• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Informing the Army’s Future Structure

They are not part of any primary reserve unit. Neither primary nor supplementary reserve get called out.
That's what I'm saying...the Supplementary Reserve doesn't really match what I was brainstorming about as "Class AA". Technically correct that Primary Reserves don't typically get "called out" for Op Lentus taskings, but there is voluntary participation. How many Supplemental Reservists typically volunteer for domestic disaster response operations? Serious question...I really have not idea if any typically do or not.
 
I’m not even sure there really is a process for a sup reserve member to volunteer. I have never seen it or heard of it.
I have heard of and met in various deployed theatres members of the US Army Individual Ready Reserve which is sort of similar to the Sup Reserve.
 
And an excellent example of a self-inflicted wound that occurs when you don't cull the herd early on, and just keep promoting the dross, IMHO...
There are some units that have some depth but the majority have less than one hundred to feed the food chain. When all you have is one or two warrant officers and a major or two then what you end up with for a CO and an RSM is the last men standing - or some parachuted in RegF retiree.

The gene pool is generally small.

🍻
 
There are some units that have some depth but the majority have less than one hundred to feed the food chain. When all you have is one or two warrant officers and a major or two then what you end up with for a CO and an RSM is the last men standing - or some parachuted in RegF retiree.

The gene pool is generally small.

🍻
One hundred, with an optimistic 15% not trained, can produce a major and a MWO on a six year cycle, maybe.

Thinking that instead they should produce a LCol and a CWO on a three year cycle is profoundly damaging to the institution.
 
Perhaps there is a role for a new Class of Army Reservist in combination with a change to mandatory training attendance for the current Class A Reservists.
As I indicated before we already have a ResF sub-component that could be used to fill the bill. The Canadian Rangers. There's nothing that says they have to be in the Arctic or on a coast, and many aren't. You can easily create several types of units there from coast watchers to home guard to civil response. It comes with a pretty flexible training regime and an existing command structure.

🍻
 
I’m not even sure there really is a process for a sup reserve member to volunteer. I have never seen it or heard of it.
I have heard of and met in various deployed theatres members of the US Army Individual Ready Reserve which is sort of similar to the Sup Reserve.
A few decades shortly after I transferred from the RegF to the ResF I was made the headquarters company commander of a Militia training establishment for the summer. They had a retired RegF CWO come up off the Supp Res from Florida every summer to be the camp RSM ... at least until I gently eased him out of the job.

Sup Res has very limited obligations, does not parade and is only lightly administered under DAOD 2020-4. In short they may be compulsorily placed on active service, but everything else is strictly voluntary.

🍻
 
When I was on the Supp List, I had to turn in all my kit and I had no obligation to parade or train with anyone. I didn’t hear from DND till 10 years later I got a letter saying they were taking me off.
 
When I was on the Supp List, I had to turn in all my kit and I had no obligation to parade or train with anyone. I didn’t hear from DND till 10 years later I got a letter saying they were taking me off.

They've improved since then.

Five years and you're out.
 
Was there not for a time, late 80s-early 90s, something called the Supplementary Ready Reserve? I seem to recall it as a transitional phase where there was still some kind of, I believe, annual obligation.
 
As I indicated before we already have a ResF sub-component that could be used to fill the bill. The Canadian Rangers. There's nothing that says they have to be in the Arctic or on a coast, and many aren't. You can easily create several types of units there from coast watchers to home guard to civil response. It comes with a pretty flexible training regime and an existing command structure.

🍻
How workable would it be to integrate Ranger elements into the existing Reserve unit infrastructure? Perhaps a Ranger Platoon attached to a Reserve unit where numbers warrant...having their own reporting structure to their parent Ranger Patrol Group, but if a Reserve unit generates personnel for a domestic OP they could fall under the command of the host unit?
 
