Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Respectfully Infanteer but that is precisely the point in a small army.

We have invested so much in vehicles generally, and LAVs in particular, that just driving them about the countryside eats up a lot of manpower.

We consume a battalion of infanteers as drivers. Another battalion as gunners. And that is from a force with only 9 battalions.

If we assume that the LAV "needs" a full time vehicle commander then we are allocating an additional battalion of infanteers away from traditional infanteering and committing them to the vehicles.

At that point fully one third of the infantry, 3 out of 9 battalions are committed to the tactical employment of the vehicle leaving 6 battalions available for employment as infantry. Add in the additional battalion lost in the transport platoons (9 spread across the Reg infantry) and you are now down to an army of 5 battalion equivalents of infantry or 15 company equivalents.

And two/thirds of those, call it 10 company equivalents, are tasked to the LAVs. That leaves 5 company equivalents to man the 3 non-LAV battalions.

So, yes, the issue of whether or not the LAV needs a permanent vehicle commander separate from the gunner becomes important in determining capabilities available to the government and any Grand Strategy it can develop.

We have spent so much money employing tradesmen in London that it has constrained our ability to develop Grand Strategy.


RCIC

1 Bn Truck Drivers
1 Bn LAV Drivers
1 Bn LAV Gunners
1 Bn LAV Commanders
3 Bn LAV GIBs (9 Coys)
2 Bn Non LAV infanteers (6 Coys)

CANSOFCOM

1 Bn Special Operators
1 Coy Extra Special Operators.


Given that what else is available to the Canadian Government to influence events?

What can the RCAC do with its 3 Bn Equivalents of Drivers, Gunners and Commanders?
Basically it is constrained to form on all those GDLS London LAVs.

The RCA? With 37 M777s that can reach out to 30 to 70 km once they find a suitable place to put their trails down?

Those, like the RCIC, are tactical influencers. They serve Grand Strategy but they don't influence it. Everybody else in the Army enables the tactical influencers.


The RCAF?

Probably the most flexible Grand Strategy influencer and enabler that DND supplies the Government. And doesn't get the attention that it needs in an infantry-centric force.

They should be central to the Force 2025 planning, and to the Future Force.

The RCN?

Well, its current fleet is well equipped to keep trawlers at bay and to defend US aircraft carriers. And provides little in the way of capabilities that Force 2025 could exploit.

On the other hand the first of the CSCs is supposed to have been supplied by the Halifax tradesmen for us within a year or two of Force 2025 and entirely within the Future Force frame. And with that comes a slew of potential ordnance and command and control and transport capabilities that could influence Force 2025.

Missiles and UAVs that can complement, augment and in some cases supplant capabilities that only the RCAF can currently supply. Mission bays and extra berths that can transport Extra Special Operators, Special Operators, Non-LAV infanteers and LAV infanteers, but, sadly, not their LAVs. Nor their accompanying RCAC tanks. The RCA becomes surplus to requirement when the RCN transporting the Extra Special Operators, their helicopters, boats and UAVs, can reach out 1700 km with Tomahawks and SM6s, 185 km with the Naval Strike Missiles and 100 km with the 127mm Vulcano rounds - all capable of precisely engaging moving targets at extreme range.

All of which has left me curious as to how the Latvian Battle Group fits into the development of Force 2025 and the Future Force. How much effort is being expended on Jointery?

And why shouldn't the RCA be able to deploy ashore the same capabilities that the RCN can deploy 15 times over from the sea? I think it would be a significant enabler of Grand Strategy if the RCA were capable of deploying the equivalent of even 3 CSCs ashore.

Given that premise how does the LAV Battalion contribute? Or are we better off ensuring that, at least the 3 Battalion Equivalents of LAV GIBs are capable of deploying in the Mission Bays of the CSCs with Ultra Light Tactical Mobility Platforms? Then they can augment the 2 Battalion Equivalents of Non-LAV infanteers and the reinforced Battalion Equivalent of Special and Extra Special Operators?

So, in that context, as far as I am concerned, the issue of whether the LAV needs a commander, whether the RCIC can afford to tie another full battalion of trained infanteers to a vehicle that has limited deployment opportunities and limited domestic utility (advantage of the Bushmaster in fighting floods?), and is a product of an era when the effort was to concentrate riflemen on an objective on a pre-determined and linear battlefied, rather than distribute them rapidly to parts unknown, yes, that battalion of LAV commanders matters.


Whoops! Sorry for the run-on sentence.

