Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

Do we have to put them on the ground with the III/V? Can't we work alongside I, XVIII or even the USMC?

The USMC is still planning on flying its F18s until 2030 as bombtrucks and WSO carriers. Be interesting to see the benefits of a WSO in an mixed optionally manned formation working with F35s.

Some need to go to III/V, some should go to XVIII, and probably the USMC too.

With a small Military, Canada needs to be adaptable - but also have certain tailor made formations to mesh with allies.

 

[Kirkhill]

Some need to go to III/V, some should go to XVIII, and probably the USMC too.

With a small Military, Canada needs to be adaptable - but also have certain tailor made formations to mesh with allies.

Sounds a lot like something that Sir John French or Lord Gort might have said during their tenures as Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff.

The very thing that Canadian politicians and soldiers rebelled against in both wars. It is not just tankers that don't want to be penny-packeted into a fight.

 

[GR66]

Sounds a lot like something that Sir John French or Lord Gort might have said during their tenures as Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff.

The very thing that Canadian politicians and soldiers rebelled against in both wars. It is not just tankers that don't want to be penny-packeted into a fight.

I think the reality is that we're unfortunately living in a time where there is the potential for two very different types of wars taking place. We need to be ready for either should they take place. This isn't 1914 or 1939 where you have years to build up an army that you ignored during the build up to conflict. The complexity of modern military equipment doesn't allow for that.

All I've been trying to argue here is that we are prepared for neither currently and our current discussions on trying to become prepared are focusing almost exclusively on how we can fight one of those two wars. To my mind we definitely need a little of Column A and a little of Column B. I don't think that's really penny-packeting.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think the reality is that we're unfortunately living in a time where there is the potential for two very different types of wars taking place. We need to be ready for either should they take place. This isn't 1914 or 1939 where you have years to build up an army that you ignored during the build up to conflict. The complexity of modern military equipment doesn't allow for that.

All I've been trying to argue here is that we are prepared for neither currently and our current discussions on trying to become prepared are focusing almost exclusively on how we can fight one of those two wars. To my mind we definitely need a little of Column A and a little of Column B. I don't think that's really penny-packeting.

I agree with your overall position.

My contention is that all wars occur in multiple environments, over a variety of seasons, in various phases. As a result I believe that an adaptive, generalist force that can be fielded broadly in a timely fashion will always find work, regardless of the theatre.

At the other end of the spectrum, a specialist force that is tied to a particular threat in a particular location, that is hard to maintain, hard to modernize, inclined to "keep up with the Joneses", and hard to deploy or re-deploy from their primary deployment, is at risk of being sidelined. And if it is sidelined then all the capital, all the training, all the manpower, all the careers invested are wasted.

The USMC is not the US Army's armored force. They do very different things. But which get used more often across the full spectrum of conflict? Regardless of how they are equipped, in peace or war, the Pentagon seems to find things for the Marines to do.

That is the type of generalist force I want the CAF to aspire to be. One that integrates and leverages all its investments in one cohesive, focused capability of general utility.

 

[FJAG]

I think the reality is that we're unfortunately living in a time where there is the potential for two very different types of wars taking place. We need to be ready for either should they take place. This isn't 1914 or 1939 where you have years to build up an army that you ignored during the build up to conflict. The complexity of modern military equipment doesn't allow for that.

There are two thoughts here and I'm not sure I agree with either.

The proxy war with Russia has been running for almost a decade albeit that while we've been involved in the preparation for the fight, the West has done little in arming for it. It's not that there hasn't been an opportunity for it, it's just that we never took it. I'm concerned that Russia's performance to date may very well lull the West into a false sense of security , or, at least, a lack of a sense of urgency about preparing further.

The question about China is much more complex. Yes, we see it as a competitor and even a foe. What we don't see is the nature of the conflict. It has two key components: Taiwan - a conventional war in the old style - (which may or may not be accompanied by North Korea attacking south) and the artificial islands in the South China Sea. I'll leave aside the economic and cyber war that accompanies that.

China's actions are belligerent and part of a long game to dominate the area economically. That domination requires a stable but compliant world and not a war but there is little doubt that circumstances could arise where they take action - probably against Taiwan. The South China Sea islands importance is in simply being there. Tactically they may add a surveillance screen but are too small and too fixed to become major bases of operations. In a conflict they would be easy to neutralize. It's not like the Japanese occupying the western Pacific region with millions of men in hundreds of locations supported by large fleets.

