Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[markppcli]

Yeah I personally think the anti drone capability is probably worth it but you’d also loose significant ammunition capacity so I’d imagine that means no more HE on dismounts which means you need more coax storage. Probably a price worth paying.

 

[markppcli]

It's conversations like this I wish there was an Army.ca Pub. I could buy a pint for the table and pick the brains of all the Army types for a couple of hours over nachos and wings.

Could always set up a discord server for beers and fireside chats. Probably best discussed on another thread though.

 

[Underway]

Not to turn this into an advert for CTA but glossy brochure stuff from here:

 

[FJAG]

How does a 25mm fit into this? We keep comparing to Stykers, which is fair given their similarity, but we have a tool they don't. The Dragoon variant isn't every vehicle.

It's conversations like this I wish there was an Army.ca Pub. I could buy a pint for the table and pick the brains of all the Army types for a couple of hours over nachos and wings.

If I understand things correctly, the need for a 25 mm system came out of a specific operational requirement submitted by 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Europe as a counter APC weapon system (In part it explains why the system is called the "Dragoon" because 2CR is known as the 2nd Dragoons). 2nd Cav is about the size and structure of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team.

Armored Cavalry Regiments in the US Army used to have a more traditional role of scouting, reconnaissance and providing screens and guards for more conventional divisions but have more recently been rebranded into being either Armored BCTs or Stryker BCTs. While as an SBCT 2nd Cav is really more a light infantry brigade transported in armoured personnel carriers, my guess is that 2nd Cav because of its location and more bellicose opponent considers itself more robust than the average SBCT and wanted a greater edge in being able to defeat the mech infantry forces it might face and therefore looked to augment their capability in that respect (seeing our LAVs and the various other wheeled carriers with 25 and 30 mm systems helped make up their minds). Incidentally the Dragoon's turret is unmanned (although it can be reloaded from inside) while our LAV's turret is manned. The Dragoon still carries around a full squad.

How far the US will go in deploying the Dragoon is questionable because doctrinally the Stryker is not meant to be an infantry fighting vehicle but an armoured personnel carrier. The US Army has proper IFVs in their ABCTs namely the Bradley and has a project on the books (the Next-Generation Combat Vehicle) which is designed to replace all the close combat needs of the Army. My guess is that the Dragoon will stay as a niche vehicle which will not replace the basic Strykers nor change the Stryker combat doctrine in general. There are currently 9 SBCTs in the Army and I believe contracts have been let to partially convert three of those to Dragoons (not on a one for one but 1/4 to 1/2 of them in various companies basis). Incidentally the US Army is concurrently doing an upgrade program to their Stryker fleet similar to the hull upgrades of our own LAV 6.0.

 

[Kirkhill]

So now the change around requires CQ to drop off the system. So we're regigging on the go. Not exactly this really quick, low effort turn around you were talking about.


Payload, and weight. There's a reason a TOW missile is twice the weight of a Javelin.

To echo what @FJAG is saying, the Anti Armour platoon's job is firing happening kilometers away from the line companies. The task isn't simply to carry a missile and stand over there, it's specific tactics and tasks. Covering flanks and gaps, assessing gaps, sited in enough depth that your signature is masked, having appropriate fire control, ect. I have been part of the TOW section of a rifle company enough to know that when it's just a secondary task it's done badly, to the point that the system is as much a detriment as it is an asset.

And yet it appears that one way in which the Stryker-borne battalion can be employed is as an Anti-tank battalion. Not just as a rifle battalion with Anti-Tank support.

The CO has to plan the Anti-Tank battle around 27 squad missile launchers with 4000 m range, and a 128 mm, 8.4 kg Tandem warhead.

Vice the 152 mm 6.4 kg warhead of the TOW?

And I didn't mean, anywhere, to give the impression that individual sections would just reach into the tool box and do a quick change from mouseholing towns to taking on Panzer brigades.

I would expect the Chain of Command to advise what type of operations the nation was to engage in. Exactly in the same manner that a battalion would be warned for a deliberate attack or a hasty defence. The battalion would draw and distribute the necessary stores.

The US Army went to Afghanistan with Javelins and AT4s. They swapped them out for CG84s.

Now they are relearning Javelin skills and adding Switchblades to their tool boxes.

 

[Kirkhill]

And.... Is the LAV an Infantry Section Carrier with a Heavy Machine Gun?

Or....Is it a mobility challenged Infantry Fighting Vehicle?

