Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

The Department of ‘Meh.. Good Enough’?

Seems to work for the USAF....

Air Force Clears Tanker for Refueling Mission with Work Arounds

Air Force Clears Tanker for Refueling Mission with Work Arounds

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

And other departments. Sounds as if there is an increasing emphasis on working in the near term with what is available, despite unsettling the accountants.

Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve Launching Despite Funding Uncertainty

Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve Launching Despite Funding Uncertainty

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

Army Taking Incremental Approach to Fielding New Missile

Army Taking Incremental Approach to Fielding New Missile

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

Uncrewed Aircraft Can Offset Declining Fighter Squadron Capacity, Air Force Official Says

Uncrewed Aircraft Can Offset Declining Fighter Squadron Capacity, Air Force Official Says

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

B-21 Bomber to Make Public Debut in December

B-21 Bomber to Make Public Debut in December

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

AFA NEWS: Tests Show Converting C-130s into Amphibious Aircraft ‘Viable’

AFA NEWS: Tests Show Converting C-130s into Amphibious Aircraft ‘Viable’

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

I blame the Ukrainians. They have reintroduced the concept of "suck it and see".

Let the battlefield be the proving ground.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Actually now that I have had a chance to dig through some my books .
I was wrong......it wasn't 50-60 years,it was longer turns out we've looking at light armour units since roughly 1946.

 

[McG]

With less than 2.5 years to deliver before posting season 2025, there will be nothing substantial in anything delivered by Force 2025. There is not enough time to implement any major equipment projects (in fact, we will still be waiting for delivery of things that were promised in SSE) and no major infrastructure projects. So, we will not have new fleets of currently forecasted vehicles, we will not have substantial relocations of major units (unless units are swapping locations), and there will not be substantial re-allocation of major vehicle fleets to locations that do not currently support lots of vehicles. So the Army's F2025 needs to be the low level changes that set a foundation for the CAF's Objective Force 2030 which will follow.

At the extreme end of ambitious, we might fix PRes, CSS, army training, and light forces structures ... but even this would be a challenge within existing PYs and remaining time.

 

[FJAG]

At the extreme end of ambitious, we might fix PRes, CSS, army training, and light forces structures ... but even this would be a challenge within existing PYs and remaining time.

Some interesting ideas here but my question is - Is the ARes structure here an end state in and of itself based on an augmentation concept or is it a Phase 1 to a future more rounded total force structure with a mobilization capability?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Some interesting ideas here but my question is - Is the ARes structure here an end state in and of itself based on an augmentation concept or is it a Phase 1 to a future more rounded total force structure with a mobilization capability?

All things are possible assuming: money

 

[FJAG]

All things are possible assuming: money

True enough. But sometimes a plan has many steps before one gets to the desired end state and some of the early teps can be done very, very cheaply.

I'm all in for phased plans that lead to a desired end-state.

 

[McG]

Is the ARes structure here an end state in and of itself based on an augmentation concept or is it a Phase 1 to a future more rounded total force structure with a mobilization capability?

I think that would depend on the government’s interest in resourcing the PRes to do more. If no, then this organization is still a stable structure to continue the individual augmentation & domestic response that have dominated the use of PRes through recent decades. If yes, then this organization is a solid foundation from which to build something more.

 

[GR66]

There's an interesting article on pg. 62 of the Canadian Army Journal titled "Freed by Limits" (page 62).

The author (Maj John Kees) looks at some ways of working within the existing equipment and funding restraints to create an Army that isn't bound by a fixed Brigade Group structure and is instead designed for flexible response and adaptation.

I think he has some interesting ideas. For example, tailoring at least a portion of the force structure to match the reality of our current logistics capabilities and finding novel ways of maintaining capabilities even in the absence of new equipment.

Where I think he's off the mark is the fact that the long lead time for equipment procurement means that you don't realistically have the time to build the force you need to suit a particular situation from too limited an equipment base. Personnel can be trained more quickly than complex equipment can be built. We may be able to "borrow" some items from the great Tickle Trunk to the South, but is that really a good strategy for a supposedly independent nation?

As far as the Army Reserves go, in the absence of a commitment to procure (and maintain, upgrade and replace over time) the huge range of vehicles and equipment required to be the basis for a major expansion of the Army in a conflict then I think augmentation, domestic response, maintenance of certain capabilities that the Reg Force doesn't need on a daily basis and possibly a single Light Brigade Group are likely the best option for the Reserves.

 

[FJAG]

I think that would depend on the government’s interest in resourcing the PRes to do more. If no, then this organization is still a stable structure to continue the individual augmentation & domestic response that have dominated the use of PRes through recent decades. If yes, then this organization is a solid foundation from which to build something more.

I've probably said this all too often, but governments do not have any interest in the details. They think macro and don't have the knowledge to think micro without input from the military. They leave details to the experts until a political crisis (sexual misconduct I'm looking at you) draws their attention to a micro point.

The CA needs to take on the role of salesmen. It needs to develop a good workable plan that maximizes resources, needs to work out the macro and micro issues in detail, and then needs to sell the politicians on the plan. There are very few people, politicians included, who would not be prepared to agree to a plan that doubles the size of the "effective" Army within the existing manpower and payroll envelope.

