Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

You know me, I'm always pushing for a structure that uses the 15-20,000 ResF personnel to create more deployable brigades, especially CS and CSS ones.

I'm trying to figure out what the role of 'brigade recce' really is when SSE has no plan for the deployment of a real brigade.

We seem to be making a habit of economy of effort deployments these days (like Latvia) where we have a battlegroup headquarters, a rifle company and various CS and CSS elements with the bulk of the echelon being allied elements.

If the belief is that the role of light battalions is to work with SOF, then do light battalions belong in the army?

All of these comments appear to be the signs of an Army desperately looking for a role.

We have "Divisions" and "Brigades" without the enablers to deploy Divisions or Brigades and without even a policy stating that we ever intend to deploy Divisions or Brigades.

We have significant Reserve units but no plans to deploy them as units, no plans to integrate them into Reg Force units, no real warfighting equipment for them and no extra Reg Force equipment available for them to use.

We have Armoured Regiments that get rid of their tanks then partially bring them back but have no clear plan on how they are to be integrated into the wider Army. If we're not going to deploy a Brigade do we need them organized as a Regiment? Should the be penny-packeted into Battle Groups? Do we really, REALLY need them for the type of Army we have built?

We have Light Battalions but no clear specific role defined for them or how we expect them to operate other than their being "Light" and able to operate where our LAVs can't.

The Government doesn't seem to be interested in any expanded permanent commitment of forces (or pre-positioned equipment) in Europe beyond what we have now in Latvia which kind of raises some questions about the value of "Heavy" forces that can't quickly be deployed in case of a conflict. Heck, if an actual Russian invasion of a European country and threats of retaliation against NATO and the Nordic States for our support of Ukraine can't elicit a deterrent force deployment then what would?

And the unspoken question being raised by the Ukrainian conflict is that in light of Russia's conventional forces being significantly weakened by the conflict at the same time as there is a resurgence in European defence spending and capabilities, has the military (not political) need for a Canadian land Army being deployed to Europe actually decreased?

A cynical person would look at the Canadian Army and say:

• We have more Infantry and Armour than the Government is willing to deploy.
• They are expensive to maintain in peacetime but don't have the tools they need to be effective in a war.
• We don't have enough (or the right type of) artillery to be useful in a major conflict.
• Our "Heavy" forces are located too far away from where they are likely to be needed in a major conflict to be immediately useful, but the Government is unwilling to station them (or their equipment) closer.
• We have light forces which could be rapidly deployed in the case of a conflict but we have no clear plans of what that deployment should look like.
• Our domestic logistics overhead is extensive and difficult to maintain but we lack the logistics capacity to deploy and sustain the size of Army we have during a full scale war.
• Our Reserves are primarily suited for domestic aid to civil authorities rather than contributing to our warfighting ability in any significant way beyond as a source of (partially) trained individual augmentees for the Reg Force.

Sad that such an important part of our nation is left floundering around in the dark without a flashlight trying to find a role for itself in the absence of any clear guidance (and no I don't think SSE is a clear enough blueprint of what we really expect the Canadian military to be able to do). In the meantime however we will continue to sink time, effort and treasure into an organization which I believe most people will agree is underachieving.

/rant

 

[WLSC]

All of these comments appear to be the signs of an Army desperately looking for a role.

We have "Divisions" and "Brigades" without the enablers to deploy Divisions or Brigades and without even a policy stating that we ever intend to deploy Divisions or Brigades.

We have significant Reserve units but no plans to deploy them as units, no plans to integrate them into Reg Force units, no real warfighting equipment for them and no extra Reg Force equipment available for them to use.

We have Armoured Regiments that get rid of their tanks then partially bring them back but have no clear plan on how they are to be integrated into the wider Army. If we're not going to deploy a Brigade do we need them organized as a Regiment? Should the be penny-packeted into Battle Groups? Do we really, REALLY need them for the type of Army we have built?

We have Light Battalions but no clear specific role defined for them or how we expect them to operate other than their being "Light" and able to operate where our LAVs can't.

The Government doesn't seem to be interested in any expanded permanent commitment of forces (or pre-positioned equipment) in Europe beyond what we have now in Latvia which kind of raises some questions about the value of "Heavy" forces that can't quickly be deployed in case of a conflict. Heck, if an actual Russian invasion of a European country and threats of retaliation against NATO and the Nordic States for our support of Ukraine can't elicit a deterrent force deployment then what would?

