Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Fabius]

It’s definitely eye opening for our units and sub units to join our allies and realize that our systems and interoperability abilities only gets us to the contingency level on their PACE plan for voice.

Data isn’t even on the radar half the time below our Bdes yet that’s were most of the allied COP etc exists even at sub unit level.

Makes for some frustrated commanders.

Admittedly the new radios like the 163s have some awesome capabilities but the CA does not seem to have the backbone architecture to actually use it.

Honestly the whole operating in a Comms degraded environment piece isn’t helping us as the default of Cdn commanders is to go back in time for solutions, aka dispatch riders. That mindset is inverse to the one in the US Army where they seem to be seeking to harden their systems in order to maintain them as they recognize the massive overmatch capabilities they give.

 

[markppcli]

I know some know this, but Comms is larger than just the radios. C5ISR for the CA is not keeping up period. There have been some very blunt conversations with our allies specifically the US Army on this, and I think it’s shocked some of the higher echelons in the CA.

Interestingly the US Army with their focus on Divisions, has moved and is planning to move most of their integration points to Division and Corps level meaning that at Bde and below if your not operating the exact same system and software as the US Army you can’t integrate to the level we were formally used to.

The CA is seeing this play out in real time on exercise I think.

The CA is getting wake up calls at JRTC when Canadians are requiring essentially us translator teams to help us communicate.

The equipment I have that lets me do VMR over CNR is looked at like magic by CAF commanders, but it’s normal.

It is a massive headache to have to explain to Commanders that compatibility issues aren't "opportunities for us to overcome..." No amount of positive thinking will make an outdated system bleep bloop with a newer system bleeping newer bloops.

It will get people killed eventually.

I’ll quote from a speech we had at Christmas from a well know SEAL motivational speaker “no amount of positive thinking gets you up that rope, you need the ability to climb.” We’re so used to “making do” that we seem to assume that can be our default, and that our allies will tolerate that. The act surprised when we drag down the rest of the team.


The 163 is an incredible piece of equipment that is going to be used by troops as a walkie talkie they carry around by the antenna mount. We have a Ferrari and we’re going to keep it in neutral and push it around with a dump truck.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It’s definitely eye opening for our units and sub units to join our allies and realize that our systems and interoperability abilities only gets us to the contingency level on their PACE plan for voice.

Data isn’t even on the radar half the time below our Bdes yet that’s were most of the allied COP etc exists even at sub unit level.

Makes for some frustrated commanders.

Admittedly the new radios like the 163s have some awesome capabilities but the CA does not seem to have the backbone architecture to actually use it.

Honestly the whole operating in a Comms degraded environment piece isn’t helping us as the default of Cdn commanders is to go back in time for solutions, aka dispatch riders. That mindset is inverse to the one in the US Army where they seem to be seeking to harden their systems in order to maintain them as they recognize the massive overmatch capabilities they give.

It's OK, the troops have their Smart Phones

 

[KevinB]

Correct me if I am wrong, but I’m pretty sure the CA didn’t get enough 163’s and 117’s to equip even all the Regular units.
Not to mention the lack of “add on’s” to facilitate data (both up and downstream) not to mention the lack of backbone for the data, and storage/collation.

I do get a kick out of Harris’ marketing in suggesting the screen on the 163 is viable to watching ISR footage, as unless it’s cabled to a secure tablet, you can’t see anything practical on that screen.

I remember with TCCS ‘the worlds first digital Army’ and what a shit show that was.

Keep in mind I’m the guy who used to sit and roll his eyes in the NetWarrior etc briefings - but in this day and age, if your not on the bleeding edge of networked systems and security - your just a target for those who are.

When you can disseminate data in real time without a threat of detection, the advantages you have are immense.

 

[markppcli]

It's OK, the troops have their Smart Phones

The amount of exercises I’ve been on where it’s “turn in your cell phones for the next three weeks, not you CQ you need that to conduct replenishment” leads me to believe the problem is not with the age group you think it is.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I’m pretty sure the CA didn’t get enough 163’s and 117’s to equip even all the Regular units.
Not to mention the lack of “add on’s” to facilitate data (both up and downstream) not to mention the lack of backbone for the data, and storage/collation.

I do get a kick out of Harris’ marketing in suggesting the screen on the 163 is viable to watching ISR footage, as unless it’s cabled to a secure tablet, you can’t see anything practical on that screen.

I remember with TCCS ‘the worlds first digital Army’ and what a shit show that was.

