Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

I think we agree that the LAV isn’t an IFV, however at times it needs to be used as one.

And I think that that is the most dangerous statement I have ever seen you utter.

Consider:

The Infantry Squad Vehicle isn't an IFV, however at times it needs to be used as one?

Any tool's limitations need to be considered before it is used.

 

[markppcli]

I think we agree that the LAV isn’t an IFV, however at times it needs to be used as one.

Well it is, by all definitions an IFV. Is it the most protected of all IFVs ? No. Will I protect its dismounts for all but dedicated anti armour direct fire? Yes. So it’s capable of getting the guys to the fight, and supporting them in it. As opposed to say an ISV which is so incomparable as to be an absurdist argument.

As Canada doesn’t have an IFV so in areas where there is significant artillery, I think one would prefer the LAV to drive on in to the objective so one isn’t dismounted and walking for a KM or two onto the objective while being shelled.

Very much, better to be vulnerable to ATGMs, that will pop everything anyways, than be vulnerable and slow to all direct and indirect fire for the whole approach to an objective.

But the LAV being crewed by infantry does make it more likely that the LAV will support the dismounts when needed, and the crew understands what the dismounts need and will do a great deal better than Armor would.

Yes very much so; organic vs attached. There’s good reason that virtually every military functions this way.

Even with a Heavy Tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle, not having the dismounts who are familiar with the system is crippling on long term operational capabilities.
@markppcli has pointed out the advantages of spare gunners and drivers in terms of turret watch and admin movements, as well as the advantages for maintaining the systems with more hands.

Spares for casualties are a real thing, people will get hurt be that by the enemy or by any other method you need to be able to fill that gap in some way. French tank companies used to have spares in a vab following them around, don’t know that that’s a realistic solution for Canada. I cannot think of a military that splits crew from dismounts, beyond NZ and they do an awful job being “mechanized.”

 

[Kirkhill]

I think we agree that the LAV isn’t an IFV, however at times it needs to be used as one.

 

[KevinB]

You’re the guy who constantly quotes Rumsfeld.

My point is when you don’t have a screwdriver, you hammer a lot of ‘threaded nails’…

I fully believe Canada should have a Tracked Heavy IFV to operate with the tanks as a true Combined Armor formation.
But you don’t.
So in lieu of that some hard decisions need to be made if Canada was to be engaged in a High Intensity Conflict with another Nation.

 

[GR66]

Well it is, by all definitions an IFV. Is it the most protected of all IFVs ? No. Will I protect its dismounts for all but dedicated anti armour direct fire? Yes. So it’s capable of getting the guys to the fight, and supporting them in it. As opposed to say an ISV which is so incomparable as to be an absurdist argument.

I agree with @markppcli that the LAV is by definition an IFV...maybe not the IFV that many here would like for a true "heavy" force, but it is and IFV. While it is physically larger that we might like, doesn't have the off road mobility of a tracked IFV and the ability to keep up with tanks (which are another whole kettle of stinking, rotten fish for Canada) and may be under-armed/under-supported by key variants, it can fulfill an IFV role in many terrains and against many potential enemies.

The problem with taking the view of "it's not an IFV" and adjusting our doctrine to use it just as an APC is that not only would we let our combined arms skills atrophy (which we need to keep, especially if we ever do get a more suitable tracked IFV), but also we'd lose any incentive we have to upgrade our existing LAV fleet to provide the enablers we need to make them more effective.

 

[ueo]

What exactly is DND/CAF management managing?

The institution(s)?
Crises?
Surveillance Operations?
The Land Battle?
Other stuff?

All of the above?

And why is it "army-centric"? Or even "infantry-centric"?

Even as Ukraine fights an existential war of survival I am struck by how much "normal" life needs have to be addresses and, especially when compared to the Operation Barbarossa era, how few "troops" are actually engaged by both sides. And also by how many other non-infantry/non-army skills are engaged in "managing" the war effort.

Next posting / promotion. The devil to the rest!

 

[BrianWL]

I forget where we were talking about what but a note about TTPs for Javelins and their employment at what level for Ukranians after the war.

an earth mover!! wow !! great tech, rather than the FN CShovel, or FN Cpick........

 

[markppcli]

45:59 for the use of IFVs and their critical use. See the aforementioned RUSI report for the advantages of autocannon s.

 

[FJAG]

I agree with @markppcli that the LAV is by definition an IFV...maybe not the IFV that many here would like for a true "heavy" force, but it is and IFV.

