Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

The suspension on the TAPV is commercially available although limited in supply. Many HD Parts suppliers can source those parts through their suppliers. There are suspension companies domestically who can source, build and manufacture required parts.
Tail light warranty seems to be the thing of the day. Parts suppliers usually provide manufactures warranty. It would be interesting to see why we actually have a parts shortage. Is it actually lack of parts, lack of ordered parts or sole source contract and not willing to go outside of that to meet requirements.

No one is going to put third party equipment on a nearly new vehicle.
Given Textron has a different suspension for the TAPV than the M1117 ASV, Canada is somewhat limited.

You keep providing ways to game the system for repairs, which is a short term game for long term fail, and a major fail for operations overseas. The better method would be actually having a robust supply of OEM parts in the system, and tech’s to work on them, as you aren’t going to just be able to drive into a HD Truck Garage in Upper Mongolia to get replacement work done.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Looking at the proposed US Division structures, particularly the Heavy Division, would the reasoning (infantry mass) for the 2x ABCT + 1x SBCT structure hold true if scaled to the Bde level, ie 2x CAB's + 1x Stryker Bn?

If so,

-how much more realistic/ easier would it be for the PRes to provide the bulk of those Stryker Bn's than to be current and effective in turreted LAV's?
-how many American pattern triangular (1 tank 2 mech) CAB's could Gagetown handle?
-could Stryker Coy's effectively train at Meaford/Borden?

 

[Kirkhill]

No one is going to put third party equipment on a nearly new vehicle.
Given Textron has a different suspension for the TAPV than the M1117 ASV, Canada is somewhat limited.

So we have to do the hardest thing in the world and admit an error?

Send the TAPVs back to Textron and tell them to rework them to the ASV standard and take the tire (and crane) off the roof?

 

[Kirkhill]

Looking at the proposed US Division structures, particularly the Heavy Division, would the reasoning (infantry mass) for the 2x ABCT + 1x SBCT structure hold true if scaled to the Bde level, ie 2x CAB's + 1x Stryker Bn?

If so,

-how much more realistic/ easier would it be for the PRes to provide the bulk of those Stryker Bn's than to be current and effective in turreted LAV's?
-how many American pattern triangular (1 tank 2 mech) CAB's could Gagetown handle?
-could Stryker Coy's effectively train at Meaford/Borden?

Once upon a time the PRes was entrusted with Grizzlies and Bisons. There isn't much difference between a Bison and a Stryker conceptually. The big problem with the older vehicles was their distribution. It would have made more sense (for the PRes - not the Regs @markppcli) for the Bisons to be centralized in the Training Centres and have them crewed and maintained by Service Battalion personnel.

The AVGP turrets (the Grizzlies) they presented the same problems as the LAVs. With the turret they became "fighting vehicles" and not "log vehicles".


With respect to the size of training areas I just took a look at the Wainwright area and deducted a 5 km fringe from its perimeter. The assumption was that a force at Wainwright could be surrounded on all sides and that the opposition force had access to 81mm mortars and 5 km ATGMs.

When that 5 km zone was excluded the Wainwright manoeuver zone was highly constrained

 

[daftandbarmy]

Once upon a time the PRes was entrusted with Grizzlies and Bisons. There isn't much difference between a Bison and a Stryker conceptually. The big problem with the older vehicles was their distribution. It would have made more sense (for the PRes - not the Regs @markppcli) for the Bisons to be centralized in the Training Centres and have them crewed and maintained by Service Battalion personnel.

The AVGP turrets (the Grizzlies) they presented the same problems as the LAVs. With the turret they became "fighting vehicles" and not "log vehicles".

I was in a Reserve Unit that had just 'shed' their Grizzlies. Their was much rejoicing.

It was impossible to get troops trained consistently, and in enough numbers, to run them as courses were never available. Maintenance was a nightmare as we were 100% dependent on thin CAF resources and it took forever to get them returned, even for minor fixes, and there were no training areas to use them properly. Regardless, enthusiastic, if misguided, CO's continued to insist that we had to train 'armoured Infantry' so most exercises went through the Kabuki Theatre of pretending alot of other things were in place (tanks, artillery etc etc) while doing alot of advancing in extended lines. Morale was, predictably, not good.

Assigning these vehicles to the militia, without fixing issues like this first, is a bad idea.

 

[IKnowNothing]

I was in a Reserve Unit that had just 'shed' their Grizzlies. Their was much rejoicing.

