Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Good2Golf]

[good stuff clipped…]
…Now the argument is that light forces are required, even though they are within a the mechanized brigades that were really just their temporary homes at the end of the 1990s until they were supposed to be shelved. Everyone is keen to do some sort of deliberate force design for them, as opposed to the awkward evolution that led to their creation. Fast forward almost 20 years, and there has been lots of light forces talk, and a MID that was partially implemented (but in contradictory ways - why is your strategically ready force have all of its capabilities partially embedded in the reserves?), and you end up where we are now, with light battalions still awkwardly afloat with no real centre of excellence, and still in search of a valid mission within the Army.

Yup, this is the Army’s challenge to resolve.

The Army has ADHD when it comes to light forces. Neither the GoC, nor the CAF are going to direct the Army how to address light forces; the onus is is squarely on the Army to work it out, but, I predict it never will. I participated as a charter member rep in enough LFWGs that I need both hands to count them, yet it seemed impossible for the Army to get out of the starting gate about what LF should be, how to shape them, and how to equip and employ them.

Invariably it devolved into a PY, equipment and physical basing discussion….reinforced by injections from leadership, thusly….
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Around 2000, I heard General Jeffery (then CLS) refer to the 3rd Bns as “battalions awaiting APCs” with the idea being they existed as a reservoir of PYs in the hope that the government might keep buying more of the new LAV3.

The Army’s challenge will be, that as it fritters and frets about what LF should be within an Army nexus, to maintain relevance to the CAF and GoC, when those establishments see CANSOF’s CSOR bang out the door and do stuff that Army LF (actually, capably in the past), self-espoused as the ones to do the job.

Until then, other CAF element will either watch from the side, or in some cases continue to try to support LF development, but the flavour will likely remain “let’s the rest of us know when you’ve sorted it out…”

$0.02

G2G

 

[Underway]

Near the end of the 1990s, the decision was made to put the airborne elements into the Third Battalions as para companies, with the rest of the 10/90 unit being augmented from PYs from other places (including the other Battalions) to create the light battalions. However, around the turn of the century, the idea was to get rid of them, and to plow their PYs into the First and Second Battalions to keep them up to strength. But 9/11 happens, and 3 PPCLI heads out with the 101st Airborne Division to Kandahar, and now light forces are seen as a necessary capability in the war on terror and the age of insurgency. So they get retained on the order of battle. Shortly after, the combat support companies in all battalions are cut; there were other pressures, but that equaled out to the 9 x companies that the centre needed to harvest..

So this whole scenario happens again in some form or another. I'm pretty confident that it's not 3PPCLI that joins the 101st. It's CSOR that goes in (they didn't exist in 2001). This would literally be the exact role they were designed for.

That has to fit into the calculus somewhere.

The CAF needs to decide what it wants to be when it grows up and do so within the parameters the government dictates in terms of personnel and funding limits.

This relates to my last sentence above. There are area's where the interests of the various elements (army, navy, airforce, SOF) overlap and discussion need to be had. If the army divested the light battalions with the idea that CSOR was now able to do those tasks (not saying they are, just an example) that would require a discussion between the elements. Of all the elements the army needs to have the self-reflection more than the others.

So I guess this brings back the discussion, perhaps the army needs a light brigade centre of excellence. An air cavalry of sorts. Is that even a valuable asset in today's modern battlespace? Is this the idea behind the heavy, med and light push in some circles instead of the balanced CMBG organizations that currently exist?

 

[daftandbarmy]

So this whole scenario happens again in some form or another. I'm pretty confident that it's not 3PPCLI that joins the 101st. It's CSOR that goes in (they didn't exist in 2001). This would literally be the exact role they were designed for.

Well, maybe not.

Our infantry is highly capable of operating in a 'light forces' environment in a conventional role, as was demonstrated by 3VP and others.

CSOR (to my knowledge) doesn't tend to deploy in a battle group context e.g., 'two up, one back, bags of smoke, go for the greenest part of the map'. If they did, it would be a complete waste of their specialist skills and the situation would have to be pretty dire.