 

[markppcli]

And yet it appears that one way in which the Stryker-borne battalion can be employed is as an Anti-tank battalion. Not just as a rifle battalion with Anti-Tank support.

The CO has to plan the Anti-Tank battle around 27 squad missile launchers with 4000 m range, and a 128 mm, 8.4 kg Tandem warhead.

Vice the 152 mm 6.4 kg warhead of the TOW?

And I didn't mean, anywhere, to give the impression that individual sections would just reach into the tool box and do a quick change from mouseholing towns to taking on Panzer brigades.

I would expect the Chain of Command to advise what type of operations the nation was to engage in. Exactly in the same manner that a battalion would be warned for a deliberate attack or a hasty defence. The battalion would draw and distribute the necessary stores.

Well no what they described wasn't an anti tank Bn, it was a Bn allowing he maneuvre of it's carriers with the infantry creeping up with ATGMs. That's not an "anti tank Bn" in the way that you'd see the Anti Tank Bn of a Russian Division for example, where it's principal purpose is providing fires against tanks.

Tow 2 B warheads are also tandem, I'm very curious how the Javelin manages 4km of range which so much warhead weight in comparison to the total weight of the missile.

With regards to changing jobs; that's sort of exactly what you said isn't it?

But I don't accept that swapping an infantry section from clearing houses to hunting tanks is a particularly difficult problem.

It's about as different as taking a 10 soldiers from doing arifle section job to being assault pioneers. Or taking an artillery troop and telling them to do a fighting patrol. Of course you can do that but will it be optimal?

 

[markppcli]

And.... Is the LAV an Infantry Section Carrier with a Heavy Machine Gun?

Or....Is it a mobility challenged Infantry Fighting Vehicle?

It’s a wheeled infantry fighting vehicle in the same vein as a VCBI, Freccia, and various other models. With substantial advantages in protection over most.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't know much about life today but circa 1982, with pretty much the same tool kit you have today, as an Infantry platoon leader, I was expected to train my platoon for both those operations, along with mounted and dismounted ops. Laying concertina and tanglefoot, enfilade from defilade, fortify a house, and a bunch of other stuff.

Were we masters of anything?

We were jacks of all trades.

Platoon in battle 309(3)

 

[markppcli]

Your platoon were qualified assault pioneers and did all those jobs? They did demo, crater roads? Built bunkers? Ect? Ie did they do the jobs of an assault pioneer platoon?
Those tasks you listed are not assault pioneer tasks is what I’m trying to get at. I listed some of those specialities.

 

[Kirkhill]

Obviously not.

What I am saying is that there was one very broad standard for all rifle infantry.

Everything was predicated on dismounted tactics.

Vehicles merely moved us from a to b.

The problems started with the Grizzly (purchased instead of the Marder that everyone wanted). And have never been resolved.

 

[markppcli]

It’s not a problem, it’s an evolution. M113s could never contribute to the fight ( to little armour, ineffective weapon on the move), a LAV can and does. Trying to compare the two is apples and oranges. The Grizzly was a turd no doubt about it, but outside of having wheels it shares virtually nothing with a LAV (6 or 3).

Saying there was one standard for infantry is a bit disingenuous given what we were talking about. There were absolutely specialist roles, particularly anti tank, organized and manned differently than a standard rifle section. These were in combat support company. The Rifle Section of 1982 didn’t just pick up an become a 106mm recoilless rifle section at the drop of a hat.

 

[GR66]

All these discussions are very interesting and important. They go to the heart of what the Canadian Army could/should become. However, the topic of this thread is about "FORCE 2025". It's now the middle of 2021. Most of the fundamental changes being discussed here (Heavy/Medium/Light Brigades vs. Symmetrical Brigades, LAVs as APCs vs IFVs, the best use of currently non-existent ATGMs and Loitering Munitions, the proper structure and role of Light/Rapid Reaction Forces, etc.) won't actually be addressed until FORCE 2030, FORCE 2035 or even beyond.

I think the goal of FORCE 2025 should be to begin setting the framework within which all of these debates and changes can take place as we move forward. To achieve that goal I would propose the three following changes:

1) Simply the Army command structure in such a way as to re-focus our attention on Brigade-sized deployments as opposed to simply force generating troops for Battle Groups. Combine all of the Reg Force Brigades (as well as the Canadian Combat Support Brigade which would support a deployed Canadian Brigade Group) within a single (2nd) Division. Group all of the Reserve Brigades under a single (3rd) Division.

