Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[markppcli]

Would placing "carrier" roles and vehicles in Log to augment whatever lives within the infantry be worthwhile?

No

 

[daftandbarmy]

Interesting given that Saxon, Saracen, Warrior, and the various protect mobility vehicles are all crewed by infantry.

The op tempo in the urban areas during the NI campaign was insane.

Each battalion ran at least 50 'framework', or routine, patrols daily, each of them requiring some type of support from both APVs and Pigs. Add on top of that regular large scale search operations, riot/crowd control activities, responding to terrorist attacks etc and you can imagine the amount of stresses on the vehicles and crews.

I assume the 'division of labour' had something to do with that, as well as the fact that the Pigs belonged to 39 Bde HQ and could be redeployed at any time to support larger scale Brigade level operations such as huge riots/ marches etc.

 

[GR66]

The op tempo in the urban areas during the NI campaign was insane.

Each battalion ran at least 50 'framework', or routine, patrols daily, each of them requiring some type of support from both APVs and Pigs. Add on top of that regular large scale search operations, riot/crowd control activities, responding to terrorist attacks etc and you can imagine the amount of stresses on the vehicles and crews.

I assume the 'division of labour' had something to do with that, as well as the fact that the Pigs belonged to 39 Bde HQ and could be redeployed at any time to support larger scale Brigade level operations such as huge riots/ marches etc.

Probably quite a difference though between basically a counter-insurgency operation with fixed basing and facilities vs deployed ops in a peer conflict. What works in one situation doesn't necessarily work well in another.

 

[markppcli]

The op tempo in the urban areas during the NI campaign was insane.

Each battalion ran at least 50 'framework', or routine, patrols daily, each of them requiring some type of support from both APVs and Pigs. Add on top of that regular large scale search operations, riot/crowd control activities, responding to terrorist attacks etc and you can imagine the amount of stresses on the vehicles and crews.

I assume the 'division of labour' had something to do with that, as well as the fact that the Pigs belonged to 39 Bde HQ and could be redeployed at any time to support larger scale Brigade level operations such as huge riots/ marches etc.

I imagine their organic carriers not travelling with them also played a part in it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I imagine their organic carriers not travelling with them also played a part in it.

As an Ops Officer I really didn't care who owned the TC armour.

All I had to do was issue orders at 1500hrs the day before for 30 occupied house searches in downtown Belfast with an H-Hour of 0100hrs and, magically, all the vehicles I needed appeared on time with drivers, ready to roll.

 

[FJAG]

'Driven', I assume, by operational common sense.

Infantry units rotated through 4/5 month tours while the RCT units stayed in place for years.

The bigger armoured vehicles also needed a different standard of training and maintenance skills than we had time, or resources, to put the Infantry through.

The tour length thing itself makes a lot of sense - gives the drivers a good opportunity to gain that important local knowledge. Kind of like a London cabbie.

 

[Kirkhill]

Britain also had quite a number of Lt Role Bns traditionally that were very light on own transport.

RASC/RCT elements were routinely attached to "leg" battalions on operations. It was in an RASC truck that my Dad the Para was riding when it ran over a British mine on the approach to Bde HQ on Mt Carmel in Haifa.

And by the way... I am not calling for the formation of Armoured Carrier Platoons, I am calling for armour trained personnel to be permanently assigned to the Infantry Battalion but the vehicles to be grouped within the battalion as separate platoons within the Combat Support Coy under their respect LAV Capts and LAV Sgts.

I reckon that allows the infantry to focus on legwork and the crews to focus on their vehicles while everybody is sufficiently physically close to allow for regular exercising and attaching. Maybe some exercises call for all the vehicles and only a platoon of legs. Other exercises call for all the legs and platoon of LAVs.... etc. Maybe the LAVs only carry the ATGM dets.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The tour length thing itself makes a lot of sense - gives the drivers a good opportunity to gain that important local knowledge. Kind of like a London cabbie.

Exactly, many of them knew the patterns that had been set before and could advise on better dismount/ pickup areas to avoid possible IEDs/ organized aggro and riots.

In some cases we used this knowledge to set up counter-ambushes, with great effect.... lots of arrests in this case.

 

[markppcli]

Britain also had quite a number of Lt Role Bns traditionally that were very light on own transport.

RASC/RCT elements were routinely attached to "leg" battalions on operations. It was in an RASC truck that my Dad the Para was riding when it ran over a British mine on the approach to Bde HQ on Mt Carmel in Haifa.

And by the way... I am not calling for the formation of Armoured Carrier Platoons, I am calling for armour trained personnel to be permanently assigned to the Infantry Battalion but the vehicles to be grouped within the battalion as separate platoons within the Combat Support Coy under their respect LAV Capts and LAV Sgts.