How workable would it be to integrate Ranger elements into the existing Reserve unit infrastructure? Perhaps a Ranger Platoon attached to a Reserve unit where numbers warrant...having their own reporting structure to their parent Ranger Patrol Group, but if a Reserve unit generates personnel for a domestic OP they could fall under the command of the host unit?

Why do you hate the Rangers so much? ;)
 
As I indicated before we already have a ResF sub-component that could be used to fill the bill. The Canadian Rangers. There's nothing that says they have to be in the Arctic or on a coast, and many aren't. You can easily create several types of units there from coast watchers to home guard to civil response. It comes with a pretty flexible training regime and an existing command structure.

🍻
Further to the Canadian Rangers...


2. Overview​

Role of the CR​

2.1 The CR is the sub-component of the Reserve Force (Res F) that provides a CAF presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the CAF.

Mission​

2.2 The mission of the CR sub-component is to provide lightly-equipped and self-sufficient mobile forces in support of CAF sovereignty and other domestic operations.

Liability to Serve​

2.3 Under QR&O subparagraph 2.034(d), Reserve Force – Sub-components, the CR sub-component consists of CAF members who have undertaken, by the terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and training as may be required of them, but who are not required to undergo annual training.

2.4
A CAF member of the CR sub-component (CR member) is liable to perform duties of a military nature, including any duty involving public service, only:
  1. if called out on service in an emergency under QR&O paragraph 9.04(3), Training and Duty; or
  2. if placed on active service by the Governor in Council under section 31 of the National Defence Act.
2.5 Paragraph 33(2)(a) of the National Defence Act provides that a CAF member of the Res F (including a CR member) may be ordered to train for such periods as prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council.
Note – To date, no regulations prescribing periods of training for CR members have been made.
2.6 A commanding officer (CO) of a Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (CRPG) may authorize the attendance of a CR member on courses sponsored by the Regular Force (Reg F) or Res F.


4. Tasks​

CR Tasks​

4.1 The tasks in the following table may be undertaken by a CR member on duty when authorized by their CRPG HQ:
TasksExamples
Conduct and provide support to sovereignty operations
  • Conduct and provide support to surveillance and sovereignty patrols, including training in Canada.
  • Conduct North Warning System site patrols.
  • Report suspicious and unusual activities.
  • Collect local information of military significance.
Conduct and provide assistance to CAF domestic operations
  • Conduct surveillance of Canadian territory.
  • Provide local knowledge and CR expertise (i.e. advice and guides).
  • Participate in search and rescue operations.
  • Provide support in response to natural or man-made disasters and support in humanitarian operations.
  • Provide assistance to federal, provincial, territorial or municipal government authorities.
Maintain a CAF presence in the local community
  • Instruct, mentor and supervise junior Canadian rangers.
  • Participate in and support events in the local community (e.g. Yukon Quest, Canada Day, Remembrance Day, etc.).
Note – When assisting with the conduct of the activities of the Junior Canadian Rangers’ Programme, CR members are contributing to national goals of the Government of Canada by significantly improving the quality of life of junior Canadian rangers across the country, especially in the most isolated areas of Canada.

Tasks Not Assigned

4.2 The following tasks may not be assigned to a CR member, except when placed on active service under section 31 of the National Defence Act:

  1. undertaking tactical military training;
  2. performing immediate local defence tasks, such as containing or observing small enemy detachments pending the arrival of other forces;
  3. providing vital point security (e.g. dams, mines, oil pipelines, etc.);
  4. assisting federal, provincial, territorial or local police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents, saboteurs, criminals or terrorists; and
  5. serving in aid of the civil power.

