes. We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.

Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.

The Swedes are at 11 with their Pansarbattalions. Effectively they get two Tank companies out of one of our Tank Squadrons.

 

[markppcli]

Yes. We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.

Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.

British type 56 isn’t 4 x 4 Sqns ? But point taken, I guess it’s about roles, with Sqns expecting to be split between two combat teams. Then again I suppose we could achieve that with 3 Tps vs 4 and 1 less tank in the HQ.

 

[Kirkhill]

Plenty of low-level training and familiarization occurs within the CMBGs every year. At a minimum, the UR series tends to involve most of the junior officers where they will work together. Units look for opportunities to include other arms and Bde Comds also tend to mandate that this occurs.

Tempo is a question of balance. Folks in the army do like to train, but they don't necessarily want to be in the field forever. Repetition is good to get things down, but doing the same thing every time in the same place can get wearing. Some variety and imagination is useful as long as the requirements are met.

Postings are a fact of life - we are an army of people. We try to avoid too much churn between Build and Hold but it happens. The alternative is a shorter cycle like we had earlier which had a lot of training churn (2 x Ex MR a year). The training conducted during the Hold year compensates for skill fade and posting churn.

In all honesty I think that training is one thing that we do well.

Thanks again.

King for a day T2B.

Where do you think effort needs to be expended?

 

[Infanteer]

I have to find the reference, but I believe the Brits are moving away from the Type 56.

The Swedes are at 11 with their Pansarbattalions. Effectively they get two Tank companies out of one of our Tank Squadrons.

Yes, and in many cases, a Cdn Tank Squadron usually gets busted up into a sqn(-) and a half sqn.

Is the Sigs Platoon a Battalion asset or is it a Brigade asset on loan to the Battalion?

Unit. Belongs to the CS/HQ sub-unit of the unit.

I would love to see a robust Sigs Regiment at all Bdes, with strategic comms assets as well. I would also love to take the Brit model and apply it to our forces: Bn comms and below are operated and set up by Bn CP operators (Infantry who know how to comms), with maintenance and repair capabilites on demand from the Bde Signals Regiment. This would allow the Bde G6 the ability to prioritize capabilities and staffing, without having a platoon of Jimmies under employed at a Bn, while their HQ & Sigs brethren are running around like chickens with their heads cut off putting out fires.

A brigade doesn't need "strategic comms assets" as it is not a brigade's job to "strategically communicate" (whatever that means). A Bde does not need a Sig Regt either - this is simply overkill and adding needless appendages onto a formation that needs to be lean and mobile.

As for turning Unit Sig Pls into "occ filled" organizations vice "sig filled" organizations, this is how we used to do it as well. It's something that could be done, and would have to result in a PY transfer to the other Corps and Branches as these organizations are largely handed off. A caution to this - in talking to a lot of Sig NCMs, service in a Pl/Tp in a front line unit is a good thing for them, and jettisoning this opportunity might not help the Sig Branch with retention.

 

[McG]

That isn't entirely true. Many armies still employ these types of organizations. The Russians (and I believe the Chinese) have AT Bns as part of their Artillery Regiments. It's a divisional asset that may or may not be used en masse, situation dependent.

The AFU had this type of organization going into the war. It would be interesting to see how it has served them (or not).

Yes. We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.

Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.

A lot of those countries also have captains commanding manoeuvre sub-units. If we significantly tinker with the size of the organization, we may want to relook at the ranks (officer & WO) that are needed for C2.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

A brigade doesn't need "strategic comms assets" as it is not a brigade's job to "strategically communicate" (whatever that means). A Bde does not need a Sig Regt either - this is simply overkill and adding needless appendages onto a formation that needs to be lean and mobile.

Then we need to manage expectations at the Brigade HQ level. Commanders and staff have gotten used to the sprawling TOCs of eFP Latvia and TFK over the last 20 years , which have Strategic level comms (NRL, CSNI, LFPST, from the CFJSR) embedded into their Sigs Sqn. If they need to be lean and mean, that means austere. Tough cell to the Ops Staff that want the information inputs provided over more than just a CNR net.

