Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

I'm sure someone will note that Artillery can't hold and take ground.

Right enough

That being said, the situation now with NATO is very different even than the Allies during WWII. It's not an American Army and British Army and a Canadian Army working together in cooperation for an overall operational plan. NATO is 31 (going on 32) countries supplying interlocking lego-bricks to build an integrated Army (or that is the objective at least).

But here we have 32 lego-bricks alive to their situation (could one say "woke"?) that are looking for help holding ground so that they don't have to take ground. Ukraine, working in the same environment, with the same seasonal constraints and taking the full force of Russia's capabilities, has demonstrated what they need to do to "Hold".

What they have also demonstrated is that they have the will power to defend. They even have the bodies to defend. What they don't have are the weapons .... and the ammunition.

Specifically they need to control their "Approaches" - air, sea and land. And they have the age old problem of continental countries of not being able to act pre-emptively outside their borders because that will immediately be perceived as an aggressive act which will provoke the very war they want to prevent.

Unlike Britannia's Kids they don't have the "Waves" as a playground where they can posture, cajole and generally buy time.

Even the utility of Air Forces are constrained, in peace time, and at risk of being heavily degraded in the early days of a war.

We should be able to assist with that ---

With capabilities being more complex (and expensive) and the size of Armies in general shrinking, those lego blocks are getting smaller and smaller. Ukraine is a perfect example. Supporting nations are not equipping entire Ukrainian Battalions or Brigades, they are supplying individual weapon systems. The same is true within NATO with the eFP Battle Groups (expanding to Brigades).

Take a look at eFP Latvia as an example:

View attachment 77400
I don't see any reason why Canada's contribution has to be specifically a "Heavy" Brigade Group. I do think politically there is a need to have troops in the direct line of fire in order to maintain Alliance cohesion but I also believe that as long as the scale of the contribution we provide shows an equal level of commitment (and military effect) as a Brigade Group then I seriously doubt our Allies would complain.

Agree


D&B's comment about Artillery is particularly appropriate

Especially for a gun-shy nation with the politicians we have.

Thinking about coastal borders - The old 3 mile and 12 mile borders were established by the technology of the day - specifically the range of the guns and they ability of eyeballs and telescopes to control them.

Maritime countries could supplement that coastal force with free-ranging observation posts, commonly described as frigates, to keep enemies at bay and give advance warning. Those frigates are now supplemented by submarines and aircraft.

Continental countries are denied all of those advance forces and early warning assets. They are thus heavily, if not fully, reliant on Ground Based forces.

Without moving their feet how far into the enemy's country can they see?
Without moving their feet how far into the enemy's country can they reach?
Without moving their feet how much punishment can they absorb?

On Day Minus 1 they need the technology to fully understand the enemy's intentions -

That is a dollars and cents thing that allies can assist with - by contributing dollars and cents to the locals, by contributing kit, by contributing deployed "Special Observers" (pace article posted by @FJAG) and by contributing national assets currently engaged in doing exactly the same task for domestic purposes.

Those ISR assets represent dollars that have are critical to our national interests as well as supplying a base for international engagement.

On Day Zero they need the technology to react to the enemy's actions -

That is a speed of reaction thing that is entirely reliant on what is available to the locals without moving their feet. They need to be able to knock out anything coming their way. And that means reaction forces, on alert, that can react in seconds. In a world of missiles minutes are too long and for a country like Latvia their entire war could be over in hours. Those reaction forces need to be missile based to give that reaction time.

The first priority has to be a well supplied, multi-level, mutually supporting Ground Based Air Defence System. And every system should have a Long Range capability to defend as far forward, into the enemy territory, as possible. So every Air Defence System should run the gamut of ManPADs, V-Shorads, Shorads, M-Rads and L-Rads and even Theatre. Moscow should know that Latvia has the ability to take out Russian aircraft over Moscow as soon as they point their noses towards Latvia. It is not good enough to just play Space Invaders with incoming Russian missiles and being able to knock them out of the sky. That capability needs to be addressed with radar guided guns in the 20 to 76mm range. But that can't be the focus.

Moscow, or Peking, also needs to know that Latvia, or Taiwan, or South Korea, or Japan, has the ability to launch their own Long Range Precision Fires deep into their enemy's territory to disrupt airfields, missile launch sites, command posts, logistics hubs and form up points.

Those are "the more the merrier" assets. Those are the type of assets that allies like Canada should be able to deploy in advance of Day Zero, putting a small number of Canadians on the line with the locals that will supply a very welcome capability without straining the locals supply lines. A Canadian Mechanized Brigade literally takes bread out of the mouths of Latvian senior citizens and children. The bread for both comes via the same supply chain. So a troop of gunners with lots of missiles on hand would be a more welcome and valuable contribution.

On Day 7 they need to fill the identified gaps.