National Defence Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5)​

Full Document:
Act current to 2023-07-25 and last amended on 2022-06-20. Previous Versions


Previous PageTable of ContentsNext Page
Marginal note:Placing forces on active service
  • 31 (1) The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component, unit or other element thereof or any officer or non-commissioned member thereof on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so
    • (a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada;
    • (b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter; or
    • (c) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the North Atlantic Treaty, the North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement or any other similar instrument to which Canada is a party.
  • Marginal note:When officers and non-commissioned members deemed on active service
    (2) An officer or non-commissioned member who
    • (a) is a member of, serving with, or attached or seconded to, a component, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces that has been placed on active service,
    • (b) has been placed on active service, or
    • (c) pursuant to law has been attached or seconded to a portion of a force that has been placed on active service,
    • shall be deemed to be on active service for all purposes.
  • R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 31
  • R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 60
  • 2004, c. 15, s. 76
Previous Version

KR&Os

Section 1 - Obligation to Serve​

9.01 - ACTIVE SERVICE​

Section 31 of the National Defence Act provides:
"31. (1) The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component, unit or other element thereof or any officer or non-commissioned member thereof on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so
(a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or
(b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada.
(2) An officer or non-commissioned member who
(a) is a member of, serving with, or attached or seconded to, a component, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces that has been placed on active service,
(b) has been placed on active service, or
(c) pursuant to law has been attached or seconded to a portion of a force that has been placed on active service,
shall be deemed to be on active service for all purposes."
(M)
(9.02: REPEALED 1 SEPTEMBER 1999)

9.03 - AID TO THE CIVIL POWER​

Sections 275 and 276 of the National Defence Act provide:
"275. The Canadian Forces, any unit or other element thereof and any officer or non-commissioned member, with materiel, are liable to be called out for service in aid of the civil power in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring that service, occurs or is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered as likely to occur.
276. Nothing in this Part shall be deemed to impose liability to serve in aid of the civil power, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only."
(C)

NOTE​

Where members of the Supplementary Reserve are not on active service, they are not, without their consent, subject to call-out under the provisions of this article.
(C)

9.04 - TRAINING AND DUTY​

(1) Subsections 33(2), (3) and (4) of the National Defence Act provide:
"33.(2) The reserve force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof
(a) may be ordered to train for such periods as are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council; and
(b) may be called out on service to perform any lawful duty other than training at such times and in such manner as by regulations or otherwise are prescribed by the Governor in Council.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.
(4) In this section, "duty" means any duty that is military in nature and includes any duty involving public service authorized under section 273.6."
(1 September 1999)
(2) Subject to any limitations prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, a member of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train each year on Class "B" Reserve Service prescribed under subparagraph (1)(b) of article 9.07 (Class "B" Reserve Service) for a period not exceeding 15 days and on Class "A" Reserve Service (see article 9.06 - Class "A" Reserve Service), for a period not exceeding 60 days.
(2.1) Despite paragraph (2), a member of the Primary Reserve who is a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may not be ordered to train if the member is required to perform any duties under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act during the period of training. (22 February 2007)
(3) In an emergency, the Minister may call out on service to perform any lawful duty other than training, such members of the Reserve Force, except members of the Supplementary Reserve, and such units and elements thereof as the Minister considers necessary.(1 September 1999)
(3.1) Despite paragraph (3), a member of the reserve force who is a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may not be called out on service if the member is required to perform any duties under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act during the period of call out. (22 February 2007)
(4) The authority of the Minister under paragraph (3) may, subject to such limitations as the Minister may prescribe, be exercised by military authorities designated by the Minister for that purpose.
(G) (P.C. 2007-215 of 22 February 2007)

NOTES​

(A) For the meaning of "emergency" as used in paragraph (3) of this article, refer to article 1.02 (Definitions).
(B) Where members of the Supplementary Reserve are not on active service, they are not, without their consent, subject to call-out under the provisions of this article.
(C)

Top of Page

Section 2 - Service with Consent​

9.05 - SERVICE WITH CONSENT​

A member of the Reserve Force may, with the member's consent and by or under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, be employed with the Regular Force or another sub-component of the Reserve Force.
(G)