One has to agree on the definition fitting. It's the degree in which it's an IFV, as you point out, where it suffers. I liken it to the Ross rifle. By definition it was a rifle, and in some respects a good one. It was just the wrong rifle for that war.

The problem with taking the view of "it's not an IFV" and adjusting our doctrine to use it just as an APC is that not only would we let our combined arms skills atrophy (which we need to keep, especially if we ever do get a more suitable tracked IFV), but also we'd lose any incentive we have to upgrade our existing LAV fleet to provide the enablers we need to make them more effective.

This is a point that I favour. Skill fade is very real. It's why I always argued that even if we'd borrowed US Army Avengers to keep our AD skills alive it would have been beneficial. But we needed the PYs elsewhere. Having interim training equipment, however, is only of value if there is a concrete plan to acquire the actual operational equipment at some point.

If there is no plan to acquire actual IFVs then you might as well give up the training as being both a) useless and b) dangerous as you will go to war with less than adequate equipment regardless of your skill in using it. OTOH, sometimes you just have to accept the fact that you may need to fight under conditions that are less than ideal. That's both a political and military risk that needs to be clearly understood and accepted. My worry is that the politicians do not understand the risks and that the military is understating them until they get to a crisis point and are forced to admit that: we can't do that anymore.

 

[markppcli]

One has to agree on the definition fitting. It's the degree in which it's an IFV, as you point out, where it suffers. I liken it to the Ross rifle. By definition it was a rifle, and in some respects a good one. It was just the wrong rifle for that war.

I suppose that’s fair, although I remain unconvinced of the assessments that the LAV 6 isn’t adequately protected. Just as I’ve not really had huge mobility issues but that’s just my experience and I would agree tracks are better for tactical mobility.

This is a point that I favour. Skill fade is very real. It's why I always argued that even if we'd borrowed US Army Avengers to keep our AD skills alive it would have been beneficial. But we needed the PYs elsewhere. Having interim training equipment, however, is only of value if there is a concrete plan to acquire the actual operational equipment at some point.

If there is no plan to acquire actual IFVs then you might as well give up the training as being both a) useless and b) dangerous as you will go to war with less than adequate equipment regardless of your skill in using it. OTOH, sometimes you just have to accept the fact that you may need to fight under conditions that are less than ideal. That's both a political and military risk that needs to be clearly understood and accepted. My worry is that the politicians do not understand the risks and that the military is understating them until they get to a crisis point and are forced to admit that: we can't do that anymore.

Against this is all based on the assumption of inadequate protection. I don’t see it, and I don’t know what level of protection would be deemed appropriate. It’s easy to say “needs to be better protected” okay against what threat and what level of protection ? Nothing will take an atgm and keep rolling, but surely taking just about anything up to that is acceptable in an IFV? No one here would doubt that the Uhlan / Pizarro / ASCOD is an IFV; but it offers less armour than the LAV so what’s the acceptable line or is it just about tracks ?

 

[KevinB]

I suppose that’s fair, although I remain unconvinced of the assessments that the LAV 6 isn’t adequately protected. Just as I’ve not really had huge mobility issues but that’s just my experience and I would agree tracks are better for tactical mobility.



Against this is all based on the assumption of inadequate protection. I don’t see it, and I don’t know what level of protection would be deemed appropriate. It’s easy to say “needs to be better protected” okay against what threat and what level of protection ? Nothing will take an atgm and keep rolling, but surely taking just about anything up to that is acceptable in an IFV? No one here would doubt that the Uhlan / Pizarro / ASCOD is an IFV; but it offers less armour than the LAV so what’s the acceptable line or is it just about tracks ?

Honestly the 6.0 is pretty well armored.
Not as much as a Bradley A4, but I’m not sure the differences would be significant in a conflict, if it were not for the mobility issue.

The main issue I have is from seeing the USMC LAV’s in Fallujah, and Ramadi, that wheels are not ideal in urban fighting, and my own experiences in the AVGP and LAV III off-road compared to M113 and Bradley that has me heavily favoring tracks when it comes to working with Tanks.


I would also suggest that regardless of what many seem to feel about tank massing and usage, that tanks need an IFV for integral support, and that tanks alone aren’t the breakout asset they used to be.

 

[suffolkowner]

I suppose that’s fair, although I remain unconvinced of the assessments that the LAV 6 isn’t adequately protected. Just as I’ve not really had huge mobility issues but that’s just my experience and I would agree tracks are better for tactical mobility.



