Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[markppcli]

I've been looking at the latest US Army proposed Divisional structures again and I think that a modified version of the Light Division 2030 could work for Canada.

("Canadianizations" noted in RED)
View attachment 77388

• Each of the three Brigades would have 1 x Reg Force Light Battalion and 2 x 30/70 Light Battalions (Reg Force HQ and 1 x Reg Force Company)
• In addition each Brigade would have a 4th Reg Force LAV Battalion allowing a Brigade to get "heavier", provide Mechanized Battle Groups for deployments and provide Mechanized forces for our NATO commitments
• The MPF Battalion would substitute the MPF platform for a LAV-based DFS vehicle (LAV with 105mm MPF turret or maybe 120mm Centauro II turret?)
• Divisional Cavalry Squadron would be a mix of MBTs (if we expand our fleet) and LAVs/TAPVs
• Divisional Artillery Regiments would mirror US Field Artillery Battalions with 1 x 155mm M777 Battery (Reg Force) and 2 x 105mm Batteries (Reserve). Like the Infantry Brigades each Artillery Regiment would add a 4th SP 155mm Battery (Reg Force) to deploy when the LAV Battalions are employed.
• Canadian-led Multinational Brigade would become the 3rd maneuver Brigade in NATO Multinational Division North and consist of the existing eFP Latvia Battle Group, a fly-over LAV Battalion and a fly-over Tank Regiment.

This system would allow Canada to force generate Reg Force Light or Mechanized Battle Groups. Provide NATO with the fly-over forces to expand eFP Latvia into a full Brigade. And (with mobilization of the Reserves) deploy a full Light Division. New equipment requirements would be limited:

• Missing enablers such as ATGMs, SHORAD, etc. that will have to be acquired regardless of the force structure we adopt.
• A DFS platform to fulfill the MPF role (could be the MPF platform or a LAV-based platform for fleet commonality)
• Additional tanks for the Divisional Cavalry Regiment beyond the 80 required for the fly-over Tank Regiment (60 prepositioned and 20 training) or the Cavalry Regiment will use DFS/ATGM LAVs instead.
• 3 x Batteries of a SP 155mm Howitzer (plus spares).
• 6 x Batteries of replacement 105mm Howitzers (plus spares)
• AD Batteries for 4th AD Regiment RCA

What does this LAV Bn look like ? What is the supposed advantage in that?

 

[GR66]

What does this LAV Bn look like ? What is the supposed advantage in that?

It would be a standard LAV Battalion. It simply provides flexibility for force generation by the Brigades.

• You can deploy a Battle Group (Reg Force LAV or Reg Force Light) and still have three Battalions in the Brigade available for mobilization/deployment if required.
• Gives additional building blocks within the overall division for Brigade Group deployments.
  • Heaviest would be the three LAV Battalions with an Artillery Regiment using the SP 155mm Batteries from each of the Regiments.
  • Mixed Brigades with 1-2 LAV Battalions together with 1-2 Light Battalions.
  • Fully Light Brigade with 3 x Light Battalions (with the LAV Battalions in reserve or available for NATO reinforcement)

 

[markppcli]

So the Bde are purely force generators then Vs field formations ?

I would like to see a Canadian structure built like this.



I’d form the remaining reserve units into their own Bde that would have to be heavily geographically dispersed but such is life. The Bdes can be brought up to strength to fight as formations. It would allow for 1 and 5 CMBG to maintain 1 BG deployed through a rotation of alternating Bn / Bde. 2 CMBG becomes the high readiness light Bde, capable of rapidly deploying up to two BGs simultaneously or the whole Bde on later notice.

The Reserve Bns in each Bde can either form a depth maneuver element or provide the inevitable other tasks in a rotational style deployment. Crew Replacemnts would parade at armouries close to bases with simulators and fall into shared equipment for field training.

I’d see divisional as 4 AD providing air defence and a mostly reserve HIMARS regiment located in Shilo or Gagetown where they have space to fire.

Obvious needs are AD, ATGM, SP Artillery, and Mortars.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So the Bde are purely force generators then Vs field formations ?

I would like to see a Canadian structure built like this.