Top of Page

Section 3 - Types of Service​

9.06 - CLASS "A" RESERVE SERVICE​

(1) A member of the Reserve Force is on Class "A" Reserve Service when the member is performing training or duty in circumstances other than those prescribed under articles 9.07 (Class "B" Reserve Service) and 9.08 (Class "C" Reserve Service).
(2) Class "A" Reserve Service includes proceeding to and returning from the place where the training or duty is performed, but not when that training or duty, including attendance at local parades, local demonstrations or local exercises, is performed at local headquarters.
(G)

9.07 - CLASS "B" RESERVE SERVICE​

(1) A member of the Reserve Force is on Class "B" Reserve Service when the member is on full-time service and:
  1. serves in a temporary position on the instructional or administrative staff of a school or other training establishment conducting training for the Reserve Force, the Royal Canadian Sea Cadets, the Royal Canadian Army Cadets or the Royal Canadian Air Cadets;
  2. proceeds on such training attachment or such training course of such duration as may be prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff; or
  3. is on duties of a temporary nature approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff, or by an authority designated by him, when it is not practical to employ members of the Regular Force on those duties.
(2) Class "B" Reserve Service includes proceeding to and returning from the place of duty.
(G)

9.075 - DEEMED FULL-TIME SERVICE​

A member of the Reserve Force who is serving on an operation of a type approved by or on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff under subparagraph 9.08(1)(b) (Class "C" Reserve Service) is deemed to be on full-time service.
(G) (PC 2003-1372 of 17 September 2003)

9.08 - CLASS "C" RESERVE SERVICE​

(1) A member of the Reserve Force is on Class "C" Reserve Service when the member is on full-time service and is serving
  1. with approval by or on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff in a Regular Force establishment position or is supernumerary to Regular Force establishment; or
  2. on either an operation or an operation of a type approved by or on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff.
(17 September 2003)
(1.1) For the purpose of subparagraph (1)(b), "operation" includes training and other duties necessary for the operation, and leave related to the operation. (17 September 2003)
(2) Class "C" Reserve Service includes proceeding to and returning from the place of duty.
(G) (P.C. 2003-1372 of 17 September 2003)

Top of Page

This part stands out for me -

2.2 The mission of the CR sub-component is to provide lightly-equipped and self-sufficient mobile forces in support of CAF sovereignty and other domestic operations.

This role, it strikes me, is every bit as valid in the more densely settled parts of Canada as it is in
sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the CAF.

The Canadian Rangers could be expanded to accommodate the larger population.
Or the Canadian Reserve structure could be expanded to accommodate the same terms of service as the Rangers but within the existing Regimental structure.
 
Was there not for a time, late 80s-early 90s, something called the Supplementary Ready Reserve? I seem to recall it as a transitional phase where there was still some kind of, I believe, annual obligation.
It's been the Supplementary Reserve for decades. The term Ready Reserve comes out of various US Reserve force classifications. For example, the US Navy has a "Selected Reserve" and an "Individual Ready Reserve". The SELRES have similar training requirements as the National Guard operating out of reserve centers while the IRR are much like our Supp Res without any training requirements and are often not assigned against specific billets. There are similar IRR in the USAR and the USAF Reserve.

🍻
 
People generally don’t learn in a vacuum. Theory is great, but it’s doesn’t mean it applies to practical implementation in the field.

1) Training Facilities, the idea of the summer Tent or H Hut facilities is ridiculous. There should be a large investment in training infrastructure.
Classrooms, real ones that have AC, bathrooms etc.
Barracks that are an actual hard fixed facility that is not a modular tent.

Integration of Technology into training - eg the Microsoft HoloLens type that can show how things are done correctly on a digital overview while a student does it physically they can learn and see right being done while doing it.

Fused training structures that allow Reg and Res personnel (if they are available) that take courses together.