Against this is all based on the assumption of inadequate protection. I don’t see it, and I don’t know what level of protection would be deemed appropriate. It’s easy to say “needs to be better protected” okay against what threat and what level of protection ? Nothing will take an atgm and keep rolling, but surely taking just about anything up to that is acceptable in an IFV? No one here would doubt that the Uhlan / Pizarro / ASCOD is an IFV; but it offers less armour than the LAV so what’s the acceptable line or is it just about tracks ?

Thats the thing right. Im curious how poorly or well the LAV 6 measures up on mobility, protection, an firepower vs the alternatives. Or does everyone just love tracks. For the record I love tracks, Ive spent some time on tracked vehicles just not military ones

 

[KevinB]

Thats the thing right. Im curious how poorly or well the LAV 6 measures up on mobility, protection, a firepower vs the alternatives. Or does everyone just love tracks. For the record I love tracks, Ive spent some time on tracked vehicles just not military ones

While I’ve never worked with the LAV 6.0, and speaking from a LAV III as my last experience.

Mobility: Excellent on road performance, but limited off road mobility compared to similar weight tracked vehicles. If you hit a trench when driving a LAV you might either ripped a wheel off, or drop it (and the related sudden stopping issues) into the trench resulting in an effective mobility kill. Stumps and rocks can be a major problem as well. Rubble and debris from urban combat often will destroy the tires and quickly degrade the run flats to make a mobility kill.

Armor: The LAV 6.0 added a lot more armor than the III, for a resulting large increase in weight (which leads me to suspecting off route mobility was impacted negatively), the blast, crush, penetration models and tests are all non OS, but I don’t have any reason to believe it wasn’t a significant improvement from the 3.

Firepower: This is a problem area dependent on role.

1) Most new IFV now have 35mm or larger cannon, and ATGM’s. The 25mm M242 Bushmaster cannon was the gold standard in the 80’s through Y2K, it’s a very effective round against most targets, Canada doesn’t have the APFSDS-DU round which offers a lot more pen, but frankly an IFV should be trying to gun for a MBT with a cannon anyway. There is no effective round for 25mm air defense.

2) Most IFV have an integrated ATGM to allow for MBT or Longer Range Engagement of enemy positions and AFV’s.

3) Older IFV/AFV Fire Control stab systems aren’t setup to track UAS, so in addition to not having and effective round for engagement, the FCS is not designed to that that.

 

[Kirkhill]

You’re the guy who constantly quotes Rumsfeld.

My point is when you don’t have a screwdriver, you hammer a lot of ‘threaded nails’…

Aye, I do.

And I believe that.

But

I have a buddy with a nail gun. Better I should keep my screwdriver in good shape by using it as God intended and let my Buddy go to town with his nail gun.

I am not going to be working the same patch as my buddy but if I'm screwing around then that is something he doesn't have to do.

I fully believe Canada should have a Tracked Heavy IFV to operate with the tanks as a true Combined Armor formation.

Agreed

But you imply that we have tanks - judging from some of the commentary based on

small numbers
multiple types (A4, A4M, A6, ARV, AEV)
readiness

Do we really?

But you don’t.

Agreed.

And I would argue we don't have enough tanks to justify a dedicated armoured formation. We do have enough tanks, perhaps, to consider using them after the fashion of the Mobile Protected Fire Battalion planned for the US Light Divisions.

The logistics of dispatching a couple of tank troops to support a Battle Group mission would seem to not be beyond us - and the mix and match nature of our fleet would be less of a problem.

So in lieu of that some hard decisions need to be made if Canada was to be engaged in a High Intensity Conflict with another Nation.

Hard questions indeed. Do we choose to engage in a High Intensity Conflict? If so how best can the screwdriver we own be applied?

I choose to concentrate on refining our abilities to screw around.

You can bash on with your very effective nail guns.

Do we need a new drill?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I really think the LAV 6 should be called the HAVW 6. You got tracked IFV weight, without the mobility. It would seem from the armchair view that it would have been better to have improved the LAV III, while staying in the weight range and then add a heavier armoured and armed tracked IFV for doing the more intense conflicts. If your in a place like Mali, the LAV III would be excellent, in a place like Ukraine the heavier tracked IFV is better, but you can still use your LAV's as a fast moving reserve to bolster weak points.

 

[Kirkhill]

One has to agree on the definition fitting. It's the degree in which it's an IFV, as you point out, where it suffers. I liken it to the Ross rifle. By definition it was a rifle, and in some respects a good one. It was just the wrong rifle for that war.