View attachment 77390View attachment 77391View attachment 77392

I’d form the remaining reserve units into their own Bde that would have to be heavily geographically dispersed but such is life. The Bdes can be brought up to strength to fight as formations. It would allow for 1 and 5 CMBG to maintain 1 BG deployed through a rotation of alternating Bn / Bde. 2 CMBG becomes the high readiness light Bde, capable of rapidly deploying up to two BGs simultaneously or the whole Bde on later notice.

The Reserve Bns in each Bde can either form a depth maneuver element or provide the inevitable other tasks in a rotational style deployment. Crew Replacemnts would parade at armouries close to bases with simulators and fall into shared equipment for field training.

I’d see divisional as 4 AD providing air defence and a mostly reserve HIMARS regiment located in Shilo or Gagetown where they have space to fire.

Obvious needs are AD, ATGM, SP Artillery, and Mortars.

And about 4 times as much Infantry...

 

[markppcli]

And about 4 times as much Infantry...

Not really. It goes from 9 full Bns to 3 full Bns + 4 70/30 (each of 2 companies with a third 30/70). Plus a 10/90 Bn in each that would essentially be made up of the reservists presently making up a Bde, for example the 10/90 Bn in 1 CMBG would be the British Columbia regiment would would be made up all of reservists in BC.

 

[KevinB]

So the Bde are purely force generators then Vs field formations ?

I would like to see a Canadian structure built like this.

View attachment 77390View attachment 77391View attachment 77392

I’d form the remaining reserve units into their own Bde that would have to be heavily geographically dispersed but such is life. The Bdes can be brought up to strength to fight as formations. It would allow for 1 and 5 CMBG to maintain 1 BG deployed through a rotation of alternating Bn / Bde. 2 CMBG becomes the high readiness light Bde, capable of rapidly deploying up to two BGs simultaneously or the whole Bde on later notice.

The Reserve Bns in each Bde can either form a depth maneuver element or provide the inevitable other tasks in a rotational style deployment. Crew Replacemnts would parade at armouries close to bases with simulators and fall into shared equipment for field training.

I’d see divisional as 4 AD providing air defence and a mostly reserve HIMARS regiment located in Shilo or Gagetown where they have space to fire.

Obvious needs are AD, ATGM, SP Artillery, and Mortars.

I think you forgot to rename what should be 2 CER and 2 SVC in your 2Bde ORBAT

 

[markppcli]

I think you forgot to rename what should be 2 CER and 2 SVC in your 2Bde ORBAT

Probably, they’re works in progress. 4 Bde is still in the works while I figure out the least offensive names to group Ontario Reserve Regiments under. The Ontario Regiment is leading the charge at the moment.

 

[Kirkhill]

As I said higher, military service like that is a cultural trait de caractère of a country. We barely have enough workers for Tim Hortons and the wage is raising because of that.

Once someone is in the military worked hours doesn’t count. We spend our life on overtime.

I have been immersing myself recently in some history studies. Part of the way I have been trying to understand "history" is to put some personal, family "frames of reference" into the effort. Me. My wife and kids. Our parents. Our ancestors..... I find it connects the micro with the macro and makes things more understandable for me.

I was just going over some notes and it finally dawned on me when and where my late father-in-law joined up.

Cleas was a stoker in the RCNVR - emerged intact from the war after putting in his time in the Rosthern and on a "twin screw corvette" on the West Coast when he did the Kiska run in 1943.

Cleas joined in March 1942 at the height of the St. Lawrence Campaign when U Boats were dominating the waters from Cap Chat to Anticosti.

Cleas came from a small, virtually unilingual, francophone hamlet on the prairies that had only been in existence for about 50 years. There was one church in town and it was Roman Catholic. It is a fair bet that in March 1942 he wasn't getting much local community support for enrolling.
Despite that background he joined up for the RCNVR. For a job hunting U Boats. Not a natural fit for a prairie farm boy of any background. But he found the connection.

There is a codicile to this tale.

When Cleas came back home he got married and had kids. 20 years later his oldest son got married and Cleas met his son's new father in law and shook his hand. His son's new father-in-law had served in U-Boats. In the Gulf of St Lawrence and the North Atlantic.

