Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Good2Golf]

Yes except most countries like to sit on the sidelines and dither until it’s done.

We see what you did there…

 

[KevinB]

Isn't this thread based on the premise of proposing end states that require many issues to be wished away?

I took your comment about how close it was a Lt Div, when it isn't even 20% there, as not just wishing something away, but being ignorant of the missing items and issues. I'm not trying to be rude (though I am probably doing a good job of that).

And this isn't very different than many of the 4 Bde plan's put forward. 1 and 5 CMBG would remain essentially as is, each with 2x70/30 and 1x 30/70 Mech Bn's plus a hybrid armour and artillery regiment each. The only real difference is that by using the OCONUS LBCT structure and 10/90 Light Bn's you create the ability for your QRF tasked force to pivot and deploy a short division in war time, while 2 and 5 share the task of sustaining Mech Nato Tasking.

Putting a X Bde or X Div plan out there with acknowledging shortfalls and trying to rationalize fixes I would suggest is significantly different than what you proposed, IHO

Equipment wise:
TAPV as placeholder for both Light Cav and Direct Fire Vehicles (JLTV and MPF to replace)
Pool all towed howitzers and L16's in the division (SP 155 and 120 for 1 and 5 CMBG)

A lot of the rest would be covered by existing projects no? As long as said projects were scoped to account for the division
TMP + Domestic Arctic Mobility Enhancement + LUV to provide light-> Motorized flexibilty
ATGM Replacement
GBAD

My issue with the above is most of the programs aren't scoped for a Division, most appear to be scoped in true CA fashion for a a Bde or deployed BG.

Given PMJT seems to like 1.4% GDP or less for the CAF, I don't see any major changes.

The other issue the vast majority of the CA don't have modern Night fighting or Communication tools.
You are looking at a ~10k CDN for missing personal kit for each individual soldier (that's not even high end stuff).

To equip the 44k of the Canadian Army and have some spares that would be around 1/2B dollars - that's not getting into missing "basic" equipment for section, platoon, and higher.
I did some rough napkin math, and just for a 1 Div entity the CA is short around 45B (USD), and around 90B for what I would lay out for a 4 Bde entity with a Bde worth of spares. Looking at a second Div, the shortfall jumps up even higher, as the Reg Force Bde's are short equipment, but the PRes basically have none.

My biggest pet peeve is Light is thrown around especially in Canada as simply people without Armored or Protected Mobility. Realistically Light units need a specific niche, Para, Airborne, Mountain, Amphibious etc. They are tailored to those roles, and the supporting equipment is acquired. I don't see that effort being undertaken in Canada, as I see a lot of the same view of the LIB's as simply Bn's without LAV's.

I think a much more realistic approach to the CA is a 4 Bde Group approach with the understanding that currently 1 Cdn Div is not a deployable Div, but and Admin HQ to manage the field Army.

Because when one looks at the 44k that is the CA.
There is supposed to be 22.5k Regular Force Personnel, 16,200 PRes, and 5,300 Canadian Rangers.
The CR won't be used in a Bde etc formation - so you have 38,700 PY (allegedly)
But it tends to take 1.5PY to fill a Regular Force line serial (admin per outside of units, training, releasing, sick/lame/lazy etc)
So that 22.5k is now really just 15k of Unit Line Serials
With the PRes, numbers are purportedly even worse - (PAT, NES, etc) I will be generous and say it take 3PY to fill 1 Line Serial
So your PRes is really just 5,400 (and frankly looking at the unit effective strengths - I would say that is overly generous).

So you have 20,400 Personnel that you can place in the field Army.
Which isn't much more than 1 Div, or 2 very very very Lean Ones that aren't effective as there is no support structure higher in the CA.
All of that brings me back to the 4 Bde Groups and 1 Div HQ
You could pull the CS out of the Bde's and make more Support Bde's - but I would argue that only works for homogeneous Bde's.
Homogenous Bde's that aren't very suited for any specific task at all, and generally either inadequate or overly provisioned for the tasks at hand.

