Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

Is there somewhat of a disconnect between the renewed focus being on dispersed operations and mission command vs. the shift from the BCT being the primary unit of action back to the Division? The new "Heavy" and "Penetration" Division structures seem to me to lean toward a concentration of heavy forces which might attract the exact type of precision fires that are meant to be avoided by dispersion.

MDO doesn't solely mean Dispersed operations - it just means Multi-Domain.

One still disperses for safety and concentrates for attack or defense.

The Bde is not large enough to hold all the assets ones needs for Maneuver Operations - so the Division is going back to the 'primary' Maneuver Unit - so Artillery and other assets can be concentrated.

Is there something to learn from the way the Ukrainian campaign has rolled out (accidental or not)?

• The initial enemy attack is blunted by dispersed, light forces using handheld AT/AD weapons which are difficult to detect by a force on the move and less easily targeted by the attacker's artillery.

WRT to Ukraine - one needs to understand the initial Russian push was blunted by both Mech/Armor and Light Forces - pretty much only due to both an overwhelming Information advantage - and the Russia Thunder Run method.
If Russia had used either their overwhelming fire advantage at the beginning, or a precision Air Campaign favored by NATO, then the UKR units would have been rolled hard and fast.
You can't emplace a strategy based on assuming enemy mistakes.

• Once the initial attack is stopped long range precision fires are used to degrade the enemy's logistics, AD assets and troop concentrations forcing them to disperse.

That is general doctrine - but not just LRPF - but all CS and GS Arty as well as Air etc.

• Once the attacking force is isolated into smaller pockets, mobile units achieving local superiority conduct counter-attacks where weaknesses are detected.

I think everyone know I am not a huge fan of the LAV series - but I would point out a lot of the Hummer based assaults that have been done by UKR would be better suited to a mobile force -- UKR is both being extremely advantaged by knowing RuAF positions and strengths allowing the Hummers to work, and fairly lucky RU issues have hampered their responses that could really have chewed up those Light vehicles.
I believe a LAV based medium force could have done a lot more slicing than the Hummers - due to similar mobility (the Hummer is great, but the Up Armors are not exactly significantly mobile) and then better protection and firepower.

Keep in mind as UKR is getting more APC and IFV, they are converting a lot of there Light Inf to those -- keeping Air Assault, Airborne and the Marine Light Inf as Infantry - but the bone stock Leg Inf are transitioning where possible.

All I am seeing out of Ukraine is the validation of effective combines arms operations - and the need for both Air and Intelligence Superiority...

 

[Underway]

The main issue for Canada is the size of the Army and the fact that Div generally are homogenous type formations and Canada can’t (won’t) field enough equipment and troops for a real Division (arguments can be made the same is true for a real Brigade).

True but there is some interesting stuff in how those Brigades are being organized inside the Division. Combining Strykers, Bradleys and Tanks into one Brigade to get the advantages of the each for example echo's a bit of the CMBG. The internal security components (see TAPV) required for the Division are spelled out relatively clearly as well. Some ideas for sure.

The second thought is that realizing we won't ever be fighting on our own. The RCN actualizes this reality by being fulling ineroperable with the US and NATO. Creating a CMBG structure that could plug into the US Division structure might be an idea. Not as a Penetration Brigade but a Heavy Brigade could be done relatively easily.

I think everyone know I am not a huge fan of the LAV series - but I would point out a lot of the Hummer based assaults that have been done by UKR would be better suited to a mobile force -- UKR is both being extremely advantaged by knowing RuAF positions and strengths allowing the Hummers to work, and fairly lucky RU issues have hampered their responses that could really have chewed up those Light vehicles.
I believe a LAV based medium force could have done a lot more slicing than the Hummers - due to similar mobility (the Hummer is great, but the Up Armors are not exactly significantly mobile) and then better protection and firepower.

Stragtegic mobility is one of those things we've forgotten about because the nature of the wars the West has been fighting in the last few years. In this case it was critical.

 

[KevinB]

True but there is some interesting stuff in how those Brigades are being organized inside the Division. Combining Strykers, Bradleys and Tanks into one Brigade to get the advantages of the each for example echo's a bit of the CMBG. The internal security components (see TAPV) required for the Division are spelled out relatively clearly as well. Some ideas for sure.

Honestly, the Strykers days are probably numbered down here, there have been plans to reduce them once the Bradley replacement comes on line (retaining some Bradley Bde's in favor of cutting Stryker formations). The more interesting thing I saw was moving some Stryker formations into Light Div's to give some protected mobility.

The second thought is that realizing we won't ever be fighting on our own. The RCN actualizes this reality by being fulling ineroperable with the US and NATO. Creating a CMBG structure that could plug into the US Division structure might be an idea. Not as a Penetration Brigade but a Heavy Brigade could be done relatively easily.