2) Group all of our Tank Squadrons in a single geographic location. This will simplify training and logistics while the Army decides how it wants to eventually deploy its limited tank resources. If we decide on designating one Brigade as our "Heavy" Brigade then they are already together in place to do that. If we wish to maintain symmetrical Armoured Regiments within each Brigade then we can use the "affiliated" Brigade model and keep the tanks co-located physically but organizationally/operationally part of each of the Brigade Groups.

3) Remove the 3rd (Light) Infantry Battalions from the Mechanized Brigades and group them together in a single Light Brigade. We would then have a single Light Infantry organization within which we can focus on answering all of those questions about what the role of Light forces should be in the Canadian Army, how they should be organized and equipped, etc. without the distraction of being an appendage of the Mechanized Brigades. We could also rotate readiness between the three Light Battalions to provide a rapid response capability for the Army.

 

[Kirkhill]

With respect Mark "It" is a problem.

Prior to the Grizzly we had a General Purpose Infantry based on battalions of 4 rifle companies of large sections and a company of long service specialists who could be relied on to perform their specialist tasks in support of the rifles, or, when the need arose, could revert to being rifles. One man in each section was lost to the vehicle as a driver. In the absence of the vehicle that driver would revert to life as a rifleman.

In the 80s the infantry wanted a piece of the armoured battlefield. Our enemies and allies were all kitting up with BMPs, BMDs and Marders. The Yanks were working on the Bradley and the Brits on the Warrior. Canada's Army, and the Infantry in particular, wanted to stay "relevant" to that fight. The government of the day was less enthused. It didn't want to further engage in Europe. It saw the army's role as an anti-insurrection force with domestic application. And it didn't want to risk "tanks in the streets" and to civilians an IFV, with its tracks and turret, is a tank.

Consequently the government authorized the purchase of the AVGP. A brilliant police vehicle for something like the para-military police of Europe. At odds with the British traditions of both a non-standing army and civil policing.

The Army tried to make the best of a bad situation and employ the Grizzly, and the Cougar.

The Cougar was at least given the accurate description of being a "trainer" - even if it was a poor tank trainer.

The Grizzly should have been designated as an IFV trainer for Panzergrenadiers.

The problem was that the adoption of the Grizzly forced the conversion of the General Purpose Infantry sections to specialist Panzergrenadier sections. Sections that dedicate 3 of their number to crewing their vehicle and only allow for 6 dismounts for General Duties. And those dismounts are specialists in the Armoured Battle, tied to their vehicles and equipped for that battle. But in Canada's case their vehicle was never adequate for that battle and the troops were never given the weapons necessary for that battlefield - namely the section level, 2000 m, Milan ATGM.

So we lost 2/3 of the infantry to the specialist Panzergrenadier role while denying them the tools necessary to do that job, both vehicles and weapons (in addition to the lack of the Milan the 20mm cannon was replaced by the venerable, supposedly dismountable, 50.) The other 1/3 of the infantry was actually still in General Purpose configuration with large sections but they were equipped with the M113s which could actually keep up with the tanks while the Grizzlygrenadiers were in the rear with the gear. And the Airborne was in its own special place.

Since that time, IMO, Canada has been trying to catch up.

Coyote moved closer to the Marder ideal with its 25mm turret.
LAV 3 upped the armour
LAV 6 upped the armour again.

We are approaching the capabilities of the original 1980s vintage Marder with better comms - which the current generation of allied vehicles also have.

We still have not completed the transition to the Marder (now exemplified by the CV90) in that we still rely on wheels and not tracks. And we never got round to supplying those essentials for infantry on the armoured battlefield, the anti-tank missile.

Panzergrenadiers are dedicated anti-tank teams that can revert to riflemen when the need permits. But the crew is still lost to the section and is only available to the section if the vehicle can stay in range of the riflemen.

Canada has, again IMO, converted itself into a Panzer Army, without Anti-Tank weapons and a vehicle that struggles to keep up with the tanks, just in time for the rest of the world to move away from reliance on tanks and back to an emphasis on General Purpose Infantry. That is how I see Airborne, Heliborne, Mountain, Light, Stryker, Piranha, Boxer and Scorpion equipped infantry. All of which are equipped with 2-5 km dismountable Anti-Tank missiles, man-portable artillery like the CG 84mm, and are adopting more UAS type munitions in the 40mm to 120mm calibre range.

The good news is that the battlefield is now moving back to asphalt so the LAV's wheels are less problematic. They can cross a short European field on the way to the next road without getting too far out of range of the nearest tow truck.