My expectation is that one of those gaps is going to be air cover. The Ukrainians did wonders by dispersing their kit, especially their air command and logistics assets prior to the Russians engaging. That is in addition to the moving of their aircraft, rotary and fixed, from airfields to highways and parking lots.

My thinking is that by Day 7 the Latvians would be appreciative of a Fast Jet force from Canada, in extremis launching missions from inside Latvia but more ideally launching from more secure bases in Sweden and Poland, maybe even Germany. They might also appreciate a Rotary Wing Wing deploying to Latvia to replenish lost Rotary Wing assets and restore local rapid response mobility. I would also think they would appreciate a steady inflow of supplies by Air Transport from all points of the globe - some local, some distant, some carrying large loads, some small. And ISR assets will always be welcome

So forward deploying Air Assets is less critical than other forces. That gives our national command chain time conduct a couple of polls and consult with a couple of gurus to determine if saving Latvia is worth their jobs at the next election.

By Day 30 the issue will have been decided or it will have bogged down and there will a steady bleed of troops that needs to be replaced -

There we have the opening for Canadian Infantry.

By Day 365, if things are still bogged, now you will be looking at the need for Reserves.


Note that I haven't engaged the RCN.

They, and their Brethren of the Seas will continue doing what they do in peace time - keep the sea lanes open to get bread into the mouths of Latvian senior citizens and any deployed Canadians (not to mention missiles, bullets and spares).


With respect to "taking ground" - The least aggressive posture is one that leaves that capability in the hands of the locals for local counter-attacks. Foreigners bringing that capability into theater can only look as if they are there to cross borders.

 

[Kirkhill]

WRT @GR66, @FJAG and @KevinB and their concern over my purloining of the word "Special"

I intentionally grabbed on to it precisely because the word "Special" is exactly like the words "thing" and "got", both of which I was regularly discouraged from using because they are about as informative as "Um!" and "Ah!"

In Canada we have, existing, a very small, competent body of people willing to undertake, on short notice, missions that the government deems to be necessary. In that sense they are Special operations. They are operations outside of the usual planning horizons. They are extraordinary. They may even be emergency operations.

The National Defence Act, provides for raising additional forces to undertake missions that the government deems to be necessary that are outside the usual planning horizons, that are extraordinary, that may even be emergency operations.

This follows on from the Special Force battalions raised for the Korean War and arguably the special circumstances under which the expeditionary forces were raised for WW2, Siberia, WW1 and the Boer War, even the Yukon Field Force.

Special doesn't have anything to do with the people engaged. They are not inherently Speshul any more that Slim's infamous Corps of Tree Climbers were Speshul.


If Special means "outside the usual planning horizons" then what are "the usual planning horizons"?

I don't know the extent of the horizons but I suspect that the minimum expectation starts with being able to assist the "mountie with a rifle" domestically.

 

[KevinB]

WRT @GR66, @FJAG and @KevinB and their concern over my purloining of the word "Special"

I intentionally grabbed on to it precisely because the word "Special" is exactly like the words "thing" and "got", both of which I was regularly discouraged from using because they are about as informative as "Um!" and "Ah!"

In Canada we have, existing, a very small, competent body of people willing to undertake, on short notice, missions that the government deems to be necessary. In that sense they are Special operations. They are operations outside of the usual planning horizons. They are extraordinary. They may even be emergency operations.

The National Defence Act, provides for raising additional forces to undertake missions that the government deems to be necessary that are outside the usual planning horizons, that are extraordinary, that may even be emergency operations.

This follows on from the Special Force battalions raised for the Korean War and arguably the special circumstances under which the expeditionary forces were raised for WW2, Siberia, WW1 and the Boer War, even the Yukon Field Force.

Special doesn't have anything to do with the people engaged. They are not inherently Speshul any more that Slim's infamous Corps of Tree Climbers were Speshul.


If Special means "outside the usual planning horizons" then what are "the usual planning horizons"?

I don't know the extent of the horizons but I suspect that the minimum expectation starts with being able to assist the "mountie with a rifle" domestically.

You are absolutely missing the issues.
It worked in days of old when you got issued a rifle and helmet and off you went.

It simply doesn’t work in this day and age for anything BUT territorial defense forces.

 

[Halifax Tar]

You are absolutely missing the issues.
It worked in days of old when you got issued a rifle and helmet and off you went.

It simply doesn’t work in this day and age for anything BUT territorial defense forces.

How is that different from what the Ukraine is doing right now, and most certainly Russia, ?

A prolonged conflict will adjust our equipment and training expectations to good enough for both.

 

[Kirkhill]

You are absolutely missing the issues.
It worked in days of old when you got issued a rifle and helmet and off you went.

It simply doesn’t work in this day and age for anything BUT territorial defense forces.

And I am relying on that -

I am relying on the locals to defend themselves to the greatest extent possible. And their willingness to accept whatever help they can get their hands on.

Bodies with helmets and rifles are not their priority. Helmets and rifles for THEIR bodies are a priority. Along with NLAWs and Javelins and mines and radios and pickup trucks and other kit that the average Starbucks customer can operate with 15 minutes of instruction.

