Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

And that requires capabilities. We measure $ inputs when we should be measuring defence capability outputs. Currently the latter do not equate to the former.

And that is where we disagree. Which capabilities do we require? Which should we acquire?

You want to bet on Black (Heavy). I want to bet on Red (Light).

In truth none of us are that adamant. Almost everybody wants to hedge their bets. The argument fundamentally becomes how much to you put on Black and how much on Red.

Me, I'm 70/30 Red (Light) to Black (Heavy).

And that is just the professional regulars. Augmented by released professionals as a reserve sounds right to me.

The bigger area of disagreement is over how much money should be spent on organizing, training and equipping unpaid volunteers anxious and willing to assist.

 

[Kirkhill]

From Forbes
Something for everyone here
Even a couple of "gimmes" for @markppcli and @FJAG

AEROSPACE & DEFENSE

The Ukrainian Army’s Jaeger Brigades Are Its Middleweight Forest Troops​

David Axe
Forbes Staff
I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.
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Dec 26, 2022,11:31pm EST

71st Jaeger Brigade troopers.
UKRAINIAN ARMY PHOTO
The Ukrainian army grew fast in the months before, and after, a 200,000-man Russian army rolled into northern, eastern and southern Ukraine, widening a grinding war that had been raging for eight years.

With a huge influx of new volunteers and returning ex-soldiers, the army—which before the war had around 200,000 people on its payroll—grew by tens of thousands.

The fresh manpower allowed the army to form a couple dozen light territorial brigades plus several new heavy mechanized brigades, as well as to enlarge the existing 20 or so active mechanized and tank brigades.

Perhaps the most obscure units are the three jaeger brigades, each with around 2,000 troops. Jaeger is German for “hunters.” The 61st, 68th and 71st Jaeger Brigades honor a long European tradition—and fit somewhere in the middle of the army’s force-structure. Neither heavy nor light.

The first jaegers were what the word implies. Hunters and woodsmen who formed specialized skirmishing units in Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Today the German, Austrian, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish armies still have jaeger units, and generally consider them special operations forces.
In Ukraine, jaeger brigades are middleweight infantry—neither as light as territorial brigades, which generally lack tracked vehicles, nor as heavy as tank or mechanized brigades with their hundreds of tanks and fighting vehicles.

The 61st was the first jaeger brigade. It formed in 2015 as part of the Ukrainian army’s initial expansion in response to the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

The 61st Jaeger Brigade is based in Zhytomyr Oblast in northerwestern Ukraine. The brigade with its BRDM wheeled vehicles and trucks fitted with ZSU-23 auto-cannons was suited to operations in the marshes and forests (presumably they don't go off track) of northern Ukraine’s border region.
And since the 61st Jaeger Brigade’s home oblast overlapped with the radioactive Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, the plan was for the brigade also to have a radiological reconnaissance unit.
It’s not clear that the radiological unit ever formed, however—the 61st has spent much of the current war in southern Ukraine which, while wet in places, generally isn’t radioactive. Yet.


The 68th and 71st Jaeger Brigades formed this year. Both benefitted from a consignment of new pickup trucks, some of which the brigades modified with bed-mounted rocket-launchers. Jaegers also have been spotted in U.S.-supplied MaxxPro wheeled armored vehicles.

The 71st technically belongs to the airborne corps, even though its troopers aren’t qualified as parachutists or heliborne assault troops. Instead, the 71st Jaeger Brigade supports the lighter, airborne-qualified formations in the same corps.
The 71st lately has been fighting around Opytne, one of the settlements anchoring the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut in the east.

The 68th, it seems, is somewhere in the south around Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The war has untethered the jaeger brigades from the geography that originally justified their formation. Which is not to say the brigades aren’t useful. Jaeger brigades in theory can move more quickly than heavy brigades can do, and hit harder than territorial brigades can do.

But the sheer violence of the Russian-Ukraine war motivates troops to harden. So don’t be shocked if, over time, the jaeger brigades evolve in the same way most Ukrainian formations are evolving: by adding armor and firepower and slowly becoming heavy brigades ... regardless of their name.


Adding armour and firepower assumes that armour and firepower is available to be added.

To which

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/27/ukraine-russia-tanks-military-vehicles/

Captured Russian tanks and equipment are coveted trophies — and a headache​

Ukrainian forces have seized hundreds of tanks and other military vehicles, but many are languishing as they wait for repairs and spare parts​

By Samantha Schmidt
,
Isabelle Khurshudyan
and
Serhii Korolchuk

Updated December 27, 2022 at 10:07 a.m. EST|Published December 27, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EST


KHARKIV REGION, Ukraine — When Ukrainian forces came across the abandoned Russian fighting vehicle on the battlefield, they knew they had found a rare prize.
The BMP-3, armed with a 100mm main gun and a 30mm autocannon, was one of the few of its kind that the Ukrainian military had seized from the Russians since the start of the invasion. But about a month ago, after weeks of being operated by Ukrainian soldiers, its engine and fueling system began to fail

Ever since, the Russian fighting vehicle has been out of commission, stuck at a repair site in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv region.
Ukrainian forces have seized hundreds of what they call “trophies” — Russian tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles — since the start of the war. They’ve become valuable assets for Kyiv. The brigade working at this repair site jokingly referred to them as “lend-lease” tanks, referring to the World World II program under which the United States supplied Britain, the Soviet Union and other Allied nations with humanitarian aid and military equipment.


But many of these tanks and other vehicles are stuck in hangars like the one at this repair site as brigades struggle to find the parts needed to repair them. The unit here, a maintenance battalion for the 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade, has been unable to find the parts it needs for the BMP-3.
“It’s obvious it should be fighting the enemy and not sitting in a hangar,” said Ruslan, the 47-year-old commander of the maintenance battalion, who spoke on the condition that his last name not be used.

A member of the maintenance battalion for Ukraine's 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade works on the engine of a battlefield vehicle. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)
To find parts to fix the vehicle, the battalion would need to first find an identical match. Unlike earlier models of this type of fighting vehicle, the BMP-3 cannot be repaired using parts from similar Ukrainian vehicles.

It’s possible another brigade might have a vehicle that is a match, Ruslan said, but there is no system for locating the parts. He suggested that the armed forces could benefit from a program or database tracking compatible parts across brigades. “It would save time,” he said. “It would save a lot of resources.”

A press officer for the 14th Brigade, the only brigade that has fought on all major front lines in the country since the start of Russia’s invasion, joked that it’s in the Ukrainian nature to collect and hoard prized possessions. It’s not always as easy as merely asking another brigade for its identical trophy tank or vehicle.


In the Donetsk region, Vadym Ustymenko, a member of a tank unit in Ukraine’s 25th Airborne Assault Brigade, said he has changed tanks “six or seven times” in the past seven months because they often need repair. He’s now fighting in a T-80 tank — among the best models in Ukraine’s arsenal.

The 25th Brigade was the first unit into the city of Izyum after Russian forces hastily retreated from the Kharkiv region in September, leaving behind an extraordinary amount of tanks and armored personnel carriers.



“Speaking about just the tanks, there were indeed a lot of them, but very few were operational,” Ustymenko said. “Those that you could just start up or only needed a few minutes of work, you could count on one hand. Those that needed some repair but would eventually run was another 30 percent probably. And the last 50 percent was junk that requires a whole lot of work.”

For the tanks that were in bad condition, some could be “donors” of needed parts, said another soldier in Ustymenko’s unit. Because Ukraine’s weapons largely date to the Soviet Union, a tank that’s more than 30 years old could be improved with a spare part from a seized Russian model that’s just five years old.


The soldiers in Ustymenko’s unit said they occasionally communicate with other brigades about spare parts. One soldier in the tank unit mentioned that they asked for some ammunition for their tank from a brigade in the area and were refused.