Proper standards for training. I don’t know if it’s changed, but often when teaching reservists in the summer, some instructors didn’t have a clue of the subject matter or know how to teach, and lessons that would have failed off any competently run Leadership Course where accepted due to a shortage of instructors.
When you need to go back and reteach lessons repeatedly in the evening due to totally FUBAR instructor - it really eats into both the candidates and other instructors time. But the Sgt teaching is given a pass from the Standards WO due to just coming from a compassionate ERE position…
(That was a PPCLI issue, the RCR issues were different).
When I read this comment on training facilities maybe it's just me....but what the heck are we doing with the Universities?

I'm thinking UBC/UofA/UofSaskatchewan/Lakehead/....all of which have student dorms that are partially or mostly vacant for the summer, immediately adjacent to proper classrooms, and co-located in communities near the Armories for local units. I get this might be a re-think or culture clash to have the CAF mobilize upon the schools, during the summer, but why not?

And frankly it's a dual win for the Canadian Government can turn around and partially fund a new lecture hall under Education and CAF commitments without taking on the longer term maintenance issues need of base infrastructure. I acknowledge this only works for classroom type training and possibly some trades and that infrastructure is still needed for longer term field operations and application of training but it's a bridge solution that would allow for a concentration of troops, in appropriate facilities (i.e. not a tent), and then mobilize the needed trainers to match.

Okay..so I haven't had coffee yet and it might be a dream but it's a partial option
foresterab
 
How workable would it be to integrate Ranger elements into the existing Reserve unit infrastructure? Perhaps a Ranger Platoon attached to a Reserve unit where numbers warrant...having their own reporting structure to their parent Ranger Patrol Group, but if a Reserve unit generates personnel for a domestic OP they could fall under the command of the host unit?
There is nothing to prevent that because all chains of command lead to the CDS and a joint structure. The question is why would you do it?

In the last napkin force I circulated a year or so ago I made 2 Div responsible for all domestic ops with two coastal "regiments" and two manoeuvre brigades each of which have regional responsibilities and each of which has RegF, ResF units and a Ranger group under command (there's also an arty and a CSS brigade). The intent is to allow each brigade to force generate mixed and match resources for missions as they are required by CJOC.

I don't think that you need a integrated command structure below that although I can see that they may very likely be grouped into a specific task force for some operations and as you grow the Ranger establishment there will be a need to share infrastructure across the RegF, ResF and Rangers.

I'm generally in favour of a Canadian Army that integrates components for the purpose of sharing infrastructure, equipment and training (see for example my 30/70 units). I think the Rangers should also be part of that as well. Settling at the right level of integration needs some thinking about. In any event, it needs professional leadership across the board.

🍻
 
When I read this comment on training facilities maybe it's just me....but what the heck are we doing with the Universities?

I'm thinking UBC/UofA/UofSaskatchewan/Lakehead/....all of which have student dorms that are partially or mostly vacant for the summer, immediately adjacent to proper classrooms, and co-located in communities near the Armories for local units. I get this might be a re-think or culture clash to have the CAF mobilize upon the schools, during the summer, but why not?

And frankly it's a dual win for the Canadian Government can turn around and partially fund a new lecture hall under Education and CAF commitments without taking on the longer term maintenance issues need of base infrastructure. I acknowledge this only works for classroom type training and possibly some trades and that infrastructure is still needed for longer term field operations and application of training but it's a bridge solution that would allow for a concentration of troops, in appropriate facilities (i.e. not a tent), and then mobilize the needed trainers to match.

Okay..so I haven't had coffee yet and it might be a dream but it's a partial option
foresterab
There's a lot of benefit in what you say albeit not across the board.

Take for example the CSS trades. One could have mechanics, cooks, health care workers, even some engineering trades and so on take subsidized regular community college courses where they learn the fundamentals of their trade and earn a civilian qualification and then during the summer breaks you bring military equipment in to those facilities where those students do the conversion training to apply their new found civilian skills to their military specialty.