Another priority is Information. You can never have too much of that.

And another priority is all of the big bucks, high tech, gee-whiz kit, with qualified operators, that they can never get enough of because they can't afford it.


Porcupines and hedgehogs have long quills and short ones. I am relying on the locals in Europe to supply the short ones.

Australia is shifting to long quills at the expense of short quills. It is looking at subs, ships, missiles and aircraft to reach deep into their approaches, without moving their feet, while reducing their short quills, betting on there being little chance of a tank war in the outback.

I believe our situation to be more analogous to Australia's than Latvia's.

Here is our Area of Operations. Effectively the area we are required to cover, and the area we can cover "without moving our feet"

We have freedom to roam within those bounds. And we have freedom, within those bounds, to forward deploy the longest quills we can buy.

 

[KevinB]

And I am relying on that -

I am relying on the locals to defend themselves to the greatest extent possible. And their willingness to accept whatever help they can get their hands on.

Bodies with helmets and rifles are not their priority. Helmets and rifles for THEIR bodies are a priority. Along with NLAWs and Javelins and mines and radios and pickup trucks and other kit that the average Starbucks customer can operate with 15 minutes of instruction.

Another priority is Information. You can never have too much of that.

And another priority is all of the big bucks, high tech, gee-whiz kit, with qualified operators, that they can never get enough of because they can't afford it.


Porcupines and hedgehogs have long quills and short ones. I am relying on the locals in Europe to supply the short ones.

Australia is shifting to long quills at the expense of short quills. It is looking at subs, ships, missiles and aircraft to reach deep into their approaches, without moving their feet, while reducing their short quills, betting on there being little chance of a tank war in the outback.

I believe our situation to be more analogous to Australia's than Latvia's.

Here is our Area of Operations. Effectively the area we are required to cover, and the area we can cover "without moving our feet"

We have freedom to roam within those bounds. And we have freedom, within those bounds, to forward deploy the longest quills we can buy.

And you are totally fucked in the ass if America was to do the same.

You are in NATO. You can’t ignore that.

 

[Kirkhill]

And you are totally fucked in the ass if America was to do the same.

You are in NATO. You can’t ignore that.

NATO is a contractual agreement. No more. No less.

Has it value? Yes.
Should it be honoured? Yes
How should it be honoured? That depends.
When should it be honoured? That depends.
Will the US honour it? That depends.

Edit: and WRT this -

fucked in the ass

Keep up with the times. Not the threat it once was.

 

[KevinB]

How is that different from what the Ukraine is doing right now, and most certainly Russia, ?

A prolonged conflict will adjust our equipment and training expectations to good enough for both.

How does that help Canada in anyway?

Big threat of invasion?

 

[Halifax Tar]

How does that help Canada in anyway?

Big threat of invasion?

I may have missed your point but I was referencing the actual requirement for long training cycles and programs and the same for equipment procurement, and questioning their necessity.

 

[GR66]

You can’t do with a BtlGroup or Bde what you can do with a Div.
I’m vehemently against the Battle Group, as it’s really just a Bde Minus, as you still need the HQ and support portions when you deploy it by itself.

Question - do you believe that Canada will in the foreseeable future deploy or have the capability to deploy a full Division complete with the required enablers and be able to sustain it in combat? If not, then we'll be contributing forces to an allied Division. Do you then waste the resources required to create a deployable Division structure that will never deploy or do you focus those resources into the building blocks of a Division that we can deploy?

You may hate the Battle Group but I predict that the coming decades, just like the Cold War, will see a great deal of conflict in periphery states as the major powers fight for advantage as opposed to direct invasion of each other's territories. I'd be willing to bet you'll see Canadian Battle Groups deployed to hot spots long before you ever see a Division in the field.

I agree with you, but simply from a Canadian Sovereignty issue, there may be things you will need to go alone on, or at very least have the capacity to go it alone.

Absolutely. We should certainly try to put the enablers in place to allow Canada to conduct operations independently, but I honestly don't see that necessarily requiring Divisional level force structures. We may want certain capabilities that match or even exceed Divisional level requirements (artillery and AD for example) but you don't need Divisions to have those capabilities available.

The USN and USAF to that.
Nothing Canada will every afford can do it.
Sorry the new CSC and F-35 aren’t being acquired in any valid number to actually do anything to protect Canada.

The fact the RCN and RCAF are getting new items is a major boost, but it’s not enough without my tax dollars funding the US Military.

This goes to my point that both the RCN and RCAF are woefully under sized. Do I expect a country of 39 million people crammed into a thin strip along their Southern border to be able to field forces capable of defending the 2nd largest country on the planet all by itself? Of course not. But I'm sure that the US would be greatly appreciative of a RCN with an extra dozen Corvettes, a dozen subs and dozens of unmanned platforms to assist them as well as an RCAF with more fighters, MPAs and transport/refueling aircraft too.