We don't need a 'centre of excellence' for light infantry. We're already pretty excellent at that stuff.

We need a decision on what we're going to do with our light infantry, which doesn't seem to be going away but is drifting around in some kind of Army purgatory.

Then it's providing the kit and troops required to populate a fairly self-reliant battalion that's ready to anchor a light BGp to take on a peer/near peer enemy in the light role. And that means support weapons, the right vehicles, C&C capacity etc.

Right now, if we deployed them anywhere in their current state, IIRC we could only send them to some kind of low intensity UN or disaster relief/ domestic response mission.

 

[Good2Golf]

Well, maybe not.

Our infantry is highly capable of operating in a 'light forces' environment in a conventional role, as was demonstrated by 3VP and others.

CSOR (to my knowledge) doesn't tend to deploy in a battle group context e.g., 'two up, one back, bags of smoke, go for the greenest part of the map'. If they did, it would be a complete waste of their specialist skills and the situation would have to be pretty dire.

We don't need a 'centre of excellence' for light infantry. We're already pretty excellent at that stuff.

…

CAN LF could deploy again as they did in 2001, but I’d posit that the CSOR of today would be there before our LF, integrated with and supporting JTF 2, and the GoC’s decision Space would then be, “Do we have to send anything else (LF, Mech, etc.) in?”

As a lens to look at the CURSIT pan-deployed CAF Ops, is there any appetite for sending CA LF to augment OP IMPACT?

 

[MJP]

As a lens to look at the CURSIT pan-deployed CAF Ops, is there any appetite for sending CA LF to augment OP IMPACT?

Well yes but in almost purely D&S roles despite them thinking it is more....moot considering the role they are/have filled could be done by any of our Inf Bns IMHO.

 

[Infanteer]

So this whole scenario happens again in some form or another. I'm pretty confident that it's not 3PPCLI that joins the 101st. It's CSOR that goes in (they didn't exist in 2001). This would literally be the exact role they were designed for.

I will state categorically that CSOR would not deploy today as a subordinate unit to a US Infantry Brigade Combat Team (what 3/101 essentially was); especially considering that 3 PPCLI started by guarding Kandahar Airfield...not a SOF task. There is a fundamental difference between what a Light Infantry Battalion and CSOR do.

A Light Infantry Battalion is a conventional force organized to conduct ground operations as part of a land formation to seize and hold ground, defeat enemy forces, and engage local populations. They really draw their tasks from three buckets - offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations.

CSOR is a Special Operations force organized to conduct special operations in support of national objectives. I've seen the SOF task buckets best characterized broadly as direct action, unconventional warfare, and special reconnaissance. There are other things as well, but I find these "buckets" get to the essence of the SOF mission set.

CSOR is not a light infantry battalion, and its organization and employment is reflective of this.

 

[Kirkhill]

I will state categorically that CSOR would not deploy today as a subordinate unit to a US Infantry Brigade Combat Team (what 3/101 essentially was); especially considering that 3 PPCLI started by guarding Kandahar Airfield...not a SOF task. There is a fundamental difference between what a Light Infantry Battalion and CSOR do.

A Light Infantry Battalion is a conventional force organized to conduct ground operations as part of a land formation to seize and hold ground, defeat enemy forces, and engage local populations. They really draw their tasks from three buckets - offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations.

CSOR is a Special Operations force organized to conduct special operations in support of national objectives. I've seen the SOF task buckets best characterized broadly as direct action, unconventional warfare, and special reconnaissance. There are other things as well, but I find these "buckets" get to the essence of the SOF mission set.

CSOR is not a light infantry battalion, and its organization and employment is reflective of this.

Is there still a need for a Tier-N Special Operations Capable Light Force in your view? A hybrid force that permits the government to "escalate" slowly from Special Operations to Conventional Operations? A Force that can extract/reinforce Special Operations elements in a timely fashion without having to wait for a Mechanized Brigade to be repositioned?