While Ukraine can often repair its own equipment on or near the front lines with available spare parts, a breakdown of Western-provided equipment typically means it needs to be towed back to a NATO facility in Poland. That could mean removing a vital weapon from the battlefield for weeks.
“The weapons that are coming from the U.S., they are mostly coming from stockpiles, so they are not new,” said Daria Kaleniuk, executive director of the Anti-Corruption Action Center in Ukraine. She has been meeting with Western politicians to push for Ukraine to receive modern fighter jets and battle tanks. Sending damaged weapons to Poland “is a huge delay and a big frustration for the Ukrainian military,” Kaleniuk said. (Still want to donate our Leos?)
At the field repair site in the Kharkiv region, members of the maintenance battalion worked to fix two Russian tanks and several armored personnel carriers, repairing engines, steering systems and machine-gun turrets. One of the first things the unit does when repairing a trophy is repaint it, removing the “Z” symbol of its former Russian owner.

Often, the most challenging part of repairing a Russian vehicle is simply identifying the problem, Ruslan said. Many tanks were seized in the area around Kupiansk during Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive.


Each brigade has a technical reconnaissance (scavenger) unit dedicated to searching fields for abandoned vehicles and equipment, then transporting them to repair sites. The tanks and vehicles have become easier to find since the leaves fell off the trees, improving visibility.

But the winter months also create harsher conditions for tanks and equipment, causing more wear and tear.
Constant power outages create an additional obstacle. The near-daily blackouts at this repair site delay the team’s work. Even a generator isn’t enough to power all of the tools they need to fix the equipment. This is part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal, Ruslan said.
“The Russians are doing this for a reason,” he said.

CORRECTION
An earlier version of this story said a Russian BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle was armed with a 100mm machine gun. Some versions of the vehicle have a 100mm main gun. This story has been updated.

 

[GR66]

I'll be the first to admit that I don't think enough about the China issue but for starters I would think that Canada's interest is minor in the Indo-Pacific and much more focused on the NW passage. Incidentally while my above discussion about Russia focuses on the ResF in a heavy role in Europe my focus for the RegF is primarily on the defence of Canada through quick and highly trained people air, land and sea, capable of securing our shores, including the North.

Our interest in the Indo-Pacific is in keeping a rule based World order where nations can freely trade goods, services, ideas and people. That is what is at risk with the expansion of China. It is a fundamental threat to the basic structure to our society in a way that Russia is not. For that very reason I would NOT think that "Canada's interest is minor".

This is why we have an air force and navy. The army's role is secondary.

And I said as much in my post. The Army's role is secondary...but right now our Army's role is non-existent.

Why is it that when you hear us talking about heavy forces you think that we only talk about tanks and IFVs. Heavy forces, like any other, need a variety of support systems from HIMARS to EW to UCAVs etc etc. I keep using the words "balanced force". That includes everything from unarmed int pers to light infantry, to .... at the far end nuclear strike. And while we won't use nuclear weapons ourselves anymore, we need to be allied with people who can and will as a proper deterrent.

Heavy is a category that has a place in a balanced inventory and should be prepositioned in a place where it is needed and be highly visible as part of our deterrence policy. If deterrence is done right it may never be needed (see the whole damn Cold War as a prime example). This is why IMHO it is a classic ResF task. There is absolutely zero value of having a heavy force within Canada manned by expensive full-timers with no ability to transport it anywhere in time of emergency. (You do need sufficient RegF pers to lead and train the ResF flyover users and to develop and upgrade the skill set)

The reason I think about tanks and IFVs when you talk about heavy forces is that you consistently, specifically talk about Armoured Brigade Groups and Armoured Divisions pre-deployed to Europe. I'm not in any way suggesting that "balanced forces" are not required in a potential conflict against either Russia or China (or any other potential foe). What I am suggesting is simply questioning whether our Canadian contribution to the "balanced" NATO forces needs to be "balanced" (i.e. Armoured Brigade/Division) itself. Are there possibly other types of contributions to the overall balanced NATO forces that Canada could make?

NATO has both national and multi-national Brigades, Divisions and even Corps. Is the only feasible and useful Canadian contribution to that "balanced force" an Armoured Brigade or Division?

Yes it is. The problem facing us in the face is Europe. And I simply do not understand anyone who doesn't recognize that we are in fact in the middle of a Cold War that has warmed up considerably since 2014.

And yesterday China carried out a "strike drill" with 47 aircraft across the Taiwan Strait in a further increase in pressure and tension that has also been escalating over the past decade plus. That's on top of the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong, cultural genocide in Tibet and actual concentration camps in Xinjiang. I equally simply do not understand anyone who doesn't recognize that we are in fact in the middle of a Cold War that has warmed up considerably there as well.

What you need to understand that what I'm defending is the need to keep an eye on Europe but not at the expense of other issues. We need a balanced force which includes a component that looks and is capable of mechanized warfare because for the time being, it still matters.

But in essence you are keeping an eye on Europe at the expense of other issues:

I see nothing to build on re China at this time. There is no military alliance of consequence to work with and much political effort is needed before we even get to the question of what role Canada will play.

My point is that we already have NATO in place to face Russia and there are many other countries that are also contributing to that collective defence/deterrence. They do have balanced forces that are capable of mechanized warfare. I'm not in any way saying that we abandon NATO and focus only on China but as you note above it's vs China that there is much more work to be done in creating an effective defensive alliance vs an even more powerful military than anything Russia can muster. Are there force structures we could put in place that would both be something to build upon in a conflict with China and at the same time contribute to the balanced NATO deterrent against Russia?

And that certainly doesn't preclude the possibility of for example having a fly-over Armoured Brigade in Europe both as a useful military contribution but also as an important political contribution and signal of support.

That's why I continuously say to make Europe a primarily ResF responsibility (to sa ve costs) and target the majority of the RegF on those other issues that require very high skills or quick reaction. Equipment is a red herring. A properly trained and organized ResF with the right RegF leadership and support structure can handle heavy equipment including all those HIMARS and air defence systems you mention.

Our problem is that the RegF refuses to create a ResF capable of using heavy equipment and hoards the "good toys" for themselves. It unnecessarily increase the cost of defence and ties up too many full-time people in what is basically a very necessary but improperly manned stand-by deterrence force.

This is true whether we're talking about Russia or China. Personnel are a huge chunk of our defence budget and anything we can do to make sure we have enough of the right equipment and a pool of well trained, part time personnel to man it when required will go a long way to making us a more efficient (and effective) military.

 

[Kirkhill]

And anudder great article from Forbes

Ukraine Converts $21.9 Billion In U.S. Military Surplus Into Fearsome Force

Doubters want you to believe $21.9 billion dollars in military aid is a lot, when, in fact, it's mostly cast-off gear that the U.S. was already sending to the scrapyard.

www.forbes.com

Making do with military surplus - and still beating your enemy.


What is just as fascinating to me is that 21.9 BUSD is broadly equivalent to DND's budge for a year. Even if you just looked at the capital budget you are looking at 4 to 5 years of the capital budget.

Ukraine Converts $21.9 Billion In U.S. Military Surplus Into Fearsome Force​

Craig Hooper
Senior Contributor
I evaluate national security threats and propose solutions.
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Dec 26, 2022,03:27pm EST
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Listen to article10 minutes

Few nations have put U.S. military aid to better use than Ukraine
AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
The list of American security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s “unprovoked and brutal invasion” is impressive. What is more impressive is that $21.9 billion in U.S. military aid has been dominated by largely second-string gear, comprised of unpopular or lower-tech systems that were, in many cases, on the way to the scrapyard.