The Army on the other hand is FUBAR. It pretty much needs to be rebuilt from the ground up.

Agreed. We're just debating on exactly what should be built.

 

[KevinB]

I may have missed your point but I was referencing the actual requirement for long training cycles and programs and the same for equipment procurement, and questioning their necessity.

My point is, in threat of invasion, Canada is screwed anyway.
Ukraine has survived due to Western equipment, or they’d be fighting with pitchforks.
Russia has continued by throwing manpower and their exceptionally deep pool of old equipment and munitions.

Neither of those would apply to Canada, as the only Country that could launch a credible invasion is America, but there would be no equipment coming and Canada has no in reserve.

Question - do you believe that Canada will in the foreseeable future deploy or have the capability to deploy a full Division complete with the required enablers and be able to sustain it in combat? If not, then we'll be contributing forces to an allied Division. Do you then waste the resources required to create a deployable Division structure that will never deploy or do you focus those resources into the building blocks of a Division that we can deploy?

I’m not sure it needs to be a deployable Div, but @FJAG made a good point that to train Brigades to work with coalitions, you need to have some sort of Div entity that they report to etc.

You may hate the Battle Group but I predict that the coming decades, just like the Cold War, will see a great deal of conflict in periphery states as the major powers fight for advantage as opposed to direct invasion of each other's territories. I'd be willing to bet you'll see Canadian Battle Groups deployed to hot spots long before you ever see a Division in the field.

I hate them because they are incredibly stupid as a deployment entity, and require significant resources and personnel above the BattleGroup that it’s just a cheap one personnel and equipment way to deploy a Bde

Absolutely. We should certainly try to put the enablers in place to allow Canada to conduct operations independently, but I honestly don't see that necessarily requiring Divisional level force structures. We may want certain capabilities that match or even exceed Divisional level requirements (artillery and AD for example) but you don't need Divisions to have those capabilities available.

Folks more qualified than I on Bde and Div operations have commented that pushing so many assets into a Bde makes it ungainly awkward. Frankly I’d rather expand some of the Bde HQ cells to manage those and have a fully functioning Mini Div, but that’s just me, and my only experience at Div level was in the Div Arty Cp some 30 plus years ago

This goes to my point that both the RCN and RCAF are woefully under sized. Do I expect a country of 39 million people crammed into a thin strip along their Southern border to be able to field forces capable of defending the 2nd largest country on the planet all by itself? Of course not. But I'm sure that the US would be greatly appreciative of a RCN with an extra dozen Corvettes, a dozen subs and dozens of unmanned platforms to assist them as well as an RCAF with more fighters, MPAs and transport/refueling aircraft too.

Naval and Air Forces are expensive. Canada will never field a lot of them without a major major major shift in the voting public.
Armies, even exceptionally equipped ones, are much cheaper.

Agreed. We're just debating on exactly what should be built.

 

[FJAG]

I’m vehemently against the Battle Group, as it’s really just a Bde Minus, as you still need the HQ and support portions when you deploy it by itself.

I'm a product of the Seventies when a battle group was simply an armoured regiment with a company spliced in or an infantry battalion with a squadron of tanks attached. Maybe an engineer troop if necessary. It's really noting more than a combined arms battalion.

When we started rethinking our kinder and gentler army of the '00s and started thinking in terms of "Tactical Self-sufficient Units" we went off the rails, IMHO. Interestingly at that time the US was transforming and disassembling its divisions into Brigade Combat Teams which basically mirrored our Brigade Groups and designated them as the lowest common denominator for independent deployment. I'm not sure if we were scaling the BCT/BG concept down because at the time it was very clear we could no longer deploy a brigade but would need to deploy ... something.

Kabul and Kandahar drew us into strange directions what with TFs and NCE, and NSEs. IMHO we were slipping off doctrine albeit I guess you could always call it a new doctrine. The end product is we created very large battlegroups with so many add-on enablers (TACPs, ASCCs, ESCCs, ISTAR etc) that the headquarters could only operate out of a static base. IMHO that was not only wrong but bordered on the perverse.

I think we need to get back to lean mean battalions. If enablers are required then they should be located at the appropriate brigade or divisional or national command element HQ that the battalion reports to.

Neither of those would apply to Canada, as the only Country that could launch a credible invasion is America, but there would be no equipment coming and Canada has no in reserve.

My concern isn't a Russian invasion; it's unopposed Russian or Chinese incursions.

 

[Kirkhill]

Natural resource value: ranking by country 2021 | Statista

As of 2021, Russia held natural resources amounting to an estimated total value of 75 trillion U.S.

www.statista.com

Statista is an arm of the European University Institute.