It was impossible to get troops trained consistently, and in enough numbers, to run them as courses were never available. Maintenance was a nightmare as we were 100% dependent on thin CAF resources and it took forever to get them returned, even for minor fixes, and there were no training areas to use them properly. Regardless, enthusiastic, if misguided, CO's continued to insist that we had to train 'armoured Infantry' so most exercises went through the Kabuki Theatre of pretending alot of other things were in place (tanks, artillery etc etc) while doing alot of advancing in extended lines. Morale was, predictably, not good.

Assigning these vehicles to the militia, without fixing issues like this first, is a bad idea.

How much of this remains an issue if "Stryker" rather than armoured/mech doctrine was bought into and adhered to, the units were equipped to a deployable standard for such, and exercises above sub-unit level took place in co-ordination with the RegF Bde to which the unit is assigned?

 

[Kirkhill]

I was in a Reserve Unit that had just 'shed' their Grizzlies. Their was much rejoicing.

It was impossible to get troops trained consistently, and in enough numbers, to run them as courses were never available. Maintenance was a nightmare as we were 100% dependent on thin CAF resources and it took forever to get them returned, even for minor fixes, and there were no training areas to use them properly. Regardless, enthusiastic, if misguided, CO's continued to insist that we had to train 'armoured Infantry' so most exercises went through the Kabuki Theatre of pretending alot of other things were in place (tanks, artillery etc etc) while doing alot of advancing in extended lines. Morale was, predictably, not good.

Assigning these vehicles to the militia, without fixing issues like this first, is a bad idea.

I was in at the same time and had the same problems.

That is why I became a fan of Beattie's Bisons. - But apparently the Regs were as well.

Agree entirely that a bigger problem is who gets to own this stuff. The Americans are going through the same discussion with the MPFS/MGS. How do you manage an essential, but niche, capability? It is most effectively employed in penny packets but most effectively maintained centrally.

 

[Rifleman62]

To the best of my knowledge, Beattie's Bisons where never issued to the PRes.

It was impossible to get troops trained consistently, and in enough numbers, to run them as courses were never available. (I wonder why, tinfoil hat). Maintenance was a nightmare as we were 100% dependent on thin CAF resources and it took forever to get them returned, (PRes vehs are the last priority at every Base) even for minor fixes, and there were no training areas (why issue to a Vancouver unit anyway) to use them properly.

 

[markppcli]

Looking at the proposed US Division structures, particularly the Heavy Division, would the reasoning (infantry mass) for the 2x ABCT + 1x SBCT structure hold true if scaled to the Bde level, ie 2x CAB's + 1x Stryker Bn?

If so,

-how much more realistic/ easier would it be for the PRes to provide the bulk of those Stryker Bn's than to be current and effective in turreted LAV's?
-how many American pattern triangular (1 tank 2 mech) CAB's could Gagetown handle?
-could Stryker Coy's effectively train at Meaford/Borden?

I think it’s actually doable to have the reserves man a Bn in each Bde. I’d argue that they shouldn’t have their vehicles held by Svc Bn (sorry @Kirkhill butnill never see that logic) but have them integral and crewed by RCAC reservists. While I’m a big fan of the Infantry crewing their own vehicles the realities of how many hats a guy with 34 days of training available per year can be expected to wear has to be met.

If we have to find a job for the TAPV, I’d argue we do because we aren’t going to get rid of them and we have a need for something that they can do (all be it badly), then my idea would be to issue all 500 or near enough to the RCAC reserve units and have them act as the Cavalry / mobility for motorized reserve Bns. By my reckoning it’ll take around 70 TAPV to provide enough lift for each of these Bns, and we have to assume spares, training and op reserved. 280 would give us the ability to have 4 motorized Bns, with plenty of spares, training, op stock, and the inevitable other jobs they’d be expected to fulfill. Will the TAPV be ideal? No. Will it be suitable? Unlikely. However unlike 90 percent of what we discuss here it exists, we have it, and it is paid for.

Once upon a time the PRes was entrusted with Grizzlies and Bisons. There isn't much difference between a Bison and a Stryker conceptually. The big problem with the older vehicles was their distribution. It would have made more sense (for the PRes - not the Regs @markppcli) for the Bisons to be centralized in the Training Centres and have them crewed and maintained by Service Battalion personnel.

When did the Bison get pulled from the reserves ? Honest question I knew it was purchased with that intention I just didn’t know they ever showed up. I also don’t know if they’ve ever really been used in the APC role.. ever frankly.

