Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

3 x tank Sqns doesn’t make a tank regiment for you?

If we had 60 of the same model of Leopard and enough serviceable at any given time to deploy all of them and still have enough for training, combat replacements and reserves, then yes. But 20 x 2A6Ms, 20 x 2A4M CANs and 42 x 2A4's makes for a pretty enemic tank force with no depth. Dropping from 3 squadrons to 2 squadrons gives you some depth and would have us using only the upgraded mine-resistant models.

Reducing the Squadron size from 19 to the US model of 15 would help somewhat but would still leave us pretty thin. Without increasing our fleet we are really kidding ourselves saying we've got a fully combat effective Tank Regiment as per our doctrine (like many other parts of our Army I guess).

 

[markppcli]

This is not a structural problem, its a problem with creativity. I recall the last company I was in did section and platoon attacks in urban settings, live fire clearance of a trench system (not trenches, but a system with communication trenches), and force on force offensive and defensive tasks.

So I can see that, but at the same time these are issues that I know are common across the board. I don’t think I’ve met anyone who’s done live trench system clearances more recently that 2014. Force on force is an aside, my general comment was that we are in a constant state or requiring to hit validation targets. I don’t know when you were last in a rifle company, but I can say the creativity of what our objectives look like has been constant since at least 2013 ? Before that we had a bit more complexity. Either way this is very odd topic.

 

[Infanteer]

So I can see that, but at the same time these are issues that I know are common across the board. I don’t think I’ve met anyone who’s done live trench system clearances more recently that 2014.

Needless to say, this isn't something that Force 2025 is going to (or needs to) fix - a unit could design a trench clearance range pretty quickly.

 

[MilEME09]

Needless to say, this isn't something that Force 2025 is going to (or needs to) fix - a unit could design a trench clearance range pretty quickly.

Unimaginative leadership in some cases

 

[Kirkhill]

Courtesy of FJAG.

Is there a comparison to be made with the LAV-Leo combination?


ATP 3-90.1
Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team
JANUARY 2016

Capabilities

The mechanized Infantry company has the following capabilities:
 Seizes and retains key terrain.
 Assaults enemy positions.
 Infiltrates enemy positions.
 Conducts combat operations under limited visibility.
 Clears enemy from restricted and urban terrain.
 Blocks mounted/dismounted avenues of approach.
 Conducts dismounted or mounted patrols.
 Conducts reconnaissance and security operations.
Participates in air assault operations
 Repels enemy attacks with close combat.
 Establishes strong points to deny the enemy key terrain or flank positions.
 Establishes battle positions and engagement areas as part of a larger defense.
 Operates in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environment.


The Armor company has the following capabilities:
 Conducts operations requiring firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect.
 Reduces mine and wire obstacles when equipped with mine rollers and mine plows.
 Employs a combination of fire and maneuver to destroy enemy tanks, fighting vehicles, anti-armor
systems, and emplacements.
 Seizes key terrain.
 Assaults enemy positions.
 Provides support, in the form of Armor protection and fires, to Infantry and engineer elements in
restricted or urban terrain or during an assault.
 Conducts combat operations under limited visibility.
 Conducts mounted patrols.
 Blocks mounted avenues of approach.
 Conducts security, screen, and guard operations.
 Operates effectively as a counter-attack or penetration force as part of a larger operation.
 Establishes battle positions and engagement areas as part of a larger defense.
 Establishes strong points to deny the enemy key terrain or flank positions.
 Operates in a CBRN environment.

Limitations

The mechanized Infantry company has these limitations:
 High consumption rate of Class III, V, and IX.
 Dependency on logistics packages from the forward support company (FSC) to maintain
continuous operations.
 Lack of organic mortars.
 Built-up areas, dense woods, and other restricted terrain reduce the mobility of BFVs.
 Existing or reinforcing obstacles can restrict or reduce BFV mobility.
 BFVs pose a variety of challenges in gap (wet and dry) crossing operations. (The company may
experience difficulty finding adequate fording sites or a bridge with sufficient weight
classification.)