The bad news is that while our allies are building vehicles that transport full sized general purpose sections, sections that can operate in a variety of environments, with or without their vehicles, vehicles that have separate crews that don't detract from the section, we are stuck with 2/3s (3/3s) of our infantry tied to their vehicles. And we have lost the GP infantry.

Unless we want to consider the time it takes to rerole and requalify a LAV battalion for duties without their vehicles, their turrets, their optics and their cannons. Not to mention without pioneers, mortars, MANPADS and, of course ATGMs.

LAV infantry is a form of specialist infantry - previously exemplified by the Panzergrenadier.

The reason we have so much trouble identifying the role of the Light Infantry is that they are the odd-job men. They are the general duties, general purpose, bog-standard, infantry. They used to be the basis of Canada's Army. Which resulted in an Army which could successfully turn its hand to any problem.

Up thread I proposed 3x DS Brigades (Divisional Support or "Deep Strike", whatever). Those brigades incorporated one specialist infantry battalion each. I also proposed a separate, stand alone, "Light" brigade of 3 "Light" infantry battalions.

I am going to revise that prescription to 3x DSBs as configured and add a second pure infantry brigade. And remove the label "Light" from the lexicon. They are simply "Infantry Brigades". Just like the Infantry Brigades of the Militia. All specialists on working on their feet, to close with and destroy, regardless of season or terrain, or transport.

The number of bodies in the infantry, in a battalion, in a company, in a section doesn't really bother me. So long as they are appropriately organized and equipped to defeat the threats that face Canada at home and its citizens and interests overseas.

And I don't believe that the LAV army does that.

 

[markppcli]

My question to that is who supports this Light Brigade? Who provides it mobility, who fixes its trucks, who provides it medical assistance? Simply throwing them all together does not a brigade make.

I would rather see us man our Bn's fully, ie with combat support companies manned full time not by reserve mortar and assault pioneer platoons. The ATGM capability can be manned by our existing tow systems for now. The PYs would come from the 3rd Bns with one left to provide that "operational quick reaction" we seem to require. Maybe it could be jump qualified.

 

[Kirkhill]

With respect to the section level ATGM vs the battalion level ATGM platoon -

Technologically the burden for training operators to load, aim and fire ATGMs, has, just like machine guns, decreased over the years. And just like machine guns they are being distributed like candy and hand-grenades. Those that worry that the techniques associated with best tactical employment are being lost as a result are right to worry. Just like the techniques associated with the machine guns are occasionally lost and demand the re-reading of "The Emma-Gees". The good news is that much of the Emma Gees is applicable to the employment of ATGMs. (siting in pairs, enfilade from defilade, masking signature, mutual support, covering your arcs, range templates....)

Just as the CO should have somebody in has staff specialized in optimizing the use of his available MGs, he also needs someone specialized in optimizing the use of his available ATGMS, regardless of who in his battalion is carrying them.

 

[markppcli]

With respect Mark "It" is a problem.

(1. )Prior to the Grizzly we had a General Purpose Infantry based on battalions of 4 rifle companies of large sections and a company of long service specialists who could be relied on to perform their specialist tasks in support of the rifles, or, when the need arose, could revert to being rifles. One man in each section was lost to the vehicle as a driver. In the absence of the vehicle that driver would revert to life as a rifleman.

In the 80s the infantry wanted a piece of the armoured battlefield. Our enemies and allies were all kitting up with BMPs, BMDs and Marders. The Yanks were working on the Bradley and the Brits on the Warrior. Canada's Army, and the Infantry in particular, wanted to stay "relevant" to that fight. The government of the day was less enthused. It didn't want to further engage in Europe. It saw the army's role as an anti-insurrection force with domestic application. And it didn't want to risk "tanks in the streets" and to civilians an IFV, with its tracks and turret, is a tank.

Consequently the government authorized the purchase of the AVGP. A brilliant police vehicle for something like the para-military police of Europe. At odds with the British traditions of both a non-standing army and civil policing.

The Army tried to make the best of a bad situation and employ the Grizzly, and the Cougar.

The Cougar was at least given the accurate description of being a "trainer" - even if it was a poor tank trainer.

The Grizzly should have been designated as an IFV trainer for Panzergrenadiers.

The problem was that the adoption of the Grizzly forced the conversion of the General Purpose Infantry sections to specialist Panzergrenadier sections. Sections that dedicate 3 of their number to crewing their vehicle and only allow for 6 dismounts for General Duties. And those dismounts are specialists in the Armoured Battle, tied to their vehicles and equipped for that battle. But in Canada's case their vehicle was never adequate for that battle and the troops were never given the weapons necessary for that battlefield - namely the section level, 2000 m, Milan ATGM.