The AVGP turrets (the Grizzlies) they presented the same problems as the LAVs. With the turret they became "fighting vehicles" and not "log vehicles".


With respect to the size of training areas I just took a look at the Wainwright area and deducted a 5 km fringe from its perimeter. The assumption was that a force at Wainwright could be surrounded on all sides and that the opposition force had access to 81mm mortars and 5 km ATGMs.

When that 5 km zone was excluded the Wainwright manoeuver zone was highly constrained


View attachment 76527

This last part I don’t really understand? When we’re talking about training area constraints surely we’re talking about the ability to fire weapons and maneuver around in it? What is the 5k bubble intended prove or illustrate ?

 

[Kirkhill]

I think it’s actually doable to have the reserves man a Bn in each Bde. I’d argue that they shouldn’t have their vehicles held by Svc Bn (sorry @Kirkhill butnill never see that logic) but have them integral and crewed by RCAC reservists. While I’m a big fan of the Infantry crewing their own vehicles the realities of how many hats a guy with 34 days of training available per year can be expected to wear has to be met.

I'm good with the RCAC reservists manning them as well. In some ways it makes more sense than the Service Battalion. Leave the softsided vehicles to the Service Battalions and simplify echelon management?

If we have to find a job for the TAPV, I’d argue we do because we aren’t going to get rid of them and we have a need for something that they can do (all be it badly), then my idea would be to issue all 500 or near enough to the RCAC reserve units and have them act as the Cavalry / mobility for motorized reserve Bns. By my reckoning it’ll take around 70 TAPV to provide enough lift for each of these Bns, and we have to assume spares, training and op reserved. 280 would give us the ability to have 4 motorized Bns, with plenty of spares, training, op stock, and the inevitable other jobs they’d be expected to fulfill. Will the TAPV be ideal? No. Will it be suitable? Unlikely. However unlike 90 percent of what we discuss here it exists, we have it, and it is paid for.

I like it. As I suggested though, it might be worth returning the vehicles back to the factory for an A1 modification now that the CAF has had a chance to play with them and better understand how they might be used given their limitations.

When did the Bison get pulled from the reserves ? Honest question I knew it was purchased with that intention I just didn’t know they ever showed up. I also don’t know if they’ve ever really been used in the APC role.. ever frankly.

A good question. Bisons were purchased after I released. I understood them to have been purchased for the reserves as utility boxes on wheels. Wasn't it basically the USMC's LAV-L logistics vehicle which was also used for Mortar Carriers and MRTs?

This last part I don’t really understand? When we’re talking about training area constraints surely we’re talking about the ability to fire weapons and maneuver around in it? What is the 5k bubble intended prove or illustrate ?

Recognizing that a unit on wheels is going to move to get out of harms way when it can, and into harms way when it wants I was wondering what would happen if an enemy force armed with Javelins and 81mm mortars were to engage a Square Combat Team at Wainwright.

Instead of putting the opfor in the centre of the circle and allowing the Cbt Tm to engage a point target I was wondering what it looked like if the opfor were manoeuvering around the perimeter - dismounted and supported by light vehicles.

It looked to me as if the only "safe area" for the LAV/Leo Cbt Tm would be a tight area on the open ridge in the middle of Wainwright.

Based on that I wonder if Suffield isn't now a better place for even a Cbt Team to exercise? Gagetown's jungle and swamps present a different set of challenges.

Is Wainwright still the right place for mounted training? Or are Suffield and Shilo more appropriate?

 

[GK .Dundas]

There's a story that went around at the time of the purchase. That the reg force was sort of interested in Bison when it was first proposed. However it kind of fell under nice to have but we really don't have the money to spare.
And so it went until one day a couple of weeks prior to its delivery to reserve training centres .
When someone pointed that they had a real need and they were just sitting there.....in a parking lot in London ....just going to to waste...
And to be honest what were the reserve's do with them anyway...and the suddenly NDHQ suddenly had a visit from the Good Idea Fairy (tm.) And someone had noticed that the vehicles didn't come out of THEIR budget but some of else's budgets.
"Just think of the money we'll save . They cried " and thus it came to be.
I have to admit I sometimes wonder how the Reserves would have looked after several years with the Bison under their collective belts ?