The problem is the Army can't come up with a viable plan except to do what its done all along with a few minor tune-ups from time-to-time. The last one we had to turn the CAF from a Cold War Army to a "modern" OOTW medium force was the most short-sighted disaster ever foisted on an organization or government. The capabilities divestments that followed essentially turned a small credible force into a smaller force of limited capabilities. As it stands, the CA is of limited use yet draws significant national resources.

There is quite frankly no need to resource the ARes more. There is a very clear need to resource the Army more but that's irrespective of whether we make the ARes more efficient. IMHO by increasing the capability of the ARes we can probably reduce personnel costs within the Army. (Just as an example, a US Army Stryker brigade combat team [the nearest equivalent of our CMBG] cost $3 billion in direct, indirect and overhead costs each year while an identically equipped ARNG one costs $0.85 billion - less than a third) Equipment, on the other hand, is what will cost money and appropriate equipment is essential for the CA. If the CA is not properly equipped then you might as well pack in the whole organization and save the country $6 or 7 billion a year.

 

[Kirkhill]

Some interesting ideas here but my question is - Is the ARes structure here an end state in and of itself based on an augmentation concept or is it a Phase 1 to a future more rounded total force structure with a mobilization capability?

Sometimes all you can hope for is establishing a firm base for the next step..... whatever that might be. Some people get confused with complex plans.

 

[KevinB]

Sometimes all you can hope for is establishing a firm base for the next step..... whatever that might be. Some people get confused with complex plans.

Except the CA is attempting to place a foundation on quicksand…

 

[FJAG]

Sometimes all you can hope for is establishing a firm base for the next step..... whatever that might be. Some people get confused with complex plans.

True enough. But the firm base needs to have a second step, or options for several 2nd steps.

Anyone who gets confused by complex plans shouldn't be in a position of leadership either military or political.

 

[Kirkhill]

True enough. But the firm base needs to have a second step, or options for several 2nd steps.

Anyone who gets confused by complex plans shouldn't be in a position of leadership either military or political.

All true...

 

[daftandbarmy]

Except the CA is attempting to place a foundation on quicksand…

Which hasn't been helped by the hurricane in the maritimes, the war in Ukraine, or internal dithering ...

As the East Coast picks up the pieces post-Fiona, MPs ask themselves what an army is for
​

Vaccine management, disaster response — can the Canadian Armed Forces do it all? Should it?​

With a major war raging in Ukraine that threatens to get more dangerous, coupled with devastating climate-driven disasters, the Liberal government — as Prevost noted — is labouring behind closed doors to revise its defence policy.

Unlike the last policy vision, released in 2017, the latest review is being done mostly in-house, without a great deal of public consultation.

The question seems to be whether it will be able to reconcile all of the competing visions that were on display Tuesday.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fiona-canadian-armed-forces-hurricane-atlantic-canada-1.6598003?cmp=newsletter_Morning%20Headlines%20from%20CBC%20News_1613_706097

 

[Kirkhill]

Which hasn't been helped by the hurricane in the maritimes, the war in Ukraine, or internal dithering ...

As the East Coast picks up the pieces post-Fiona, MPs ask themselves what an army is for​

​

Vaccine management, disaster response — can the Canadian Armed Forces do it all? Should it?​

With a major war raging in Ukraine that threatens to get more dangerous, coupled with devastating climate-driven disasters, the Liberal government — as Prevost noted — is labouring behind closed doors to revise its defence policy.

Unlike the last policy vision, released in 2017, the latest review is being done mostly in-house, without a great deal of public consultation.

The question seems to be whether it will be able to reconcile all of the competing visions that were on display Tuesday.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fiona-canadian-armed-forces-hurricane-atlantic-canada-1.6598003?cmp=newsletter_Morning%20Headlines%20from%20CBC%20News_1613_706097

Strangely I find myself in agreement with both the NDP and Cheryl Gallant.

New Democrat MP Lindsay Mathyssen seemed to suggest that some kind of Rubicon had been crossed in terms of the expectations set for the military — that the military was being called upon to do what both federal and provincial governments should be doing for themselves.

Using soldiers to bail out provincial health care systems and respond to disasters seemed anathema to Conservative MP Cheryl Gallant.

"What would the impact [be on] our army's future ability to do its job in a future conflict if the reserve army were to become a climate change defence force, which is what some of our members are suggesting?" Gallant asked.

But is there a common thread with the CAF's problems? Logistics?

Government's ability to create cross-party policy and procurement and supply. Trucks, Vaccines, Doctors, Gas, Fighters, Ships, Guns.

Sewers and Street Lights.

Is it any wonder the Army ends up as a slush fund?

 

[Halifax Tar]

Strangely I find myself in agreement with both the NDP and Cheryl Gallant.





But is there a common thread with the CAF's problems? Logistics?

Government's ability to create cross-party policy and procurement and supply. Trucks, Vaccines, Doctors, Gas, Fighters, Ships, Guns.

Sewers and Street Lights.

Is it any wonder the Army ends up as a slush fund?