And MarkPPCLI is dead right about the Canadian Mounted Rifle Reserve. And integrate them tightly with the LAV Battalions.

But, I still would argue, while agreeing that tactically it makes more sense to tie the GIBs to the LAVs strategically it would be advantageous to separate them. The best compromise, In My Opinion, is the LAV Coy (or Squadron) attached or embedded within the Rifle Battalion.

The related thought is that I would rather have a larger number of 4 to 6 man sections that can be carried in any vehicles or operate on foot than a smaller number of 8-10 man sections that have to be split to be transported.

 

[markppcli]

Res F doesn't need first-line equipment. Anything fitting the general idea of a carrier with better mobility than a truck should do. I'd argue the simpler, the better - fewer specialized skills to be maintained (focus on cores) and lower maintenance burden. If the kit is deployable for some ops (eg. peacekeeping), so much the better, although it risks the pool being taken away.

Right I'm just suggesting there's what we have, and what would be ideal. Ideally we'd have a reg force fully mirrored by the reserves, instead we have access to TAPV. Which we can all agree isn't ideal but it's deployable, and will frankly be good enough.

 

[Kirkhill]

This conversation is going at this backwards. The discussion on crews is a doctrinal matter, while the discussion on structure is related to land force roles and missions. The latter should feed the former - so instead of starting with "how many people do we put in a LAV", the conversation should be on "what strategic roles and missions is the Army expected to conduct." Work from the top down.

Here is a good example of where the discussion should start.

As a project manager I learned a long time ago that the problem needs to be worked from both ends concurrently. Top Down - What you would like to do. Bottom Up - What you can do.

 

[markppcli]

Respectfully Infanteer but that is precisely the point in a small army.

We have invested so much in vehicles generally, and LAVs in particular, that just driving them about the countryside eats up a lot of manpower.

We consume a battalion of infanteers as drivers. Another battalion as gunners. And that is from a force with only 9 battalions.

If we assume that the LAV "needs" a full time vehicle commander then we are allocating an additional battalion of infanteers away from traditional infanteering and committing them to the vehicles.

At that point fully one third of the infantry, 3 out of 9 battalions are committed to the tactical employment of the vehicle leaving 6 battalions available for employment as infantry. Add in the additional battalion lost in the transport platoons (9 spread across the Reg infantry) and you are now down to an army of 5 battalion equivalents of infantry or 15 company equivalents.

And two/thirds of those, call it 10 company equivalents, are tasked to the LAVs. That leaves 5 company equivalents to man the 3 non-LAV battalions.

So, yes, the issue of whether or not the LAV needs a permanent vehicle commander separate from the gunner becomes important in determining capabilities available to the government and any Grand Strategy it can develop.

We have spent so much money employing tradesmen in London that it has constrained our ability to develop Grand Strategy.


RCIC

1 Bn Truck Drivers
1 Bn LAV Drivers
1 Bn LAV Gunners
1 Bn LAV Commanders
3 Bn LAV GIBs (9 Coys)
2 Bn Non LAV infanteers (6 Coys)

CANSOFCOM

1 Bn Special Operators
1 Coy Extra Special Operators.


Given that what else is available to the Canadian Government to influence events?

What can the RCAC do with its 3 Bn Equivalents of Drivers, Gunners and Commanders?
Basically it is constrained to form on all those GDLS London LAVs.

The RCA? With 37 M777s that can reach out to 30 to 70 km once they find a suitable place to put their trails down?

Those, like the RCIC, are tactical influencers. They serve Grand Strategy but they don't influence it. Everybody else in the Army enables the tactical influencers.


The RCAF?

Probably the most flexible Grand Strategy influencer and enabler that DND supplies the Government. And doesn't get the attention that it needs in an infantry-centric force.

They should be central to the Force 2025 planning, and to the Future Force.

The RCN?

Well, its current fleet is well equipped to keep trawlers at bay and to defend US aircraft carriers. And provides little in the way of capabilities that Force 2025 could exploit.

On the other hand the first of the CSCs is supposed to have been supplied by the Halifax tradesmen for us within a year or two of Force 2025 and entirely within the Future Force frame. And with that comes a slew of potential ordnance and command and control and transport capabilities that could influence Force 2025.