 

[ArmyRick]

There's a story that went around at the time of the purchase. That the reg force was sort of interested in Bison when it was first proposed. However it kind of fell under nice to have but we really don't have the money to spare.
And so it went until one day a couple of weeks prior to its delivery to reserve training centres .
When someone pointed that they had a real need and they were just sitting there.....in a parking lot in London ....just going to to waste...
And to be honest what were the reserve's do with them anyway...and the suddenly NDHQ suddenly had a visit from the Good Idea Fairy (tm.) And some had noticed that the vehicles didn't come out of THEIR budget but some of else's budgets.
"Just think of the money we'll save . They cried " and thus it came to be.
I have to admit I sometimes wonder how the Reserves would have looked after several years with the Bison under their collective belts ?

I think we should purchase about 600 CV90s for the P RES and maybe some M109 Paladins as well, a few apaches, etc. All for the P RES.

Then the Reg Force can scoop them up just prior to delivery. See? There is a way to re-equip the army.

 

[IKnowNothing]

I think it’s actually doable to have the reserves man a Bn in each Bde. I’d argue that they shouldn’t have their vehicles held by Svc Bn (sorry @Kirkhill butnill never see that logic) but have them integral and crewed by RCAC reservists. While I’m a big fan of the Infantry crewing their own vehicles the realities of how many hats a guy with 34 days of training available per year can be expected to wear has to be met.

If we have to find a job for the TAPV, I’d argue we do because we aren’t going to get rid of them and we have a need for something that they can do (all be it badly), then my idea would be to issue all 500 or near enough to the RCAC reserve units and have them act as the Cavalry / mobility for motorized reserve Bns. By my reckoning it’ll take around 70 TAPV to provide enough lift for each of these Bns, and we have to assume spares, training and op reserved. 280 would give us the ability to have 4 motorized Bns, with plenty of spares, training, op stock, and the inevitable other jobs they’d be expected to fulfill. Will the TAPV be ideal? No. Will it be suitable? Unlikely. However unlike 90 percent of what we discuss here it exists, we have it, and it is paid for.

Thanks for this.

So elaborating on post 6282, scaling US Heavy Division structure to Canadian Bde's, making use of what we have.
80 tanks
18 Coy's worth of LAV's
4 (theoretical) Bn sets of TAPV's.

Adopt US pattern tank coy's (14) over our squadrons, US style mechanized CAB's (1 tank, 2 mech coy's) over our Mech battalions.

46 Tanks in Canada shared for training 6x (2 per RegF Armoured Regiment) 14 tank coy's- use sim's, TAPV's as tank trainers, etc as necessary
12 Lav coy's = 6x 2 Coy CAB's
1 LAV Coy + 66 LAV Recce = 4 Cav Squadron sets (one per RegF regiment)

Organize the 3 CMBG's as 2x Leo+Lav CAB + one TAPV Bn.
2x Full CAB sets + spares (34 tanks, 5 Coy sets of LAV's) + one Bn set of TAPV's + one cav squadron pre-positioned in Latvia
Continue with 3 stage MRP, each CAB spends 6 months of their committed year in Latvia, each TAPV bn flies over once every 3 years to join Bde level REFORGER style exercise.

Would need the ATGM and SHORAD UOR's expanded, and something similar to gain some SP155's.

LIB's chopped from the CMBG's to be organized into one single (geographically spread out) Light/Jaeger Bde.

 

[Rick Goebel]

To the best of my knowledge, Beattie's Bisons where never issued to the PRes.

The Calgary Highlanders had 7 of them for at least a few years.

 

[GK .Dundas]

The Calgary Highlanders had 7 of them for at least a few years.

I think those were probably Grizzlies .

 

[KevinB]

The Calgary Highlanders had 7 of them for at least a few years.

No PRes unit ever got Bisons - they where held at MTC's, until taken for the RegF.

The only Bisons's used as APC's where using RCMP as GIB's.

 

[childs56]

No one is going to put third party equipment on a nearly new vehicle.
Given Textron has a different suspension for the TAPV than the M1117 ASV, Canada is somewhat limited.

You keep providing ways to game the system for repairs, which is a short term game for long term fail, and a major fail for operations overseas. The better method would be actually having a robust supply of OEM parts in the system, and tech’s to work on them, as you aren’t going to just be able to drive into a HD Truck Garage in Upper Mongolia to get replacement work done.

Much of what you are saying is third party is actually sourced through the OEM. All those big truck parts places order parts from OEM, the companies who manufacture for example suspension are certified by the OEMs for doing the work.
Due to Canada's flawed procurement system we are stuck with little to any actual support. We need to look elsewhere to find, fix and repair the problems. Until we do something different we will keep getting the same results.
We are never going to get a robust supply of parts in the system. So we need to draw on what we can do not what we should do.