The Yanks transition through their SEALs and Delta types to MEU (SOCs) and Rangers to Airborne and Lt Infantry to Strykers to Heavies (Heavies to include Combat Aviation Brigades).
The Brits transition through SBS/SAS to 1 Para SFSG to Army Special Operations Brigade to Lt Infantry to Medium-Heavies.

And both the Brits and the Yanks have explicitly added, as a new non-conventional, ie Special, asset, Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs or STABs) designed explicitly to generate diplomatic brownie points without upsetting the client's neighbours too much.

What options on that spectrum does the Canadian Army offer the Government? And how much of the spectrum is managed by CanSOFCOM?

 

[Good2Golf]

So two questions follow:

1) would Canada ever be called to participate in a US light combat formation as it was in 2001?

2) if Canada was called upon as such, could the CA even provide a unit-level capability as it did in 2001?

The issue isn’t some trying to portray that CSOR has replaced any of the CA’s light battalions, but rather how does the GoC see the various force capabilities available to them to support the variety of policy and coalition capability demands put to it.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Light force == difficult terrain force. Surely there has to be something short of CSOR in the toolbox for places where the LAVs can not go, consisting of suitable equipment and people who train with it regularly.

 

[Infanteer]

So two questions follow:

1) would Canada ever be called to participate in a US light combat formation as it was in 2001?

2) if Canada was called upon as such, could the CA even provide a unit-level capability as it did in 2001?

1. Don't know - that's a political question.
2. Sure - the Light Bns haven't changed much since 2001. They even have Cbt Sp platoons back! In all seriousness though, our Light Bns routinely integrate with US IBCTs on exercise to work on interoperability. We send units to the JRTC every year to participate in US validation exercises.

 

[blacktriangle]

Is it worth maintaining jump capability in conventional units if we don't plan on conducting forcible entry somewhere? And if so, would it make sense to consolidate that capability within one battalion, perhaps in Ontario?

Also, would there be any value in having the remaining two light battalions focus on an SFA role?

 

[Infanteer]

Is there still a need for a Tier-N Special Operations Capable Light Force in your view? A hybrid force that permits the government to "escalate" slowly from Special Operations to Conventional Operations? A Force that can extract/reinforce Special Operations elements in a timely fashion without having to wait for a Mechanized Brigade to be repositioned?

What is "Tier-N?" I've seen lots of reference to "SOF Tiers" but I've never actually seen it referenced within SOF.

Light Battalions are conventional infantry units, so you generally aren't going to get anything more out a light battalion than you would out of a mechanized battalion in terms of hands and feet skills. As Brad Sallows mentions, light battalions represent a unit that can trained to enable increased capability in difficult terrain. They can also be considered more "strategically responsive" if they are properly equipped and training and provided with a mission to do so (think US Global Response Force). I'm not sure we're there on the latter aspect in the CA.

But the idea that Light Forces exist to provide some sort of B team for an airfield seizure is not anything that I've seen promoted or practiced. There are areas where SOF missions can transition to and from the Army, such as the building partner capacity mission in Niger (note which battalion supplied the soldiers), but I wouldn't say any of this is specific to the light forces.

 

[Infanteer]

Is it worth maintaining jump capability in conventional units if we don't plan on conducting forcible entry somewhere? And if so, would it make sense to consolidate that capability within one battalion, perhaps in Ontario?

The 67 dollar question.

 

[Brad Sallows]

"Jump" (or "amphibious", or "oversnow") is not synonymous with "forcible entry". It's a way of getting somewhere. Sometimes the only way in to where you want to be is by air/aviation.

 

[daftandbarmy]

"Jump" (or "amphibious", or "oversnow") is not synonymous with "forcible entry". It's a way of getting somewhere. Sometimes the only way in to where you want to be is by air/aviation.

 

[Kirkhill]

What is "Tier-N?" I've seen lots of reference to "SOF Tiers" but I've never actually seen it referenced within SOF.