Keep in mind I’m the guy who used to sit and roll his eyes in the NetWarrior etc briefings - but in this day and age, if your not on the bleeding edge of networked systems and security - your just a target for those who are.

When you can disseminate data in real time without a threat of detection, the advantages you have are immense.

The new ISSP roll out is heavy on 163s and will see Samsun S20 tacticals loaded with atac issued along side it, the 163 are coming right now the head ache is the lack of headsets / adapters to the different pin configuration. the other issue is that units don’t understand what these things can / are designed to do and your average combat arms NCO or Officer will dismiss it as “sigs stuff”. Of course some people seem to think cell phones are constantly transmitting, which is untrue, and don’t understand that a 1 nano second data message is infinitely harder to detect by en EW than a voice conversation. But I digress.

 

[KevinB]

The amount of exercises I’ve been on where it’s “turn in your cell phones for the next three weeks, not you CQ you need that to conduct replenishment” leads me to believe the problem is not with the age group you think it is.

That positive -- ISOPREP should be a thing before and on ex as well as Ops

The new ISSP roll out is heavy on 163s and will see Samsun S20 tacticals loaded with atac issued along side it, the 163 are coming right now the head ache is the lack of headsets / adapters to the different pin configuration. the other issue is that units don’t understand what these things can / are designed to do and your average combat arms NCO or Officer will dismiss it as “sigs stuff”. Of course some people seem to think cell phones are constantly transmitting, which is untrue, and don’t understand that a 1 nano second data message is infinitely harder to detect by en EW than a voice conversation. But I digress.

If it makes you feel any better, I've seen a lot of 18E's banging their head into a wall when trying to get their teams to understand what capabilities exist and why some methods are significantly better than other if one wants to both transmit info and stay alive.
- and headset, PTT, Tablet and spare cables for vehicle clip in having different pins/not compatible is still an issue down here.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The amount of exercises I’ve been on where it’s “turn in your cell phones for the next three weeks, not you CQ you need that to conduct replenishment” leads me to believe the problem is not with the age group you think it is.

Meanwhile, in the first large scale European conflict in the digital age...

Ukraine war: How old tech is helping Ukraine avoid detection​

As Ukraine prepares for its major offensive, it will only get harder to hide the troop build up from Russia's forces. So Ukraine is having to work out ways to confound the enemy.

In a trench on the eastern front, a Ukrainian mortar team knows Russia's not just trying to hunt them down with drones - it's also using electronic warfare to try to locate their position.

The men of Ukraine's 28th Brigade may have access to 21st Century technology - satellites, smart phones, and tablets - to help communicate and identify targets. But they're also using a machine from the distant past.

An antique that wouldn't look out of place in a trench during World War One: an old wind-up phone.

Vlad and his men pick up the field phone whenever they're about to fire a mortar. Its dull ring makes a sound from a bygone era. For outgoing calls, they must wind up a handle. It's like a scene from a black and white movie.

Vlad grabs the cables that reach out to other nearby trenches. He says it's the safest means of communication, and that "it's impossible to listen in".

He says Russian electronic warfare systems can detect and intercept mobile phones and radios, but pointing to his ancient field telephone, Vlad says: "This technology is very old - but it works really well."

Ukraine war: How old tech is helping Ukraine avoid detection

Ukrainian troops preparing for a major offensive use a wind-up phone to stop the enemy listening in.

www.bbc.com

 

[markppcli]

Meanwhile, in the first large scale European conflict in the digital age...

Ukraine war: How old tech is helping Ukraine avoid detection​

As Ukraine prepares for its major offensive, it will only get harder to hide the troop build up from Russia's forces. So Ukraine is having to work out ways to confound the enemy.

In a trench on the eastern front, a Ukrainian mortar team knows Russia's not just trying to hunt them down with drones - it's also using electronic warfare to try to locate their position.

The men of Ukraine's 28th Brigade may have access to 21st Century technology - satellites, smart phones, and tablets - to help communicate and identify targets. But they're also using a machine from the distant past.

An antique that wouldn't look out of place in a trench during World War One: an old wind-up phone.

Vlad and his men pick up the field phone whenever they're about to fire a mortar. Its dull ring makes a sound from a bygone era. For outgoing calls, they must wind up a handle. It's like a scene from a black and white movie.

Vlad grabs the cables that reach out to other nearby trenches. He says it's the safest means of communication, and that "it's impossible to listen in".

He says Russian electronic warfare systems can detect and intercept mobile phones and radios, but pointing to his ancient field telephone, Vlad says: "This technology is very old - but it works really well."