A Canadian story.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I have been immersing myself recently in some history studies. Part of the way I have been trying to understand "history" is to put some personal, family "frames of reference" into the effort. Me. My wife and kids. Our parents. Our ancestors..... I find it connects the micro with the macro and makes things more understandable for me.

I was just going over some notes and it finally dawned on me when and where my late father-in-law joined up.

Cleas was a stoker in the RCNVR - emerged intact from the war after putting in his time in the Rosthern and on a "twin screw corvette" on the West Coast when he did the Kiska run in 1943.

Cleas joined in March 1942 at the height of the St. Lawrence Campaign when U Boats were dominating the waters from Cap Chat to Anticosti.

Cleas came from a small, virtually unilingual, francophone hamlet on the prairies that had only been in existence for about 50 years. There was one church in town and it was Roman Catholic. It is a fair bet that in March 1942 he wasn't getting much local community support for enrolling.
Despite that background he joined up for the RCNVR. For a job hunting U Boats. Not a natural fit for a prairie farm boy of any background. But he found the connection.

There is a codicile to this tale.

When Cleas came back home he got married an had kids. 20 years later his oldest son got married and Cleas met his son's new father in law and shook his hand. His son's new father-in-law had served in U-Boats. In the Gulf of St Lawrence and the North Atlantic.

A Canadian story.

Interesting. Ive always been told the prairies produced a disproportionate amount of sailors and Naval Officers in WW2.

 

[Kirkhill]

Interesting. Ive always been told the prairies produced a disproportionate amount of sailors and Naval Officers in WW2.

The prairies did. Some folks have suggested it was some combination of "not walking" and wanting to see something different than the "endless horizon".... Still others have suggested it was a perception of a safer gig than the trenches.

In March 1942 I don't think "safer" was foremost in Cleas's mind.

 

[Kirkhill]

But back to the toys.....

Another article about the Aussies swapping tanks and howitzers for missiles and changing their home defence effort from building mech brigades for the outback to

For the first time, the review addresses the need to harden Australia’s air bases and secure fuel supplies against attack from Australia’s north. In the past, these were couched in general terms; there are currently no hardened defense facilities.

And

“The current Australian Defence Force (ADF) force structure is based on a ‘balanced force’ model that reflects a bygone era. It does not adequately address our new strategic environment,” the review stated. “The ADF needs a much more focused force that can respond to the risks we face. It should be informed by net assessment and able to effect a strategy of denial.”

More missiles, less vehicles: Australia unveils strategic review

For the first time, the review addresses the need to harden Australia’s air bases and secure fuel supplies against attack from Australia’s north.

www.defensenews.com

Meanwhile the Germans seem to have cut a check.

400 MUSD for an additional 227 BvS10s.

This "comes after Germany, Sweden and the U.K. teamed up in December to collectively buy 436 of the company’s BvS10 rides for $760 million – 140 for Germany, 236 for Sweden and 60 for the British armed forces."

All of them currently own large fleets of BvS10s and Bv 202s and 206s. As do many other countries.

The comment has been made about the merits of the ancient, but simple, armoured box - the M113. The Ukrainians have been happy to get anything that will transport troops, in sections and teams. Armoured boxes, like the M113s, or even armoured trucks like MRAPs, Bushmasters and even Saxons. Or armoured pickup trucks. Weapons and sensors fits are generally light and expedient - max flex comes to mind.

The Bandvagons, to my mind, fill the bill for both domestic and foreign service. With and without armour.

Germany drops $400 million on additional all-terrain vehicles from BAE

The new order brings Germany's envisioned inventory to almost 370 BvS10 vehicles, which are optimized for operations in harsh conditions.

www.defensenews.com

Edit - in both the German, and the Multinational contracts - the per unit cost was 1.75 MUSD. (actually 1.76 and 1.74 for the pedants).

It would we nice if we could report our contract costs using the same reporting guidelines AS WELL AS reporting them using our national life cycle costing guidelines.

 

[Kirkhill]

And....

A2/AD

This "new" concept, as far as I am concerned, is simply National Defence. And Canada's contribution to global, and North American, and North Atlantic, and Northern Hemisphere stability is simply to secure all of that territory that we claim. 6 to 9 time zones out of the "Free World's" time zones. Roughly balancing Russia's 9.