As Congress gears up to constrain the Biden Administration’s relative largesse, it is worth emphasizing that the aid, to date, is neither excessive nor threatening to U.S. national security.

In fact, U.S. military support to Ukraine has cost less than what Congress is paying to procure two Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In total, taxpayers will put some $26 billion into the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79). In comparison to these troubled flattops, the $21.9 billion for Ukraine appears to be a far more effective return on investment.

Aid to Ukraine has, in effect, shattered the Russian military, exposing it as little more than a paper tiger. The war has helped destroy Russia’s once-burgeoning arms bazaar, ruining Russian efforts to destabilize strategic regions. Enabling the fight has bolstered Ukraine’s commitment to their nation, critical for advancing society-building and anti-corruption efforts there. Facilitating Ukraine’s resistance may even end the kleptocratic reign of Vladimir Putin, paving the way for a more just—if not more democratic—society in Russia itself.

The war served a good proving ground for modern conflict, forcing the U.S. to recognize old “big war” conflict models it had eschewed for decades. The war has also reinforced the value of basic, boring old consumables, items the U.S. often ignores in the constant pursuit of the newest and shiniest technology—like the pricey FordClass carrier.
In all, the $21.9 billion has been very well spent. Had America held back the support, and just let Russia roll over Ukraine, America would have spent far more in keeping Russia from suborning the rest of Europe.
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Helping Ukraine stand against overt aggression has already offered a great return on investment. America has frittered away far more for far less strategic benefit. The second Iraq War of 2003 cost the United States over a trillion dollars. Afghanistan cost another trillion in 2022 dollars. Those two conflicts—which offered little strategic advantage the U.S.— make the $21 billion in Ukraine security aid look like chump change.

Surplus International MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) fighting vehicles return from ... [+]
© 2012 BLOOMBERG FINANCE LP

Second-String U.S. Gear Has Rarely Been Used So Effectively​

While the numbers and lists of gear are impressive, America hasn’t given very much that might impact America’s security in any substantial way. We’ve handed over a lot of former Russian or otherwise obsolete equipment, including 45 Russian-built T-72B main battle tanks and 20 Mi-17 helicopters. Much of the gear sent to Ukraine was headed for either the scrapheap or to other allies.
To a general audience, armored personnel carriers sound impressive. The fact that America gave Ukraine some 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers sounds like a big deal. But military experts know that America stopped building these tracked utility vehicles about 25 years ago and is busy stripping them from the U.S. force.
Other surplus gear has gone to Ukraine. During America’s counterinsurgency conflicts, the Army procured lots of M1117 Armored Security Vehicles—a wheeled armored car—between 1999 and 2014. More appropriate for military constabulary duties than full-scale conflict, the U.S. has already been drawing down the vehicle inventory, so the 250 sent to Ukraine won’t be missed. To give an idea of where Ukraine sits in terms of donations, the U.S. gave 200 of these vehicles to Columbia in 2020. Over 700 were produced for the Afghanistan Army and 400 went to the Iraqi armed forces. At least, in Ukraine, these vehicles are directly supporting U.S. goals.
Some fancy militarized-sounding gifts have centered around mobility. A grant of almost 300-400 “Tactical Vehicles” may impress a general audience, but they’re all just military trucks built to carry between 2.5 or 5 tons.
American taxpayers gave Ukraine 477 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs). Built for a grinding counterinsurgency, the U.S. military has been so eager to shed the heavy, hard-to-maintain vehicles it has handed them out to police departments all over the United States.
America also provided some 1,200 “High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles.” Better known as Humvees, the U.S. is busy replacing this modern retake of the old military jeep with a newer version called the “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.”
Even the newly popular tube artillery systems—when donated, the future of much of the 142 155mm and 36 105mm howitzers, the 10 120mm, 10 82 mm and 10 60mm mortar systems donated to Ukraine were in doubt. The Marine Corps was aiming to cut their M777 howitzer batteries from 21 to five, but the importance of artillery on the Ukraine battlefield may have changed a few opinions.
In air defense, all the focus has been on the yet-to-be-delivered Patriot air defense battery and the eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NSAMS). But the bigger story is in the old HAWK missiles the U.S. is supplying. The U.S. hasn’t used HAWK missiles since 2002, and, given that we made thousands of them, it would be very interesting to know more about how these old missiles are doing in the field.

A civilian at an interactive exhibition "Weapons of Victory," where visitors have the opportunity to ... [+]
ANADOLU AGENCY VIA GETTY IMAGES

Amid The Dross, Ukraine Has Gotten Some “Good Stuff”​

This isn’t to say that the U.S. hasn’t supplied “good stuff”—complex, front-line weapons, coupled with always in-demand consumables. But, while the new gear gets a lot of headlines, the truly modern systems are few and far between, dwarfed the array of nearly-obsolete U.S. weaponry.
The modern gear gets headlines. But then again, those modern, front-line systems in Ukraine are very few and far between, reflecting a jaundiced assessment of Ukrainian strategies, technical capabilities, and training. That’s why a modern Patriot air defense system may take time to be fielded in Ukraine. In a few years, eight batteries of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NSAAMS) will arrive. New operators need a lot of training to fully exploit America’s high-tech gear.
Ukraine supporters, when agitating for more and better weaponry point toward Ukraine’s quick exploitation of the 38 U.S. supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS. But these front-line assets are largely “fire-and-forget” platforms, and, as export items, their effectiveness depends more on the end-user’s prowess in finding, reporting and targeting relevant enemy assets.
That is why the U.S. has put a lot of emphasis upon modern command and control assistance. Command post vehicles, including well over 80 different radars of various types, jamming gear, tactical communications systems, SATCOM terminals and surveillance equipment helped Ukraine plug critical capability gaps. And yet, while these tactical tools are high-demand and are, in many cases, considered relatively modern equipment, the U.S. has plenty to offer.
Some high-tech, relatively “experimental” gear has also gone to Ukraine. The U.S. has fed 700 Switchblade kamikaze drones, 1,800 Phoenix Ghost unmanned aerial systems, unmanned costal defense vessels and other interesting trinkets into the war zone. These new high-tech “experiments” do cost money, but, for the U.S., getting an understanding of how these platforms perform on a modern battlefield is invaluable.
Use rates of relatively modern man-portable or other small defensive anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems—1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, 8,500 Javelin anti-armor missiles, 46,000 other anti-armor systems, as well as 1,500 TOW anti-tank missiles, and 13,000 grenade launchers—have likely outstripped America’s ability to produce the munitions. But, again, this largesse has only made a small dent in America’s supplies—over the years America produced tens of thousands of Stingers and almost 50,000 Javelins.
Another worry is Ukraine’s consumption of modern artillery shells. But this “revelation” is, again, worth an enormous amount to the U.S. military. For years, only a lonely team logisticians and other defense experts worried about America’s habit of underfunding munitions production and weapons sustainment.
Until now, their concerns went unheard by a military more interested in funding shiny new weapons than in refreshing the grubby, dirty, and dangerous industrial base devoted to making munitions. Discovering that the critics were right, and identifying this manufacturing shortfall as a major constraint, enables the U.S. to do something about it now, when U.S. national security is not directly threatened on the battlefield.
While, in total, the amount of military funding sent to Ukraine seems large, in real terms, much of the military aid sent to Ukraine—outside of ammunition—is comprised of systems that the Pentagon has already written off. That is worth remembering when demagogues try to sew public doubts about America’s support of Ukraine.

Follow me on Twitter or LinkedIn. Check out my website.

 

[Kirkhill]

@FJAG

Needless to say I lean heavily towards @GR66 's arguments.

If I wanted an army that could function globally, ie across Canada, the Indo-Pacific, the High Arctic and Europe, regardless of alliances, I would give it wings and the ability to land on ships.