A caution to this - in talking to a lot of Sig NCMs, service in a Pl/Tp in a front line unit is a good thing for them, and jettisoning this opportunity might not help the Sig Branch with retention.

Part of this is because of the exact reason I referenced. The HQ and Sigs Sqns are chronically understaffed and over employed. Folks love heading out to one of the Battalions is not strictly because " it's a new and exciting experience"; it's an escape from the fuckery that is a sub-unit understaffed and poorly managed. Atts and Dets should be for the amount of time required, not a 4 year posting.

 

[markppcli]

I have to find the reference, but I believe the Brits are moving away from the Type 56.



Yes, and in many cases, a Cdn Tank Squadron usually gets busted up into a sqn(-) and a half sqn.



Unit. Belongs to the CS/HQ sub-unit of the unit.



A brigade doesn't need "strategic comms assets" as it is not a brigade's job to "strategically communicate" (whatever that means). A Bde does not need a Sig Regt either - this is simply overkill and adding needless appendages onto a formation that needs to be lean and mobile.

As for turning Unit Sig Pls into "occ filled" organizations vice "sig filled" organizations, this is how we used to do it as well. It's something that could be done, and would have to result in a PY transfer to the other Corps and Branches as these organizations are largely handed off. A caution to this - in talking to a lot of Sig NCMs, service in a Pl/Tp in a front line unit is a good thing for them, and jettisoning this opportunity might not help the Sig Branch with retention.

Hmm, I only found one article but it was about reduction in Tank Regiments as opposed to changing the structure. The Ajax will stay as 4X4 but with only 1 “command” Ajax for HQ as well, what ever that’s worth. I’d love to have a more clear picture of what a French, Spanish, or Italian tank sub unit broke down like.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Agree to disagree, but it’s probably outside the topic here.

I think we can do something well and still have room for improvement. So training can be imperfect but can have still been done well.

If we consider doctrine, organization, training, material (equipment), personnel, policy and facilities; how would you prioritize our efforts in terms of fixing problems faced by the Canadian Army today?

Seen in that framework, I think that training fixes are a lower priority than some of the other areas. That is not to say that training is a lower priority than those other areas! I just think that we have more severe problems in areas of personnel, equipment and organization (not to mention policy and facilities).

 

[markppcli]

I think we can do something well and still have room for improvement. So training can be imperfect but can have still been done well.

If we consider doctrine, organization, training, material (equipment), personnel, policy and facilities; how would you prioritize our efforts in terms of fixing problems faced by the Canadian Army today?

Seen in that framework, I think that training fixes are a lower priority than some of the other areas. That is not to say that training is a lower priority than those other areas! I just think that we have more severe problems in areas of personnel, equipment and organization (not to mention policy and facilities).

I’ll reply but probably better this be a side bar.

My issues are mostly about the focus on large collective training, and it’s rigidity. And I understand the response to that will always be “we’ll train soldiers in garrison,” but that sort of ignores reality. Between PCF, tasks, exercise, leave, and budget I may have 2-3 days a month to actually train my guys… which they likely need to do their DLN on my platoons 2 computers. Sorry I’m digressing.

The combat team attack dominates our training cycle, which is fine I suppose. What irks me is that when we do those the breach happens, we move through, and then the attack is all but over as the objective is always an extremely simple open field with banks of fig 11s, maybe 12s if we’re being spicy. We need to train people to deal with complex objectives: trenches, string points, dense tree lines. The things we teach as anchors to defensive positions. I had a conversation with my OC a few weeks ago about our devotion to validation; and I asked him if he’d ever led a company or platoon through an urban objective or a trench system. The answer was no, and neither had any of his peers. Now that’s also fine I suppose but in MR 2019 1 CMBG complete died at Rocky Ford, to include 1 CER tasked as extra infantry. We had to reset and do it again. Same with at the more conventional defensive position at Vertical Village.