If we did nothing else than secure our turf we would be doing our friends a great service.

The Sword, the Shield, and the Hedgehog: Strengthening Deterrence in NATO’s New Strategic Concept - War on the Rocks

When NATO leaders gathered in Lisbon in 1952, the Alliance hoped to have 50 divisions available to deter Soviet attack. By the end of the Cold War it had

warontherocks.com

Bring Back the Hedgehog

Finally, NATO should bring back its “hedgehog defense.” Like the hedgehog – a peaceful creature until attacked – the Cold War concept of “active defense” held the promise of deterring attack while minimizing the security dilemma associated with force build ups. It had three elements: covering forces, designed to ambush and disrupt the lead elements of an invading army; “defense in sector,” using natural terrain to channel the advance and attrite enemy forces; and counterattack to regain lost territory and target rear echelon forces. This concept later evolved from “linear” towards “maneuver” defense, exploiting new technology and doctrine (including the U.S. “AirLand Battle” concept). NATO military planners should update active defense from first principles, accounting for Russia’s own active defense concept. Several initial ideas are worth considering.

One idea for developing covering forces is “confidence building defense,” a late Cold War concept that balances between deterrence and provocation. It advocates a “spider in the web” of dispersed, highly mobile assets, with the option of quickly scaling up through prepositioned equipment and logistics. These could include the anti-tank weapons, portable drones, and artillery that have been exploited by Ukrainian armed forces for defense and counterattack. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments suggests modern guided rockets, artillery, and mortar systems (G-RAMM) could “significantly expand the geographic areas where Russian forces could face lethal threats like those they experienced in northern Ukraine.” Going further, the authors advocate a Baltic “mini A2/AD” strategy to overturn Russia’s offensive advantage of proximity by impeding access through G-RAMMs and short- and long-range air defense systems.

Long range precision strike would also enable targeting in depth in support of counterattacks, although their expense may require larger allies to provide or field them. A cheaper option may be the so-called “stay behind forces” developed by NATO during the Cold War using special forces and non-military clandestine units. To this end, an Atlantic Council report calls for expanding U.S. and European special operations forces activities, while the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment authors recommend establishing a new NATO Special Warfare Centre of Excellence in Estonia. More broadly, they argue a new NATO operational concept for “follow-on forces attack” could contribute “significantly” to deterring Russia.

Such a concept should include what Eisenhower called, the “very considerable sea and air power” possessed by NATO allies. In the air domain NATO should upgrade its existing air policing mission into an integrated air and missile defense mission. The air defense mission would require increasing the capacity of the multinational force that runs the NATO air policing missions in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, and Hungary, while updating pilots’ rules of engagement in anticipation of a more assertive Russian posture. However, the bulk of air contributions to active defense should be based in Western Europe to enhance survivability for counterattack missions. The missile defense mission would require deploying more medium- and long-range air defense systems to the region — for example increasing the number of Patriot or National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile systems deployed to Poland and the Baltics. Integration could be achieved through the existing framework of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence System.

As for the contribution of NATO’s maritime forces, one study advocates increasing the number of Standing NATO Maritime Groups from two to five to bolster NATO’s ability to patrol and secure its territorial waters, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The constant presence of the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force in the Baltic Sea also adds another layer of deterrence and should be enhanced — especially now that its headquarters has been deployed to the region. NATO’s maritime defense in the Baltic Sea region will also benefit from the addition of Finland and Sweden to the alliance. Maritime forces can also render NATO’s counterattack ability more potent through precision strike munitions launched from above and below the surface.

The final element in a new hedgehog defense for NATO is to deter so-called hybrid threats below the threshold of armed attack. These have been described as the modern Fulda Gap, or Russia’s most likely axis of attack. As NATO’s new concept points out, threats have proliferated in kind across space and cyberspace to encompass “the coercive use of political, economic, energy, information and other hybrid tactics.” Although a military alliance, NATO’s resources go far beyond conventional military capabilities, including sophisticated capabilities in strategic communications, information operations, cyber defense, offensive cyber, and counter-hybrid warfare teams. Here NATO would benefit from closer coordination with the European Union and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats based in Helsinki to spread best practice in Cold War style “total defense,” particularly as Finland and Sweden both excel in this department. Last month, Estonia’s largest ever military exercise showed how their reserve forces could operate with forces from ten NATO allies to put total defense into action. Its name? Exercise Hedgehog.