So you get 4 fairly large CXBG's, which isn't a bad thing as you can have more support units internally to support them operationally.
1 Airmobile, which would require more vertical lift than the CAF currently has. But with all the Griffons and Chinooks, could do a Bn sized lift, and multiple flight Bde lifts over shorter distances.
Missing: ATGM, ADA, not enough M777, needs significantly more Vertical Lift

1 Para, which would require the vast majority of the Herc and Globemaster fleet to move.
Missing: ATGM, ADA, not enough M777, needs more Fixed Wing Lift

1 CMBG w/ Tanks (ish)
Missing: ATGM, ADA, SPG, Rocket Arty, AEV (at least in effective numbers), AVLB etc.
*I'd argue that the LAV is not a good IFV for Armor support either, but that's another story

1 CMBG w/o Tanks
Missing: Tanks/DFS system, ATGM, ADA, SPG, Rocket Arty, AEV, AVLB etc

1 CDN DIV HQ (and theatre support structures - I am loath to call them Bde's as then the CA would put Col's in charge of them)
Even if you amalgamated the Light Bde's into a dual role for both Defense of Canada, and RDF tasking, and tried to make another CMBG there isn't enough equipment there.


Now if we are looking at best benefit to Canada, I think a 3 Bde structure would be best, and hand over 6k PY (3 Each to RCN and RCAF).
But that's just me, and I have become a bit of a fatalist recently with the CA.

 

[IKnowNothing]

I took your comment about how close it was a Lt Div, when it isn't even 20% there, as not just wishing something away, but being ignorant of the missing items and issues. I'm not trying to be rude (though I am probably doing a good job of that).

With respect, such a comment doesn't exist. If you re-read you'll note that I asked how close it would be (not stated) and then sketched out a rough structure focusing purely on the units/manning. Spitballing.

But now defending it- your proposal requires all the same baseline gaps to be filled. And one each "fairly large" Airmobile and parachute Bde in aggregate require the same total number of Inf Bn's and comparable CS elements as the (adjusted) OCONUS Division- it's pretty much a reorganization of the the same force.

Further spitballing- 3x 100/0 Bn's provide the niche capabilities at a scale we can deploy. The war time division is motorized.

 

[Kirkhill]

Isn't this thread based on the premise of proposing end states that require many issues to be wished away? And this isn't very different than many of the 4 Bde plan's put forward. 1 and 5 CMBG would remain essentially as is, each with 2x70/30 and 1x 30/70 Mech Bn's plus a hybrid armour and artillery regiment each. The only real difference is that by using the OCONUS LBCT structure and 10/90 Light Bn's you create the ability for your QRF tasked force to pivot and deploy a short division in war time, while 2 and 5 share the task of sustaining Mech Nato Tasking

Equipment wise:
TAPV as placeholder for both Light Cav and Direct Fire Vehicles (JLTV and MPF to replace)
Pool all towed howitzers and L16's in the division (SP 155 and 120 for 1 and 5 CMBG)

A lot of the rest would be covered by existing projects no? As long as said projects were scoped to account for the division
TMP + Domestic Arctic Mobility Enhancement + LUV to provide light-> Motorized flexibilty
ATGM Replacement
GBAD

An alternate view of the discussion on this thread is that it identifies those issues that need to be wished away --- and then gives ample opportunity for them to be identified. The result is identification of courses of action that permit the issue to be flanked/skirted, defeated or avoided.

I think we do pretty well as a disputatious forum.

 

[FJAG]

You may theoretically have PY’s (which I doubt) but you definitely don’t have equipment.

I think that any CA plan for larger than 1 Div is just wishing away equipment issues.

Or setting a Phase 1 establishment and training shift for a Phase 2 equipment growth.

Granted. The equipment right now only equals one division (-) regardless of how you organize it.

 

[GR66]

Or setting a Phase 1 establishment and training shift for a Phase 2 equipment growth.