And the unspoken question being raised by the Ukrainian conflict is that in light of Russia's conventional forces being significantly weakened by the conflict at the same time as there is a resurgence in European defence spending and capabilities, has the military (not political) need for a Canadian land Army being deployed to Europe actually decreased?

A cynical person would look at the Canadian Army and say:

• We have more Infantry and Armour than the Government is willing to deploy.
• They are expensive to maintain in peacetime but don't have the tools they need to be effective in a war.
• We don't have enough (or the right type of) artillery to be useful in a major conflict.
• Our "Heavy" forces are located too far away from where they are likely to be needed in a major conflict to be immediately useful, but the Government is unwilling to station them (or their equipment) closer.
• We have light forces which could be rapidly deployed in the case of a conflict but we have no clear plans of what that deployment should look like.
• Our domestic logistics overhead is extensive and difficult to maintain but we lack the logistics capacity to deploy and sustain the size of Army we have during a full scale war.
• Our Reserves are primarily suited for domestic aid to civil authorities rather than contributing to our warfighting ability in any significant way beyond as a source of (partially) trained individual augmentees for the Reg Force.

Sad that such an important part of our nation is left floundering around in the dark without a flashlight trying to find a role for itself in the absence of any clear guidance (and no I don't think SSE is a clear enough blueprint of what we really expect the Canadian military to be able to do). In the meantime however we will continue to sink time, effort and treasure into an organization which I believe most people will agree is underachieving.

/rant

Bang on! I always was on the optimist side, no more since the last budget. There’s absolutely no will to make us be what we are supposed to. I have the impression that a lot is done to make us look bad, successfully.

 

[DBNSG]

As a very interested Civilian observer these comments are bang on but I think the Army we have is satisfying exactly what the Folks that live in Ottawa want it too. That is, the Army we have, has just enough capabilities to train the Officers that lead it and all roads lead to Ottawa where the real games and careers are made .A self licking Ice Cream cone that will never be counted on by our Allies because most Canadians are willing to defend Canada down to the very last American. Led by Mr Trudeau are those Canadians wrong?

I think they are but I live in one of the biggest targets in N/A ,the Halifax area, and I have studied a little History.

 

[WestIsle]

Bang on! I always was on the optimist side, no more since the last budget. There’s absolutely no will to make us be what we are supposed to. I have the impression that a lot is done to make us look bad, successfully.

Look no further then all the latest "reports" and findings. The new MND is quick to throw the CAF under the bus at first light despite the latest report being a whole lot of nothing spanning 20 years of which there has been massive change. All the good will from callouts for domestic support for emergencies and the pandemic have been quickly brushed aside as the government cant have any of that. Trudeau Senior and Junior never thought much about the military and its place in society having largely been more interested in seeing the military or rather not seeing it in their "just society".

 

[MilEME09]

Look no further then all the latest "reports" and findings. The new MND is quick to throw the CAF under the bus at first light despite the latest report being a whole lot of nothing spanning 20 years of which there has been massive change. All the good will from callouts for domestic support for emergencies and the pandemic have been quickly brushed aside as the government cant have any of that. Trudeau Senior and Junior never thought much about the military and its place in society having largely been more interested in seeing the military or rather not seeing it in their "just society".

Catch 22 as well, the CAFs public engagement is definitely lacking, even before covid. If the public actually interacted with the military more, they might care. They do not care because they dint see us, and the loop circles back to us not putting the effort because Canadians do not care.

Really we need an active PAO program, less passive.

 

[WLSC]

Catch 22 as well, the CAFs public engagement is definitely lacking, even before covid. If the public actually interacted with the military more, they might care. They do not care because they dint see us, and the loop circles back to us not putting the effort because Canadians do not care.

Really we need an active PAO program, less passive.

We had an active one. PMO shut it down.

 

[Kirkhill]

LIB’s have multiple roles. Support of SOF is just one.

SOF has multiple roles. Finding targets for the LIB's is just one of them.

 

[Kirkhill]

Ukraine is turning into the Spanish Civil War - a field test of ideas and technologies.

The Royal Marines were playing around with Quadcopters for the CQMS. Now the Brits are donating dozens of the Malloy T150s the Marines were trialling to the Ukrainians.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1521723468815151105

Malloy Aeronautics – Revolutionizing Airborne Logistics

www.malloyaeronautics.com

I doubt it will make it into Canadian service for Force 2025 but maybe for Force 2030 if the new White Paper rears its head soon.