It may not do all jobs in every theater but it would be available to work in every theater across the full spectrum of conflict.

 

[FJAG]

And that is where we disagree. Which capabilities do we require? Which should we acquire?

You want to bet on Black (Heavy). I want to bet on Red (Light).

In truth none of us are that adamant. Almost everybody wants to hedge their bets. The argument fundamentally becomes how much to you put on Black and how much on Red.

Me, I'm 70/30 Red (Light) to Black (Heavy).

And that is just the professional regulars. Augmented by released professionals as a reserve sounds right to me.

The bigger area of disagreement is over how much money should be spent on organizing, training and equipping unpaid volunteers anxious and willing to assist.

You see that's where I think you and @GR66 and I are talking at cross purposes because, like the two of you I think that 2/3rds of our full-time Army should be light and mobile and be supported by almost all of the Navy and Air Force in the defence of Canada and discrete and minor international missions.

You hear me arguing for heavy army components solely because I strongly believe heavy army components need to be maintained for a European deterrence theatre, a theatre which others here seem to be ready to throw under the bus.

I too put 70% of the army's RegF into the Red category. Add to that mission most of the RCAF and the RCN and fully 90% of the RegF is committed to the Red (ie other than Europe heavy) side of the balance sheet.

By my meatball math, less than 5% of DND's capital and O&M budgets would go to European oriented heavy fly-over forces and with the predominant use of ResF troops less than 8% of DND's annual payroll. (i.e. roughly 5,000 out of 100,000 full-time salaries and roughly 12,000 out of roughly 27,000 authorized paid part-time positions.) would be Europe ie NATO focused. And remember we are talking focused not fully committed as most of these people are still in Canada and available for other missions while they train and are on stand-by.

We always seem to forget that one new aircraft could buy almost a subunit of tanks or IFVs or SP guns and that one ship easily a battalion or two's worth. And that battalion, prepositioned in Latvia buys a lot more goodwill and credibility than a ship at sea or an aircraft in Cold Lake.

 

[Kirkhill]

You see that's where I think you and @GR66 and I are talking at cross purposes because, like the two of you I think that 2/3rds of our full-time Army should be light and mobile and be supported by almost all of the Navy and Air Force in the defence of Canada and discrete and minor international missions.

You hear me arguing for heavy army components solely because I strongly believe heavy army components need to be maintained for a European deterrence theatre, a theatre which others here seem to be ready to throw under the bus.

I too put 70% of the army's RegF into the Red category. Add to that mission most of the RCAF and the RCN and fully 90% of the RegF is committed to the Red (ie other than Europe heavy) side of the balance sheet.

By my meatball math, less than 5% of DND's capital and O&M budgets would go to European oriented heavy fly-over forces and with the predominant use of ResF troops less than 8% of DND's annual payroll. (i.e. roughly 5,000 out of 100,000 full-time salaries and roughly 12,000 out of roughly 27,000 authorized paid part-time positions.) would be Europe ie NATO focused. And remember we are talking focused not fully committed as most of these people are still in Canada and available for other missions while they train and are on stand-by.

We always seem to forget that one new aircraft could buy almost a subunit of tanks or IFVs or SP guns and that one ship easily a battalion or two's worth. And that battalion, prepositioned in Latvia buys a lot more goodwill and credibility than a ship at sea or an aircraft in Cold Lake.

Why on earth didn't you say so in the beginning?

Strangely enough I can support that.

 

[FJAG]

Why on earth didn't you say so in the beginning?

Strangely enough I can support that.

Take a look at my Army 2026 organization charts up in several threads well over a month ago.

1 Div (the heavy one) is a 30/70 force. All of 1 Div's battalions are 30/70.

2 Div (the all others jobs one) is a 70/30 force. In 2 Div 4 battalions are light 100/0 pure RegF (2 of which are para capable) supported by a CS brigade with battalions of 70/30 signals, EW, AD, Engrs (x2) and 30/70 MI and MP and 8 x light 30/70 battalions and three 30/70 Fd artillery regiments. Two of the 30/70 Inf battalions (one on each coast) is amphibious and one (on the west coast) is mountain.

Long story short, 2 of the RegF infantry battalions (six rifle companies) are in the heavy 1 Div. The remaining 7 RegF battalions (21 rifle companies) are made light and in 2 Div. Equipment wise, the LAVs from 12 companies are in 1 Div (6 prepositioned and six in Canada for training) 4 companies worth are unallocated.

Just as a reminder here's what I put out- the divisions are roughly the same size; the key is in the colour coding of the RegF to ResF ratios. Note too that 2 Div spans the whole country and owns all the Cdn Rangers which are spread further around the country than just the coastal areas and, which in my mind ought to be the core around which a home guard organization can be built:

 

[Kirkhill]

Based on the above level of concordance (agreement maybe too much to hope for yet)

Howzabout?

We have 12 professional regular manoeuvre groups and 4 professional regular fire groups plus a burgeoning array of other useful and interesting stuff.

I'm going to set the array aside and focus on the traditional units.


Therefore - 6 manoeuvre groups formed into 3 Special Service type Brigades.

From Wiki

The following units were serving in the SSF on disbandment in 1995:

• Special Service Force Headquarters and Signals Squadron
• 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
• Royal Canadian Dragoons
• 2 Combat Engineer Regiment
• 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment
• Canadian Airborne Regiment (now disbanded)
• 2 Field Ambulance
• 2 Military Police Platoon
• 2 Service Battalion
• 2 Intelligence Platoon
• 427 Tactical Helicopter Squadron

That takes care of 9 out of the 12 manoeuvre units and 3 of the fire support units.

My variations would be to lighten up the Cavalry and the Artillery (reduce the number of regular squadrons), have the Cavalry and the Artillery co-operate on ISTAR, reduce the number of CS batteries but thicken up the AD troop to become a full battery. One of the infantry battalions would be platform independent light. The other would be primarily National Defence LAV but capable of leaving their LAVs behind if necessary.

With three Light Brigades of that sort then an HQ and Sigs Sqn of any brigade could be fielded with various atts and dets from other brigades to meet particular circumstances.

All of those elements should be 100% Reg,


What is left over? 1 fire support unit and 3 manoeuvre units plus additional bodies from the lightened (and dare I suggest) automated cavalry and artillery.

You could do worse than 4 CMBG as a model

An armd recce sqn
2 infantry battalions
1 armd regiment
1 large artillery regiment (3x 8-Gun Batteries, 1x LR Battery, 2x AD Batteries)

That could both be adequately manned to supply immediate support to the deployed Light Brigades AND allied with part-timers (militia, volunteers, reservists, whatever) to both permit the deployment of the heavy brigade independently and its sustainment over the long haul.

Generally speaking I would be reducing the size of sections and platoons, emphasizing vehicles (appropriate to the means of deployment and the theatre) as well as team served systems, and multiplying the means of communication - radios, dispatch riders and lasers.

As for the reserves

Light First.

Every reserve unit is formed up as a Rifle Coy in terms of numbers and rank structure. Without exception. Everybody trains with batons and rifles.

Some units focus on assault operations, some on defence, some on mobile ops, some on air defence, some on close fire support, some on intelligence gathering, some on transport and supply.



One other thing I have thinking about since watching the Ukrainian efforts, and this moves into the array of interesting stuff, I am starting to think there needs to be a very close alignment between the Artillery (especially the GBAD elements but also the Class II and III types) AND the EW squadron - not so much its intelligence are as its active measures arm.


Edit - after seeing @FJAG's reiteration of his position I see that his first Division and mine don't look dissimilar. My primary issues are the 30/70 split (I would be aiming for 0/100 res to regs) and too many LAV battalions. As well as too many armoured regiments.

Make your three brigade armoured regiments into Light Armour (no tanks) and make one of the LAV battalions a light battalion.