Granted. The equipment right now only equals one division (-) regardless of how you organize it.

The reality unfortunately is that with F-35's, CSCs and NORAD improvements (and submarines?) the money for your Phase 2 equipment growth is likely 20-30 years out by which time our completely broken down original equipment will all have to be replaced. How many years can a "Phase" be before it just becomes your accepted force structure?

Our existing "Division" needs new tanks, SP Artillery, ATGMs, Rocket Artillery, lots of UAVs, Comms, Optics, GBAD, Engineering vehicles, bridging equipment, logistics vehicles, war stocks of ammo, more helicopters, additional strategic airlift, etc. Frankly I think we'll be lucky to get enough of that to make a single combat effective Division. Two is probably fantasy.

 

[OldSolduer]

Our existing "Division" needs new tanks, SP Artillery, ATGMs, Rocket Artillery, lots of UAVs, Comms, Optics, GBAD, Engineering vehicles, bridging equipment, logistics vehicles, war stocks of ammo, more helicopters, additional strategic airlift, etc. Frankly I think we'll be lucky to get enough of that to make a single combat effective Division. Two is probably fantasy.

But but what about the Leopards we bought you??? I mean we need beaucoup $$$$ to fund vote buying I mean social programs....

 

[KevinB]

With respect, such a comment doesn't exist. If you re-read you'll note that I asked how close it would be (not stated) and then sketched out a rough structure focusing purely on the units/manning. Spitballing.

But now defending it- your proposal requires all the same baseline gaps to be filled. And one each "fairly large" Airmobile and parachute Bde in aggregate require the same total number of Inf Bn's and comparable CS elements as the (adjusted) OCONUS Division- it's pretty much a reorganization of the the same force.

No because I destroyed everything else to get it.
There isn’t a 6 CSSB, the JSR is gone, the Health services and all the purple positions are gone to build a 4 Bde force.

Further spitballing- 3x 100/0 Bn's provide the niche capabilities at a scale we can deploy. The war time division is motorized.

That would require enough vehicles for a Division

Honestly I would say the CA could field a Bde fairly easily (short the given enablers) and a second Bde by gutting the rest (again short enablers).

I think the CA really needs to think of what it wants to be when it grows up, because I don’t see any unity or purpose of effort.

I don’t see any value to having PY’s that can’t be employed due to missing equipment.
This isn’t 1940 anymore, tanks and aircraft can’t be dumped out enmasse anymore.
The largest chunk of the CAF budget is personnel - and that needs to change.

 

[Fabius]

For any of these ORBATs to happen the CA needs a massive culture change. The CA has and remains wedded to and unable to see past managed readiness of whatever latest incarnation. It’s a problem that has existed since at least the 90s with the FYR and was reinforced by the GWOT and our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The thinking only revolves around how to maintain a force of BG to Bde (sort of) forward deployed on a 6-12 month rotation forever.

Institutionally there is no concept of the Canadian Army going to war with all three CMBGs being all in, it doesn’t exist period even as a remote possibility from anything I see in the CA right now.

From that stems the decisions on equipment etc. that are only enough for a BG to a Bde.

Even the GoC in SSE doesn’t envision anything other than rotational forces. Maybe the DPR will change that but I doubt it.

 

[FJAG]

The reality unfortunately is that with F-35's, CSCs and NORAD improvements (and submarines?) the money for your Phase 2 equipment growth is likely 20-30 years out by which time our completely broken down original equipment will all have to be replaced. How many years can a "Phase" be before it just becomes your accepted force structure?

Our existing "Division" needs new tanks, SP Artillery, ATGMs, Rocket Artillery, lots of UAVs, Comms, Optics, GBAD, Engineering vehicles, bridging equipment, logistics vehicles, war stocks of ammo, more helicopters, additional strategic airlift, etc. Frankly I think we'll be lucky to get enough of that to make a single combat effective Division. Two is probably fantasy.