I reckon that allows the infantry to focus on legwork and the crews to focus on their vehicles while everybody is sufficiently physically close to allow for regular exercising and attaching. Maybe some exercises call for all the vehicles and only a platoon of legs. Other exercises call for all the legs and platoon of LAVs.... etc. Maybe the LAVs only carry the ATGM dets.

See previous comment on crew casualties.

I think we’ve had this discussion before and I have no real interest in returning to explaining how mechanized units operate and why your suggestions don’t work and your suggested benefits aren’t really going to pan out.

 

[Kirkhill]

It was interesting looking at the @markppcli video and compare it to a Canadian LAV battalion.

The Ukrainian BTR is broadly similar to the Canadian LAV.

Under a single Command Vehicle Ukraine groups 12 BTRs.
Under a Command Group of 3 Vehicles Canada groups 12 LAVs.

Canada Groups their 12 LAVs as 3 groups of 4 with 3 platoon leaders
Ukraine Groups their 12 BTRs as 4 groups of 3 with 4 platoon leaders.

Ukraine effectively groups the Platoon Weapons Dets into one Platoon and forms an Anti-Tank Platoon (1500-2000m range - SACLOS Wire - 3 Teams with 9 dismounts total plus 6 crew and a Platoon Leader and Platoon 2iC).
Canada has the manpower for this configuration but it doesn't have the weaponry. The Javelin might be appropriate.

If I look at the remaining 9 vehicles and apply some Canadianization to them what I end up with is

3 Platoons with 3 vehicles with 2 man crews each.

The Platoon is commanded by Lt and a WO and 3 Sergeants. Each Sergeant commands a section

The basis of all the sections is the Squad Leader and a Senior Rifleman with a UGL attached as well as an RPG team (Canadianized this would be a CG84 team).

In addition, under command the Platoon Leader has a (Canadianized again) C6 team of gunner and assistant, 4 C9 LMG gunners, 2 Designated Marksmen and a Combat Medic

In addition the Battalion has a GMG platoon of 6x C16, an AD platoon of 9 (Stingers) and an AT/DF Platoon of ATGMs and RRs (Javelins and CG-84s?) It also has a well equipped Pioneer Platoon with its own earthmover.

Finally, it has a permanently attached mortar battery with 6 towed 120mms.

Is there anything there that we can learn from?

 

[Kirkhill]

See previous comment on crew casualties.

I think we’ve had this discussion before and I have no real interest in returning to explaining how mechanized units operate and why your suggestions don’t work and your suggested benefits aren’t really going to pan out.

Mark,

I know we will continue to see this thing differently. And you are right that we will not convince each other. But perhaps our interminable volleying might help others? Or not.

Cheers.

 

[markppcli]

Mark,

I know we will continue to see this thing differently. And you are right that we will not convince each other. But perhaps our interminable volleying might help others? Or not.

Cheers.

I’d probably be more agreeable to that if you had ever considered anything myself, or anyone else who’s actually employed a turreted AFV, had ever told you about their employment. However given your rather impressive disregard for experience or expertise, I think it’s best I just ignore your comments as a rule.

 

[KevinB]

Mark,

I know we will continue to see this thing differently. And you are right that we will not convince each other. But perhaps our interminable volleying might help others? Or not.

Cheers.

Everyone who has worked in/with Mech Inf/Combined arms seems to be telling you the same things though.

1VP years ago with the LAV3 played with LdSH crews on one ex - I wasn’t in 1VP at the time, but when I returned, everyone who’d been part of it agreed that it didn’t work well, and it was best to crew with Inf.

/which led me to wanting to split the Inf trade to Light and Mech.

 

[Kirkhill]

I’d probably be more agreeable to that if you had ever considered anything myself, or anyone else who’s actually employed a turreted AFV, had ever told you about their employment. However given your rather impressive disregard for experience or expertise, I think it’s best I just ignore your comments as a rule.

Fair enough.

 

[Kirkhill]

Everyone who has worked in/with Mech Inf/Combined arms seems to be telling you the same things though.

1VP years ago with the LAV3 played with LdSH crews on one ex - I wasn’t in 1VP at the time, but when I returned, everyone who’d been part of it agreed that it didn’t work well, and it was best to crew with Inf.

/which led me to wanting to split the Inf trade to Light and Mech.

If we're going to go there

Light Role Infantry used to include infantry transported by sea (marines), by aircraft (paras), by helicopters (air assault), by truck (motorized) and by APC (Mech - to include M113s and FV432s). All of those battalions were similarly organized in terms of types of functional platoons.

Beyond that there was something known as Armoured Infantry (equipped with Marders, Warriors and Bradleys). They were entirely distinct from all other types of infantry - and in some armies they were part of the Armoured Corps.


I am going to suggest the following tale.