When it comes to the combat arms, and contrary to what some think about having proper class room facilities, my preference is to learn everything, absolutely everything, in the field under canvas. Firstly you need range facilities close by so that you can learn and do in rapid succession and secondly, I'm one of those folks who thinks that learning in the field helps to acclimatize the individual to what the army is. You do needs some infrastructure for administration, instructors and yes, even the odd lecture but, in general, conditions for PCF students should be austere.

I agree that we need to rethink our training structure from the bottom up and to ensure that the facilities fit the skills being taught. There's a lot of scope there for making much more use of civilian infrastructure.

🍻
 
When I read this comment on training facilities maybe it's just me....but what the heck are we doing with the Universities?

I'm thinking UBC/UofA/UofSaskatchewan/Lakehead/....all of which have student dorms that are partially or mostly vacant for the summer, immediately adjacent to proper classrooms, and co-located in communities near the Armories for local units. I get this might be a re-think or culture clash to have the CAF mobilize upon the schools, during the summer, but why not?

And frankly it's a dual win for the Canadian Government can turn around and partially fund a new lecture hall under Education and CAF commitments without taking on the longer term maintenance issues need of base infrastructure. I acknowledge this only works for classroom type training and possibly some trades and that infrastructure is still needed for longer term field operations and application of training but it's a bridge solution that would allow for a concentration of troops, in appropriate facilities (i.e. not a tent), and then mobilize the needed trainers to match.

Okay..so I haven't had coffee yet and it might be a dream but it's a partial option
foresterab

I spoke to a guy at a College about that once, and he was all for it.

The CAF? Not so much.
 
I spoke to a guy at a College about that once, and he was all for it.

The CAF? Not so much.
The CAF, in general, seems to be resistant to innovation although sometimes some good things do pop up. I think its the risk aversion thing. If you talk about civilian infrastructure the first thing that always pop ups is: what if we damage something, immediately followed by what if one of our people gets hurt? The CAF is very good at finding reasons not to do many things rather than setting up mitigation programs.

🍻
 

Peter MacKay: The urgent need to fix Canada's military — and how to do it​

Advice from a former defence minister to one just starting
Author of the article:
Peter MacKay, Special to National Post
Published Aug 14, 2023 • Last updated 6 hours ago • 8 minute read

340 Comments

Canadian flag on a military uniform.
The challenges facing the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are as daunting and as complex as they are numerous, writes former defence minister Peter MacKay, who says the federal government has a duty to ensure that defence is prioritized. PHOTO BY LARS HAGBERG / THE CANADIAN PRESS

With the recent federal cabinet shuffle, Canada has a new defence minister. As Bill Blair takes the reins, it is worth taking stock of where the Department of National Defence finds itself and the headwinds Blair faces in this new role. It is critically important to examine what opportunities exist to revitalize arguably the most important file of any government.

The challenges facing DND and the Canadian Armed Forces are as daunting and as complex as they are numerous. Most recently, Canada has been maligned by international partners, perhaps especially the United States, for failing to reach the NATO spending target. Adding insult to injury were reports of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau telling NATO officials behind closed doors that we “never will” reach that goal, only to contradict himself a few weeks later at a NATO meeting in Vilnius by agreeing to see two per cent of GDP spending on defence as a floor, not a ceiling. Canada’s behaviour has spread confusion and mistrust among allies and gives glee to our adversaries.


NATO is concerned about Canada's 2% GDP spending failure but more troubling and where the rubber meets the road, NATO is not blind to the actual conditions of Canadian Armed Forces equipment .. Our training partners on Land, Sea and Air are even more concerned as to the rotting state of our Forces fighting equipment be they fighter aircraft, tanks and naval task force destroyers. You can make arguments about not getting to 2% if you've kept your equipment in good working order, but Canada, under Justin Trudeau has not even done the minimal to keep what it has to offer up in case of a hot war break out, in peak, top notch, reliable working condition. I'm so disgusted with all who are even remotely responsible for the mess our Armed Forces find themselves in.