Top Ten Richest Countries in the World by Natural Resources

Country	Resources	Population	Wealth		Country	Wealth
	TrUSD	Million	$/Person			$/Person
Russia	75	143	$ 524,475.52		Saudi Arabia	$ 944,444.44
US	45	332	$ 135,542.17		Canada	$ 868,421.05
Saudi Arabia	34	36	$ 944,444.44		Australia	$ 769,230.77
Canada	33	38	$ 868,421.05		Russia	$ 524,475.52
Iran	27	88	$ 306,818.18		Venezuela	$ 500,000.00
China	23	1412	$ 16,288.95		Iraq	$ 363,636.36
Brazil	22	214	$ 102,803.74		Iran	$ 306,818.18
Australia	20	26	$ 769,230.77		US	$ 135,542.17
Iraq	16	44	$ 363,636.36		Brazil	$ 102,803.74
Venezuela	14	28	$ 500,000.00		China	$ 16,288.95

As a nation the US, like China, does pretty well, collectively.
But at the personal level the large population means that the US citizen's treasure chest is a lot smaller than the Canadian version.
Canada has a lot more potential capital in the bank.


Those same countries by GDP

Country	GDP	Population	GDP		Country	GDP
	TrUSD	Million	$/person			$/person
US	23	332	$ 69,277.11		US	$ 69,277.11
China	18	1412	$ 12,747.88		Australia	$ 61,538.46
Canada	2	38	$ 52,631.58		Canada	$ 52,631.58
Russia	1.8	143	$ 12,587.41		Saudi Arabia	$ 22,222.22
Australia	1.6	26	$ 61,538.46		Venezuela	$ 17,857.14
Brazil	1.6	214	$ 7,476.64		China	$ 12,747.88
Saudi Arabia	0.8	36	$ 22,222.22		Russia	$ 12,587.41
Venezuela	0.5	28	$ 17,857.14		Brazil	$ 7,476.64
Iran	0.36	88	$ 4,090.91		Iraq	$ 4,545.45
Iraq	0.2	44	$ 4,545.45		Iran	$ 4,090.91

The US tops the list collectively and individually. Canada shows a respectable third in both lists.
But given the amount of unexploited capital in the bank we could be doing a lot better.

Now here is one for the tinfoil hat brigade. Full disclosure - I have one.

Country	Resources	Population	Wealth		Country	Wealth
	TrUSD	Million	$/Person			$/Person
US/Canada	78	370	$ 210,810.81		Saudi Arabia	$ 944,444.44
Russia	75	143	$ 524,475.52		Australia	$ 769,230.77
Saudi Arabia	34	36	$ 944,444.44		Russia	$ 524,475.52
Iran	27	88	$ 306,818.18		Venezuela	$ 500,000.00
China	23	1412	$ 16,288.95		Iraq	$ 363,636.36
Brazil	22	214	$ 102,803.74		Iran	$ 306,818.18
Australia	20	26	$ 769,230.77		US/Canada	$ 210,810.81
Iraq	16	44	$ 363,636.36		Brazil	$ 102,803.74
Venezuela	14	28	$ 500,000.00		China	$ 16,288.95

If the US and Canada were considered as a single corporate enterprise then the average US citizen would become twice as rich and the average Canadian would only be worth a quarter of their current value. America would have access to 75% more capital assets in the ground.

Country	GDP	Population	Wealth		Country	Wealth
	TrUSD	Million	$/Person			$/Person
US/Canada	25	370	$ 67,567.57		US/Canada	$ 67,567.57
China	18	1412	$ 12,747.88		Australia	$ 61,538.46
Russia	1.8	143	$ 12,587.41		Saudi Arabia	$ 22,222.22
Brazil	1.6	214	$ 7,476.64		Venezuela	$ 17,857.14
Australia	1.6	26	$ 61,538.46		China	$ 12,747.88
Saudi Arabia	0.8	36	$ 22,222.22		Russia	$ 12,587.41
Venezuela	0.5	28	$ 17,857.14		Brazil	$ 7,476.64
Iran	0.36	88	$ 4,090.91		Iraq	$ 4,545.45
Iraq	0.2	44	$ 4,545.45		Iran	$ 4,090.91

On the other hand average GDP of an American would take a minor hit while the per capita GDP for Canadians would rise about 20%.

How sovereign does the US want us to be up here in Canada?
How sovereign do we want to be?
We can afford to be a lot more sovereign than we are just now.

 

[KevinB]

I'm a product of the Seventies when a battle group was simply an armoured regiment with a company spliced in or an infantry battalion with a squadron of tanks attached. Maybe an engineer troop if necessary. It's really noting more than a combined arms battalion.

I was an 80’s-90’s guy with another 4 years after 9/11.
I always understood the BattleGroup was basically an ad hoc organization for a specific task - but based off the Bde (so while it may work ‘remotely’ it wasn’t an actual separate deployed entity.

When we started rethinking our kinder and gentler army of the '00s and started thinking in terms of "Tactical Self-sufficient Units" we went off the rails, IMHO. Interestingly at that time the US was transforming and disassembling its divisions into Brigade Combat Teams which basically mirrored our Brigade Groups and designated them as the lowest common denominator for independent deployment. I'm not sure if we were scaling the BCT/BG concept down because at the time it was very clear we could no longer deploy a brigade but would need to deploy ... something.