I'm not undervaluing the cost of what's needed, but I don't see an immediate need to upgrade the whole Army with new kit.

We currently have six battalions worth of LAV6.0s and ACSVs which are enough to equip the infantry component of three armoured brigades. We also have the majority of the logistics and comms gear for 3 brigades. Using a Type 44 tank regiment we'd need about another 90 tanks @ 10 million. As for artillery, factor in 70 SPs @ 7 million.

GBAD is already funded although at what levels it will come in is questionable. My guess is we need more funding for a full battalion so throw in another .5 billion.

We definitely need to upgrade the anti-armour capabilities so let's say simply for calculation at the rate of 2 per platoon/recce troop so say 160 CLUs @.25 million for 50 million (rounded up).

There are enough helicopters in 1 Wing and the basics for a UAV squadron and target acquisition system in 4 RCA(GS). No attack helicopters except the pseudo armed ones in 430 Tac Hel. I'm not about to buy attack helicopters but grant .25 billion for UAVs.

There are enough LRSS and TAPVs to form the basis of the recce/cavalry forces needed.

We don't need bridging equipment. We're not creating a Heavy Reinforced division. Nor do we need rocket artillery (much as I like it) as it's not part of a divisional structure anyway. We already have an equipped signals regiment, an EW regiment, three brigade signals squadrons and enough field engineers (maybe more armoured engineers needed)

Yes, I'm ignoring a whole lot of costs that usually get thrown into these things like a life cycles worth of personnel (those PYs are already there). I'm not adding infrastructure because there's already enough in place if we use it well. Ammunition is a whole different issue which needs to be addressed outside of equipment capital costs.

So if one looks at the basic costs of the equipment needed to augment what we already have to provide for a bare bones, three-armoured brigade division, we need to pony up roughly 2.7 billion (Tanks .9 bil; SPs .7 bil; GBAD .5 Bil; ATGM .05 bil; TacHel/UAV .25 bil; contingency .3 bil) to provide the fundamental elements of three armoured brigades.

Again, I want to emphasize that being able to form and even equip a bare-bones division does not equate to being able to deploy and sustain one in the field. At best, what I see is a deployable divisional headquarters and at most, two brigades. Add in a US BCT (SBCT or IBCT) and attach it to a US Corps and you have something useful.

If you make 1/3rd of that division ResF, then there are enough RegF PYs available for an additional Light brigade which would need equipping from the ground up (except artillery - we have enough M777s). But that's a whole different and cheaper issue.

 

[KevinB]

I'm not undervaluing the cost of what's needed, but I don't see an immediate need to upgrade the whole Army with new kit.

We currently have six battalions worth of LAV6.0s and ACSVs which are enough to equip the infantry component of three armoured brigades. We also have the majority of the logistics and comms gear for 3 brigades. Using a Type 44 tank regiment we'd need about another 90 tanks @ 10 million. As for artillery, factor in 70 SPs @ 7 million.

GBAD is already funded although at what levels it will come in is questionable. My guess is we need more funding for a full battalion so throw in another .5 billion.

We definitely need to upgrade the anti-armour capabilities so let's say simply for calculation at the rate of 2 per platoon/recce troop so say 160 CLUs @.25 million for 50 million (rounded up).

There are enough helicopters in 1 Wing and the basics for a UAV squadron and target acquisition system in 4 RCA(GS). No attack helicopters except the pseudo armed ones in 430 Tac Hel. I'm not about to buy attack helicopters but grant .25 billion for UAVs.

There are enough LRSS and TAPVs to form the basis of the recce/cavalry forces needed.

We don't need bridging equipment. We're not creating a Heavy Reinforced division. Nor do we need rocket artillery (much as I like it) as it's not part of a divisional structure anyway. We already have an equipped signals regiment, an EW regiment, three brigade signals squadrons and enough field engineers (maybe more armoured engineers needed)

Yes, I'm ignoring a whole lot of costs that usually get thrown into these things like a life cycles worth of personnel (those PYs are already there). I'm not adding infrastructure because there's already enough in place if we use it well. Ammunition is a whole different issue which needs to be addressed outside of equipment capital costs.