All the rest of the tanks and LAVs then get amalgamated in the Heavy Brigade - either 3 permanent Combined Arms Units or 1 Armd and 2 Mech Inf (if you want to adhere to tradition) is fine with me. Some of those will be manned by part-timers.

 

[FJAG]

Based on the above level of concordance (agreement maybe too much to hope for yet)

I'll give you my reasons for why I prefer my organization below

Howzabout?

We have 12 professional regular manoeuvre groups and 4 professional regular fire groups plus a burgeoning array of other useful and interesting stuff.

I'm going to set the array aside and focus on the traditional units.


Therefore - 6 manoeuvre groups formed into 3 Special Service type Brigades.

From Wiki

The following units were serving in the SSF on disbandment in 1995:

I'm not a fan of the SSF. It was a mashed together organization designed primarily to remove a formation (at the time we had four brigades/combat groups and an airborne regiment.) We ended up with three brigades/combat groups and an SSF (which was bigger than an airborne regiment but smaller than a brigade)

Essentially in 1976 the RCR had three battalions, one each in London, Petawawa and Gagetown. 2RCR in Gagetown had nothing really to do with 2 Combat Group (just like E Bty 2RCHA and the VIII Hussars outfit in Gagetown had nothing to do with 2 Cbt Gp in Pet - I was in Pet from 72-76 and trained many times with 1 and 3 RCR but never with 2 RCR. I'm not sure who they belonged to either before or after the SSF formation). In 1976 they moved the Airborne Regt to Pet and moved 3 RCR to Germany) Effectively 2 Combat Group went from 2 bns to one mech bn and the Airborne. Everything stayed more or less the same for the rest of the combat group except the elements lightened up a bit and got a para capability grafted in. It never made sense to me albeit its stated purpose was to have a rapid reaction light force with a more general purpose follow up force.

That takes care of 9 out of the 12 manoeuvre units and 3 of the fire support units.

My variations would be to lighten up the Cavalry and the Artillery (reduce the number of regular squadrons), have the Cavalry and the Artillery co-operate on ISTAR, reduce the number of CS batteries but thicken up the AD troop to become a full battery. One of the infantry battalions would be platform independent light. The other would be primarily National Defence LAV but capable of leaving their LAVs behind if necessary.

I'm way out of date on ISTAR subsequent to Afghanistan. Cavalry to artillery cooperation comes in the brigade ops centre where ops in general is grafted at the hip to the FSCC and STACC. You can link in recce with dedicated FOO/JTACs and, maybe, an FSCC. You do not need an ISTAR cell per se for that. To me the bulk of sensor-shooter responses do not need the analysis that an ISTAR organization or All-source intelligence cell gives, and if anything, it can slow down the response. Don't get me wrong, I'm not against ISTAR. It depends on the processes and how things function. I'm from the old school brigade staff structure where the Bde IntO, the ArtyOps O and the brigade major could all talk to each other from the back doors of their cheek-to-jowl CP vehicles.

One thing about air defence. The SSF was unique in having an AD troop. All the other two Canadian brigades had a battery at the time and 4 CMBG a battery plus a bunch. The doctrine I learned under was an AD regiment supported a division and an AD battery a brigade.

With three Light Brigades of that sort then an HQ and Sigs Sqn of any brigade could be fielded with various atts and dets from other brigades to meet particular circumstances.

I've slowly bought into the building block system. manpower shortages have always made that a necessity for my whole career and it became embedded in our basic force generation/force employment structure at the sub-unit level in the early 00s transformation.

All of those elements should be 100% Reg,

This I do not buy and I'll explain below.

What is left over? 1 fire support unit and 3 manoeuvre units plus additional bodies from the lightened (and dare I suggest) automated cavalry and artillery.

You could do worse than 4 CMBG as a model

An armd recce sqn
2 infantry battalions
1 armd regiment
1 large artillery regiment (3x 8-Gun Batteries, 1x LR Battery, 2x AD Batteries)

That varies depending on whether you aim to fight as a separate brigade or as part of a division. I agree totally that 1 armd regt and two mech battalions form the core. Recce and artillery and service support can be downloaded from a divisional asset. Just as a point, you don't want two AD batteries in a brigade because you only want one AD control centre - if there aren't enough sensor and fire units then make the battery bigger.

That could both be adequately manned to supply immediate support to the deployed Light Brigades AND allied with part-timers (militia, volunteers, reservists, whatever) to both permit the deployment of the heavy brigade independently and its sustainment over the long haul.

Generally speaking I would be reducing the size of sections and platoons, emphasizing vehicles (appropriate to the means of deployment and the theatre) as well as team served systems, and multiplying the means of communication - radios, dispatch riders and lasers.

I don't go into that level of detail. There are far too many options and which option is appropriate is both theatre dependent and highly subjective.

As for the reserves

Light First.

Every reserve unit is formed up as a Rifle Coy in terms of numbers and rank structure. Without exception. Everybody trains with batons and rifles.

Some units focus on assault operations, some on defence, some on mobile ops, some on air defence, some on close fire support, some on intelligence gathering.

Totally disagree with minor exceptions.

I'm on the side of the reserves as an active partner in meeting basic defence requirements. For me that starts with a reserve predominant heavy force because it's affordable and you only need it in very narrow circumstances. It does need enough RegF leadership to provide structure and training and even, in an emergency, a small rapid deployable capability. Equipment usage, wear and tear and ammunition expenditures are reduced over a full-time force but at the same time you do have the capability available when needed.

There must also be a capability to augment light forces with reservists. In my structure 1/3 of the RegF is heavy and 2/3 is light while the ResF is roughly 60/40.

There clearly is a need for some 100/0 RegF units for rapid reaction work. The number of such units is debateable and one has to look both historically at how we've been doing deployments and how we want to do them in the future as well as how we want to manage readiness.

I have the same view about light ResF units needing RegF leadership but possibly a slightly smaller support structure. They need it to relieve part-timers of administrative burdens that get in the way of training; to organize and supervise and run such training; to keep equipment ready; and to create a core around which others are mobilized.

Essentially my 30/70 model is created by taking the PYs of a single RegF battalion and out of them creating 3 battalion cores. Each core has one complete rifle company and a roughly 1/3 slice of headquarters, combat support and combat service support and a very small core for two more rifle companies. The remaining positions are filled out using some RegF (ie RSS staff) and the reservists from two or more reserve battalions.

The result is that for every RegF battalion that existed, you can create three 30/70 battalions. That creates more battalions that can be deployed than we presently can based on the fact that there is already a professional core there to build up. In addition one can increase the interval between when a given battalion needs to redeploy. Our current deployment missions are generally less than a single battalion augmented to a battle group in certain circumstances. In many case a single battalion core and a single rifle company is sufficient to deploy. In others, where speed is an issue, that core can be augmented by the RegF personnel from other battalions (the way we do now) or, where speed is not an issue it can be augmented by ResF personnel from within its own battalion, its own brigade or the army in general.

The aim here is to create both a more professional ResF capable of deployment through better leadership and training and also a larger deployable force through making better use of the full-time leadership, that is currently too concentrated in RegF units/formations, and filling out the deploying unit numbers with less skilled reservists.

There is no magic in having 100% RegF battalions when they are constantly undermanned and we have been constantly deploying less than battalions and/or augmenting battalions with sub-units from other battalions. This was routine in Afghanistan where for example TF 3-07 had one company from each of the three R22eR battalions. Aggregating sub-units into a purpose based task force is the paradigm that was created with Advancing with Purpose.