If I was Canada I would look at fitting into both Heavy and Light Div's - and restructuring Bde's to do that -- but that is just me.

Stragtegic mobility is one of those things we've forgotten about because the nature of the wars the West has been fighting in the last few years. In this case it was critical.

Define we

 

[Underway]

Honestly, the Strykers days are probably numbered down here, there have been plans to reduce them once the Bradley replacement comes on line (retaining some Bradley Bde's in favor of cutting Stryker formations). The more interesting thing I saw was moving some Stryker formations into Light Div's to give some protected mobility.

I'll believe that when I see it. I don't think I'll see it. They are adding Strykers to the Penetration Brigades because of the higher number of infantry they can move under armour, and the Bradleys (and replacement) can't carry enough bodies.

 

[WestIsle]

I fully agree about the value of one station training. As it stands now, a soldier needs 2 or 3 courses to become DP1 qualified and sent to their first job — and the various army and joint training authorities seem to lack the ability to synchronize that training, leading to our most valuable resources — people — sitting around the country waiting for courses. Often being treated like garbage at the same time — because neglecting PATs has become a habit.

Enrolling a potential R22eR soldier and sending him straight to Valcartier, without any contact with CFLRS, just makes good sense to me. And the infantry knows this — they’ve been experimenting with ‘trial’ combined BMQ/DP1 Infantryman serials since the 1990’s. I don’t know what’s stopping this — but I suspect it’s CMP gatekeeping and trying to defend the value of St Jean. A value I question.

The quality of troops trained at St.Jean has become a huge issue. They freely admit to training troops as purple trades so many are not ready to complete training on a combat arms DP1

 

[WLSC]

We'll never get rid of augmentation. It's a way of life because we're simply not large enough in either students or instructors to run a year-round balanced course load.

I do agree with @daftandbarmy though that ResF units will never be able to concentrate on any level of collective training unless relieved of the administrative and training responsibility of individual training. I think we can solve much of the problem with regional training depots who own the BTLs of both the RegF and ResF running with their own core staff in a training cycle balanced to cater to the needs of both. I think that these depots should also own Army recruiting so that the entire process from civilian applicant to trained DP1 soldier is owned by one organization. Same-same for the RCN and RCAF.

If I were King I'd break the training year into two cycles: 1 Sep to 30 April for collective training and 1 May to 31 Aug for DP1 and 2 Individual training (including a major collective training exercise for ResF units in August). That would leave the RegF free in the 1 May to 31 Aug time frame to do equipment maintenance, summer leave, APS AND providing augmentation for regional depots. The four summer months should be the Army's primary individual training period because of the high school and summer breaks. Courses schedules should commence as soon as high schools let out at the end of June and universities and colleges at the end of April or so.


I'm a great fan of the presence in the local community concept but there is a point of diminished returns where tiny units need to be rolled into nearby larger units (even if a different type of unit) or, in some cases, shut down.

For smaller units not capable of recruiting let's say twenty recruits for a course, the individual recruits should be sent off for summer training at a regional depot. We can't go on making small bespoke courses for a half dozen candidates at a small armory.


I think that this is more realistic than syphoning off a small group of instructors to keep a tiny handful of recruits amused during the winter (albeit involving a level of risk the Army tends to frown on). That's how my first two years as a gunner went. Since I was thick as a post in school Grade 11 and had to go to summer school instead of my initial recruit course, I spent one winter on a basic gun number's course and the next on a driver wheeled and arty communicator course and did a half dozen live fire exercises (as both a #3 and once as a #1 on a 105mm C1) before ever taking my recruit course. That kept me interested and involved.

I lived thru a very centralised recruiting process and « collective depot ». I agree with you that it’s very beneficial and useful. What morphed/stopped it was that different trade/units had different requirements from other trades and some units realised that their recruits where going voluntarily to other units with their buddy or for simply better units.

Attraction should be kept at unit level but the admin centralised with a view to reward performance in attraction and retention. Not to switch and level the numbers or recruits for the least performing unit. I agree the not all units can pull the necessary personal to accomplish that but that something that can an exception. The training depot should be à keep at 100%. It was magic. It morphed because it was a local initiative. If it was a national directive, it would stop the least performing units to cry to loud.

 

[KevinB]

I'll believe that when I see it. I don't think I'll see it. They are adding Strykers to the Penetration Brigades because of the higher number of infantry they can move under armour, and the Bradleys (and replacement) can't carry enough bodies.

We have gone to more Bradley's / Platoon - the Stryker has a lot of issues, I'll leave it at that.