Ukraine war: How old tech is helping Ukraine avoid detection

Ukrainian troops preparing for a major offensive use a wind-up phone to stop the enemy listening in.

www.bbc.com

Do you think we don’t use field phones ?

They work great in a static situation. But that’s not what we’re discussing here. Using data over CNR lets you send a contact report via a nano second message that is such a tiny ping as to be nothing.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Do you think we don’t use field phones ?

They work great in a static situation. But that’s not what we’re discussing here. Using data over CNR lets you send a contact report via a nano second message that is such a tiny ping as to be nothing.

Of course...

... but I've always done my best, and most important, work on radio silence.... except for on here of course

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Do you think we don’t use field phones ?

They work great in a static situation. But that’s not what we’re discussing here. Using data over CNR lets you send a contact report via a nano second message that is such a tiny ping as to be nothing.

Actually I was wondering if we still used them? Can you link in our field telephones into the radio net as well? Do they still use the switchboard for the telephones or is that gone by the wayside (showing my age, although not quite this old)

 

[KevinB]

Actually I was wondering if we still used them? Can you link in our field telephones into the radio net as well? Do they still use the switchboard for the telephones or is that gone by the wayside (showing my age, although not quite this old)

There are digital field phones that run over fibre cable, you can link them to digital systems. Some satellite systems have allowances for tethered "feed" as well so you are away from the transmission site.

Older wire field phones, well I don't think you could run them into a digital net, nor would I think anyone want you too.

 

[markppcli]

Carried a field phone in

Actually I was wondering if we still used them? Can you link in our field telephones into the radio net as well? Do they still use the switchboard for the telephones or is that gone by the wayside (showing my age, although not quite this old)

each LAV in Latvia. You can use them to remote the radios but I’ve never been in a situation where that made practice sl sense

 

[IKnowNothing]

Question(s) for the field-

Scenario- NATO/US applies sufficient pressure to get Canada to step up, GoC commits to reactivating 4CMBG in Latvia, following the same basic Organization as 1989. Initial commitment is 1/3rd of the Bde stationed there to replace the multinational eFP BG, the rest as flyover.

1. What is your equipment shopping list, and what interim steps should be taken until purchases can be made/delivered
2. Could the CA support and sustain this endeavor, and if not, what changes would need to be made?
3. What would be left for all other missions, how should it be organized and equipped?

 

[KevinB]

Question(s) for the field-

Scenario- NATO/US applies sufficient pressure to get Canada to step up, GoC commits to reactivating 4CMBG in Latvia, following the same basic Organization as 1989. Initial commitment is 1/3rd of the Bde stationed there to replace the multinational eFP BG, the rest as flyover.

1. What is your equipment shopping list, and what interim steps should be taken until purchases can be made/delivered

An entire ABCT, ideally just pay the DoD to uncrate them from V Corps POMCUS storage in Europe

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/51535-breakout-figure2_1.pdf note this in inaccurate the CAB's are no longer square - but have 2:1 Coy's, the 2 Armor Heavy CAB's having 1 Coy of Inf, and the Inf Heavy CAB having 2 Inf Coy and 1 Armor

I'd budget 2 Months for Training in Germany with the US Army, then move to Latvia.
Sending each Reg't 1st Bn over for training, then supporting

2. Could the CA support and sustain this endeavor, and if not, what changes would need to be made?

Shouldn't be hard, cycle the 1st and 2nd Bn's from Each Inf Regt over at alternating 3 year postings, each Armor, Arty, Eng etc unit also on 3 year staggered postings.
Would need to alternate Bde structures to accommodate the US Style, and would need less Infantry / Bde than Canada currently theoretically has.

3. What would be left for all other missions, how should it be organized and equipped?

You would have 2 CMBG's with LAV's of Equipment, and 2 Regular Bde's of Troops, plus 6 CSBG.
I'd adopt the total force model with 100/0 for Rapid Deployment, Deployed, or Operational Forces in Readiness (100/0 just means Reg or Class C PRes).

So 1 Lt Bde at 100/0 (or 70/30 if you could fix the PRes system), plus Latvia CABT (Canadian Armored Brigade Team - yeah my computer doesn't like using a u in armor) at 100/0

That leaves around 1 CMBG and 6CSBG worth of Regular Force and the PRes
Which should be able to be broken down into 3 Bde's: a 70/30 for constituting forces (getting ready to start to replace the Latvian CABT, and augmented to 100/0 before deployment) a 30/70 that came off Latvian rotation, and a 30/70 training formation.



and the Leo2's could be all donated to Ukraine.