The same is even more true for armoured and combat support and service support elements which may or may not be needed for any given mission.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll give you my reasons for why I prefer my organization below

I'm not a fan of the SSF. It was a mashed together organization designed primarily to remove a formation (at the time we had four brigades/combat groups and an airborne regiment.) We ended up with three brigades/combat groups and an SSF (which was bigger than an airborne regiment but smaller than a brigade)

Essentially in 1976 the RCR had three battalions, one each in London, Petawawa and Gagetown. 2RCR in Gagetown had nothing really to do with 2 Combat Group (just like E Bty 2RCHA and the VIII Hussars outfit in Gagetown had nothing to do with 2 Cbt Gp in Pet - I was in Pet from 72-76 and trained many times with 1 and 3 RCR but never with 2 RCR. I'm not sure who they belonged to either before or after the SSF formation). In 1976 they moved the Airborne Regt to Pet and moved 3 RCR to Germany) Effectively 2 Combat Group went from 2 bns to one mech bn and the Airborne. Everything stayed more or less the same for the rest of the combat group except the elements lightened up a bit and got a para capability grafted in. It never made sense to me albeit its stated purpose was to have a rapid reaction light force with a more general purpose follow up force.


I'm way out of date on ISTAR subsequent to Afghanistan. Cavalry to artillery cooperation comes in the brigade ops centre where ops in general is grafted at the hip to the FSCC and STACC. You can link in recce with dedicated FOO/JTACs and, maybe, an FSCC. You do not need an ISTAR cell per se for that. To me the bulk of sensor-shooter responses do not need the analysis that an ISTAR organization or All-source intelligence cell gives, and if anything, it can slow down the response. Don't get me wrong, I'm not against ISTAR. It depends on the processes and how things function. I'm from the old school brigade staff structure where the Bde IntO, the ArtyOps O and the brigade major could all talk to each other from the back doors of their cheek-to-jowl CP vehicles.

One thing about air defence. The SSF was unique in having an AD troop. All the other two Canadian brigades had a battery at the time and 4 CMBG a battery plus a bunch. The doctrine I learned under was an AD regiment supported a division and an AD battery a brigade.

I've slowly bought into the building block system. manpower shortages have always made that a necessity for my whole career and it became embedded in our basic force generation/force employment structure at the sub-unit level in the early 00s transformation.

This I do not buy and I'll explain below.

That varies depending on whether you aim to fight as a separate brigade or as part of a division. I agree totally that 1 armd regt and two mech battalions form the core. Recce and artillery and service support can be downloaded from a divisional asset. Just as a point, you don't want two AD batteries in a brigade because you only want one AD control centre - if there aren't enough sensor and fire units then make the battery bigger.

I don't go into that level of detail. There are far too many options and which option is appropriate is both theatre dependent and highly subjective.

Totally disagree with minor exceptions.

I'm on the side of the reserves as an active partner in meeting basic defence requirements. For me that starts with a reserve predominant heavy force because it's affordable and you only need it in very narrow circumstances. It does need enough RegF leadership to provide structure and training and even, in an emergency, a small rapid deployable capability. Equipment usage, wear and tear and ammunition expenditures are reduced over a full-time force but at the same time you do have the capability available when needed.

There must also be a capability to augment light forces with reservists. In my structure 1/3 of the RegF is heavy and 2/3 is light while the ResF is roughly 60/40.

There clearly is a need for some 100/0 RegF units for rapid reaction work. The number of such units is debateable and one has to look both historically at how we've been doing deployments and how we want to do them in the future as well as how we want to manage readiness.

I have the same view about light ResF units needing RegF leadership but possibly a slightly smaller support structure. They need it to relieve part-timers of administrative burdens that get in the way of training; to organize and supervise and run such training; to keep equipment ready; and to create a core around which others are mobilized.

Essentially my 30/70 model is created by taking the PYs of a single RegF battalion and out of them creating 3 battalion cores. Each core has one complete rifle company and a roughly 1/3 slice of headquarters, combat support and combat service support and a very small core for two more rifle companies. The remaining positions are filled out using some RegF (ie RSS staff) and the reservists from two or more reserve battalions.

The result is that for every RegF battalion that existed, you can create three 30/70 battalions. That creates more battalions that can be deployed than we presently can based on the fact that there is already a professional core there to build up. In addition one can increase the interval between when a given battalion needs to redeploy. Our current deployment missions are generally less than a single battalion augmented to a battle group in certain circumstances. In many case a single battalion core and a single rifle company is sufficient to deploy. In others, where speed is an issue, that core can be augmented by the RegF personnel from other battalions (the way we do now) or, where speed is not an issue it can be augmented by ResF personnel from within its own battalion, its own brigade or the army in general.

The aim here is to create both a more professional ResF capable of deployment through better leadership and training and also a larger deployable force through making better use of the full-time leadership, that is currently too concentrated in RegF units/formations, and filling out the deploying unit numbers with less skilled reservists.

There is no magic in having 100% RegF battalions when they are constantly undermanned and we have been constantly deploying less than battalions and/or augmenting battalions with sub-units from other battalions. This was routine in Afghanistan where for example TF 3-07 had one company from each of the three R22eR battalions. Aggregating sub-units into a purpose based task force is the paradigm that was created with Advancing with Purpose.

The same is even more true for armoured and combat support and service support elements which may or may not be needed for any given mission.

And I thought we were doing so well!

I'll be back to you.

Just for thoughts I would ask you to compare these formations

173rd Abn Brigade (Separate) - I am inclined to discount the role of the ARNG battalion

• Headquarters and Headquarters Company
• 4th Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment[5][7]
• 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment[5]
• 54th Brigade Engineer Battalion[10]
• 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment[5]
• 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment[5]
• 1st Battalion, 143rd Infantry Regiment, associated unit (Texas and Rhode Island Army National Guard)[8][9]
• 173rd Support Battalion[11]

2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) "Spartans" located at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska

• Headquarters and Headquarters Company
• 2nd Battalion 377th Field Artillery Regiment
• 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment "Denali"
• 6th Brigade Engineer Battalion "Oak"
• 1st Battalion 501st Infantry Regiment
• 3rd Battalion 509th Infantry Regiment
• 725th Brigade Support Battalion "Centurion"

Special Service Force

• Special Service Force Headquarters and Signals Squadron
• 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
• Royal Canadian Dragoons
• 2 Combat Engineer Regiment
• 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (LAV-AVGP)
• Canadian Airborne Regiment (now disbanded) (Lt-Abn)
• 2 Service Battalion
• 2 Field Ambulance
• 2 Military Police Platoon
• 2 Intelligence Platoon

• 427 Tactical Helicopter Squadron

 

[FJAG]

There really is no comparison. US Airborne brigades are based on the IBCT structure. ie 1 x cav sqn, 3 x Inf bns, 1 x arty bn, 1 x engineer bn and 1 x bde support battalion and are comparable in structure to our CMBGs (other than the LAVs). SBCTs have the same structure but different equipment. ABCTs are the same but have 3 x Combined arms battalions.

The fact that 173 IBCT and 2 Bde 11 Ab Div only have two para battalions has less to do with structure but more to do with not deploying a full IBCT to Italy or Alaska or investing in an additional two airborne IBCTs. The 101 Abn has three IBCTs with three airmobile bns each and the 82 has three IBCTs with 3 airborne bns each. In other words

At its heart, the SSF was the same as 2 Cbt Gp but with one of its two infantry battalions removed to make room for the Airborne Regiment. At this time the Airborne Regiment lost a number of its enablers which became part of the 2 CG/SSF units. For example the airborne battery dissapeared and the para role went to E Bty (para). E Bty had for a long time been the divorced child of 2 RCHA which had been sent to be part of the CTC when the schools all consolidated in Gagetown in the 1970. E Bty title had returned to Pet before the Airborne came and had joined D and T Bty (T was the air defence battery but had also bee equipped with L5s. Gagetown's gunners stayed there and were renamed as W Bty. The same happened to its sigs, engineer and logistics elements which were absorbed in the SSF's sigs squadron, engineer regiment and service battalion leaving behind only enough support elements as a more or less regular line battalion would have.