 

[FJAG]

rue but there is some interesting stuff in how those Brigades are being organized inside the Division. Combining Strykers, Bradleys and Tanks into one Brigade to get the advantages of the each for example echo's a bit of the CMBG. The internal security components (see TAPV) required for the Division are spelled out relatively clearly as well. Some ideas for sure.

The second thought is that realizing we won't ever be fighting on our own. The RCN actualizes this reality by being fulling ineroperable with the US and NATO. Creating a CMBG structure that could plug into the US Division structure might be an idea. Not as a Penetration Brigade but a Heavy Brigade could be done relatively easily.

I'm a bit of a cynic on this. I think the fact that an SBCT is part of the Heavy Division has more to do with the fact that there aren't enough ABCTs to create the number of Heavy Divisions that the Americans want than that they think an SBCT fills the role well. I'm pretty sure the Americans would prefer one of their own SBCT rather than a CMBG which is short of ATGMs, mortars, MGS, and SPGs (once they convert).

Honestly, the Strykers days are probably numbered down here, there have been plans to reduce them once the Bradley replacement comes on line (retaining some Bradley Bde's in favor of cutting Stryker formations). The more interesting thing I saw was moving some Stryker formations into Light Div's to give some protected mobility.

You know me. Waste not, want not. Most of the Active Army IBCTs are there because there is a role for a light force. Most of the ARNG IBCTs are there because even the Americans can't afford to equip everyone with mechanized equipment. The Strykers have life left in them. My guess is that they'll try to pony up the money to equip app the current Active ABCTs and SBCTs and ARNG ABCTs with Bradley replacements and then cascade the Strykers down to selected elements of both Active and ARNG IBCTs

 

[Kirkhill]

We have gone to more Bradley's / Platoon - the Stryker has a lot of issues, I'll leave it at that.

And fewer platoons per company.

 

[KevinB]

And fewer platoons per company.

Not on the most recent ORBAT.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not on the most recent ORBAT.

Kay.

The last one I saw (open source) created 2 6-car platoons from 3 4-car platoons.

 

[ArmyRick]

Not on the most recent ORBAT.

Are you able to put up a link?

 

[KevinB]

Are you able to put up a link?

I’ll check today, as @Kirkhill just worried me that it’s not OS.

Kay.

The last one I saw (open source) created 2 6-car platoons from 3 4-car platoons.

 

[Infanteer]

Just saw a note that its not called a penetration division anymore, its now a reinforced heavy division or something like that. Saw that one coming a mile out.

 

[KevinB]

Just saw a note that its not called a penetration division anymore, its now a reinforced heavy division or something like that. Saw that one coming a mile out.

I will say it was very humorous to watch the MCOE CG brief it in Benning as it got a lot of snickers when he said it.
I suspect it dawned on folks then that it probably wasn't suitable *shocking I know...

 

[quadrapiper]

Just saw a note that its not called a penetration division anymore, its now a reinforced heavy division or something like that. Saw that one coming a mile out.

Can't imagine the flood of memes, morale patches, etc. if "penetration division" was retained.

 

[Kirkhill]

The way these conversations have evolved this could have gone into this thread, the Ukrainian one, the GBAD one or the C3 Replacement one. Lots of overlap.

L3 Harris Vampire - a modular C-UAV system based on an EO/IR sensor, a EW jammer and a 70mm missile pod (APKWS)
It can be mounted in a variety of vehicles. And possibly ground mounted?

VAMPIRE™

L3Harris’ Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment is a portable kit that can be installed on most vehicles with a cargo bed for launching of APKWS or other laser-guided munitions.

www.l3harris.com

Here Is the Counterdrone Kit the US Is Sending Ukraine

Made by L3Harris Technologies, the system can be quickly installed on different types of vehicles.

www.defenseone.com

 

[Kirkhill]

And in the same overlapped tendency

US response to the changing security situation in the Arctic (The true north strong and free?)

China, Russia Quietly Expanding Arctic Partnership, Says Panel - USNI News

China is subtly installing a larger presence in the Arctic through an extensive partnership with Russia in areas ranging from multi-use ports and airfields to energy extraction, Arctic security experts said Tuesday. The partnership also includes scientific research and sharing intelligence...

news.usni.org

Biden releases Arctic strategy with emphasis on competition with China and Russia

The 15-page document is intended to guide U.S. policy in the Arctic for the next 10 years.

www.adn.com

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf

Thin gruel.

 

[FJAG]

The new FM 3-0 Operations is out! The new FM 3-0 Operations is out!



It's right here.

 

[KevinB]

The new FM 3-0 Operations is out! The new FM 3-0 Operations is out!



It's right here.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



I really want to ask who thinks that wording makes any sense?
Why bother having the Distro Restriction if it is APR unlimited?