Missiles and UAVs that can complement, augment and in some cases supplant capabilities that only the RCAF can currently supply. Mission bays and extra berths that can transport Extra Special Operators, Special Operators, Non-LAV infanteers and LAV infanteers, but, sadly, not their LAVs. Nor their accompanying RCAC tanks. The RCA becomes surplus to requirement when the RCN transporting the Extra Special Operators, their helicopters, boats and UAVs, can reach out 1700 km with Tomahawks and SM6s, 185 km with the Naval Strike Missiles and 100 km with the 127mm Vulcano rounds - all capable of precisely engaging moving targets at extreme range.

All of which has left me curious as to how the Latvian Battle Group fits into the development of Force 2025 and the Future Force. How much effort is being expended on Jointery?

And why shouldn't the RCA be able to deploy ashore the same capabilities that the RCN can deploy 15 times over from the sea? I think it would be a significant enabler of Grand Strategy if the RCA were capable of deploying the equivalent of even 3 CSCs ashore.

Given that premise how does the LAV Battalion contribute? Or are we better off ensuring that, at least the 3 Battalion Equivalents of LAV GIBs are capable of deploying in the Mission Bays of the CSCs with Ultra Light Tactical Mobility Platforms? Then they can augment the 2 Battalion Equivalents of Non-LAV infanteers and the reinforced Battalion Equivalent of Special and Extra Special Operators?

So, in that context, as far as I am concerned, the issue of whether the LAV needs a commander, whether the RCIC can afford to tie another full battalion of trained infanteers to a vehicle that has limited deployment opportunities and limited domestic utility (advantage of the Bushmaster in fighting floods?), and is a product of an era when the effort was to concentrate riflemen on an objective on a pre-determined and linear battlefied, rather than distribute them rapidly to parts unknown, yes, that battalion of LAV commanders matters.


Whoops! Sorry for the run-on sentence.

And MarkPPCLI is dead right about the Canadian Mounted Rifle Reserve. And integrate them tightly with the LAV Battalions.

But, I still would argue, while agreeing that tactically it makes more sense to tie the GIBs to the LAVs strategically it would be advantageous to separate them. The best compromise, In My Opinion, is the LAV Coy (or Squadron) attached or embedded within the Rifle Battalion.

The related thought is that I would rather have a larger number of 4 to 6 man sections that can be carried in any vehicles or operate on foot than a smaller number of 8-10 man sections that have to be split to be transported.

I won't get into all you points but I think we need to consider whether or no that LAV is crewed by infantry or armour, the size of the force isn't going to change. Which is I think Infanteer's point now that I see it through that lens. I would suggest that in a force that will not grow, they should stay a) because I do believe the structure is superior regardless and b) you won't get increased manning so you may as well get increased integration.

A better question I think worth asking is given Canada's inability and historic unwillingness, true of most middle powers, to conduct initial theatre entry, is there a reason to maintain 3 Bn of light infantry? In a war of maneuver, the CMBGs are supposed to be moving at mechanized speeds, the only way for the Light Bn to keep up is to be mounted in trucks and that's the worst of both worlds. Would it be better to maintain a single Bn of high readiness, rapidly deployable, conventional infantry and then back fill the rest of the RCIC with the left overs so to speak? Or use those extra PY's to fill out a new counter UAV / GBAD capability?

 

[Infanteer]

Do we have the size of our force elements right? Is the company, is the squadron, is the battery design that we have now, is it fit for purpose for some of the new capabilities we’re bringing in, and the new way of operating?
That is directly from Force 2025; and is what we are talking about. Our role, which you neatly summarized, is frankly a known. We are discussing, within the confines set out in Force 2025, what that force should look like. We have no discussed the higher level, because it has been defined and set out already.

If it has been defined and set out already, then what is it?

Force 2025 is derived from the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy (CAMS). CAMS speaks to things like "interoperability within ABCANZ" and a "Global Response Task Force." What do these mean? Perhaps we should consider those before a company ORBAT? When I read the CAMS sections on Force 2025, the explicit tasks are to "validate its ability to generate sufficient forces to meet the mission concurrency requirements" in various policies, as well as to "validate the functions, organization, and distribution of land formations..."

Again, start big, then go small. Digging into sub-units at this point is missing the forest for the trees.

 

[Kirkhill]

A better question I think worth asking is given Canada's inability and historic unwillingness, true of most middle powers, to conduct initial theatre entry, is there a reason to maintain 3 Bn of light infantry? In a war of maneuver, the CMBGs are supposed to be moving at mechanized speeds, the only way for the Light Bn to keep up is to be mounted in trucks and that's the worst of both worlds. Would it be better to maintain a single Bn of high readiness, rapidly deployable, conventional infantry and then back fill the rest of the RCIC with the left overs so to speak? Or use those extra PY's to fill out a new counter UAV / GBAD capability?