With the SSF in place, D Bty retook the AMF(L) role (which had for a few years moved to Shilo) in support of 1 RCR and E Bty the para role in support of the CAR. T Bty was deactivated and converted into an AD troop. SSF was looked at as a domestic and international quick reaction fire brigade. Remember that this was all before that managed readiness nonsense.

Meanwhile 1 Combat Group and 5 Combat group were getting heavier as their artillery gave their L5s away for M109s to support the M113s and AVGPs of the infantry. We were an asynchronous army with a small light SSF, two middlin' combat groups and one heavy mechanized brigade group.

If you really want to have a laugh about the stupid things that went on then consider this. In the 1970 reorganization ( this was when the RCR and PPCLI went from 2 to 3 battalions each and the last of the Cdn Guards, Black Watch and QOR disappeared along with 4 RCHA, the FGH and 3 CMBG) 2 PPCLI in Germany was renamed the 3rd Mechanized Commando (mostly a mishmash of RCR and Patricia troops - 2 PPCLI's name went home to Winnipeg to take over 3 RCHA's barracks as the 3rd moved to join me in Shilo) 3 Mech Cdo was fully mechanized but wore the Airborne cap badge and maroon beret (which pissed off all the jumpers). It continued on in Germany for seven years drawing soldiers from Canada from wherever it could. In 1977 it went to the supplementary order of battle and was replaced by the3 RCR title which came from 2 Combat Group.

 

[GR66]

I'm going to continue to push back a bit here.

You see that's where I think you and @GR66 and I are talking at cross purposes because, like the two of you I think that 2/3rds of our full-time Army should be light and mobile and be supported by almost all of the Navy and Air Force in the defence of Canada and discrete and minor international missions.

You hear me arguing for heavy army components solely because I strongly believe heavy army components need to be maintained for a European deterrence theatre, a theatre which others here seem to be ready to throw under the bus.

I don't have an issue with the whole 100/0, 70/30, 30/70 concept at all. I agree that the only way we're really going to get value out of the Reserves is to integrate them into a larger overall "Total Force" structure under Reg Force leadership.

I also agree that it makes sense for those "Light" forces that are easier to transport quickly by air to have a higher Reg to Reserve ratio than the "Heavier" forces which will require transport by sea so that you can have a "Light" Rapid Deployment capability.

Where I do have the issue is with your basic overall force structure still focusing exclusively on unit types that are primarily suited for a European theatre of operations. You have one Mechanized Division consisting of 4 x Canadianized SBCTs (one forward deployed to Latvia) and a Light Infantry Division of 4 x Canadianized IBCTs. There is nothing here that is really suitable for the Indo-Pacific Theatre.

Again I'm not arguing that air and naval forces won't be the primary contributions to a conflict against China. However, unlike in Europe where the overall balance of military/economic/demographic strength massively favours NATO over Russia in any potential European conflict, the situation is NOT the same in the Indo-Pacific. That to my mind makes it even more important for us to find ways for the Army to contribute in any way it can to support the RCN and RCAF in a conflict with China.

Let's take a look at likely scenarios for a NATO-Russia conflict in Europe. You have fully 1/2 of your proposed force structure (1 Mechanized Division) optimized for deterring Russia and fighting them if required. I think we both agree that the threat from Russia is highly unlikely that they will launch a conventional attack on NATO that realistically they have no real chance of winning:

I'm not so much worried that Russia will make another thrust across the German plains; its will it try to gather low hanging fruit by "rescuing" the ethnic Russians living in the Baltic States, the Balkans, Poland and elsewhere. Russia espouses a need to secure its borders from NATO through buffer states but it's definition of a buffer state is one that is wholly within Russia's sphere of influence. Russia will continue to nibble on the edges of NATO's smaller states and in the process keep trying to create little Donbases and Luhansks and Georgias and Chechnyas wherever it can (even if it destroys them in the doing) on the supposition that NATO will not risk full-out nuclear war over these tiny slivers. Its a policy of death by a thousand cuts.

So let's say that we have our Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Latvia as a deterrent to Russia with the rest of 1 Division back in Canada to sustain/augment them if Russia actually does invade.

I think I can safely say that we are both in agreement that Russia is not going to "make another thrust across the German plains" in some kind of attempt to defeat the whole of NATO. They simply don't have the military capability. So I think we can also agree that any territorial ambitions that Russia has would be in either non-NATO nations or possibly in regions within NATO countries that have significant ethnic Russian minorities that they could exploit in order to expand their influence.

Ukraine has shown that Russian military involvement in non-NATO countries is highly unlikely to illicit a direct military response by NATO. Other than Ukraine, what are the other non-NATO states in Europe that Russia might invade? Moldova is the most likely, but Russian forces would have to cross Ukraine to get there. How likely is that? Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo? Russian forces would have to fly over NATO territory to get to any of these. The Caucuses (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan)? We've already shown an unwillingness to have any direct military involvement there in the face of Russian military attacks. So that really leaves Russian influence in ethnic Russian areas of NATO countries.

Is Russia going to simply launch a military invasion of Latvia in order to seize the portions of Latvia that have significant ethnic Russian minorities? Certainly that would trigger an Article 5 response by NATO. Do you have any doubt that NATO would be able to mobilize and retake that territory? Do you think that Russia would risk nuclear annihilation by using nukes to defend such seized territory? I don't think so. Any Russian attempts to expand their influence/territory into these ethnically Russian areas would have to be much more in the "Grey Zone".

So let's look at a possible alternate scenario for Russian activities against Latvia:

• ethnic Russians begin street protests demanding language rights and certain areas of self-determination within Latvia
• strikes and protests by ethnic Russians become increasingly violent with street fights, molotov cocktails being thrown, etc.
• the Latvian government cracks down on protesters with arrests, raids, curfews, detentions, etc.
• ethnic Russian attacks against government forces escalate with protesters (aided by "little green men" from Russia and military type weapons crossing the border) including bombings of police stations, RPG attacks on police vehicles, sniper attacks, etc.
• the Latvian government moves military forces in to deal with protesters and declares martial law in the restive regions of the country
• pro-Russian Latvian forces seize key government buildings and declare an independent Republic

At what point along this continuum do we authorize our Mechanized Brigade Group to engage against the Latvian separatist forces?
At what point along this continuum does Russian regular military forces crossing the border into Latvian territory NOT trigger an Article 5 NATO military response?

My guess is that we would not use Canadian forces at all against Latvians and that movement of Russian forces directly into Latvian territory (disputed or not) would definitely trigger an Article 5 NATO response.

So we have fully 1/2 of our force structure tailored for a series of scenarios where it is highly unlikely to actually be used while at the same time it's looking increasingly likely that there may be some kind of conflict in the Indo-Pacific for which we have 0% of our force structure designed to face.

I'll say again though that I'm not proposing that we abandon NATO and "throw it under the bus" as has been suggested. Let's face it even under @FJAG proposed structure Canada is still a pretty minor proportion of the total NATO deterrence against Russia. Adjusting our force structure to also take into account a potential conflict with China is not going to make the difference between a strong and stable NATO and a renewed Warsaw Pact with all the Baltics, Ukraine and Eastern Poland all speaking Russian behind a new Iron Curtain.

I'm not going to put a Napkin Army here because I'm not sure yet what it might look like but I'd suggest that it could still include a Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Latvia (with the bulk of it being flyover forces) because I agree we need to keep a "Heavy" capability.