Kabul and Kandahar drew us into strange directions what with TFs and NCE, and NSEs. IMHO we were slipping off doctrine albeit I guess you could always call it a new doctrine. The end product is we created very large battlegroups with so many add-on enablers (TACPs, ASCCs, ESCCs, ISTAR etc) that the headquarters could only operate out of a static base. IMHO that was not only wrong but bordered on the perverse.

Agreed.

I think we need to get back to lean mean battalions. If enablers are required then they should be located at the appropriate brigade or divisional or national command element HQ that the battalion reports to.

I don’t think that any unit or subunit can exist effectively these days without a lot more enablers. Down here even the squad has changed significantly.

My concern isn't a Russian invasion; it's unopposed Russian or Chinese incursions.

Agreed, which is why I see a need for Light RDF units. The CAR used to conduct Lightning Strike Ex’s into the Arctic for those exact reasons, and it’s one of the reasons I think Canada should have at min 1 Abn Bde.

A TD style mobilization entity won’t be in time to do anything for that.

 

[FJAG]

I was an 80’s-90’s guy with another 4 years after 9/11.
I always understood the BattleGroup was basically an ad hoc organization for a specific task - but based off the Bde (so while it may work ‘remotely’ it wasn’t an actual separate deployed entity.

I think that's essentially correct. My training was all within a brigade group framework, and battle groups in those days were fluid structures that could change as simply as on a radio order. Battle group constitution would change frequently particulalry on changes of phase - e.g. a tank heavy guard battle group could drop its infantry company as it passes through into reserve. etc.

I was never involved in the Balkans stuff so I don't know how much the concept started there but I expect it did because from time-to-time we sent batteries (and I presume recce squadrons) there. The only more permanent structure that I recall was the Airborne Regiment which was effectively a battle group sized and structured organization.

I don’t think that any unit or subunit can exist effectively these days without a lot more enablers. Down here even the squad has changed significantly.

I think we need to redefine what the organic structure of various levels of entities are. What defines/creates a battle group is having attachments which are not ordinarily organic to the battalion. Enablers can be either organic or attached depending on what it is and how its used.

Agreed, which is why I see a need for Light RDF units. The CAR used to conduct Lightning Strike Ex’s into the Arctic for those exact reasons, and it’s one of the reasons I think Canada should have at min 1 Abn Bde.

I've come to the same conclusion with my napkin force. Currently I have a light brigade designated for Petawawa which includes two 100/0 RegF para battalions, a 10/90 Para battalion out of Ottawa, a Canadian Ranger group out of Yellowknife (effectively 1 & 3 Gps combined), a 70/30 mixed recce regiment in Petawawa and a 70/30 Svc Bn. There is a light artillery regiment in the arty bde (2 x LG1 btys, 1 x M777 bty, with one LG1 battery as para). I'm politically undecided as to whether to label it a "Para" brigade or simply "light" brigade. The word "Airborne" is dead to us.

A TD style mobilization entity won’t be in time to do anything for that.

I see a bigger role for the Cdn Rgrs in my Army (including on all coasts as well as in the south) For the cost of a few more complex weapon systems, a modicum more training and some equipment, ammo and supply caches, you could probably do quite a bit.

I'm resolved to the fact that Canada needs to create two divisions. First, a 30/70 division (1 Div - Edmonton) which has the responsibility of all things Europe theatre and long-term NATO commitments and which has an "in extremis" deployability capability. Second, a 70/30 division (2 Div Montreal) which is a statice HQ and whose primary purpose is continental defence and other quick reaction, short duration missions. (By the way this does not preclude the fact that a 2 Div unit might be tasked on a European rotation nor does it preclude a 1 Div unit being tasked for a non-European rotation or mission in the event that it becomes necessary)

There should be only one headquarters to look after all continental issues (which for me centres mostly on the perimeter coastlines).

The unresolved issue I'm grappling with is the cross over as between 2 Div and CJOC for continental operations. It's clear in my mind that 2 Div should "own" all the units which comprise "continental defence" in order to properly manage and train them. The question is whether we leave CJOC as currently structured or whether we spin off a CJOC "Canada Desk" that collocates with 2 Div in Montreal. I think collocation creates a lot of synergies for operational and even force planning. I think that needs some wargaming.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think that's essentially correct. My training was all within a brigade group framework, and battle groups in those days were fluid structures that could change as simply as on a radio order. Battle group constitution would change frequently particulalry on changes of phase - e.g. a tank heavy guard battle group could drop its infantry company as it passes through into reserve. etc.

I was never involved in the Balkans stuff so I don't know how much the concept started there but I expect it did because from time-to-time we sent batteries (and I presume recce squadrons) there. The only more permanent structure that I recall was the Airborne Regiment which was effectively a battle group sized and structured organization.