So if one looks at the basic costs of the equipment needed to augment what we already have to provide for a bare bones, three-armoured brigade division, we need to pony up roughly 2.7 billion (Tanks .9 bil; SPs .7 bil; GBAD .5 Bil; ATGM .05 bil; TacHel/UAV .25 bil; contingency .3 bil) to provide the fundamental elements of three armoured brigades.

Again, I want to emphasize that being able to form and even equip a bare-bones division does not equate to being able to deploy and sustain one in the field. At best, what I see is a deployable divisional headquarters and at most, two brigades. Add in a US BCT (SBCT or IBCT) and attach it to a US Corps and you have something useful.

If you make 1/3rd of that division ResF, then there are enough RegF PYs available for an additional Light brigade which would need equipping from the ground up (except artillery - we have enough M777s). But that's a whole different and cheaper issue.

I think you are grossly underestimating the missing equipment costs.

 

[markppcli]

Oh! I get it now.

Let me restart. I presume that the guns are still part of the training required for DP1 but its done at the unit rather than at RCSA.

Takes me back to the early 70's when we had to surge training to expand for the air defence expansion. Did what was then called the Trade Level 3 course (basically army fieldcraft and crew served weapons and the 105mm howitzer combined) and then did Trade Level 4 (gun number OJT) all at 2 RCHA.

Each training troop had a staff of five full-time for admin and instruction and were augmented by around a dozen as drivers, FOOs, CP staff for the live-fire exercise. We had a troop in-house three months at a time for about a year - sometimes two. It really didn't interfere with unit training and was wildly successful. I'm a great fan mainly because I ran two back-to-back troops as a young lieutenant. It was quite rewarding.

Not quite, their DP 1 qualified without anything g essentially. They learn to shoot a C9 and operate a radio, but not arty comms.

The expectation is that they’ll be brought up to OFP for their job roles by the regiments. No budget or time adjustment for that, no adjustment to orbat, just an offload of task.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not undervaluing the cost of what's needed, but I don't see an immediate need to upgrade the whole Army with new kit.

We currently have six battalions worth of LAV6.0s and ACSVs which are enough to equip the infantry component of three armoured brigades. We also have the majority of the logistics and comms gear for 3 brigades. Using a Type 44 tank regiment we'd need about another 90 tanks @ 10 million. As for artillery, factor in 70 SPs @ 7 million.

GBAD is already funded although at what levels it will come in is questionable. My guess is we need more funding for a full battalion so throw in another .5 billion.

We definitely need to upgrade the anti-armour capabilities so let's say simply for calculation at the rate of 2 per platoon/recce troop so say 160 CLUs @.25 million for 50 million (rounded up).

There are enough helicopters in 1 Wing and the basics for a UAV squadron and target acquisition system in 4 RCA(GS). No attack helicopters except the pseudo armed ones in 430 Tac Hel. I'm not about to buy attack helicopters but grant .25 billion for UAVs.

There are enough LRSS and TAPVs to form the basis of the recce/cavalry forces needed.

We don't need bridging equipment. We're not creating a Heavy Reinforced division. Nor do we need rocket artillery (much as I like it) as it's not part of a divisional structure anyway. We already have an equipped signals regiment, an EW regiment, three brigade signals squadrons and enough field engineers (maybe more armoured engineers needed)

Yes, I'm ignoring a whole lot of costs that usually get thrown into these things like a life cycles worth of personnel (those PYs are already there). I'm not adding infrastructure because there's already enough in place if we use it well. Ammunition is a whole different issue which needs to be addressed outside of equipment capital costs.

So if one looks at the basic costs of the equipment needed to augment what we already have to provide for a bare bones, three-armoured brigade division, we need to pony up roughly 2.7 billion (Tanks .9 bil; SPs .7 bil; GBAD .5 Bil; ATGM .05 bil; TacHel/UAV .25 bil; contingency .3 bil) to provide the fundamental elements of three armoured brigades.