We also certainly need to keep a segment of our force that can be quickly transported by air in case of a crisis (either within Canada or elsewhere) but perhaps we need to examine what those forces might look like. Does that need to be a dedicated Light Infantry Brigade? Can dismounted LAV-based forces be deployed as an infantry component? Could CSOR fill that role? Are there other air-deployable types of forces that would be as useful/more useful than light infantry? AD, EW, Rocket Artillery?

All I'm saying is that our current thinking on force structures seems to be firmly locked in a Cold War box. We need mechanized forces to deter/fight the Russians and some Light Infantry to fill the gap in an emergency. We already have those basic building blocks and we just argue about how to shuffle them around (and put back in the enablers that have been lost to budget cuts over the years) rather than starting from first principles and asking what are our military challenges/objectives and what types of forces do we need to meet those.

 

[KevinB]

I think for Europe you are missing post Ukraine conflict stabilization operations.

Assuming that NATO will move into Ukraine to stabilize the border.

Also when/IF Russia becomes a failed state - and needs a Marshall 2.0 and Constabulary Forces.

I’m a big fan of Balanced Forces
I think the Light Forces should be modeled on XVIII Airborne- specifically the 82nd and 101st, and ideally 2 Airborne Bde’s and 2 Airmobile.
I’d be willing to accept a 1 and 1 Bde (as opposed to 2 each) if both have 3 Inf Bn’s in them. But would prefer 2 and 2 in a 60/40 organization.
Where at least 1Bde of each are 100 Reg.

Then 1 Heavy Bde (the equivalent of 3 Combined Arms Bn’s, with 2 Tank Heavy and 1 Tracked IFV Inf heavy Bn’s)
Then 1 Mech Bde with 1 Tank Heavy and 2 LAV heavy Inf Bn)

The Heavier forces being primarily Res as 30/70 organizations.

But neither the Light ‘Global QRF’ or the Heavy formations do anyone any good if there isn’t a robust supply and support system in place - and RCAF and RCN support to get them into theaters and support them once there.

 

[ArmyRick]

There really is no comparison. US Airborne brigades are based on the IBCT structure. ie 1 x cav sqn, 3 x Inf bns, 1 x arty bn, 1 x engineer bn and 1 x bde support battalion and are comparable in structure to our CMBGs (other than the LAVs). SBCTs have the same structure but different equipment. ABCTs are the same but have 3 x Combined arms battalions.

The fact that 173 IBCT and 2 Bde 11 Ab Div only have two para battalions has less to do with structure but more to do with not deploying a full IBCT to Italy or Alaska or investing in an additional two airborne IBCTs. The 101 Abn has three IBCTs with three airmobile bns each and the 82 has three IBCTs with 3 airborne bns each. In other words

At its heart, the SSF was the same as 2 Cbt Gp but with one of its two infantry battalions removed to make room for the Airborne Regiment. At this time the Airborne Regiment lost a number of its enablers which became part of the 2 CG/SSF units. For example the airborne battery dissapeared and the para role went to E Bty (para). E Bty had for a long time been the divorced child of 2 RCHA which had been sent to be part of the CTC when the schools all consolidated in Gagetown in the 1970. E Bty title had returned to Pet before the Airborne came and had joined D and T Bty (T was the air defence battery but had also bee equipped with L5s. Gagetown's gunners stayed there and were renamed as W Bty. The same happened to its sigs, engineer and logistics elements which were absorbed in the SSF's sigs squadron, engineer regiment and service battalion leaving behind only enough support elements as a more or less regular line battalion would have.

With the SSF in place, D Bty retook the AMF(L) role (which had for a few years moved to Shilo) in support of 1 RCR and E Bty the para role in support of the CAR. T Bty was deactivated and converted into an AD troop. SSF was looked at as a domestic and international quick reaction fire brigade. Remember that this was all before that managed readiness nonsense.

Meanwhile 1 Combat Group and 5 Combat group were getting heavier as their artillery gave their L5s away for M109s to support the M113s and AVGPs of the infantry. We were an asynchronous army with a small light SSF, two middlin' combat groups and one heavy mechanized brigade group.

If you really want to have a laugh about the stupid things that went on then consider this. In the 1970 reorganization ( this was when the RCR and PPCLI went from 2 to 3 battalions each and the last of the Cdn Guards, Black Watch and QOR disappeared along with 4 RCHA, the FGH and 3 CMBG) 2 PPCLI in Germany was renamed the 3rd Mechanized Commando (mostly a mishmash of RCR and Patricia troops - 2 PPCLI's name went home to Winnipeg to take over 3 RCHA's barracks as the 3rd moved to join me in Shilo) 3 Mech Cdo was fully mechanized but wore the Airborne cap badge and maroon beret (which pissed off all the jumpers). It continued on in Germany for seven years drawing soldiers from Canada from wherever it could. In 1977 it went to the supplementary order of battle and was replaced by the3 RCR title which came from 2 Combat Group.

Just a quick history question, so 3RCR was part of 2 combat group until the SSF stood up in '77 and then went overseas to take over 3 Mech (not really) CDO?

 

[Kirkhill]

For the record, and pushing back against the three battalion model

In addition to the two battalion brigades that I cited here is the 4 CMBG model ca 1989

	Headquarters – Lahr
	8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) – armoured (59 Leopard C-1, 24 Lynx, 3 Leopard ARV (Taurus?), 23 M113)
	1st Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment – mechanized
	3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment – mechanized
	1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery – self-propelled artillery and light anti-aircraft (24 M109A2, 15 Blowpipe SAM)
	4th Air Defence Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery – motorized anti-aircraft artillery (with Oerlikon 35mm)
	4 Combat Engineer Regiment – mechanized engineers[9](3 Biber, 19 M113, 3 Lynx)
	444 Helicopter Squadron – light helicopter squadron (12 CH136 Kiowa (OH58))

6 battalions and 3 armoured regiments, together with 4 arty regiments buys you 2x SSF and 1x 4 CMBG.

You could always do as the 173rd Abn does and add an ARNG/PrRes battalion to each brigade - maybe thicken up the arty and the cav. But in the mean time you have three functional brigades at notice to move.

 

[daftandbarmy]

But neither the Light ‘Global QRF’ or the Heavy formations do anyone any good if there isn’t a robust supply and support system in place - and RCAF and RCN support to get them into theaters and support them once there.

This is the key, of course.

Strategic reach, and sustainment during heavy fighting, requires a whole of nation effort which Canada might just not be ready for.

 

[GR66]

This is the key, of course.

Strategic reach, and sustainment during heavy fighting, requires a whole of nation effort which Canada might just not be ready for.

Totally agree and hopefully the Army isn't looking at its future force structure in isolation and is sitting down with the RCN and RCAF and figuring out what kind of force can actually be sustained.

Sadly I don't know whether to put [/sarcasm] after this comment or not.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Totally agree and hopefully the Army isn't looking at its future force structure in isolation and is sitting down with the RCN and RCAF and figuring out what kind of force can actually be sustained.

Sadly I don't know whether to put [/sarcasm] after this comment or not.

I can see it now

 

[GR66]

I think for Europe you are missing post Ukraine conflict stabilization operations.

Assuming that NATO will move into Ukraine to stabilize the border.

Also when/IF Russia becomes a failed state - and needs a Marshall 2.0 and Constabulary Forces.

I can think of no better way than moving NATO forces into Ukraine after the conflict to strengthen the radical elements in Russia. You'd basically be confirming their pre-war propaganda about NATO's attempts to encircle Russia. Surveillance overflights and a security guarantee are more likely (and less provocative) than NATO forces or NATO membership at least until a post-Putin Russia sorts itself out.

Similarly, moving NATO forces into Russia that is breaking apart would be an invitation to Russian radical nationalists to use their nuclear weapons in the "final defence" of their country.