In WW2, the Marines were the US's amphibious assault forces, but once a position was taken it was occupied by army and army air corps forces for consolidation. This island hopping campaign was necessary because of the limited range of weapon systems which couldn't reach Japan's mainland until a firm corridor was established. The navy cruised and cleared the waters in between the hops.

The Marines objectives for Force 2030 include "Force Design 2030 is our latest effort to adapt, remain relevant, and out maneuver our adversaries." I think that means "not just be a small US Army". There is much debate within the Marines as to whether Force 2030 is the right move. Effectively they are designing a system of smaller forces that can seize and hold hard-points that the Navy can manoeuvre around and which the Army can subsequently occupy, if necessary, as the Marines move forward. The problem is numbers of men and ships. The region is vast, crowded and complex (for both us and the Chinese). Neither party has the depth to run a Japanese style Pacific War. Notwithstanding that, the war with China will be a long one. They have the initiative. It will probably unfold much like the war with Japan with initial loses that need to be retaken.

That leaves me with the question. How do you see such a conflict unfolding and what role do you see Canada needing to prepare for that our current (or my napkin force) structure doesn't cater for? And don't tell me bags of cyber battalions and hundreds of long range tactical missiles. We both know we don't have the political will for that and besides we will be part of an alliance. So what does Canada realistically bring to the table that the Aussies and Indonesians and Philippines and Brits and Americans don't already have, or need more of that isn't already catered for?

All I've been trying to argue here is that we are prepared for neither currently and our current discussions on trying to become prepared are focusing almost exclusively on how we can fight one of those two wars. To my mind we definitely need a little of Column A and a little of Column B. I don't think that's really penny-packeting.

Which gets me back to the point that creating a mix of a light force (2 Div) and a heavy force (1 Div) constitutes exactly that, a Column A and a Column B to choose from. Organizing into those groups and enabling the ResF to be a mobilization base is the start of reform. The next, and costlier, phase is to purchase the right weapon systems to grow the capability. But you have to start somewhere and for us that's in organization and initially fixing the blatant capability deficiencies.

 

[GR66]

I agree with your overall position.

My contention is that all wars occur in multiple environments, over a variety of seasons, in various phases. As a result I believe that an adaptive, generalist force that can be fielded broadly in a timely fashion will always find work, regardless of the theatre.

At the other end of the spectrum, a specialist force that is tied to a particular threat in a particular location, that is hard to maintain, hard to modernize, inclined to "keep up with the Joneses", and hard to deploy or re-deploy from their primary deployment, is at risk of being sidelined. And if it is sidelined then all the capital, all the training, all the manpower, all the careers invested are wasted.

The USMC is not the US Army's armored force. They do very different things. But which get used more often across the full spectrum of conflict? Regardless of how they are equipped, in peace or war, the Pentagon seems to find things for the Marines to do.

That is the type of generalist force I want the CAF to aspire to be. One that integrates and leverages all its investments in one cohesive, focused capability of general utility.

To be fair you're really comparing what the USMC is moving toward to the US Army rather than what the USMC was until very recently. The Marines have been for quite a long time essentially a "mini Army" and have been employed by the US Government almost interchangeably with the Army in recent conflicts. General Berger's re-structuring is an attempt to change that.

You're right that the USMC doesn't have to be the heavy, door-knocking force for the United States because they have the US Army to fulfill that role. By that definition though I'd disagree with you that the "new" USMC will be used "across the full spectrum of conflict" in that they need the US Army to fulfill that extreme, heavy end of the spectrum.

That being said, I'll agree that it could be an option for the Canadian Army to look at force design in the same manner...i.e. taking into account what our Allies are bringing to the table and filling in the gaps with what you describe as "generalist" forces (and from your descriptions from previous posts I'm assuming by that you mean forces more in line with what the future USMC is striving toward).