We used to have big armies with lots of bodies. Equipment was expensive and scarce and allotted on the basis of perceived operational need. The bodies were trained and required to fill in where necessary.

We then lost an enemy and decided to downsize our armies. We got rid of the bodies because now we couldn't get them for free. We actually had to pay them. (We in this sense refers to NATO and its conscript armies). At the same time we ditched a lot of the equipment. The tendency was to get rid of the low cost stuff (jeeps, trucks and M113s) and keep the "good stuff" (Warriors, Bradleys and Marders - latterly joined by CV90s).

The US converted all of its Mech Infantry Battalions (M113s) to Armoured Infantry battalions (Bradleys) and put its M113s into storage.
The Brits, assisted by pressure from the Infantry Cap Badge mafia kept as many Lt Battalions as possible, together with a small number of Armoured Infantry battalions in Warriors. The Lt Battalions got the transport of the day.

I think I can make a guess as to why the Brits switched from RASC/RCT driver/mechanics to Infantry driver/riflemen. Nobody was arguing to retain driver/mechanics in Parliament. They were arguing to retain battalions, cap badges and COs. When Britain reduced the size of its army it makes sense to me that the available bodies would be transferred from "inconsequential" logistics trades to "necessary" infantry trades.


A chap name of Cole Petersen published an article some years back (he was a Major then - god knows what rank he is now) entitled Chariots on Fire. I found a lot to agree with in that article. It referred to the Russo-Ukrainian experience prior February 24th of last year and also to the Israeli experience with HAPCs like the Narmer (heavily armoured transports for moving troops with no support weapons mounted).

The conclusion drawn by Major Petersen was

... the LAV is not an HAPC and our infantry are not
"armoured infantry". Our doctrine should reflect this and our
tactics should not needlessly expose vehicles with overaggressive
tactics that are not suited to the capabilities of an
IFV vis-a-vis modern anti-armour and artillery systems. lf our
Army was to fight a "hybrid enemy" (which, in fancy buzzword
talk, appears to mean anyone with more capability than flipflops
and an AK-47) we would likely be forced to adopt the
same measures as infantry on both sides ofthe current
fighting in Ukraine. We should do this now, rather than learn it
the hard way down the road.

Maj Petersen's analysis on that day had not yet factored in the effects of the ubiquitous UAVs. I suggest that the environment for the LAV has not improved.

I would also suggest that the decision to uparmour the LAV 3 to the LAV 6 and ditch the CCV project (which would have supplied the possibility of a properly equipped Armoured Infantry element) has done nothing to dissuade those inclined to use the LAV "agressively". The tendency is to see the LAV as a Close Combat Vehicle rather than an Armoured Personnel Carrier.

The CCV is an Armoured Infantry Vehicle - geared towards close, if not intimate, support in a Combined Arms team that is Tank heavy.

The LAV is a Wheeled Armoured Personnel Carrier that has been upgunned and based on USMC practice (followed by Canadian and Australians) found to be effective in a light armoured cavalry/recce/scout role.

Is the LAV suitable for the dismount on the objective role? I guess that depends on the opinion of the passengers.

It is my understanding that at least some of the passengers would prefer to get off early and walk to their objectives while their taxis stay safely accessible.

As to the discussion

Section LAV det
Platoon LAV section
Company LAV platoon
Battalion LAV company
Brigade LAV battalion

I remember seeing articles in both CAJ and Ducimus arguing those points.

Equally I can find lots of real world armies (and marines) organized along all those lines. With the USMC and the Royal Marines both maintaining dedicated carrier forces - some of which are turreted - and are used to dismount on the objective (assuming that a beach can be seen as an objective).


I'm willing to admit my ignorance. I am not willing to cede my point.


At heart I don't see the LAV battalions as Mech/Armoured Infantry. I see them as Infantry battalions with a lot of transport.

 

[Kirkhill]

Everyone who has worked in/with Mech Inf/Combined arms seems to be telling you the same things though.

1VP years ago with the LAV3 played with LdSH crews on one ex - I wasn’t in 1VP at the time, but when I returned, everyone who’d been part of it agreed that it didn’t work well, and it was best to crew with Inf.

/which led me to wanting to split the Inf trade to Light and Mech.

Make that Light and Armoured with CCVs and we have the beginning of an agreement.
And trying things out on one ex is a BS method of evaluation. It doesn't allow for weaknesses to be identified and corrected and tested and modified until a working solution is found.

Guderian: Well that exercise was a screw up. No idea what that Brit Liddle-Hart is on about. Dump the panzers.

 

[markppcli]

Make that Light and Armoured with CCVs and we have the beginning of an agreement.
And trying things out on one ex is a BS method of evaluation. It doesn't allow for weaknesses to be identified and corrected and tested and modified until a working solution is found.