Also from the article:

"We saw this during the pandemic. The military was called on to do warehouse management, supply chain management," she said, before asking Prevost to reconcile the ordinary tasks the military is asked to perform "with the significant underfunding" of public services.

 

[FJAG]

I don't know if it's just Brewster's style of writing or whether our two attending CAF witnesses were just being cagey or clueless but this shouldn't be much of a debate for the CAF. The CAF is given a piss-pot full of money every year to have a 100,000 folks available at all times to do all of the above as required by the government from time-to-time.

If the CAF needs to be mealy-mouthed in front of a Parliamentary committee then it looks like the CAF does not have clear plans.

To suggest underfunding as an issue when there is a shortfall of 10,000 folks from government authorized personnel levels seems disingenuous.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Let's be honest when you have NDHQ and Ottawa, do you really need Russia or China, earthquakes, Hurricanes et al ?

 

[GR66]

I'm going to make a couple of assumptions here:

1. The minimum aspiration for the CA should be to have the capability to deploy and sustain a Brigade Group. It's the smallest size unit that will allow for a reasonable level of national autonomy in a major military deployment.
2. Any major combat deployment for the CA will be expeditionary in nature (that includes the Canadian Arctic)
3. We are unlikely to engage in any major Brigade Group level combat deployment outside a coalition.
4. The most likely leader and major contributor to any combat coalition we join is the United States.

Given the above I'd argue that it would make sense to establish a close working relationship with the US forces we would be most likely to deploy with and also as much as possible align our future equipment acquisitions to match what those partners are using so as to take advantage of an integrated logistical pipeline.

Looking at the US Army Reg Force Divisions that are geographically closest to us (and therefore easiest to train with) we have:

11th Airborne Division (Arctic Warfare) in Alaska

• 1st IBCT
• 2nd IBCT (Airborne)

7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington

• 1st SBCT
• 2nd SBCT
• 81st SBCT (WA NG)

10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York

• 1st IBCT
• 2nd IBCT
• 3rd IBCT

That's two Light Infantry Divisions and a Stryker Division.

Would it then make sense for the CA to align itself with those Divisions as follows:

2nd Canadian Division (aligned with 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY)
5 Light Infantry Brigade in Valcartier
51 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 34/35/36/37 Brigades

3rd Canadian Division (aligned with 7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, WA)
1 Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton
11 Mechanized Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 38/39/41 Brigades

4th Canadian Division (aligned with 11th Airborne Division in Alaska)
2 Light Infantry Brigade (Arctic Warfare) in Petawawa
21 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 31/32/33 Brigades

Tank proficiency could be maintained by having a single Reg Force Tank Squadron in Edmonton (with Abrams tanks replacing our Leopards) and the personnel for two additional Squadrons serving on exchange service with US ABCT units (one squadron worth on exchange and one squadron worth manning schools/on individual training/leave/etc.). If in time of war we need to field tanks we can acquire the balance of the Squadrons from the US and have trained personnel to man them.

 

[KevinB]

I'm going to make a couple of assumptions here:

1. The minimum aspiration for the CA should be to have the capability to deploy and sustain a Brigade Group. It's the smallest size unit that will allow for a reasonable level of national autonomy in a major military deployment.
2. Any major combat deployment for the CA will be expeditionary in nature (that includes the Canadian Arctic)
3. We are unlikely to engage in any major Brigade Group level combat deployment outside a coalition.
4. The most likely leader and major contributor to any combat coalition we join is the United States.

Given the above I'd argue that it would make sense to establish a close working relationship with the US forces we would be most likely to deploy with and also as much as possible align our future equipment acquisitions to match what those partners are using so as to take advantage of an integrated logistical pipeline.

Looking at the US Army Reg Force Divisions that are geographically closest to us (and therefore easiest to train with) we have:

11th Airborne Division (Arctic Warfare) in Alaska

• 1st IBCT
• 2nd IBCT (Airborne)

7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington

• 1st SBCT
• 2nd SBCT
• 81st SBCT (WA NG)

10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York

• 1st IBCT
• 2nd IBCT
• 3rd IBCT

That's two Light Infantry Divisions and a Stryker Division.

Would it then make sense for the CA to align itself with those Divisions as follows:

2nd Canadian Division (aligned with 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY)
5 Light Infantry Brigade in Valcartier
51 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 34/35/36/37 Brigades

3rd Canadian Division (aligned with 7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, WA)
1 Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton
11 Mechanized Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 38/39/41 Brigades

4th Canadian Division (aligned with 11th Airborne Division in Alaska)
2 Light Infantry Brigade (Arctic Warfare) in Petawawa
21 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 31/32/33 Brigades

Tank proficiency could be maintained by having a single Reg Force Tank Squadron in Edmonton (with Abrams tanks replacing our Leopards) and the personnel for two additional Squadrons serving on exchange service with US ABCT units (one squadron worth on exchange and one squadron worth manning schools/on individual training/leave/etc.). If in time of war we need to field tanks we can acquire the balance of the Squadrons from the US and have trained personnel to man them.

Look at Corps level down here, not Div.
XVIII Airborne, and III Corps are probably the ones to tie into.