However, I do have to agree with members like @FJAG and @KevinB that there is also a political dimension to take into account. The Heavy forces are the ones that will be required to do the "dirty work" (and take the bulk of the casualties). Yes, systems like artillery, missiles, AD and ASuW might have a disproportionate impact on a conflict in the strategic sense, but if you're not also willing to do your share of the "dirty work" along with your Allies then one might question how good an Ally you really are. That's why I say we need a little of both Column A and Column B rather than just a whole bunch of Column B.

 

[Kirkhill]

There are two thoughts here and I'm not sure I agree with either.

The proxy war with Russia has been running for almost a decade albeit that while we've been involved in the preparation for the fight, the West has done little in arming for it. It's not that there hasn't been an opportunity for it, it's just that we never took it. I'm concerned that Russia's performance to date may very well lull the West into a false sense of security , or, at least, a lack of a sense of urgency about preparing further.

The question about China is much more complex. Yes, we see it as a competitor and even a foe. What we don't see is the nature of the conflict. It has two key components: Taiwan - a conventional war in the old style - (which may or may not be accompanied by North Korea attacking south) and the artificial islands in the South China Sea. I'll leave aside the economic and cyber war that accompanies that.

China's actions are belligerent and part of a long game to dominate the area economically. That domination requires a stable but compliant world and not a war but there is little doubt that circumstances could arise where they take action - probably against Taiwan. The South China Sea islands importance is in simply being there. Tactically they may add a surveillance screen but are too small and too fixed to become major bases of operations. In a conflict they would be easy to neutralize. It's not like the Japanese occupying the western Pacific region with millions of men in hundreds of locations supported by large fleets.

In WW2, the Marines were the US's amphibious assault forces, but once a position was taken it was occupied by army and army air corps forces for consolidation. This island hopping campaign was necessary because of the limited range of weapon systems which couldn't reach Japan's mainland until a firm corridor was established. The navy cruised and cleared the waters in between the hops.

The Marines objectives for Force 2030 include "Force Design 2030 is our latest effort to adapt, remain relevant, and out maneuver our adversaries." I think that means "not just be a small US Army". There is much debate within the Marines as to whether Force 2030 is the right move. Effectively they are designing a system of smaller forces that can seize and hold hard-points that the Navy can manoeuvre around and which the Army can subsequently occupy, if necessary, as the Marines move forward. The problem is numbers of men and ships. The region is vast, crowded and complex (for both us and the Chinese). Neither party has the depth to run a Japanese style Pacific War. Notwithstanding that, the war with China will be a long one. They have the initiative. It will probably unfold much like the war with Japan with initial loses that need to be retaken.




Which gets me back to the point that creating a mix of a light force (2 Div) and a heavy force (1 Div) constitutes exactly that, a Column A and a Column B to choose from. Organizing into those groups and enabling the ResF to be a mobilization base is the start of reform. The next, and costlier, phase is to purchase the right weapon systems to grow the capability. But you have to start somewhere and for us that's in organization and initially fixing the blatant capability deficiencies.

In broad strokes I agree with FJAG's 2 Div structure - we clash over details. I want his 1st div to look more like the USMC - and I do not think constantly looking for relevance is a bad thing. Especially if that is the only force available to the government and the force is more likely to be employed in "peace" than in "war". It needs to constantly be re-evaluating where it might be helpful and how so.

My bigger concern is with the 2nd Div. I favour a clearer distinction between the "Regular" 1st Div and the "Reserve" 2nd Div. I also struggle with the Heavy Force Focus - I am more inclined to invest in enablers and defensive elements first and then offensive element second.

That leaves me with the question. How do you see such a conflict unfolding and what role do you see Canada needing to prepare for that our current (or my napkin force) structure doesn't cater for? And don't tell me bags of cyber battalions and hundreds of long range tactical missiles. We both know we don't have the political will for that and besides we will be part of an alliance. So what does Canada realistically bring to the table that the Ukrainians, Poles, Balts, Scandinavians and Brits and Americans don't already have, or need more of that isn't already catered for?

The short form, in my view, is that, contrary to government messaging, the world doesn't NEED more Canada. It can get by without whatever pittance we are willing to put in the collection plate.

It's entirely up to us to decide if we want the rest of the congregation to notice our contribution.

 

[FJAG]

In broad strokes I agree with FJAG's 2 Div structure - we clash over details. I want his 1st div to look more like the USMC - and I do not think constantly looking for relevance is a bad thing. Especially if that is the only force available to the government and the force is more likely to be employed in "peace" than in "war". It needs to constantly be re-evaluating where it might be helpful and how so.