Light Battalions are conventional infantry units, so you generally aren't going to get anything more out a light battalion than you would out of a mechanized battalion in terms of hands and feet skills. As Brad Sallows mentions, light battalions represent a unit that can trained to enable increased capability in difficult terrain. They can also be considered more "strategically responsive" if they are properly equipped and training and provided with a mission to do so (think US Global Response Force). I'm not sure we're there on the latter aspect in the CA.

But the idea that Light Forces exist to provide some sort of B team for an airfield seizure is not anything that I've seen promoted or practiced. There are areas where SOF missions can transition to and from the Army, such as the building partner capacity mission in Niger (note which battalion supplied the soldiers), but I wouldn't say any of this is specific to the light forces.

Tier N is a reference to the proliferation of SOF tiers that I perceive. It gets difficult to keep track of which tree-climbing specialty belongs to which guild these days.

 

[Kirkhill]

"Jump" (or "amphibious", or "oversnow") is not synonymous with "forcible entry". It's a way of getting somewhere. Sometimes the only way in to where you want to be is by air/aviation.

Kind of like why SAR Techs (and Smoke Jumpers) are parachute trained?

 

[markppcli]

Is it the CAF or the Army though?

I know that everyone fights for resources around the table and the Army's a bit behind on that but I doubt that either the Navy or the Air Force care very much about how the Army assigns priorities within it's own bailiwick.

Had to chuckle about that article when I first read about 1 RCR having to use the old salts to teach TOW to Ukrainians on Op Unifier. Had the same problem when the artillery had to teach M109 usage to the Latvians 13 years after divestment.

He's got his facts wrong in some of the paper. the infantry didn't "give up nine mortar platoons for the artillery ... to be able to force generate three mortar troops". The PYs for those platoons went elsewhere (as he later points out not one PY went to the artillery, they all went to the CMTC). The artillery was double tasked with guns and mortars and in fact had to reshuffle its own PYs by cutting guns in favour of filling in the FSCC positions and MFC positions the infantry lost.

Again when I'm at my most cynical I figured some old Airborne guy said "hey the airborne battery had six L5s and 12 mortars and could do that sh*t so what do we have to lose?"

Also the 81mm mortar was not used in local defence of the M777. It was used in defence of the FOBs and to support infantry operations close in to FOBs. Also his discussion about massing artillery is incomplete. As a general principle that's right but in Afghanistan the greatest contribution of the M777 was its high precision delivery of single rounds to take out point targets in a danger close environment and with limited collateral damage.

I entirely agree with his view that the infantry should have its mortar platoons (and under armour) and pioneers back (and its anti-armour platoon which he thinks isn't all that necessary because you can just hand out Javelins like candy), but this is a really weak paper for a major to write. For crying out loud he has seven references in his bibliography and four of those are Wikipedia.

The “just hand out Javelins” is something very easy to say when your total knowledge of ATGM employment comes from TEWTs where can just say “Anti Armour will cover this” and everyone nods sagely. It was similar to my experiance with the just throw the tow in the LAV system, fine sir where do I put the 4 foot long 75lb 80,000 dollar missile with the sensitive RF transmitter?

 

[markppcli]

Then it's providing the kit and troops required to populate a fairly self-reliant battalion that's ready to anchor a light BGp to take on a peer/near peer enemy in the light role. And that means support weapons, the right vehicles, C&C capacity etc.

What near peer light force do you have in mind? Look at our “rivals” in China and Russia, light forces don’t really exist. Even the Chinese Light Brigades are heavily motorized and the VDV is essentially mechanized infantry.

 

[McG]

Also, would there be any value in having the remaining two light battalions focus on an SFA role?

Note: “SFA” is a US doctrinal acronym. In Canada we use “SFCB.” In Canada there is a slang use for “SFA” that probably precludes using the acronym in doctrine. I watched a room full of Canadian colonels struggle to contain their giggles as a US colonel briefed that “NATO is in Afghanistan to do SFA, and NATO is making great strides in accomplishing SFA.”