Guderian: Well that exercise was a screw up. No idea what that Brit Liddle-Hart is on about. Dump the panzers.

Do it my way!

We tried and it didn’t work, here’s soe
Reasons why it didn’t work, here’s the benefits of doing it the other way.

Try harder !!

 

[markppcli]

Everyone who has worked in/with Mech Inf/Combined arms seems to be telling you the same things though.

1VP years ago with the LAV3 played with LdSH crews on one ex - I wasn’t in 1VP at the time, but when I returned, everyone who’d been part of it agreed that it didn’t work well, and it was best to crew with Inf.

/which led me to wanting to split the Inf trade to Light and Mech.

Careful; you’re wandering into that experience and expertise stuff. Best not to bring it up in this thread.

 

[KevinB]

Make that Light and Armoured with CCVs and we have the beginning of an agreement.
And trying things out on one ex is a BS method of evaluation. It doesn't allow for weaknesses to be identified and corrected and tested and modified until a working solution is found.

Guderian: Well that exercise was a screw up. No idea what that Brit Liddle-Hart is on about. Dump the panzers.

I think we agree that the LAV isn’t an IFV, however at times it needs to be used as one.
As Canada doesn’t have an IFV so in areas where there is significant artillery, I think one would prefer the LAV to drive on in to the objective so one isn’t dismounted and walking for a KM or two onto the objective while being shelled.

But the LAV being crewed by infantry does make it more likely that the LAV will support the dismounts when needed, and the crew understands what the dismounts need and will do a great deal better than Armor would.

Even with a Heavy Tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle, not having the dismounts who are familiar with the system is crippling on long term operational capabilities.
@markppcli has pointed out the advantages of spare gunners and drivers in terms of turret watch and admin movements, as well as the advantages for maintaining the systems with more hands.

 

[FJAG]

I think that if you want to go back to the rationale behind the LAV, you need to first look at the development of the initial series of BTR 60s and BMPs. The BTR 60 was a lighter cheaper to produce vehicle designed for the motor rifle divisions while the BMP was heavier, more expensive and designed to operate with tank divisions.

Key to the designs was that the BTR 60 was lightly armed (a 14.5mm MG) but carried around a dozen troops besides its 3 man crew, while the BMP started off with a 73mm smooth bore gun, an ATGM launcher but could only carry 8 really squashed together dismounts.

Roughly 3/4 to 2/3 of the Soviet Army was Motor Rifle. Tank formations (whether Div or Army) were predominantly an armoured force supported by infantry while Motor Rifle was principally infantry supported by tank. The echelon attack system combined with the ground and situation facing them would dictate as to whether the break in force was infantry or tank heavy while the break out force was tailored to what lay beyond. Generally, and only generally, the tank formation constituted the rapid, shock force while the Rifle division was designed for heavier, slower slogging in restricted terrains.

The key here is that the BTR60 supported the Rifle concept of an infantry heavy force which fought primarily dismounted (inward facing seats and no weapon ports) while the BMP supported the concept of a tank heavy force with dismounts available only when needed (such as clearing an objective or defile on the march). It was designed to be able to fight mounted with outward facing troops and weapon ports.

One can argue these days about how effective BTR60s and BMPs actually were at their role but those were the design intents.

Which brings us to the LAV. In its Stryker configuration it was clearly a BTR60 knock-off. The BCT FM makes it clear that a Stryker brigades moves under armour but fights dismounted. While a BTR60 came in originally at 10 tons, the original Stryker came in at around 18 but reduced the crew to 2 and the dismounts to nine. The LAV III came in around the same but the gun system ups the crew to three and dramatically undermines the possible number of dismounts to 6 or 7.

I think one has to take into consideration that by the time we were getting serious about replacing the M113 and AVGP families, the Army was already focusing away from Cold War concepts to a medium-weight force more useable for a continuum of OOTW and not so much high-intensity war - more like an AVGP on steroids rather than a BTR60 or BMP. It's when I first came across the 2003 CFP 321(6) Combat Team (Interim) showing discussions of infantry dismounting short, on or beyond the objective that I got the hint that some folks were still thinking Cold War and using LAV IIIs as IFVs. I'm not sure if CFP 321(6) is still in the same form but my guess is it probably still exists as an interim document and is still what governs combined arms tactics in the Army.

IMHO, the initial Soviet approach to tank v motor rifle formations and equipment is still sound albeit needs to be massively upgraded for modern vehicles and weapons. I do not think that it is possible to make an efficient multi-purpose force. It will always be hamstrung at the extreme ends of the spectrum neither strong nor capable enough to be heavy (due to lack of the right vehicle or weapons) or to be light (due to lack of dismounts).

Do we have to make do with the LAVs we have. Absolutely. That, however, does not make them a good multi-purpose solution.