 

[FJAG]

Not the bang-on thread for this but relevant

The Army wants to spend up to $7.2 billion to stock up on Javelin missiles

The age of the Javelin is upon us.

taskandpurpose.com

 

[FJAG]

An interesting critique of Ex Maple Resolve. Unfortunately the authors left aside the critical question of whether the CA needs the exercise at all. Their reason for not answering that is in light of the Comd CA's direction that it will continue at the BG level (Level 6) at least until 2025.

I'm not a fan of Maple Resolve (nor managed readiness) because I think it is a resource hog that limits other, more vital training.. In many ways their arguments as set out touch on my thoughts as well so I'm not sure I'm an unbiased reader of what they say.

I'd be interested in other people's thoughts on the article.

https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/army-armee/migration/assets/army_internet/docs/en/canadian-army-journal/20-1/R-GL-007-000-JD-017_CAJ_20.1_EN_Accessible_Start_With_Why_Selection_And_Maintenance_Of_The_Aim_On_Exercise_Maple_Resolve.pdf

 

[WestIsle]

An interesting critique of Ex Maple Resolve. Unfortunately the authors left aside the critical question of whether the CA needs the exercise at all. Their reason for not answering that is in light of the Comd CA's direction that it will continue at the BG level (Level 6) at least until 2025.

I'm not a fan of Maple Resolve (nor managed readiness) because I think it is a resource hog that limits other, more vital training.. In many ways their arguments as set out touch on my thoughts as well so I'm not sure I'm an unbiased reader of what they say.

I'd be interested in other people's thoughts on the article.

I agree that they left out the question of whether it needs to continue. In fact I would say this is a very CAF style article that is more about pats on the back and supporting the narrative then critical analysis with alternate ideas moving forward

 

[Fabius]

Couple thoughts but I will preface them by saying that it’s 98% certain that Ex MR 24 will look almost nothing like Ex MR23.

BTS. I agree that the BTS needs to be ruthlessly prioritized. I would argue that it needs to be focused on large macro BTS such as Conduct a Delay vs Conduct OPP. One is implied by the other but not necessarily the reverse. We leave the BTS to the Division Comd to a significant degree which to me seems ridiculous.

Who. The lack of focus and ever creeping expansion of who is a problem, agreed. It’s a problem with three sources in my estimation.
1. The Bde and Division Comds push for 3 BGs etc at times despite manning pressures.
2. CADTC and Army HQ allow the Div and CMBG to decide what each MR looks like to a huge extent, reinforcing point one.
3. Lack of focus and no selection and maintenance of the aim. Ie if the Ex is Level 6 BG, why are the helicopters being employed by Bde as a flank screen with zero interaction with the BG? Doesn’t help the BTS. If it’s BG level why are Bde and Division enablers present? Why don’t we have more high profile exercises to practice our support units appropriately vs trying to jam them into a Level 6 manoeuvre exercise.

Where. Likely going to change anyway for the foreseeable future to Latvia, but honestly Wainwright is better than Pet or Gagetown. The Army has issues with bring 2 and 5 CMBG to Wainwright due to cost and more importantly time but that’s largely because we have neglected our ability to conduct road and rail moves efficiently. Training in home station is just going to make our sustainment ability less subject to stress testing but it will be cheaper.

Force on Force before Live L5. 1 CMBG some on MR 21 liked this, most were just tired by the time we got to Lvl 5 but as the authors mention it fits with our doctrine. I think our conception of live fire as the pinnacle over Force on force for a sub unit is wrong. Most sub unit Comds I know consider Force on force far more challenging in terms of decision making, judgment and tactical acumen than our live fires.

I likely have more thoughts but it’s late.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Where. Likely going to change anyway for the foreseeable future to Latvia, but honestly Wainwright is better than Pet or Gagetown. The Army has issues with bring 2 and 5 CMBG to Wainwright due to cost and more importantly time but that’s largely because we have neglected our ability to conduct road and rail moves efficiently. Training in home station is just going to make our sustainment ability less subject to stress testing but it will be cheaper.

Maybe that should be the main focus for the exercise because, you know, higher level commanders and their staff should be really good at managing huge logistical challenges.... or so it's rumoured

 

[Halifax Tar]

Maybe that should be the main focus for the exercise because, you know, higher level commanders and their staff should be really good at managing huge logistical challenges.... or so it's rumoured

Go'way bys.

Logistics and movements is to be ignored. It really has no impact on operations. Lets just blow shit up, because that soooooo cool!