My bigger concern is with the 2nd Div. I favour a clearer distinction between the "Regular" 1st Div and the "Reserve" 2nd Div. I also struggle with the Heavy Force Focus - I am more inclined to invest in enablers and defensive elements first and then offensive element second.

That's because, I believe, that you are looking at it wrong.

1 Div is primarily a Reserve organization designed to mobilize a large force in an emergency with heavy capabilities but on a day-to-day basis consume few resources while still being able to generate a small rapid reaction heavy element. It's prime focus is to generate and sustain a mechanized brigade group and, in extreme circumstances a second mechanized brigade group and a division headquarters with enablers based on current resources.

2 Div is the Regular division with the highest state of readiness and day-to-day capability with a smaller reserve component to give depth, an augmentation capability and sustainability. It's prime focus is to generate and sustain multiple battle groups on a rapid and tiered reaction basis for routine operations as required by the GoC from time-to-time. This is why each of 2 and 5 bdes have two 100/0 battalions, several 70/30 enablers and a number of 30/70 battalions. The four 100/0 battalions provide quick reaction while the division's eight 30/70 battalions provide augmentation and sustainability.

I think that there is a very large misconception as to my proposed structure which arises from the attitude which currently permeates the Army. We tie the Regular (i.e. the valuable) force to major equipment while we tie the Reserve (i.e. the inconsequential) force to the absence of any equipment. My concept turns that on its head based on the type of force we need day-to-day and that needed when we have no choice but to enter a major conflict. 1 Div is an economy of effort force. It provides prepositioned equipment as a political statement of support to NATO while manning it primarily with low cost reservists. (But make no mistake they need to be better organized, better trained and better led reservists). In the meantime our heaviest investment in annual recurring full-time personnel costs is in 2 Div. The fact that these are light forces does not mean that they are unequipped. It's just that the equipment needs to be commensurate with their missions so that they can remain capable of rapid deployment both within Canada and internationally and to have the ability to be agile and flexible in their capabilities.

If one wants to make a broad analogy then 2 Div is our RegF with ResF augmentation and 1 Div is our ResF with RegF augmentation and leadership.

The short form, in my view, is that, contrary to government messaging, the world doesn't NEED more Canada. It can get by without whatever pittance we are willing to put in the collection plate.

It's entirely up to us to decide if we want the rest of the congregation to notice our contribution.

100%

 

[GR66]

Question to any members "in the know" regarding the following line item from the "Action" section on the Army's Force 2025 webpage:

• The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps will be modernized and centralized in a single formation based in Alberta. Additional trials will be conducted to inform tasks, mission tasks and structures in order to reduce national procurement and increase its integration into a digitally networked CA;

By a "single formation" does this mean a single Regiment? It seems to suggest that when they talk about the objective being "to reduce national procurement".

Also, there has been lots of talk on this site about some of the trials, etc. being done to develop a Cavalry-like capability involving a mix of LAVs and TAPVs. Does that suggest they they are again looking at divesting the tanks and going to strictly Cavalry role for the RCAC? Or possibly reducing the number of tanks and integrating them into a mixed Cavalry Regiment?

Edited to add:

May have answered my own question. The most recent issue of the Canadian Army Journal has an article on Page 7 entitled "Armoured Corps Modernization: An Overview of the Cavalry Concept". It talks about an integration of the Tank and Recce streams in Armoured training and of Cavalry Regiments consisting of "Heavy Armoured Cav" Squadrons using the Leopard and "Light Armoured Cav" Squadrons using the LAV (or sub-optimally the TAPV).

So I'm wondering if for the Reg Force RCAC they're maybe looking at a single Cavalry Regiment with perhaps 2 x LAV Squadrons and 2 x Leopard Squadrons? That would certainly appear to take the "Heavy" (ABCT) role off the table for the Army going forward if so.

 

[Ostrozac]

By a "single formation" does this mean a single Regiment? It seems to suggest that when they talk about the objective being "to reduce national procurement".

A single large regiment with two squadrons of tank and two squadrons of LRSS is certainly an option — two small regiments might be more likely. Those two regiments (units) could still be in the same brigade (formation) — probably 1 brigade, although there is an argument that scarce resources belong in the combat support brigade instead.