The Armor company has these limitations:
 Very high consumption rate of Class III, V, and IX.
 Dependency on logistics packages from the FSC to maintain continuous operations.
 Vulnerability to enemy infantry antiarmor when built-up areas, dense woods, and other restricted
terrain significantly reduce the mobility and maneuverability of tanks.
 Restricted, reduced, or ceased tank mobility when overcoming existing or reinforcing obstacles.
 Significant challenges in gap (wet and dry) crossing operations. (The company may experience
difficulty finding adequate fording sites or a bridge with sufficient weight classification.)
 Limited capability to retain ground without Infantry support.

 

[markppcli]

Needless to say, this isn't something that Force 2025 is going to (or needs to) fix - a unit could design a trench clearance range pretty quickly.

No which is why I said as much, very off topic and a reply to T2B saying we have a good training system. I will say that range can be built, of course, but it’s going to be budgeted against hitting those validation points / PCF course requirements.

 

[suffolkowner]

What does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for the UK’s Integrated Review and the British Army?

By Nicholas Drummond The Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper were a necessary reset of UK defence priorities. In order to make defence affordable and sustainable going forward, short-term e…

uklandpower.com

similar issues on a slightly larger scale i think

 

[FJAG]

Thanks for that T2B. It helps a lot.

If increased field work isn't a viable proposition are there other opportunities to increase familiarity and integration at low levels across cap-badges and corps?

On the other hand is the problem as simple as a lack of money to maintain, repair, replace equipment necessary to sustain an appropriate level of training?

The posting rhythm is something that is often mentioned. Is there a fix for that so that once the unit is validated it can be kept intact at a high readiness until its replacement is ready? And while I'm thinking about it, is it just single cap-badge entities that are validated and readied for deployment or are combat teams and battlegroups validated and readied?

And I completely understand not wanting to wear out the troops (although I suspect a married sergeant sees things differently than a first year private). I'm going to guess that the young private would rather be out and doing rather than sitting in barracks while the sergeant has a life at home on top of his administrative duties. For the sergeant a field exercise is as likely to be seen as an imposition as an excursion?

That used to be a problem and I expect it still is. For us it was the keen young gunners and subalterns that couldn't get enough time in the field while the senior NCO and WO ranks had seen it all before for over a decade. That sometimes makes things challenging.

 

[FJAG]

Yes. We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.

Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.

I think the Brits still run a Type 56 regiment where there are three squadrons of 18 tanks plus 2 regt'l HQ tanks since Army 2020 Refine. I haven't seen anything changing that.

Combat Vehicles

Firepower - mobility - protection: the three key aspects of any fighting vehicle.

www.army.mod.uk

 

[Infanteer]

I thought they had changed to a Type 44 regiment. I'll have to check with the tankers at work.

 

[PuckChaser]

Sigs Pl 1 RCR may have little to do apart from "Set up CP, maintain comms, ensure eqpt is serviceable..." while the Bde HQ & Sigs Sqn is trying to accomplish everything with nothing, including RRB, HC/B LOS, TacNet, and any other C5ISR affects you want at the Bde Level.

I would love to see a robust Sigs Regiment at all Bdes, with strategic comms assets as well. I would also love to take the Brit model and apply it to our forces: Bn comms and below are operated and set up by Bn CP operators (Infantry who know how to comms), with maintenance and repair capabilites on demand from the Bde Signals Regiment. This would allow the Bde G6 the ability to prioritize capabilities and staffing, without having a platoon of Jimmies under employed at a Bn, while their HQ & Sigs brethren are running around like chickens with their heads cut off putting out fires.

A brigade doesn't need "strategic comms assets" as it is not a brigade's job to "strategically communicate" (whatever that means). A Bde does not need a Sig Regt either - this is simply overkill and adding needless appendages onto a formation that needs to be lean and mobile.

As for turning Unit Sig Pls into "occ filled" organizations vice "sig filled" organizations, this is how we used to do it as well. It's something that could be done, and would have to result in a PY transfer to the other Corps and Branches as these organizations are largely handed off. A caution to this - in talking to a lot of Sig NCMs, service in a Pl/Tp in a front line unit is a good thing for them, and jettisoning this opportunity might not help the Sig Branch with retention.