I think we need to redefine what the organic structure of various levels of entities are. What defines/creates a battle group is having attachments which are not ordinarily organic to the battalion. Enablers can be either organic or attached depending on what it is and how its used.

I've come to the same conclusion with my napkin force. Currently I have a light brigade designated for Petawawa which includes two 100/0 RegF para battalions, a 10/90 Para battalion out of Ottawa, a Canadian Ranger group out of Yellowknife (effectively 1 & 3 Gps combined), a 70/30 mixed recce regiment in Petawawa and a 70/30 Svc Bn. There is a light artillery regiment in the arty bde (2 x LG1 btys, 1 x M777 bty, with one LG1 battery as para). I'm politically undecided as to whether to label it a "Para" brigade or simply "light" brigade. The word "Airborne" is dead to us.

I see a bigger role for the Cdn Rgrs in my Army (including on all coasts as well as in the south) For the cost of a few more complex weapon systems, a modicum more training and some equipment, ammo and supply caches, you could probably do quite a bit.

I'm resolved to the fact that Canada needs to create two divisions. First, a 30/70 division (1 Div - Edmonton) which has the responsibility of all things Europe theatre and long-term NATO commitments and which has an "in extremis" deployability capability. Second, a 70/30 division (2 Div Montreal) which is a statice HQ and whose primary purpose is continental defence and other quick reaction, short duration missions. (By the way this does not preclude the fact that a 2 Div unit might be tasked on a European rotation nor does it preclude a 1 Div unit being tasked for a non-European rotation or mission in the event that it becomes necessary)

There should be only one headquarters to look after all continental issues (which for me centres mostly on the perimeter coastlines).

The unresolved issue I'm grappling with is the cross over as between 2 Div and CJOC for continental operations. It's clear in my mind that 2 Div should "own" all the units which comprise "continental defence" in order to properly manage and train them. The question is whether we leave CJOC as currently structured or whether we spin off a CJOC "Canada Desk" that collocates with 2 Div in Montreal. I think collocation creates a lot of synergies for operational and even force planning. I think that needs some wargaming.

Approximately 800 Canadian troops arrived in Macedonia in May of 1999, joining the 4th (UK) Armoured Brigade under the Canadian designation Operation KINETIC (NATO designation Operation JOINT GUARDIAN). In addition to national command and support element personnel, a reconnaissance squadron equipped with the new Coyote reconnaissance vehicle from Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians), a helicopter detachment equipped with eight Griffon helicopters, and engineers formed the initial Canadian contribution. On 12 June 1999, the first elements of KFOR entered Kosovo. As agreed to in the Military Technical Agreement, deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was synchronized with the departure of Serb security forces from Kosovo. By 20 June the Serb withdrawal was complete and KFOR was well established in Kosovo.

The Canadian reconnaissance squadron arrived in the vanguard of the British armoured brigade, while other Canadians soon followed or were fully tasked in support roles in Macedonia. KFOR elements were deployed to assist with the implementation of the cease-fire, provide public security for civilians, assist displaced persons in returning home safely, provide humanitarian relief and assist international organizations and non-governmental organizations in their efforts.

Soon after KFOR’s initial deployment into Kosovo the Canadian government announced that an additional 500 troops would be added to the Canadian contingent. Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and tanks from the Strathconas were formed into an infantry battle group with armoured support. The battalion began its deployment in early July and soon replaced overburdened British infantry units. The new arrivals raised the total strength of Operation KINETIC to approximately 1,400 personnel.

Kosovo Force (KFOR) - Canada.ca

Historical information about Operation Kosovo Force (KFOR).

www.canada.ca

IIRC the Strathconas speed in advancing through Kosovo to put Pristina under observation got tied up with Mike Rose trying to stop Americans from starting WWIII?

A pretty handy 1400 bodies.

 

[Kirkhill]

WRT enablers, I am sensing a variation in the older tooth to tail debate over Service Support.

Are we looking at the tooth to Combat Support ratio now?

Combat Support is going to be relatively capital intensive and have a higher operating cost when in action (pumping rounds down range) but it will have a smaller staffing requirement.

And as it gains range and precision and flexibility (one launcher, many types of targets) it is going to change the burden put on the troops at the front.

It will also change the Service Support requirement - less water and fewer hay-boxes to the front and more ammo trucks to the gun lines.

 

[Kirkhill]

I've come to the same conclusion with my napkin force. Currently I have a light brigade designated for Petawawa which includes two 100/0 RegF para battalions, a 10/90 Para battalion out of Ottawa, a Canadian Ranger group out of Yellowknife (effectively 1 & 3 Gps combined), a 70/30 mixed recce regiment in Petawawa and a 70/30 Svc Bn. There is a light artillery regiment in the arty bde (2 x LG1 btys, 1 x M777 bty, with one LG1 battery as para). I'm politically undecided as to whether to label it a "Para" brigade or simply "light" brigade. The word "Airborne" is dead to us.