Or transfer the PYs from the RCIC to the RCA and CANSOFCOM?

 

[Kirkhill]

If it has been defined and set out already, then what is it?

Force 2025 is derived from the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy (CAMS). CAMS speaks to things like "interoperability within ABCANZ" and a "Global Response Task Force." What do these mean? Perhaps we should consider those before a company ORBAT? When I read the CAMS sections on Force 2025, the explicit tasks are to "validate its ability to generate sufficient forces to meet the mission concurrency requirements" in various policies, as well as to "validate the functions, organization, and distribution of land formations..."

Again, start big, then go small. Digging into sub-units at this point is missing the forest for the trees.

Forests are defined by their trees. You can stand a 40,000 ft and observe that canopy and conclude that the forest is impassable. And then you discover that the Panzers were manoeuvering between the trees. The trees matter.

 

[markppcli]

If it has been defined and set out already, then what is it?

Force 2025 is derived from the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy (CAMS). CAMS speaks to things like "interoperability within ABCANZ" and a "Global Response Task Force." What do these mean? Perhaps we should consider those before a company ORBAT? When I read the CAMS sections on Force 2025, the explicit tasks are to "validate its ability to generate sufficient forces to meet the mission concurrency requirements" in various policies, as well as to "validate the functions, organization, and distribution of land formations..."

Again, start big, then go small. Digging into sub-units at this point is missing the forest for the trees

Read Core Competancies :
The key Canadian Army characteristics remain largely unchanged:

• The Canadian Army retains the ability to integrate capabilities to create a combined arms effect;
• The Canadian Army’s heart is its professional soldiers, organized within a brigade group structure, and capable of conducting operations within a joint and pan-domain context;
• The Canadian Army remains adaptive. Canadian Army institutions, in particular the school-houses, work to retain this characteristic. The Canadian Army finds opportunities in ambiguity; and
• The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types. The light forces offer strategic and operational agility, especially in rapidly evolving situations and in complex terrain. The heavy capabilities remain essential to enabling combat-effective medium weight forces and sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise.

Further

Assumptions​

• There will be no fundamental changes to policy or resource allocation, and the Canadian Army’s modernization goals will remain relevant to the achievement of Canada’s defence objectives;
• Subsequent planning horizons will be impacted by moderate policy and resource adjustments. This will necessitate a constant multi-horizon development perspective, meaning this document will require periodic updating;
• Modernization efforts must be undertaken concurrent to force generation and force employment on operations. There will be no pause. Efforts must be managed and prioritized, with the tempo of change being a key lever of control; and,
• Significant growth in structure is unlikely. All modernization efforts will be conducted with the perspective that every change in capability, structure, or organization must be done within the Canadian Army’s existing personnel envelope.

So we are discussing the changes within that context. What does the future Bde look like given that that structure will likely remain unchanged, and that manning will not be substantially different. Small changes, ie Bn / Coy Orbats are where we will see change. Given the recent history of the Canadian Forces I find the larger questions of national strategy boring, as our employment level is the tactical.

 

[Infanteer]

Forests are defined by their trees. You can stand a 40,000 ft and observe that canopy and conclude that the forest is impassable. And then you discover that the Panzers were manoeuvering between the trees. The trees matter.

Sure.

I've been in many of the Force 2025 discussions occurring right now, and I'll tell you that "who is the LAV crew commander" is not on anyone's radar.

Read Core Competancies :
The key Canadian Army characteristics remain largely unchanged:

• The Canadian Army retains the ability to integrate capabilities to create a combined arms effect;
• The Canadian Army’s heart is its professional soldiers, organized within a brigade group structure, and capable of conducting operations within a joint and pan-domain context;
• The Canadian Army remains adaptive. Canadian Army institutions, in particular the school-houses, work to retain this characteristic. The Canadian Army finds opportunities in ambiguity; and
• The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types. The light forces offer strategic and operational agility, especially in rapidly evolving situations and in complex terrain. The heavy capabilities remain essential to enabling combat-effective medium weight forces and sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise.

So we are discussing the changes within that context. What does the future Bde look like given that that structure will likely remain unchanged, and that manning will not be substantially different. Small changes, ie Bn / Coy Orbats are where we will see change. Given the recent history of the Canadian Forces I find the larger questions of national strategy boring, as our employment level is the tactical.