Just as during the Cold War, NATO’s challenge will increasingly be to deter all forms of aggression at once: sub-threshold, conventional, and nuclear. To meet the level of ambition agreed in its new strategic concept, NATO should revitalize deterrence by sharpening its sword, boosting its shield and bringing back its hedgehog defense. Madrid was an important point of departure for NATO, but the alliance’s journey toward stronger defense and deterrence has only just begun.

The hedgehog is cute and unthreatening.

Perhaps we can Canadianize it a bit.

 

[Kirkhill]

From the Aussie Defence Review - a plaintive moan that echoes through every western military (and dare I say the Kremlin)

“The system needs to abandon its pursuit of the perfect solution or process and focus on delivering timely and relevant capability,” it says.
“It means we have got to have a greater appetite for risk,” he said. “The way in which we built an aircraft in this country in World War II and the way in which the American industrial economy geared up in a matter of a year to produce what it did during World War II was to assume risk… This is not 1941 and we are not [in] 1939. We are not trying to paint that picture. But we are not in a benign environment either. We are in an environment where we need to have a changed relationship to risk.”

 

[daftandbarmy]

From the Aussie Defence Review - a plaintive moan that echoes through every western military (and dare I say the Kremlin)

“The system needs to abandon its pursuit of the perfect solution or process and focus on delivering timely and relevant capability,” it says.
“It means we have got to have a greater appetite for risk,” he said. “The way in which we built an aircraft in this country in World War II and the way in which the American industrial economy geared up in a matter of a year to produce what it did during World War II was to assume risk… This is not 1941 and we are not [in] 1939. We are not trying to paint that picture. But we are not in a benign environment either. We are in an environment where we need to have a changed relationship to risk.”

Based on this information I'd suggest that we are in a crisis of the good ol', historic, 'Good vs. Evil' type:

 

[OldSolduer]

From the Aussie Defence Review - a plaintive moan that echoes through every western military (and dare I say the Kremlin)

“The system needs to abandon its pursuit of the perfect solution or process and focus on delivering timely and relevant capability,” it says.
“It means we have got to have a greater appetite for risk,” he said. “The way in which we built an aircraft in this country in World War II and the way in which the American industrial economy geared up in a matter of a year to produce what it did during World War II was to assume risk… This is not 1941 and we are not [in] 1939. We are not trying to paint that picture. But we are not in a benign environment either. We are in an environment where we need to have a changed relationship to risk.”

The 80% solution works. If you wait for 100% then you’ll be waiting forever

 

[Kirkhill]

The 80% solution works. If you wait for 100% then you’ll be waiting forever

"Summat's better than nowt!" Or, if you prefer "Half a loaf is better than nane!"

 

[markppcli]

Perfect has always been the enemy of good enough. There’s a video on YouTube by “the Chieftan” commentating on the Polish acquisition of K2 tanks, to paraphrase him “they are modern, capable battle tanks that will do the job about as good as any other.” Ie the time spent debating a trialing which tank is ideal is often a waste Vs getting stank that can come into service quickly, and ideally at a good price point.

 

[KevinB]

And....

A2/AD

This "new" concept, as far as I am concerned, is simply National Defence. And Canada's contribution to global, and North American, and North Atlantic, and Northern Hemisphere stability is simply to secure all of that territory that we claim. 6 to 9 time zones out of the "Free World's" time zones. Roughly balancing Russia's 9.

If we did nothing else than secure our turf we would be doing our friends a great service.

The Sword, the Shield, and the Hedgehog: Strengthening Deterrence in NATO’s New Strategic Concept - War on the Rocks

When NATO leaders gathered in Lisbon in 1952, the Alliance hoped to have 50 divisions available to deter Soviet attack. By the end of the Cold War it had

warontherocks.com

The hedgehog is cute and unthreatening.

Perhaps we can Canadianize it a bit.

Canadian geography doesn’t require hedgehog or porcupine. It’s not the Baltics etc and doesn’t have a land border concern.