Now if we only had an aircraft that could carry leg infantry long distances rapidly and put them down anyplace .... and save the butcher's bill associated with training paras.


12 Troops or 3 tonnes @ 500 km/h over 1200 km

And an appropriate logistics system

8 Tonnes at 300 km/h over 1200 km 15 Tonnes @ 600 km/h over 6000 km

Might even haul a couple of Griffons in by CC-177s as local runabouts for the staff.

 

[KevinB]

Now if we only had an aircraft that could carry leg infantry long distances rapidly and put them down anyplace .... and save the butcher's bill associated with training paras.


12 Troops or 3 tonnes @ 500 km/h over 1200 km

And an appropriate logistics system

8 Tonnes at 300 km/h over 1200 km 15 Tonnes @ 600 km/h over 6000 km

View attachment 77425

Might even haul a couple of Griffons in by CC-177s as local runabouts for the staff.

To get somewhere quick in the Arctic/Canada’s North - it’s a parachute insertion.

To the top of Canada’s territory 2,700 miles from Trenton, and you only save 150 miles from Pembroke.
You aren’t sling loading a 105 let alone a 777 that far, and you don’t have any airfields.

The US Army is working with Sikorsky on UH-60V as right now Bell can only deliver 20-30 Valor a year for the next 5-10 years, no one else will be getting Valors for 20-30 years. Even then it’s not getting there 1/3 as fast that a C-17 or C-130 dropping troops.

 

[KevinB]

I think that's essentially correct. My training was all within a brigade group framework, and battle groups in those days were fluid structures that could change as simply as on a radio order. Battle group constitution would change frequently particulalry on changes of phase - e.g. a tank heavy guard battle group could drop its infantry company as it passes through into reserve. etc.

I was never involved in the Balkans stuff so I don't know how much the concept started there but I expect it did because from time-to-time we sent batteries (and I presume recce squadrons) there. The only more permanent structure that I recall was the Airborne Regiment which was effectively a battle group sized and structured organization.

I think we need to redefine what the organic structure of various levels of entities are. What defines/creates a battle group is having attachments which are not ordinarily organic to the battalion. Enablers can be either organic or attached depending on what it is and how its used.

I've come to the same conclusion with my napkin force. Currently I have a light brigade designated for Petawawa which includes two 100/0 RegF para battalions, a 10/90 Para battalion out of Ottawa, a Canadian Ranger group out of Yellowknife (effectively 1 & 3 Gps combined), a 70/30 mixed recce regiment in Petawawa and a 70/30 Svc Bn. There is a light artillery regiment in the arty bde (2 x LG1 btys, 1 x M777 bty, with one LG1 battery as para). I'm politically undecided as to whether to label it a "Para" brigade or simply "light" brigade. The word "Airborne" is dead to us.

Fine Parachute Regiment then

I see a bigger role for the Cdn Rgrs in my Army (including on all coasts as well as in the south) For the cost of a few more complex weapon systems, a modicum more training and some equipment, ammo and supply caches, you could probably do quite a bit.

That’s going to take a lot or work and changes in that system.

I'm resolved to the fact that Canada needs to create two divisions.

I’ve resigned myself to the fact Canada might equip 4 Bde’s if you’re lucky. I think 2 Div’s is a bridge to far.

First, a 30/70 division (1 Div - Edmonton) which has the responsibility of all things Europe theatre and long-term NATO commitments and which has an "in extremis" deployability capability. Second, a 70/30 division (2 Div Montreal) which is a statice HQ and whose primary purpose is continental defence and other quick reaction, short duration missions. (By the way this does not preclude the fact that a 2 Div unit might be tasked on a European rotation nor does it preclude a 1 Div unit being tasked for a non-European rotation or mission in the event that it becomes necessary)

I’d kick all the Armor/Mech (excluding training items) to Latvia/Poland.
40/60 for 1 Brigade with 30% and the Bde Staff over there.
30/70 for the second Bde and have it in Valcatraz.
Both doing annual flyover’s for training.

70/30 Edmonton Light Bde
70/30 Petawawa Light Bde
*both would require significant infrastructure changes to build airfields and hangars

** if necessary one could rotate the taskings, so there was a high readiness Lt Bde at all times, and Bde rotations to Europe as well, but I’m not sold on that - I’d rather have the Forward Deployed entity be a voluntary 3 year posting.

There should be only one headquarters to look after all continental issues (which for me centres mostly on the perimeter coastlines).

Agreed - but domestic support as well to the internal.

The unresolved issue I'm grappling with is the cross over as between 2 Div and CJOC for continental operations. It's clear in my mind that 2 Div should "own" all the units which comprise "continental defence" in order to properly manage and train them. The question is whether we leave CJOC as currently structured or whether we spin off a CJOC "Canada Desk" that collocates with 2 Div in Montreal. I think collocation creates a lot of synergies for operational and even force planning. I think that needs some wargaming.