That isn't a list of strategic considerations that would give way to structural factors. It's a shopping list of adjectives.

 

[markppcli]

Sure.

I've been in many of the Force 2025 discussions occurring right now, and I'll tell you that "who is the LAV crew commander" is not on anyone's radar.


That isn't a list of strategic considerations that would give way to structural factors. It's a shopping list of adjectives.

My point form that post was the major changes are not going to happen. It's going to be about small changes. Everything the army writes is buzz word centric. I mean look at this stuff:

Central to this guidance are the eight core missions of the CAF. The CAF will:

• Detect, deter, and defend against threats to or attacks on Canada;
• Detect, deter, and defend against threats to or attacks on North America in partnership with the United States, and through NORAD;
• Lead and/or contribute forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global stability;
• Lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions within the UN, NATO, and other multilateral partners;
• Engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad;
• Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad;
• Provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies; and,
• Conduct search and rescue operations.21

This isn't a staff college, I have no interest in discussing that stuff. I enjoy an intelligent, professional conversation about how the army works at my level. Since that's clearly inappropriate here, I shall retire to my previous lurking. Enjoy your gate sir, you guard it well.

 

[Kirkhill]

Sure.

I've been in many of the Force 2025 discussions occurring right now, and I'll tell you that "who is the LAV crew commander" is not on anyone's radar.


That isn't a list of strategic considerations that would give way to structural factors. It's a shopping list of adjectives.

How about "Where, when, how, why and how often will we deploy the LAV battalions?" And what is the replacement plan when the supply is exhausted?

 

[Kirkhill]

My point form that post was the major changes are not going to happen. It's going to be about small changes. Everything the army writes is buzz word centric. I mean look at this stuff:

Central to this guidance are the eight core missions of the CAF. The CAF will:

• Detect, deter, and defend against threats to or attacks on Canada;
• Detect, deter, and defend against threats to or attacks on North America in partnership with the United States, and through NORAD;
• Lead and/or contribute forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global stability;
• Lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions within the UN, NATO, and other multilateral partners;
• Engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad;
• Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad;
• Provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies; and,
• Conduct search and rescue operations.21

This isn't a staff college, I have no interest in discussing that stuff. I enjoy an intelligent, professional conversation about how the army works at my level. Since that's clearly inappropriate here, I shall retire to my previous lurking. Enjoy your gate sir, you guard it well.

Don't.

 

[Infanteer]

My point form that post was the major changes are not going to happen.

The COAs that are being considered for analysis are, I'd venture, fairly significant.

Central to this guidance are the eight core missions of the CAF. The CAF will:

Those are policy statements. The next level below is to consider how to assign resources and probable tasks to those policy statements.

This isn't a staff college, I have no interest in discussing that stuff. I enjoy an intelligent, professional conversation about how the army works at my level. Since that's clearly inappropriate here, I shall retire to my previous lurking. Enjoy your gate sir, you guard it well.

Feel free to throw your teddy bear in the corner. I was only challenging the logic of the notion of jumping straight to Step 5 when the intermediate steps should be considered first in this thread. Sorry that you feel threatened by this.

There are plenty of threads that talk about LAV crews, along with those that talk about how many soldiers should be in a rifle section, or how many guns in a battery, or tanks in a troop.

 

[Infanteer]

How about "Where, when, how, why and how often will we deploy the LAV battalions?" And what is the replacement plan when the supply is exhausted?

Now we're cooking with gas.

 

[Kirkhill]

So what answers are you coming up with?

 

[FJAG]

This conversation is going at this backwards. The discussion on crews is a doctrinal matter, while the discussion on structure is related to land force roles and missions. The latter should feed the former - so instead of starting with "how many people do we put in a LAV", the conversation should be on "what strategic roles and missions is the Army expected to conduct." Work from the top down.

Here is a good example of where the discussion should start.

You're bang on and you and I have had this discussion in this forum and elsewhere before.

Like T2B (and you unless you've changed your mind recently) I'm heavily into reforming into three asynchronous brigades: one targeted and equipped for heavy mech high intensity warfare (preferably with three combined arms battalions of two tank squadrons and two mech companies each) one equipped with three light infantry battalions as a rapid reaction force (and closely affiliated with the Special Operations Command for both northern services as well as a national/international QRF) and one as a medium weight more peacekeeping foreign service oriented one (with three LAV battalions).