It is important to look beyond that headline number and accept that even if Canada were to invest two per cent of its GDP in defence (we are currently pegged at 1.29 per cent according to most recent NATO figures), there is no guarantee that we have a system capable of managing, let alone investing, an additional $20 billion in defence funding annually.

In my experience, there has been a distinct lack of co-ordination and communication between the departments responsible for military procurement. Industry Canada, Public Works and Procurement, and National Defence — all overseen by the Treasury Board — often work at cross purposes and in silos. These woes have long plagued Canada’s approach to defence spending, from boots to battleships. It would not be a stretch to call Canada’s defence procurement system among the worst in the West, having bedevilled successive governments for years.

With the failure to get new and necessary equipment to our troops in a timely and efficient fashion, Ottawa has fostered a crisis of faith in Canada as a defence partner. Our allies and adversaries alike have called us out as a laggard and free rider. Perhaps more troubling, our men and women in uniform are acutely aware that Canada has under invested in their success, which has led to serious morale and personnel deficits. Most troubling, we have put them in harm’s way at times at elevated risk due to improper equipment, uniforms and personal protection.



Ottawa has fostered a crisis of faith

What young pilot dreams of flying fighter aircraft that are almost older or are older than their parents? How can we tolerate asking them to deploy to a desert combat mission in forest green uniforms, or more recently, require them to buy their own helmets or feed themselves? It is truly falling well below what any G7 country’s citizens should ever tolerate when it comes to the treatment of those who put their lives on the line to protect us.

Undeniably there are also other issues that we are facing as a nation, some of an urgent nature, but we are now at an inflection point. Ottawa must not allow our nation’s defence readiness to continue to decline, putting all that we have accomplished and all that we hold dear at risk. A new approach is needed. If the new minister of defence is listening, I have a few suggestions he might consider as he settles into his role.

The first thing that must be done is to call for a détente. The government and opposition must come together to work on de-politicizing defence generally and procurement specifically. This doesn’t mean that the government should be absolved of responsibility for legitimate shortcomings, nor that the opposition stop asking questions, but rather that all parties should agree that the fundamentals of defence and procurement must have continuity between governments and must be defined by interparty co-operation rather than political competition.

If defence can be de-politicized, even in part, much more progress can be made toward cutting bureaucratic processes designed to insulate politicians, allowing us to reduce costly delays and finally get our men and women in uniform the tools and resources they most need, much more quickly than is currently possible. The spectacular failures of the Sea King helicopter, Victoria class submarine and ongoing and escalating CF-18 Fighter replacement programs, costing billions and causing long delays for short-term political gain, highlight this pressing need. Partisan political games and broken promises have devastating implications for those who risk their lives in the CAF.

Broken promises have devastating implications

If defence and procurement can be de-politicized, we can then consider what the government ought to do with a freer hand. First things first, Canada needs certain interoperable capabilities in order to contribute to our international obligations. We must be able to perform the tasks required of us in the air, on land, at sea, and in space, and we must be able to do so in co-operation with our most important partners and allies.

As a middle power with limited resources, this means that we must pursue joint builds for many of our major capabilities, such as the F-35, and must also be assertive in participating in international training exercises and supply chains for future capabilities. Refuelling capabilities across all elements as well as spare parts, ammunition and training are part of that interoperability puzzle.

An aspect of defence that has been allowed to atrophy has been our manufacturing capabilities. While Canada will never be able to develop all its necessary capabilities domestically, and while we should not attempt to embrace complete autonomy, we are not helping our allies if we lack the ability to meaningfully contribute to manufacturing, to produce crucial capabilities and material necessary for collective defence. Consider the shortage of artillery munitions that Ukraine is contending with; Canada could help fill that gap, but doing so requires significant investments in domestic production.