So we have a formation failing to take complicated defended terrain, and thanks to the systems at CMTC we can actually see where each person died, what killed them, from what angle ect. In short we have a system of statistical, play by play analysis that would be the envy of a professional sports team. Did that inform any changes in training for 1 CMBG going forward ? Oh course not, because we have to validate.

 

[WLSC]

The AFU had this type of organization going into the war. It would be interesting to see how it has served them (or not).


A lot of those countries also have captains commanding manoeuvre sub-units. If we significantly tinker with the size of the organization, we may want to relook at the ranks (officer & WO) that are needed for C2.

I have this idea for a while. I wondering if it could work. Feel free to comment on it.

In a heavy mech bn, why not go from 3 x coy (9 plt) to 2 x coy of 8 plt train to work like our sabre squadron. We really lose only 2 plt.

I see that brigade with the normal unit (Eng, guns, Svc Bn, etc). The manouver unit would look like this

Tank regiment:
-4 2 x sabre squadron,
-recce sqn
-Assault tpt (?)

2 heavy mech inf bn with each:
-2 x coy (8 plt)
-cbt support coy

 

[McG]

Plt = pilot
Pl = platoon

Eng = English
Engr = engineer

 

[Brad Sallows]

You also lost a sub-unit, giving the unit commander only 2 manoeuvre sub-units.

 

[WLSC]

Plt = pilot
Pl = platoon

Eng = English
Engr = engineer

Oups!

 

[MilEME09]

I’ll reply but probably better this be a side bar.

My issues are mostly about the focus on large collective training, and it’s rigidity. And I understand the response to that will always be “we’ll train soldiers in garrison,” but that sort of ignores reality. Between PCF, tasks, exercise, leave, and budget I may have 2-3 days a month to actually train my guys… which they likely need to do their DLN on my platoons 2 computers. Sorry I’m digressing.

This is why we need 6 months work up training.......and it's sad

 

[WLSC]

You also lost a sub-unit, giving the unit commander only 2 manoeuvre sub-units.

I consider that. I was thinking that since it would work in a cbt team format, the lost of that sub unit was offset by having extra pl for the tasks.

 

[markppcli]

I have this idea for a while. I wondering if it could work. Feel free to comment on it.

In a heavy mech bn, why not go from 3 x coy (9 plt) to 2 x coy of 8 plt train to work like our sabre squadron. We really lose only 2 plt.

I see that brigade with the normal unit (Eng, guns, Svc Bn, etc). The manouver unit would look like this

Tank regiment:
-4 x sabre squadron,
-recce sqn
-Assault tpt (?)

2 heavy mech inf bn with each:
-2 x coy (8 plt)
-cbt support coy

Well you loose your depth is one

 

[WLSC]

Well you loose your depth is one

Corrected my earlier post. Not 4 but 2 sabres sqn. You can have 2 cbt teams up and one down. Depending on how you form your cbt team, you can have a half coy in depth without tanks.

 

[Infanteer]

What irks me is that when we do those the breach happens, we move through, and then the attack is all but over as the objective is always an extremely simple open field with banks of fig 11s, maybe 12s if we’re being spicy. We need to train people to deal with complex objectives: trenches, string points, dense tree lines. The things we teach as anchors to defensive positions. I had a conversation with my OC a few weeks ago about our devotion to validation; and I asked him if he’d ever led a company or platoon through an urban objective or a trench system. The answer was no, and neither had any of his peers.

This is not a structural problem, its a problem with creativity. I recall the last company I was in did section and platoon attacks in urban settings, live fire clearance of a trench system (not trenches, but a system with communication trenches), and force on force offensive and defensive tasks.

 

[markppcli]

This is why we need 6 months work up training.......and it's sad

That was my work up training…