 

[KevinB]

Much of what you are saying is third party is actually sourced through the OEM. All those big truck parts places order parts from OEM, the companies who manufacture for example suspension are certified by the OEMs for doing the work.

I get that - but I tend to think Textron is not going to like anyone cutting out their profit margin.
They are also big enough to ensure that they can crush anyone who tries.

Due to Canada's flawed procurement system we are stuck with little to any actual support. We need to look elsewhere to find, fix and repair the problems. Until we do something different we will keep getting the same results.
We are never going to get a robust supply of parts in the system. So we need to draw on what we can do not what we should do.

I totally get you on wanting to solve the issue.
The problem is when you solve the issue locally - outside the system as it where - that the system doesn't show all of its warts.
The fact that the CAF has some of the weirdest costing structures for systems, and cannot get enough parts for those systems should be a flashing light.
Can the local method work for domestic (and especially PRes units) absolutely - but it should not need to, and IMHO doing it that way is actually larger disservice to the CAF, as the system doesn't learn when it is fixed from outside

Of course a Military that actually planned in advance would have conducted replacement programs for most of the vehicle fleets years ago.
Quite frankly the continued Pork Barreling to certain "preferred" organizations on inferior to less capable products should be called to account.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I'm good with the RCAC reservists manning them as well. In some ways it makes more sense than the Service Battalion. Leave the softsided vehicles to the Service Battalions and simplify echelon management?



I like it. As I suggested though, it might be worth returning the vehicles back to the factory for an A1 modification now that the CAF has had a chance to play with them and better understand how they might be used given their limitations.




A good question. Bisons were purchased after I released. I understood them to have been purchased for the reserves as utility boxes on wheels. Wasn't it basically the USMC's LAV-L logistics vehicle which was also used for Mortar Carriers and MRTs?



Recognizing that a unit on wheels is going to move to get out of harms way when it can, and into harms way when it wants I was wondering what would happen if an enemy force armed with Javelins and 81mm mortars were to engage a Square Combat Team at Wainwright.

Instead of putting the opfor in the centre of the circle and allowing the Cbt Tm to engage a point target I was wondering what it looked like if the opfor were manoeuvering around the perimeter - dismounted and supported by light vehicles.

It looked to me as if the only "safe area" for the LAV/Leo Cbt Tm would be a tight area on the open ridge in the middle of Wainwright.

Based on that I wonder if Suffield isn't now a better place for even a Cbt Team to exercise? Gagetown's jungle and swamps present a different set of challenges.

Is Wainwright still the right place for mounted training? Or are Suffield and Shilo more appropriate?

I do get bemused when you bust out Google Earth to try and make an oblique point. Is your point that light forces with ATGMs can use complex terrain to their advantage against mechanized forces? We know that. But the light forces do not get a free ride either when they fire real missiles and mortars. The force they are going against also gets to do something to frustrate them. That whole tactics thing.

So I am still not getting your point here. There is no "safe" place for anything. Terrain is a major factor in an estimate and different forces will have advantages and disadvantages in different terrain. Its one of the reasons that a commander might form a combat team or battle group with his forces.

Have you been in a mechanized combat team? What exercises have you been on? How do you think that exercise schemes of manouevre occur? Some can be "canned" against a static., obvious foe where we are getting the basics of manouevre and TTPs down. Others are much more free-play. None will be exactly like war since nobody is actually dying and thus they can take risks they would never do in real war where they or their people will actually die.

 

[childs56]

I get that - but I tend to think Textron is not going to like anyone cutting out their profit margin.
They are also big enough to ensure that they can crush anyone who tries.


I totally get you on wanting to solve the issue.
The problem is when you solve the issue locally - outside the system as it where - that the system doesn't show all of its warts.
The fact that the CAF has some of the weirdest costing structures for systems, and cannot get enough parts for those systems should be a flashing light.
Can the local method work for domestic (and especially PRes units) absolutely - but it should not need to, and IMHO doing it that way is actually larger disservice to the CAF, as the system doesn't learn when it is fixed from outside

Of course a Military that actually planned in advance would have conducted replacement programs for most of the vehicle fleets years ago.
Quite frankly the continued Pork Barreling to certain "preferred" organizations on inferior to less capable products should be called to account.

If I have to go through Textron to replace the Cummins engine or the Allison transmission when the local shop is 3000km away that makes no sense to me when we have shops locally with the training, expierance and know how to fix replace and repair. Those companies can provide services/ products overseas if required in short notice.