And to that end, Canada must strive to seize upon its comparative advantages. What we as a nation might lack in domestic air combat platform manufacturing, we can make up for in our burgeoning tech sector. Satellite imagery and LiDAR technology, ground- and ocean-based sensors, search and rescue, artificial intelligence, drones, and more are all capabilities where Canada can not only develop value for our military, but indeed may be able to manufacture goods and services that benefit our partners and allies more generally. Surely some buys will have to come off the shelf from allied countries, but by focusing on areas where we have advantages, while not neglecting areas which we must have some self-sufficiency, the government can make smart investments that yield benefits with respect to defence and the economy.

Canada must seize upon its advantages

Similarly, with major purchases and economic opportunities that come from such things as navy vessels and subsea autonomous vessels, Canada has a choice to make: do we continue to pursue domestic builds — which have significant economic benefits and the ability to be tailor-made to the needs of the Royal Canadian Navy — or do we pursue off-the-shelf options, such as purchasing older U.S. vessels? My own view is that Canada is nurturing shipbuilding and marine technology expertise that we would be fools to not continue to invest in. But we should consider the broader implications and pressing needs of this for niche capabilities such as future submarines. Or explore lease-to-own options as we did with joint support supply ships. There is a place for sole source when an urgent need arises, as was the case when the RCN faced an inability to refuel at sea.

Urgency requires innovative thinking, thinking sometimes out of the box and outside the beltway of Ottawa. There are tremendous minds with invaluable experience available to the new minister from among retired military personnel, public servants and organizations like the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and Canadian Global Affairs Institute, which regularly convene and ponder these pressing issues. Looking farther afield to countries like Australia and New Zealand as comparators for how to untie the Gordian Knot of procurement would help. Dusting off the 2013 Jenkins report, a call to action authored by Tom Jenkins and a panel of experts on federal R&D innovation, would also provide evergreen advice.

This is effectively a question of what model of military we want to develop: one like that of Australia — which is sharp, powerful, domestically fit for purpose, but smaller in size — or one more similar to that which Poland is building — a robust military with significant mass of personnel and equipment prepared for a major conventional conflict. There are benefits to both approaches, and neither is inherently superior; the best approach is based on what we want our military to be able to achieve. The CAF’s current mandate of home game, North American defence and one or more missions abroad demands the latter model.

The new minister might contemplate standing up more reserve units to build the larger regular force Army that we need. They need to consider a type of emergency management agency specifically mandated for domestic emergency response — still deployable, but more of a robust Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) with emphasis on Canada and our changing climate and extreme weather systems. An expanded Rangers and Junior Rangers program for south of 60 in some urban centres would provide enormous benefits for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.

Therefore, if Ottawa wants to get the critically important future of our Canadian Armed Forces right and make the correct decisions, the government must start by addressing the strategic atrophy that has been allowed to fester around defence. Move forward on the recommendations already made on culture and improvement, without continually slamming the current members. The government must articulate a clear vision for Canada’s defence, must seek buy-in across party lines, and must pursue that vision honestly and forcefully with commensurate priority investment.

If we can fix these issues, then we can also restore the hope and pride of Canada’s military service members. This, above all else, should be our lodestar: we must inspire the next generation to defend our country and way of life. Restoring morale, recruitment and retention, and increasing the overall numbers and capabilities fundamentally depends upon the government’s ability to fix the chronic issues facing our military.

The competent management of Canada’s defence is vital not only to the battlefield success of our men and women in uniform, but is indispensable to our national and international interests. Defence is our national insurance policy; in an increasingly dangerous world, our government has a sacred duty to ensure that defence is prioritized, and that democracy and freedom are preserved for our citizens and for those internationally whom we have committed to defend.

From a former defence minister to one just starting, I wish Minister Blair all the best in this enormous task. I sincerely hope he can bring success to a portfolio in desperate need of reinvigorated and inspiring leadership.
 
Back
Top