There is no one all singing and dancing doctrine which covers all three albeit that basic infantry skills do form the core of all three but thereafter there is entirely too much specialization and too much specialist equipment required for each role. If each brigade routinely trains within its own skill sets/doctrine then there is much less need for lengthy pre-deployment training.

Reserves have a major role and also need specialized equipment and training. I've always maintained that the Reg F job is to fill those jobs which need extensive day to day training to stay competent or which may require a response to deploy on very short notice. Reserves, on the other hand should fill those jobs which have a lower skill level and which are not needed day to day but only in very major circumstances - there are many such jobs running from many support trades to combat trades such as artillery and even armour. To say that our current reserve structure is inadequate is an understatement. It needs major restructuring from the legislative level on up if it is to be a dependable.

Obviously we need to change our approach to fleet management and managed readiness cycles. We should focus readiness back to constant readiness rather than three (or even two stage) readiness which guarantees that 1/3 to 2/3 of our force is not ready to deploy. That also requires better management on how much of our force can be operationally deployed at any given time. If three combined arms battalions are not capable of keeping a half battlegroup in Latvia on a continuous basis then perhaps that brigade needs four such battalions long term. If the rapid reaction light brigade or the medium brigade has few deployments to handle then maybe it can get by quite comfortably with just two battalions. Battalions can always be rerolled if given sufficient time and equipment without the necessity of physically moving from base to base. A change in command affiliation is sufficient.

I think that infantry and even artillery is easiest to sort out. Infantry because it needs to conform to the core roles of the brigades. Artillery because the job is generally the same and much of the actual fire power can be relegated to the reserves while the FOO and FSCC jobs stay Reg F. Artillery equipment rather than personnel is the biggest issue. The armoured corps is, IMHO, the biggest problem in that it needs a better development of the separation in tank capability for the heavy brigade (in my mind in combined arms battalions/regiments) and a more proper delineation of what constitutes reconnaissance and/or cavalry across all the three of the specializations.

And then there is logistics across the board - we need a much better system that does not rob brigades and battalions of vital resources (both personnel and materiel) in order to form NSEs. There needs to be a very capable and flexible organization of both Reg F and Res support units which can be tapped on a regular and ongoing system to provide that rear link. IMHO NSEs should be smaller than they are now because deployed elements should take their own A and B Echs to do their normal doctrinal roles while NSEs should essentially only form the "rear link" and provide the support functions expected above unit level. That would require a delicate balance as between Bde service battalions (so that they continue to be able to fulfill the Bde's essential support in garrison functions) and specialized sustainment units which fill above (or outside) brigade level support tasks.

Finally, do we really need NCEs? We already have numerous bloated headquarters that look over a deployed battlegroup's shoulders. Sometimes there is a bde headquarters and then we have CJOC and on occasion 1 Div. We need to reduce layers. Do we really need to deploy a bde HQ when we deploy a battle group and less? Do we really need a 1 Cdn Div if we have no war plans to deploy a division. And if we ever do deploy one what's wrong with one of the two remaining divisional HQ (and yes, I think we need to reduce our Div HQs to two, 2 Div for everything including Petawawa and everything east of the Ottawa River and 3 Div for everything west of the Ottawa river (less Petawawa). Is there really any reason why the role of an NCE or bde HQ can't be handled form a slightly beefed up section of CJOC responsible for handling the named operation. If we form part of a force where Canada would be handling other battalions other than it's own battlegroup then by all means send a brigade headquarters (ensuring there is some depth to keep the day to day activities in the brigade back home perking) but unless there is a need for Canada to command a brigade, keep the brigade HQ at home.

Okay.

Back to my regular day.

 

[Infanteer]

So what answers are you coming up with?

I would start by going:

Europe, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Asian-Pacific, North America, South America.

What is the Army likely to be doing in these places, how would it go about doing them, and what is the priority?

 

[FJAG]

I won't get into all you points but I think we need to consider whether or no that LAV is crewed by infantry or armour, the size of the force isn't going to change.

Disagree re whether LAV should be infantry or armour - that's just playing with PYs and cap badges. I do believe that we need combined arms battalions like the Americans that are habitually paired armour and mech infantry within the same battalion. I don't care if the battalion is called 2 PPCLI or LdSH. In fact to keep traps shut I would suggest 1 CMBG has 1 and 2 PPCLI and the LdSH as their three combined arms battalions with each equipped identically.

Which is I think Infanteer's point now that I see it through that lens. I would suggest that in a force that will not grow, they should stay a) because I do believe the structure is superior regardless and b) you won't get increased manning so you may as well get increased integration.