To be frank, status quo is not going to be able to provide Signal Support to the Bde for F2025, F2030 or whatever else we call it. I see your point that we don't want to be growing more overhead, but do you honestly think the Bdes are served well with whatever god awful mess we have right now? I think we're kidding ourselves if we don't think Bdes need an integral ability for strat rear link because we're never, ever, going to force generate an entire Div HQ. The crazy part is that Sigs can maintain a lean and mobile Bde Main with strat rear link, but its the non-Jimmy appendages that are creating the bloat of 40 sections of Mod Tent

Sigs is the only unit in the Bde with a Maj in Comd. That individual is not a peer at whatever Stonecutters meeting of COs the Bde Comd hosts. Sigs is also vitally important with everything the CAF and CA is pushing for future tech, the proof is in the live action role play we're all watching right now with the abject failure of the Russian C4ISR construct. I completely concur that cutting Sigs postings out of line units is the absolute last thing we need to do. In fact, I'd rather we syphon folks out of CFJSR, Garrison and even Bde HQ&Sigs (as a last resort) to fill out those Sigs Pl/Tp positions, but only after we've done a fulsome review of whether we need Line Techs or IT Techs there. Our entire job exists to provide Combat Support to those line units, and hiding at Bde Main does the exact opposite. In my view, there is a viable COA to create a Sigs Regt for each Bde, in which all Sigs Pl/Tps fall under that CO but are OPCOM to the individual units. It'd be fairly transparent to those line units as the Bde CCO/FISM/LCS/FOS is managing movement between then in concert with Bde HQ&Sigs RSM anyways.

This is the inherent problem with F2025. Maybe I just haven't seen enough detailed documentation and backgrounders, but there's tons of unit reorgs and task changes going around coupled with a whole ton of "Sigs make it work with no changes on your structure". If CCSB is expected to deploy on its own, it needs a HQ&Sig Sqn. 21 EW is barely capable of providing its own Regt HQ, let alone covering off an entire Bde based around data links as a requirement to its core functions.

 

[FJAG]

If we had 60 of the same model of Leopard and enough serviceable at any given time to deploy all of them and still have enough for training, combat replacements and reserves, then yes. But 20 x 2A6Ms, 20 x 2A4M CANs and 42 x 2A4's makes for a pretty enemic tank force with no depth. Dropping from 3 squadrons to 2 squadrons gives you some depth and would have us using only the upgraded mine-resistant models.

Reducing the Squadron size from 19 to the US model of 15 would help somewhat but would still leave us pretty thin. Without increasing our fleet we are really kidding ourselves saying we've got a fully combat effective Tank Regiment as per our doctrine (like many other parts of our Army I guess).

So lets play with numbers a little bit.

First off, a US tank coy has 14 tanks - three four tank platoons and a 2 in coy hq. There are 6 tank coys in an ABCT (2 combined arms bns with two tank coys, one combined arms bn with one tank coy and the cavalry squadron with one coy) for a total of 64 tanks. Plus one tank in each combined arms bn hq for a grand total of 67 tanks.

I'm not sure if there is any fundamental difference between the Leo2A4 and A4M other than its mine protection armour so I count those pretty much the same type.

Essentially if one went to an amended ABCT structure with one tank heavy and two inf heavy combined arms battalions with a total of 4 tank coys (59 A4s) and the cavalry squadron with 14 A6Ms one would have 3 A4s and 6 A6Ms as spares. (essentially LdSH becomes the tank heavy battalion and two PPCLI bns become infantry heavy bns. The light PPCLI bn can become the cavalry squadron. It's more or less PY neutral although some cap badges may change.

Note that the infantry would need 5 coys of LAV6 and there are already 6 coys in 1 CMBG which leaves 1 coy for spares that could go to the cavalry squadron along with the LdSHs recce LAVs and TAPVs.

One would need a new paradigm for training as there are not enough of the A4 type to have a separate training establishment. Personally I see no problem in having vehicles double tasked to be available for training courses (within the unit) - yes it's maintenance heavy but it needs doing and its not like these tanks are in use every day. Its a matter of coordination. If push comes to shove, it's not like there aren't spare A4s available on the resale market.