Domestically the only real thing Canada requires beyond NORAD a sensing ability towards the Arctic surface and Subsurface. Combined with Rapid Reaction Forces of Air, Sea and Land.

Due to that Geographical security, Canada thus has the freedom to create Expeditionary Forces. It behooves Canada to tailor those Expeditionary Forces into the needs of its Allies and to meet the requirements set by it’s Alliances.

On a dollars and sense aspect the RCN and RCAF clearly need expansion to facilitate those roles, and the CA needs to be restructured.

I would argue that 1) The CA requires a Light Mobile Force to provide QRF to Domestic Sovereignty (due to lacking RCAF and RCN capability for rapid transport of heavier assets) . 2) NATO feel that Canada needs to supply a Heavy CMBG, as it’s Army based commitment.

I would suggest the old adage that 2 is 1, 1 is none is fairly accurate given what we have seen from attrition in Ukraine.

Thus I would suggest that Canada’s minimum Army size would be 2 CMBG (or CABG), and 2 Light Bde Groups. This means even without looking at other contingency missions the CA needs 4 deployable Bde’s, 2 manned at 100% (a lt and hvy), and one of the CABG’s should be forward deployed, and the other’s equipment should be forward deployed as well, which would require forward deployment of support/maintenance personnel for those, as well as domestic training equipment, and a large acquisition of linked simulators to allow for formation training.

Furthermore without equipment any reserve is effectively useless.

 

[KevinB]

Perfect has always been the enemy of good enough. There’s a video on YouTube by “the Chieftan” commentating on the Polish acquisition of K2 tanks, to paraphrase him “they are modern, capable battle tanks that will do the job about as good as any other.” Ie the time spent debating a trialing which tank is ideal is often a waste Vs getting stank that can come into service quickly, and ideally at a good price point.

Poland also bought M1A2 SepV3 Abrams in a fairly sizable quantity, so I’d argue that they also understand that having some units with additional capabilities isn’t a bad thing.

 

[Kirkhill]

Canadian geography doesn’t require hedgehog or porcupine. It’s not the Baltics etc and doesn’t have a land border concern.

Domestically the only real thing Canada requires beyond NORAD a sensing ability towards the Arctic surface and Subsurface. Combined with Rapid Reaction Forces of Air, Sea and Land.

Due to that Geographical security, Canada thus has the freedom to create Expeditionary Forces. It behooves Canada to tailor those Expeditionary Forces into the needs of its Allies and to meet the requirements set by it’s Alliances.

On a dollars and sense aspect the RCN and RCAF clearly need expansion to facilitate those roles, and the CA needs to be restructured.

I would argue that 1) The CA requires a Light Mobile Force to provide QRF to Domestic Sovereignty (due to lacking RCAF and RCN capability for rapid transport of heavier assets) . 2) NATO feel that Canada needs to supply a Heavy CMBG, as it’s Army based commitment.

I would suggest the old adage that 2 is 1, 1 is none is fairly accurate given what we have seen from attrition in Ukraine.

Thus I would suggest that Canada’s minimum Army size would be 2 CMBG (or CABG), and 2 Light Bde Groups. This means even without looking at other contingency missions the CA needs 4 deployable Bde’s, 2 manned at 100% (a lt and hvy), and one of the CABG’s should be forward deployed, and the other’s equipment should be forward deployed as well, which would require forward deployment of support/maintenance personnel for those, as well as domestic training equipment, and a large acquisition of linked simulators to allow for formation training.

Furthermore without equipment any reserve is effectively useless.

Crap.

Canada either does the job itself or it relies on Your Tax Dollars to defend our airspace, our waters, our continental shelf and our resources - In other words we leave our resources in the ground until you decide when you want them taken out and sold to you and at what price.

Canada's porcupine needs

Intelligence
Info Affairs
Psyops
Cyber warfare
Electronic warfare
An Air Force
A Navy

And Mounties with Rifles and some willing citizens to assist them.

If you want a hand we might be able to spare you some time away from our Cyber Warfare desks or an Air Force Squadron or two or even some of our Navy's sea time.

As you regularly point out. We have no need for an Army ourself.