A better question I think worth asking is given Canada's inability and historic unwillingness, true of most middle powers, to conduct initial theatre entry, is there a reason to maintain 3 Bn of light infantry?

The idea of a light battalion within a bde of two mech battalions makes sense only if you never intend to deploy the bde as an entity. Don't even get me started on the 8 gun ultra light howitzer artillery regiment.

There numerous roles for light forces including entry into a hostile OOTW theatre, northern operations, operations in mountainous terrain, operations in urban terrain, even foreign assistance training etc. My only problem is the way they are grouped. I prefer to see them in a single brigade with 2-3 battalions without tanks and modest engineer and artillery support (possibly hybrid Reg F and Res F regiments) so that the training and employment is all to a common doctrine.

In a war of maneuver, the CMBGs are supposed to be moving at mechanized speeds, the only way for the Light Bn to keep up is to be mounted in trucks and that's the worst of both worlds. Would it be better to maintain a single Bn of high readiness, rapidly deployable, conventional infantry and then back fill the rest of the RCIC with the left overs so to speak? Or use those extra PY's to fill out a new counter UAV / GBAD capability?

Agreed that a CMBG targeted for high intensity combat should be organized, equipped and trained for only that role. There's a reason why US Army manoeuvre brigades are designed as ABCTs, SBCTs and IBCTs each with its own doctrine for employment. So far we've gotten away with our structure because we do not consider the brigade as the smallest unit of action. We think in battle groups which are structured with a building block force structure mentality. That has a great cost in our ability to function properly at brigade level or above. The trouble is when the time comes where we have to commit a full brigade in a high intensity conflict (which many here think will never happen because we choose where we fight) we won't have the skill sets much less the gear to do so. Quite frankly, the way we organize the Army is a function that has been assumed by the Army for decades and is not the conscious decision of any government. Our inability to function (properly) as brigades is a self inflicted wound that's been two decades in the making.

 

[Kirkhill]

Near term or long term?

Grand Strategy is not about Force 2025. 2050? Definitely. 2100? Probably.

The Canadian Armed Forces is primarily a body of people. And the budget reflects that.

But the advantage they offer the government is defined by their equipment. Their ability to influence events is defined by the engines the supervise, the launchers they operate and the munitions they deliver.

We focus on the people to the detriment of the influence the are capable of exerting if we don't consider first the technological opportunities currently available

You're bang on and you and I have had this discussion in this forum and elsewhere before.

...

Obviously we need to change our approach to fleet management and managed readiness cycles. We should focus readiness back to constant readiness rather than three (or even two stage) readiness which guarantees that 1/3 to 2/3 of our force is not ready to deploy. That also requires better management on how much of our force can be operationally deployed at any given time. If three combined arms battalions are not capable of keeping a half battlegroup in Latvia on a continuous basis then perhaps that brigade needs four such battalions long term. If the rapid reaction light brigade or the medium brigade has few deployments to handle then maybe it can get by quite comfortably with just two battalions. Battalions can always be rerolled if given sufficient time and equipment without the necessity of physically moving from base to base. A change in command affiliation is sufficient.

No argument on the thrust. I still want to leave open for discussion whether 15 LAVs with 150 infanteers (Dr/Gnr/CC-7GIBs) on board is of more, less or equal value as 25 LAVs with 90 infanteers (Dr/Gnr - 4 GIBs) or 15 LAVs with 90 infanteers with drones, CG-84 munitions, ALAWs and NLOS missiles)?

Agree with the two battalion light force, or even making it part of the CANSOF complex

I think that infantry and even artillery is easiest to sort out. Infantry because it needs to conform to the core roles of the brigades. Artillery because the job is generally the same and much of the actual fire power can be relegated to the reserves while the FOO and FSCC jobs stay Reg F. Artillery equipment rather than personnel is the biggest issue. The armoured corps is, IMHO, the biggest problem in that it needs a better development of the separation in tank capability for the heavy brigade (in my mind in combined arms battalions/regiments) and a more proper delineation of what constitutes reconnaissance and/or cavalry across all the three of the specializations.

Artillery may be easy to sort out at the tactical level. But my personal belief is that is an under utilized and under appreciated asset that could make much better use of some of those infantry PYs. 120mm and 155mm launched loitering ISR munitions with 100 km range? Himars launchers? NASAMS launchers? FOO/FAC teams? Directing Cruise, Ballistic and HyperVelocity strike missions?