I won't speak as to the capability of the A4 in a stand up fight with Soviet Russian armour but then again one expects the gunners to go up against Russian artillery with M777s so we don't all get what we want. It would certainly do as a brigade structure that would work well for training and which would, in a pinch, be deployable.

Like I said playing with numbers and what we have. Sometimes you just have to do the best you can with what you have available. But it's basically doable.

 

[FJAG]

I thought they had changed to a Type 44 regiment. I'll have to check with the tankers at work.

I've read that that was being considered which is why I went to their web page which still refers to a Type 56 (and we all know web pages are never wrong)

My guess is with the limited number of tanks being upgraded they may try to keep a cap badge alive with tanks by spreading them out further. with 148 being upgraded to Mk3, one would get either 2 x Type 56 regts +36 or 3 x Type 44 regts + 16. The latter makes more sense. Also I would guess the whole thinking process in their force restructure is probably up in the air with the Ukraine scenario.

As it stands, Future Soldier calls for three tank regiments (2 RegF and 1 ResF) plus the Armour Trials and Development Unit. I don't think that the Brits are in the habit of equipping their ResF units with heavy equipment any more than Canada is. That draws me to the Type 56 model.

Watch and shoot.

 

[Infanteer]

To be frank, status quo is not going to be able to provide Signal Support to the Bde for F2025, F2030 or whatever else we call it. I see your point that we don't want to be growing more overhead, but do you honestly think the Bdes are served well with whatever god awful mess we have right now? I think we're kidding ourselves if we don't think Bdes need an integral ability for strat rear link because we're never, ever, going to force generate an entire Div HQ. The crazy part is that Sigs can maintain a lean and mobile Bde Main with strat rear link, but its the non-Jimmy appendages that are creating the bloat of 40 sections of Mod Tent

Sigs is the only unit in the Bde with a Maj in Comd. That individual is not a peer at whatever Stonecutters meeting of COs the Bde Comd hosts. Sigs is also vitally important with everything the CAF and CA is pushing for future tech, the proof is in the live action role play we're all watching right now with the abject failure of the Russian C4ISR construct. I completely concur that cutting Sigs postings out of line units is the absolute last thing we need to do. In fact, I'd rather we syphon folks out of CFJSR, Garrison and even Bde HQ&Sigs (as a last resort) to fill out those Sigs Pl/Tp positions, but only after we've done a fulsome review of whether we need Line Techs or IT Techs there. Our entire job exists to provide Combat Support to those line units, and hiding at Bde Main does the exact opposite. In my view, there is a viable COA to create a Sigs Regt for each Bde, in which all Sigs Pl/Tps fall under that CO but are OPCOM to the individual units. It'd be fairly transparent to those line units as the Bde CCO/FISM/LCS/FOS is managing movement between then in concert with Bde HQ&Sigs RSM anyways.

This is the inherent problem with F2025. Maybe I just haven't seen enough detailed documentation and backgrounders, but there's tons of unit reorgs and task changes going around coupled with a whole ton of "Sigs make it work with no changes on your structure". If CCSB is expected to deploy on its own, it needs a HQ&Sig Sqn. 21 EW is barely capable of providing its own Regt HQ, let alone covering off an entire Bde based around data links as a requirement to its core functions.

There are a few different ideas here, which I'm happy to go into so we can get away from 110 pages of how many LAVs can dance on the head of a pin:

1. A Bde, organized as a tactical formation, should not need a "strategic link" (which I am assuming we mean a reachback to Canada) because it either links into a parent formation or back to a NCE with a theatre level signal organization. Now, comms are sophisticated enough these days that any element has reachback to Canada - just give them an Sat Phone. Hell, every infanteer in a section has reachback with their mobile devices. What we are really discussing here is comms process and reporting, and not equipment. If a Bde is operating as a tactical formation, it can't be encumbered with national reporting. If it is operating as an NCE/Task Force HQ, like we saw in Afghanistan, then its role is different and it needs reachback for national level C2. But this isn't the default organization for a fighting formation HQ, nor should it be.
2. The argument that a Sig Sqn CO needs to be a LCol because the other unit COs are LCols is silly. There is no logic to it, and its simply rank inflation for the sake of appearances.
3. The notion that CMBG HQs are massive mod tent complexes isn't necessarily accurate. In the past, this was partly forced on the CMBGs by the self-divestment of the Bison CP fleet, and partially by Afghan hangover/silly post-Afghan concepts which see Brigades as static CPs managing every capability in the inventory. As we get back to the core business, this is going away; one of the CMBGs is using a mobile CP on a half-dozen MSVS and has no mod tentage. This is essential, as big CPs and the life support systems that go with them (heaters, generators, etc) just create the need for GDs, and the Sig Op trade has turned into a partial GD trade over the last decade due to point (3) above. We need to fix this.
4. The CMBG Sig Sqn structure is under review in Force 2025. The CCSB is a force generator, and not a tactical formation HQ, so it does not require a tactical HQ and Sig Sqn.
5. Force 2025 looks at positions. The real problem that the Sig Corps faces right now isn't organizational, its that 50% of the seats it has have no butts in them - there are a host of issues behind this, of which organization is only one.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The argument that a Sig Sqn CO needs to be a LCol because the other unit COs are LCols is silly. There is no logic to it, and its simply rank inflation for the sake of appearances.

The flaw here is treating the rank as if it's more important than the appointment. A bit of cultural shift might be needed.

 

[Infanteer]

You are right, and there is no flaw to be fixed, because the system works fine. The CO of a Sig Sqn sits at the table with the other COs, and they all answer to the same boss. The CO of a Sig Sqn is outranked by the Bde COS, but it doesn't matter, because the CO has the legal authority and is in charge of the unit. For example, any authority for the COS to sign a leave pass for the HQ staff is delegated by the Sig Sqn CO.

 

[McG]

Instead of going down the path that all COs must be LCol because most CO are LCol, we should really be asking why more CO are not majors. It is a senior officer rank and if people holding the rank can’t do the job then we are promoting the wrong people.

A lot of PRes units should probably have majors as COs. There are also units (Reg and PRes) which are spread across distant places and that would benefit from being broken into multiple units each under a major CO.

It would be more than just setting thresholds by numbers of people, but we should set a few metrics that help us judge when does a unit really need a LCol for CO, and when does a sub-unit really need a major as OC.

 

[WLSC]

Instead of going down the path that all COs must be LCol because most CO are LCol, we should really be asking why more CO are not majors. It is a senior officer rank and if people holding the rank can’t do the job then we are promoting the wrong people.

A lot of PRes units should probably have majors as COs. There are also units (Reg and PRes) which are spread across distant places and that would benefit from being broken into multiple units each under a major CO.

It would be more than just setting thresholds by numbers of people, but we should set a few metrics that help us judge when does a unit really need a LCol for CO, and when does a sub-unit really need a major as OC.

We might have to review how someone becomes Capt then. At least make sure he did everything he need to do BEFORE becoming an OC. If not it will becomes a acting/lacking nightmare like the current WO ranks.

 

[Infanteer]

CAF Rank policies isn't a Force 2025 initiative. ARes unit structures are.

 

[FJAG]

Instead of going down the path that all COs must be LCol because most CO are LCol, we should really be asking why more CO are not majors. It is a senior officer rank and if people holding the rank can’t do the job then we are promoting the wrong people.

A lot of PRes units should probably have majors as COs. There are also units (Reg and PRes) which are spread across distant places and that would benefit from being broken into multiple units each under a major CO.

It would be more than just setting thresholds by numbers of people, but we should set a few metrics that help us judge when does a unit really need a LCol for CO, and when does a sub-unit really need a major as OC.

The answer is simple. A unit needs a LCol to be a CO when the unit needs multiple majors to lead its various subunits. If all you are by function or numbers is a subunit where captains are the appropriate ranks to lead the platoons or sections or whatever then all that you need is a major.

Which brings us to ResF structures. By authorized numbers and actual numbers many ResF units are actually just subunits. Organizationally they are usually established with multiple subunits and therefore are units requiring a LCol CO. That should all be reviewed if the politics wouldn't get in the way. That needs a carrot not a stick approach.