The RCAC still hasn’t quite come to terms with what the long term impact is of acquiring an armoured vehicle that nobody needs or wants. And we acquired 500 TAPV. These were also supposed to go the light infantry battalions, but the infantry’s solution — that they would rather walk than use TAPV — isn’t really feasible for the RCAC. The Canadian Army has procured more TAPV than we did AVGP —the impact of that procurement will be widespread, and will last for decades,

 

[daftandbarmy]

A single large regiment with two squadrons of tank and two squadrons of LRSS is certainly an option — two small regiments might be more likely. Those two regiments (units) could still be in the same brigade (formation) — probably 1 brigade, although there is an argument that scarce resources belong in the combat support brigade instead.

The RCAC still hasn’t quite come to terms with what the long term impact is of acquiring an armoured vehicle that nobody needs or wants. And we acquired 500 TAPV. These were also supposed to go the light infantry battalions, but the infantry’s solution — that they would rather walk than use TAPV — isn’t really feasible for the RCAC. The Canadian Army has procured more TAPV than we did AVGP —the impact of that procurement will be widespread, and will last for decades,

 

[FJAG]

The RCAC still hasn’t quite come to terms with what the long term impact is of acquiring an armoured vehicle that nobody needs or wants. And we acquired 500 TAPV. These were also supposed to go the light infantry battalions, but the infantry’s solution — that they would rather walk than use TAPV — isn’t really feasible for the RCAC. The Canadian Army has procured more TAPV than we did AVGP —the impact of that procurement will be widespread, and will last for decades,

The artillery could use a whole bunch of them as gun detachment vehicles, recce vehicles, STA vehicles (the way they used TLAVs in Afghanistan) even as second-tier FOO vehicles for the Militia. Mind you I haven't asked anyone if they actually "want" them.

 

[KevinB]

I still think the TAPV should be quickly donated to Ukraine.
Then say sorry.

 

[RangerRay]

Might be out of my lane but I always liked the idea that armoured regiments would consist of one recce squadron and the remaining squadrons being tank squadrons.

 

[Fabius]

The RCAC and the Army don’t really know where they are going with a Cav concept or if they are going there.
The consolidation of tanks in Alberta was in theory approved but seems to have been walked back due to pending decisions on NATO commitments.
Ironically it was a semi serious discussion of if the Army could afford MBTs something that seems to have been settled with the decisions on 4th line industrial support to be set up in Canada.

 

[markppcli]

I still think the TAPV should be quickly donated to Ukraine.
Then say sorry.

Who’s side are you on?

 

[markppcli]

The artillery could use a whole bunch of them as gun detachment vehicles, recce vehicles, STA vehicles (the way they used TLAVs in Afghanistan) even as second-tier FOO vehicles for the Militia. Mind you I haven't asked anyone if they actually "want" them.

Can’t fit a gun det ina TAPV so that’s a non starter. There’s a role for them; but not in the CAF. The procurement of the TAPV should be a national scandal quite frankly. The fact that we’d rather talk about the jets we may or may not buy instead of the albatross we’ve tethered to the Army’s neck is deeply frustrating.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Can’t fit a gun det ina TAPV so that’s a non starter. There’s a role for them; but not in the CAF. The procurement of the TAPV should be a national scandal quite frankly. The fact that we’d rather talk about the jets we may or may not buy instead of the albatross we’ve tethered to the Army’s neck is deeply frustrating.

Given that it's designed as a MP's 'armoured squad car', it fits perfectly into the Peacekeeping narrative espoused by the current Liberal government.

An ambitious General, with an eye on promotion, might point that out and reconfigure the CAF accordingly

 

[markppcli]

Given that it's designed as a MP's 'armoured squad car', it fits perfectly into the Peacekeeping narrative espoused by the current Liberal government.

An ambitious General, with an eye on promotion, might point that out and reconfigure the CAF accordingly

I haven’t heard much “peace keeping narrative” from Trudeau since he realized “Canada’s back” would mean harms way in Africa.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I haven’t heard much “peace keeping narrative” from Trudeau since he realized “Canada’s back” would mean harms way in Africa.

I'm holding out hope for Haiti!