68KG​

MAX PAYLOAD​

70+KM​

RANGE​

30+ M/S (>108 km/h)​

CRUISE SPEED​

 

[McG]

LIB’s have multiple roles. Support of SOF is just one.

I don't disagree but there is a tendency, amongst many, to stop at the support to SOF role when thinking of the development of light infantry. If we are just going to hover on that one aspect of potential employment, then all light infantry may as well be given to SOF. Because if all the other roles are just an after thought, then the Army will never develop a light force that is value added to conventional army tasks.

SOF has multiple roles. Finding targets for the LIB's is just one of them.

No. That is not one of them. Conventional recce and ISR do that. If SOF is looking for targets, it is not likely that infantry will to the strike.

 

[Infanteer]

SOF has multiple roles. Finding targets for the LIB's is just one of them.

Probably not.

 

[KevinB]

I don't disagree but there is a tendency, amongst many, to stop at the support to SOF role when thinking of the development of light infantry. If we are just going to hover on that one aspect of potential employment, then all light infantry may as well be given to SOF. Because if all the other roles are just an after thought, then the Army will never develop a light force that is value added to conventional army tasks.

Which is one reason that I think pooling the LIB’s into a Light Brigade makes sense. As well having the Light Brigade working a lot with XVIII Airborne.

Failing that then I’d chop them CANSOF to be support personnel, like what SOCOM did with the Ranger Battalions

No. That is not one of them. Conventional recce and ISR do that. If SOF is looking for targets, it is not likely that infantry will to the strike.

Admittedly SR or Low Vis teams can insert to gain intel that is later used for conventional force strike - but yeah generally not a specific SOF mission

 

[daftandbarmy]

Which is one reason that I think pooling the LIB’s into a Light Brigade makes sense. As well having the Light Brigade working a lot with XVIII Airborne.

Failing that then I’d chop them CANSOF to be support personnel, like what SOCOM did with the Ranger Battalions


Admittedly SR or Low Vis teams can insert to gain intel that is later used for conventional force strike - but yeah generally not a specific SOF mission

The 'LIB' I was with once made an attempt to work with SOF type troops on an operational tour.

We shut it down after the first 'almost' blue on blue, which was largely our fault.

There's a reason why units like CSOR are selected, trained and assigned specifically to work with units like JTF2 as their main task.

 

[KevinB]

The 'LIB' I was with once made an attempt to work with SOF type troops on an operational tour.

We shut it down after the first 'almost' blue on blue, which was largely our fault.

There's a reason why units like CSOR are selected, trained and assigned specifically to work with units like JTF2 as their main task.

SOF always needs to deal with deconflicting with Conventional Forces (CF), as in certain battle spaces you just can black zone areas for no go to CF like one could for Iraq or Afghanistan - and there where still significant incidents at times.
Note: don’t assume that CF know what one means by Low Vis Vehicle - because they are going to attempt to put 25mm into the HiLux when you approach…

There are a lot of support task that are an absolute waste of SOF personnel -such as outer cordon troops - or airfield seizure paratroopers.

That said I don’t favor cutting the LIB’s to CANSOF as Canada isn’t really a place that does a lot of major NEO or personnel intensive PR’s - so they would basically gate guard stuff or sweep floors 95% or the time, or do a lot of walking around places looking for something to do — or — suck a lot of resources up trying to bring them up to a Tier II SOF entity.

I do think that a Light Bde would of properly resourced and employed have some significant roles to play for both Domestic and Expeditionary missions. Putting them in Pet would allow for enough cross pollination to CANSOF elements that they could be used as support in some roles if needed — but would also have a well resourced CF Bde to use for actual Light taskings.

 

[FJAG]

I do think that a Light Bde would of properly resourced and employed have some significant roles to play for both Domestic and Expeditionary missions. Putting them in Pet would allow for enough cross pollination to CANSOF elements that they could be used as support in some roles if needed — but would also have a well resourced CF Bde to use for actual Light taskings.

Which raises the next question - does it need to be a three full-time battalion brigade?

If we don't generally have a plan to field a brigade, can one, or should one, get by with a brigade which has one or maybe two full-time battalions and maybe one or two part-time ones plus some enablers?

 

[KevinB]

Which raises the next question - does it need to be a three full-time battalion brigade?

If we don't generally have a plan to field a brigade, can one, or should one, get by with a brigade which has one or maybe two full-time battalions and maybe one or two part-time ones plus some enablers?