How many infanteers, with what gear, does it take to permit the FOO/FAC teams to operate safely?

And then there is logistics across the board - we need a much better system that does not rob brigades and battalions of vital resources (both personnel and materiel) in order to form NSEs. There needs to be a very capable and flexible organization of both Reg F and Res support units which can be tapped on a regular and ongoing system to provide that rear link. IMHO NSEs should be smaller than they are now because deployed elements should take their own A and B Echs to do their normal doctrinal roles while NSEs should essentially only form the "rear link" and provide the support functions expected above unit level. That would require a delicate balance as between Bde service battalions (so that they continue to be able to fulfill the Bde's essential support in garrison functions) and specialized sustainment units which fill above (or outside) brigade level support tasks.

The area with the greatest domestic utility that should therefore be the easiest sell.

Finally, do we really need NCEs? We already have numerous bloated headquarters that look over a deployed battlegroup's shoulders. Sometimes there is a bde headquarters and then we have CJOC and on occasion 1 Div. We need to reduce layers. Do we really need to deploy a bde HQ when we deploy a battle group and less? Do we really need a 1 Cdn Div if we have no war plans to deploy a division. And if we ever do deploy one what's wrong with one of the two remaining divisional HQ (and yes, I think we need to reduce our Div HQs to two, 2 Div for everything including Petawawa and everything east of the Ottawa River and 3 Div for everything west of the Ottawa river (less Petawawa). Is there really any reason why the role of an NCE or bde HQ can't be handled form a slightly beefed up section of CJOC responsible for handling the named operation. If we form part of a force where Canada would be handling other battalions other than it's own battlegroup then by all means send a brigade headquarters (ensuring there is some depth to keep the day to day activities in the brigade back home perking) but unless there is a need for Canada to command a brigade, keep the brigade HQ at home.

I share the general reluctance to create more command centers. But that is an inevitable function of Dispersed Operations, surely?

The question, as far as I am concerned, is are those command elements able to effectively influence their area of interest? How many buttons does each command cell have to push and what happens when they push them?

A stack of command cells stacked one on top of each other, each with only one button, is nonsense. A flat pyramid of semi-autonomous cells with multiple buttons is sensible.

 

[McG]

If a battle group with one squadron of tanks and one mech rifle company exhausts all our "big gear" then we have a much larger problem than we think ...

The availability & maintainability of our tanks means that putting our three tank squadrons in three geographically distant training areas will have the effect of ensuring our collective training rarely will go larger than a half squadron.

That said, we could use Europe as our CMTC for whatever sized organization we feel should be there. Units could rotate through to do whatever test exercises we consider useful as a check on training status and to get experience in a multinational environment. Leave a core staff of exercise controllers and equipment maintainers with everyone else being flown there and back by our transport squadrons.

If you want to move CMTC to Europe then you will guarantee reduced throughput (so less people getting exposed to the training) and increased costs. A a half BG of kit in Latvia for the glory of Canadian combat team training in Latvia is an answer looking for its question. If the BG needs capabilities that Canada can provide, then we can send those. But we won't improve collective training by trying to make the eFP BG a primary mechanism to deliver CT.

Yes, but that misses the point. The LAV needs a crew commander, needs a gunner, and needs a driver. Which section that person belongs to and what cap badge he or she wears is irrelevant to the Army's structure for 2025, as those positions need to be filled.

If you're advocating shelving platforms because of changes to numbers of sub-units, then we're talking about something different.

Where our structure is still largely reflective of the work of Force 2013, we have a lot of organization that is designed around equipment & PYs that don't exist. Demi-platoons that have allocated only PYs for a section but are intended to be the nucleus of a full platoon on operations. Unit & sub-unit echelons with all the PYs to remain mobile & deliver the support but none of the required vehicles are available. Most of these are vestiges of past structures that we still want but cannot afford in multiples of three.

Do we really need brigades? SSE espoused that brigades were important, but maybe it is just the Bde HQ and an assortment of BGs that are what we need. But we say we want mobile brigades and we tie-up a lot of resources (PY & Eqpt) in dysfunctional echelon and HQ elements that exist to enable mobility but which cannot actually provide mobility. If mobile brigades are important and we are not going to increase resources, then we need to consolidate the existing resources into fewer mobile brigades. If mobility is not important and our brigades can be anchored to FOBs/infrastructure, then maybe we can keep all the brigades but there are resources that can be allocated away from HQ & CSS mobility.