So we lost 2/3 of the infantry to the specialist Panzergrenadier role while denying them the tools necessary to do that job, both vehicles and weapons (in addition to the lack of the Milan the 20mm cannon was replaced by the venerable, supposedly dismountable, 50.) The other 1/3 of the infantry was actually still in General Purpose configuration with large sections but they were equipped with the M113s which could actually keep up with the tanks while the Grizzlygrenadiers were in the rear with the gear. And the Airborne was in its own special place.

Since that time, IMO, Canada has been trying to catch up.

(2) Coyote moved closer to the Marder ideal with its 25mm turret.
LAV 3 upped the armour
LAV 6 upped the armour again.

We are approaching the capabilities of the original 1980s vintage Marder with better comms - which the current generation of allied vehicles also have.

We still have not completed the transition to the Marder (now exemplified by the CV90) in that we still rely on wheels and not tracks. And we never got round to supplying those essentials for infantry on the armoured battlefield, the anti-tank missile.

Panzergrenadiers are dedicated anti-tank teams that can revert to riflemen when the need permits. But the crew is still lost to the section and is only available to the section if the vehicle can stay in range of the riflemen.

(3) Canada has, again IMO, converted itself into a Panzer Army, without Anti-Tank weapons and a vehicle that struggles to keep up with the tanks, just in time for the rest of the world to move away from reliance on tanks and back to an emphasis on General Purpose Infantry. That is how I see Airborne, Heliborne, Mountain, Light, Stryker, Piranha, Boxer and Scorpion equipped infantry. All of which are equipped with 2-5 km dismountable Anti-Tank missiles, man-portable artillery like the CG 84mm, and are adopting more UAS type munitions in the 40mm to 120mm calibre range.

(4)The good news is that the battlefield is now moving back to asphalt so the LAV's wheels are less problematic. They can cross a short European field on the way to the next road without getting too far out of range of the nearest tow truck.

(5) The bad news is that while our allies are building vehicles that transport full sized general purpose sections, sections that can operate in a variety of environments, with or without their vehicles, vehicles that have separate crews that don't detract from the section, we are stuck with 2/3s (3/3s) of our infantry tied to their vehicles. And we have lost the GP infantry.

(6) Unless we want to consider the time it takes to rerole and requalify a LAV battalion for duties without their vehicles, their turrets, their optics and their cannons. Not to mention without pioneers, mortars, MANPADS and, of course ATGMs.

LAV infantry is a form of specialist infantry - previously exemplified by the Panzergrenadier.

(7) The reason we have so much trouble identifying the role of the Light Infantry is that they are the odd-job men. They are the general duties, general purpose, bog-standard, infantry. They used to be the basis of Canada's Army. Which resulted in an Army which could successfully turn its hand to any problem.

Up thread I proposed 3x DS Brigades (Divisional Support or "Deep Strike", whatever). Those brigades incorporated one specialist infantry battalion each. I also proposed a separate, stand alone, "Light" brigade of 3 "Light" infantry battalions.

I am going to revise that prescription to 3x DSBs as configured and add a second pure infantry brigade. And remove the label "Light" from the lexicon. They are simply "Infantry Brigades". Just like the Infantry Brigades of the Militia. All specialists on working on their feet, to close with and destroy, regardless of season or terrain, or transport.

The number of bodies in the infantry, in a battalion, in a company, in a section doesn't really bother me. So long as they are appropriately organized and equipped to defeat the threats that face Canada at home and its citizens and interests overseas.

And I don't believe that the LAV army does that.

You made a bunch of disjointed points there that I've gone ahead and numbered and will attempt to answer in turn.

1. Uh no we adopted M113 in the 1960s, and surely the crew were also part of the section no? So we've been dealing with a vehicle adjusting the size of our sections. I have no idea about the internal capacity of the Grizzly, it's frankly irrelevant to me.

2. The Coyote is nothing like a Marder, I'm assuming you're only talking about the armanment? You know the Coyote isn't an IFV or APC obviously so I don't see where you're going. The LAV.. fine but you seem stuck on it being different than a Marder and that being inherently bad as opposed to simply a trade off. Panzer grenadiers are no dedicated anti tank teams, they are infantry that get to the fight and fight along side vehicles, that's from the origin of the term all the way to the current Panzer Grenadier Bn.

3. Which of our allies are adopting lighter infantry? That's factually incorrect. In fact our allies are actually rapidly mechanizing in a way we are not. I agree about the ATGM, getting TOW back is good but not enough.