Again, I want to emphasize that being able to form and even equip a bare-bones division does not equate to being able to deploy and sustain one in the field. At best, what I see is a deployable divisional headquarters and at most, two brigades. Add in a US BCT (SBCT or IBCT) and attach it to a US Corps and you have something useful.

If you make 1/3rd of that division ResF, then there are enough RegF PYs available for an additional Light brigade which would need equipping from the ground up (except artillery - we have enough M777s). But that's a whole different and cheaper issue.

The one point of disagreement is over the "rocket artillery". I think technology is pushing "rockets" further down the food chain. I'm starting to lean towards the "Long Range Precision Fires" nomenclature.

LRPF can be delivered by gun (Excalibur). It can also be delivered by manned platforms such as Apaches and A-10s (AirLand Battle Deep Strike mode). It can also be delivered by UASs (Reapers and SkyGuards etc). A vast array of air launched missiles can be slung from just about anything with wings. Virtually the same array of missiles launched from surface and sub-surface platforms (ships, boats, trucks, AFVs, pallets, silos, bunkers and submarines).

Rockets have always been attractive because they are cheap (Chinese and Congreves rockets). The difficulty was getting them to hit what you wanted. I think that problem, the targeting one, has been solved. I think it was solved a long time ago. But now the problem is being solved cheaply - for less than the cost of a smartphone per rocket. The rocket now becomes a high speed, long range UAS. That range can be used in one of two ways - to achieve distance, or, to achieve time - loitering. And the rocket's motor can be either a true rocket, a pulse jet, turbo-jet, a piston engine or an electric motor. None of which require heavy walled containers of fine quality, rigorously inspected steel alloys machined to excruciatingly tight tolerances.

Guns have dominated for centuries because, despite their cost, they delivered range. And to be honest, initially the cost of guns was a plus because only the state could afford them. Hence the move away from everyman and his bow to Tercios and their handcannons. The state assured its monopoly on death. The US is the land where every woman is Queen because every woman can afford the means of lethal force.
(Digression - Sorry).

My point is that rocketry has always been a continuum ranging from bottle rockets and paraflares through bazookas and M72s to ICBMs. All of them could be seen as "kamikaze UAVs". Now they are "kamikaze UAVs that can manoeuver". And technology means that engines and control systems have been miniaturized and cheapened to the extent that even hand held rockets/UAVs can be highly effective at long ranges and also be highly precise.

A WWI QF 18 pdr had an effective range of about 6 km - broadly the range of a 120mm tank gun today, or a Javelin/Spike/Hellfire/Brimstone1.
Its companion in the Gun Park, the 4.5" Howitzer - had an identical range - a range band well covered by 60mm to 120mm mortars.
Typically that is just a bit farther than an observer on the ground can see to the horizon.

WWII 25 pdrs and M101s double that range to about 12 km - necessitating Forward Observers and Radios to fully exploit. If you wanted to strike deeper you needed an aircraft and the aircraft needed a pilot.

The M109 doubled that range again to about 24 km and work is being done to double the range again (40 to 50 km).
But a funny thing happened on the way to the forum. Somebody discovered that the gun could be used as a simple launcher - a launcher for rockets (Rocket Assisted Projectiles) and a launcher for smart gliders (Excalibur and Course Corrected rounds).

Now do we really need "heavy walled containers of fine quality, rigorously inspected steel alloys machined to excruciatingly tight tolerances" (to quote myself above).

I think the Koreans have got the right way of it with their K239 Chunmoo trucks. They use a standard "magazine" or replaceable "limber" that can hold, and launch just about any flying device, regardless of its means of propulsion once in flight, or regardless of the target being engaged. The Brits seem to be coming to same conclusion with their MRLS/Brimstone, Brimstone/CAMM launcher overlaps. And the notion that one "calibre" of rocket can used for both short range (8 km Hellfire and Brimstone) and extremely long range (160 km MBDA long range Land Precision Fires) also leads into increased commonality.