This is a point that I favour. Skill fade is very real. It's why I always argued that even if we'd borrowed US Army Avengers to keep our AD skills alive it would have been beneficial. But we needed the PYs elsewhere. Having interim training equipment, however, is only of value if there is a concrete plan to acquire the actual operational equipment at some point.

If there is no plan to acquire actual IFVs then you might as well give up the training as being both a) useless and b) dangerous as you will go to war with less than adequate equipment regardless of your skill in using it. OTOH, sometimes you just have to accept the fact that you may need to fight under conditions that are less than ideal. That's both a political and military risk that needs to be clearly understood and accepted. My worry is that the politicians do not understand the risks and that the military is understating them until they get to a crisis point and are forced to admit that: we can't do that anymore.

The Leo 1 Tank Trainer -

Which was actually deployed in numbers and overlapped both the Leo 1 and the Coyote.

We talk about the what ifs but we are staring "what if" in the face. We are closer to dealing with Rumsfeld's reality.

What can we do with what we have?

If everybody is satisfied that the LAV6.0 can operate as a Bradley/Warrior/Marder/CV90 substitute, much less a Narmer, then I will shut up. But, with very few exceptions I am not hearing that from the discussions on this board or in the CAF literature.

And before we start swapping old kit for new kit we need to be buying new kit to fill the gaps that the old kit doesn't cover.

 

[Kirkhill]

Looking at the article on the mobile, multi-nodal FARP system discussed under the Helicopters, the comment that on a two week exercise the Brits drove 1500 km setting up and tearing down FARPS - and in Britain it is difficult to drive 1500 km at the best of times -, and based on the Russian logistic failure and the Ukrainians ability to exploit their long interior lines of communication - I have no doubt that 5 or 6 battalions of LAVs and 7 recce squadrons can be very gainfully employed.

Equally I have no doubt that 3 light battalions would find work.

Where I pause is when trying to fit the LAV in the US Penetration Division construct.

As for guns, radars, UAVs, rocket launchers, trucks and wreckers and backhoes - More, more, more.

 

[Kirkhill]

My model for Canada in a High Intensity Conflict

The Great Raid of 2014, also known as the Raid of the 95th Brigade, took place from July 19 to August 10, 2014, during the war in eastern Ukraine. According to official information, units of the Ukrainian 95th Air Assault Brigade, reinforced with assets from the 25th Airborne and 30th and 51st Mechanized Brigades, conducted a 470 km raid, of which 170 km were behind enemy lines. During the raid, the 95th Brigade paratroopers entered into armed clashes with the Russian Army.

Great Raid of 2014 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[markppcli]

I really think the LAV 6 should be called the HAVW 6. You got tracked IFV weight, without the mobility. It would seem from the armchair view that it would have been better to have improved the LAV III, while staying in the weight range and then add a heavier armoured and armed tracked IFV for doing the more intense conflicts. If your in a place like Mali, the LAV III would be excellent, in a place like Ukraine the heavier tracked IFV is better, but you can still use your LAV's as a fast moving reserve to bolster weak points.

Unfortunately it came down to money. The LAV 6 purchase was an upgrade to the LAV 3 that we were able to get through because upgrades are easier than new procurement (the CCV project), and once that was approved the justification for CCV in an era of harsh budget cuts was made more difficult.

Mobility is an interesting topic; because it’s more of a series of trade offs that perhaps is being suggested. While on one hand tracks offer improved cross country mobility, that is offset by on road speed and some operational mobility. For what it’s worth I don’t find the LAV 6 to struggle that much in areas like Wainwright and suffield in comparison to say TLAVs. @KevinB is correct in the power to weight ratio, retuned engine gets a bit more go, but the felt effect is more profound in getting up hills than off road. For me anyways. What I actually miss about the LAV 3 is the barrel depression. I suppose one could argue that there’s serious benefits to road mobility if we have to ship LAVs to Europe in order to get them to the front.

There’s heavy criticism of it here, but that’s to be expected on a forum talking about change. Frankly were it me, and I was addressing the issues of the CAF replacing the LAV 6 fleet would be far far down my list.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There’s heavy criticism of it here, but that’s to be expected on a forum talking about change. Frankly were it me, and I was addressing the issues of the CAF replacing the LAV 6 fleet would be far far down my list.

As opposed to, for example, having some viable numbers of suitable artillery...