I don't think so - in all realty it probably only needs to be 1 full time full strength BN - as the CAF doesn't have enough transport to kick out a Bde in short order.
1 IRU Coy rotated - monthly - entire unit in high readiness.

One reconstituting unit (new troops PCF etc) lets call it 70-30, which replaces the sister BN annually as the IRU.
Raised to full strength in 30 days - and deployable in 60

Then a 30-70 unit which can be raised to full strength inside 60 days, deployable in 90 days.

----- I'd do the same thing with the medium Brigades

 

[Fabius]

When everyone talks about 30/70,70/30 units what are you all envisioning?
From F2025 development channels I am seeing four options under discussion boiled down as follows:

1. Reserve Class A pers assigned to and working Class A for reg force unit;

2. Reserve Class A pers parade on scheduled basis and deploy on Ex with Reg F unit but belong to and are adminstered by affiliated Res feeder units;

3. Reserve Class A pers from affiliated Reserve units form a sub unit independent of both Reserve and Reg force units but joins affiliated Reg force unit as needed. Think current ARCG.

4. Reserve unit has Reg force personnel assigned to a sub unit and said sub unit links up with affiliated Reg force unit as needed.

 

[dapaterson]

One would hope that these options would be run past Legal in advance to determine the implications...

 

[KevinB]

One would hope that these options would be run past Legal in advance to determine the implications...

Hey why start now

 

[FJAG]

One would hope that these options would be run past Legal in advance to determine the implications...

I've actually been mulling that over and what I would like to see is the MOOs and CFOOs for 4 AD, 1 AD, 18 AD and 6 Fd Regt/58 AD Bty from the 1990s. Someone must have given thought to the establishments and organizational structures of these Total Force units (Funny I never looked them up at the time)

When everyone talks about 30/70,70/30 units what are you all envisioning?

Not sure about others but I see the following:

The National Defence Act currently provides that individuals are members of the RegF or ResF (I'm leaving aside the Special Force) based on whether they are on continuing, or other than continuing, full-time service. What the term "full-time service" means is obvious while "continuing" is undefined and not easily parsable. We used to use a rule of thumb that three years would probably do it but @dapaterson would be more up on that as its more policy matter than true legal definition.

Just like people, entities in the military also have a niche they occupy "the reserve force (or the regular force) shall include such units and other elements as are embodied therein". Effectively every military entity is assigned to the appropriate force.

In my mind I essentially see units which are 100% or 70% made up of RegF personnel as being embodied in the RegF while ones that are predominantly made up of reservists are embodied in the ResF units. That, however, is arbitrary.

Generally I see all units, both RegF and ResF as having predominantly RegF personnel in the unit headquarters and then having one or more RegF line companies and mixed CS and CSS companies. A 30/70 battalion would have one full RegF line company and a 70/30 battalion would have two.

ResF companies would be roughly 90% Class A ResF and 10% RegF for leadership/administration. I'm frankly not sure about how best to describe the status of the Class A members in a RegF unit but do note that NDA s 60(1)(c)(ix) contemplates ResF members "serving with any unit or other element of the regular force..." so its quite doable. We do this all the time with Class Bs. There is obviously a legal consequence to this. S 27 also provides for "attachment" or "secondment" of an individual to another component. It's not legally impossible but a matter of crafting appropriate policies to make it practical.

It's not that easy to describe the relationship as between a RegF unit and ResF sub unit and vice versa, but it strikes me that appropriate MOOs/CFOOs can be crafted for that considering its not just "units" that make up the RegF and ResF but also "other elements" which is a very broad category encompassing any organizational entity. As it stands currently most ResF units are under ResF brigades which are under RegF divisions. I see nothing which would in principle prohibit a RegF battalion having a ResF company or vice versa.

Basically what I do not see are permanent Class B positions. Positions are either RegF or ResF and the ResF are Class As. The only time I would see a Class B is to temporarily fill a RegF position while vacant. IMHO, permanent Class B positions are an improper way of plumping up the number of "full-time" members in the CF in excess of authorized RegF PYs.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Basically what I do not see are permanent Class B positions. Positions are either RegF or ResF and the ResF are Class As. The only time I would see a Class B is to temporarily fill a RegF position while vacant. IMHO, permanent Class B positions are an improper way of plumping up the number of "full-time" members in the CF in excess of authorized RegF PYs.

So what you're saying then is that these units would only be fully up to strength for one weekend a month, and a couple of months in the summertime, when the Class A reservists would be available?