I think guns will continue to be the solution for weight of fire and short ranges. But I think if everybody and his brother has cheap long range precision fires available it is going to be hard to find targets that justify a heavy weight of fire and it is going to be even harder to close within gun range to engage those targets.

The traditional (post WWI) alternative for deep strike missions has been the Air Force - but that has always been unreliable and costly despite the best efforts of the flyers. And the proliferation of GBAD and the return of LAA is not going to make manned air support any more available.
(I agree with you on not buying Attack Helicopters - I don't expect them to survive much longer than the tanks they were designed to kill - There are too many other options available that don't require pilots flying low and slow in a world of "golden BBs".)

Goddard and Von Braun, transistors and microchips have made everything that flies equal. You can mix and match launchers to get things into the air. You can mix and match engines to keep it flying while it is in the air. You can mix and match payloads. You can decide whether to terminate the flight at extreme range (an original model Tomahawk) or you can use the range to stooge around the area of interest on-call or you can even decide to return the "rocket" to base to report directly and to be reused.

I wouldn't worry about increasing the range of howitzers. I think the old M109A4 is probably a good all purpose solution. The Archer is probably a better all-rounder today. The M777 likewise for the air transportable requirement. But assuming a full-time 4 battery regiment, with HQ being responsible for Command and Control and targeting being farmed out to the customers, I would be looking at 2 gun batteries with 6 guns each, a GBAD battery (VSHORAD/SHORAD) and a Long Range Precision Fires Battery with a bunch of Chunmoo or SkySabre/iLauncher trucks and a vast array of rockets. One truck model could support Archers, LRPFs and GBAD systems ranging from LAA to MRAD.

2 of those (1 and 2 RCHA) and 5 RALC as a dedicated LRPF regiment and 4 returning to its GBAD role.

And lots of rockets for the Reserves along with Light AA RWS units. Double hat each of the 18 or so units out there and make half of them LRPF units/batteries and the other half GBADs and have all gunners train as gun bunnies on the howitzers.

 

[KevinB]

I wouldn't put too many Rocket eggs in the basket.
They are generally a much easier target to shoot down than an artillery shell due to the size and signature.
I like the Rocket/Missile options of the MLRS/HIMARS type systems, but I see them as an augmentation as opposed to a replacement for tube arty.

Wars are a battle of rock, papers, scissors, you need to have all options to be able to field the most effective tool, or you just try to hammer a screw and wonder why it didn't work. If all you have is paper, and the enemy has scissors, you are kind of pooched.

 

[Kirkhill]

It just dawned on me - as I was thinking about the Archer and the common truck for Archers, MRLS, GBAD and LAA RWS.

The Archer is actually the 155mm RWS on the back of the truck.

That RWS could just as easily be removed from the truck and emplaced and dug in. The crew could treat the gun like the Bofors guns. Constantly replenish the magazine on the gun from a deep magazine on site while the gun is firing.

7.5 cm tornpjäs m/57 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Bofors 105 mm Coastal Automatic Gun L/54 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

12 cm tornautomatpjäs m/70 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

One thing that Ukraine is making clear to me is that even in a world of manoeuvre forces there are still fixed points on the battle field that will require defending. Chateau Gaillard, Fort Henry and the Maginot Line all still have their uses.

 

[KevinB]

It just dawned on me - as I was thinking about the Archer and the common truck for Archers, MRLS, GBAD and LAA RWS.

The Archer is actually the 155mm RWS on the back of the truck.

That RWS could just as easily be removed from the truck and emplaced and dug in. The crew could treat the gun like the Bofors guns. Constantly replenish the magazine on the gun from a deep magazine on site while the gun is firing.