4. This lav mobility point you keep brining up is a bit tired. I've crewed LAV's for nearly a decade, and I honestly don't have very many mobility issues, it comes up but it's hardly this giant issue you make it out to be.

5. Such as? Most AFVs are actually designed to carry around 8, I'd struggle to think of many that carry more and maintain an equivalent armament.

6. We train to do tasks without LAVs all the time. We do patrolling exercises, we do dismounted section and platoon attack ranges. The drivers and gunners rotate out to do that stuff to. So no I don't see it.

7. Infantry without mobility has become, frankly, obsolete. That doesn't mean they have to be "panzergrenadiers" but it does mean they need some kind of internal mobility, and the open bed truck isn't acceptable anymore. The "bog standard" is mechanized. Go look at the ORBAT of our allies and rivals, the mechanized infantry is the norm, not the exception.

Respectfully I'm still not sure what the overall point you were trying to make was? As far as I can see it is "the LAV is bad" and that is largely based off your experience with the Grizzly? Because as I pointed out above, many of your points are either incorrect (capacity of vehicles) or I'm simply unaware of them (reinvestment in light infantry forces).

 

[Kirkhill]

My question to that is who supports this Light Brigade? Who provides it mobility, who fixes its trucks, who provides it medical assistance? Simply throwing them all together does not a brigade make.

I would rather see us man our Bn's fully, ie with combat support companies manned full time not by reserve mortar and assault pioneer platoons. The ATGM capability can be manned by our existing tow systems for now. The PYs would come from the 3rd Bns with one left to provide that "operational quick reaction" we seem to require. Maybe it could be jump qualified.

I'll agree with you on the support platoons - but I am not particularly fussed about the PYs. I would sooner that garrison battalions had a full complement of kit and skills, even at cadre levels, than be concerned about having the numbers available to go out the door tomorrow. In reality it takes the Army a year to bring a battalion up to deployment level in any case. I'd sooner have a smaller, high-tech expeditionary force at NTM.

As for the support of the Brigade? That depends. Is it working with the Air Force, the Navy, the Army or allies. (Who supports the ePF?)
Is it being carried by boats, ships, planes, helicopters, trucks or buses - before it deploys Shank's Mare? The battalions, in garrison, need adminstrative vehicles. It also needs all of the man-portable gear it would employ on the battlefield in order to fully exercise the battalion. It needs to be able to get to a variety of terrains for training.

It doesn't need to be tied to a particular vehicle, nor does it need to be tied to particular numbers. It does need to be tied to particular capabilities.

 

[Kirkhill]

If you want the short form? The LAV restricts strategic mobility, has operational and tactical limitations, and drives the organization of the infantry.

Infantry is infantry with or without the LAV.

I am a glad you have confidence in your vehicle.

PS - you're the one that brought up "evolution"

The Piranha Grizzly AVGP with 3+6 crew (and two jumpseats) and a 50/7.62 hand cranked turret evolved
It became the Piranha Bison APC and the Piranha LAV-25 (USMC 3+6) and then the Coyote which evolved
It became the LAV 3 which further evolved
It became the LAV 6.

And those vehicles are all about their ability to carry troops (so the number of crew and pax doesn't appear immaterial to me), and their ability to fight (so the armament doesn't appear immaterial). As to mobility. Again I am really glad that you have confidence in your vehicle and your ability to employ it and your troops to full advantage.

 

[markppcli]

I'll agree with you on the support platoons - but I am not particularly fussed about the PYs. I would sooner that garrison battalions had a full complement of kit and skills, even at cadre levels, than be concerned about having the numbers available to go out the door tomorrow. In reality it takes the Army a year to bring a battalion up to deployment level in any case. I'd sooner have a smaller, high-tech expeditionary force at NTM.

As for the support of the Brigade? That depends. Is it working with the Air Force, the Navy, the Army or allies. (Who supports the ePF?)
Is it being carried by boats, ships, planes, helicopters, trucks or buses - before it deploys Shank's Mare? The battalions, in garrison, need adminstrative vehicles. It also needs all of the man-portable gear it would employ on the battlefield in order to fully exercise the battalion. It needs to be able to get to a variety of terrains for training.

It doesn't need to be tied to a particular vehicle, nor does it need to be tied to particular numbers. It does need to be tied to particular capabilities.

Oh that was a comment directed at the previously posted orbat with no supports inside a light brigade.
Capabilities are intrinsically tied to equipment (vehicles) and numbers.