7.5 cm tornpjäs m/57 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Bofors 105 mm Coastal Automatic Gun L/54 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

12 cm tornautomatpjäs m/70 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

One thing that Ukraine is making clear to me is that even in a world of manoeuvre forces there are still fixed points on the battle field that will require defending. Chateau Gaillard, Fort Henry and the Maginot Line all still have their uses.

https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/archer

The Vehicle is integral to the system - a Dismountable Archer would need a lot of changes.
I'm not seeing a good case for a static 155mm, that exists for Rocket/Missile and ADA systems.

 

[Kirkhill]

I wouldn't put too many Rocket eggs in the basket.
They are generally a much easier target to shoot down than an artillery shell due to the size and signature.
I like the Rocket/Missile options of the MLRS/HIMARS type systems, but I see them as an augmentation as opposed to a replacement for tube arty.

Wars are a battle of rock, papers, scissors, you need to have all options to be able to field the most effective tool, or you just try to hammer a screw and wonder why it didn't work. If all you have is paper, and the enemy has scissors, you are kind of pooched.

We can debate the relevant ratios but I feel strongly that the rocket option has to be moved down the chain of command and made available to the Brigade/Battle Group Commanders. Yes rockets are slower. UAVs and cruise missiles are slower yet.

But I have heard tell of this C-RAM thingy. Something to do with knocking Rockets, Artillery and Mortar rounds out of the sky?

Again, I will concede that "harder to hit" is a good thing. But "seeing without being seen" is also good. As is "lots and lots of them".

 

[KevinB]

We can debate the relevant ratios but I feel strongly that the rocket option has to be moved down the chain of command and made available to the Brigade/Battle Group Commanders. Yes rockets are slower. UAVs and cruise missiles are slower yet.

No disagreement here.

But I have heard tell of thei C-RAM thingy. Something to do with knocking Rockets, Artillery and Mortar rounds out of the sky?

Again, I will concede that "harder to hit" is a good thing. But "seeing without being seen" is also good. As is "lots and lots of them".

All of which will not occur when the CA seems to be stuck in a rut of 3 CMBG's without enough gear, and a lot of HQ's for entities with even less kit.

 

[Kirkhill]

https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/archer

The Vehicle is integral to the system - a Dismountable Archer would need a lot of changes.
I'm not seeing a good case for a static 155mm, that exists for Rocket/Missile and ADA systems.

Changes may be required but if BAE has already swapped the package from the Volvo articulated to the MAN 8x8 and is offering to put it on any other similar vehicle, if Rheinmetall has managed to create the RCH-155 Artillery Gun Module then it doesn't seem that it would stretch the synapses too hard to take that module and stick it on a cement pad and bolt it down.

As to not needing a 155 for static defence....why not? If you have the ammunition in stock and the gun can be emplaced with the gun crew in a deep bunker and deeper magazine then what can it hurt? Besides the enemy.

Washington isn't going anyplace.... although the Whitehouse may be due for another lick of paint.

 

[FJAG]

Not quite, their DP 1 qualified without anything g essentially. They learn to shoot a C9 and operate a radio, but not arty comms.

The expectation is that they’ll be brought up to OFP for their job roles by the regiments. No budget or time adjustment for that, no adjustment to orbat, just an offload of task.

Did someone change the definition of DP 1 in DAOD 5013-8?

DP 1,

BMOQ; environmental qualification; and basic military occupation qualification,

the requirements of the component, military occupation or entry plan,

the successful completion of BMOQ training; the successful completion of environmental training; the successful completion of basic military occupation training; and achieving the OFP.

The C9 and radio comes with "environmental training", but in order to achieve "occupational training" you really do need to learn something fundamental about your occupation.

It's not the location of where they take their "occupational training" that I see as an issue. I said before I favour seeing it taught at a depot or at the regiment rather than RCSA. I don't even see an issue with guns not being a requirement for DP1 because I could see DP1 involve the gunline, the FOO tactical group, the UAV or radars, AD or a rocket launcher as an entry point. But DP1 needs to include the completion of something that makes you a useful gear in the machine.

Sigh.