Heck, we had Iltis variants for TOW and we had a LAV 3 TOW under Armour and correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't there a BV206 variant. I know the Italians had one for AMF(L) but not sure if Canada did or not.
Aye, I'd forgotten about the LAV3-TOW. In my defence, I hardly knew them.Heck, we had Iltis variants for TOW and we had a LAV 3 TOW under Armour and correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't there a BV206 variant. I know the Italians had one for AMF(L) but not sure if Canada did or not.
The Canadian Department of National Defence has awarded Genertal Dynamics Land Systems – Canada a C$ 49.2 million (about $46.3 million) contract to take 33 of the 71 LAV-III chassis originally manufactured under a previous contract for LAV-III TOW Under Armour (TUA) vehicles, and use them as infantry carriers, instead of inegrating the Kvaerner TUA turret from older M113s. GDLS Canada will oversee the LAV-III TUAV conversion and act as the lead integrator. Rheinmetall Canada of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, will supply the Remote Weapon Station, which will feature a universal gun cradle capable of mounting 5.56, 7.62 and 12.7 mm armaments and a cooled thermal sight system. Delivery of the converted Infantry Section Carriers will occur from June 2008 – March 2009. GDLS release
I'm still a fan of, in addition to dedicated ATGM platforms in dedicated platoons, strapping a pair of ATGMs onto the LAV turrets.
We absolutely did have BV-206 mounted TOW in Norway. I personally came across one, rolled, on a mountain track in 1992, when I trying to find a good OP for my FOO party. The Patricias, pride aside, were unhurt.
Soof all of the above quotes, these two interest me the most:
We have an Army where the website says we consist of:
That's 36,700 who are potentially deployable. (do we really only have 13,700 primary reservists or is the Army's own web page out of whack?) In any event that well over a division and a half of folks. We have enough equipment for an armoured regiment, six LAV battalions and a proper 18 gun artillery regiment plus a good number of equipped engineers and support trades yet we wonder about whether we should be thinking of deploying nothing more than a "well-enabled BG"? We're seriously discussing divesting or making dormant even more capabilities?
As a Canadian taxpayer I want to take back ten billion per year because it's obviously being utterly wasted as an insurance policy for our national defence. I don't know what it's being spent on but a defence capability ain't one of them.
The government gives the Army funding to permit the manning for almost two divisions (Reg and Res combined). It behooves us to create a doctrine commensurate with that manning (albeit in a perfect world we should work out the doctrine first and build the manning afterwards but ... Canada). That doctrine should be the roadmap for everything else that makes up the Army as a whole - from cognitive, to procedural, to organizational, to material, and to moral components of how to make an army fight (yup and somewhere way down the line that doctrine should determine if we have 2 or 3 guys crewing a LAV [or even if it should be a LAV] and how many guys are needed for dismounts).
Instead of being a doctrine-based army we have become a capabilities-based army which in short means trying to figure out what we can do with the shit we've got. That's wrong on so many levels. And for full disclosure that's not a new thought I've had - it comes from Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" that was published in the Army and Training Bulletin in 2001/2. It was true then and its even more true today.
Folks. We're desperately in need of figuring out what the Army's role in Canada's defence is (and I believe a forward presence and an ability to deploy much more than 1/2 of a BG is involved as just one part of that, and should include special forces, quick reaction, medium weight peacekeepers and a whole herd of enabling systems from EW, UAV, loitering munitions etc) and then build and sell that doctrine with all of its consequences. And it needs to be a doctrine that can rapidly change as threats and capabilities change. We need to add capabilities. I can't think of a single one to divest - maybe change some from active to reserve status yes, but divest, no. And the reality is that we will be locked into some systems that we have now for some time to come but that doesn't mean we stay frozen in time and don't think outside the box and plan for the things that are needed to be successful in high intensity conflict
We simply cannot afford to have another 20 year Army Transformation plan like the one that led us to where we are now.
End of rant.
Returning to writing about history
So you think that towed artillery are appropriate for a mechanized Brigade in a high intensity conventional fight?of all of the above quotes, these two interest me the most:
We have an Army where the website says we consist of:
That's 36,700 who are potentially deployable. (do we really only have 13,700 primary reservists or is the Army's own web page out of whack?) In any event that well over a division and a half of folks. We have enough equipment for an armoured regiment, six LAV battalions and a proper 18 gun artillery regiment plus a good number of equipped engineers and support trades yet we wonder about whether we should be thinking of deploying nothing more than a "well-enabled BG"? We're seriously discussing divesting or making dormant even more capabilities?
As a Canadian taxpayer I want to take back ten billion per year because it's obviously being utterly wasted as an insurance policy for our national defence. I don't know what it's being spent on but a defence capability ain't one of them.
The government gives the Army funding to permit the manning for almost two divisions (Reg and Res combined). It behooves us to create a doctrine commensurate with that manning (albeit in a perfect world we should work out the doctrine first and build the manning afterwards but ... Canada). That doctrine should be the roadmap for everything else that makes up the Army as a whole - from cognitive, to procedural, to organizational, to material, and to moral components of how to make an army fight (yup and somewhere way down the line that doctrine should determine if we have 2 or 3 guys crewing a LAV [or even if it should be a LAV] and how many guys are needed for dismounts).
Instead of being a doctrine-based army we have become a capabilities-based army which in short means trying to figure out what we can do with the shit we've got. That's wrong on so many levels. And for full disclosure that's not a new thought I've had - it comes from Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" that was published in the Army and Training Bulletin in 2001/2. It was true then and its even more true today.
Folks. We're desperately in need of figuring out what the Army's role in Canada's defence is (and I believe a forward presence and an ability to deploy much more than 1/2 of a BG is involved as just one part of that, and should include special forces, quick reaction, medium weight peacekeepers and a whole herd of enabling systems from EW, UAV, loitering munitions etc) and then build and sell that doctrine with all of its consequences. And it needs to be a doctrine that can rapidly change as threats and capabilities change. We need to add capabilities. I can't think of a single one to divest - maybe change some from active to reserve status yes, but divest, no. And the reality is that we will be locked into some systems that we have now for some time to come but that doesn't mean we stay frozen in time and don't think outside the box and plan for the things that are needed to be successful in high intensity conflict
We simply cannot afford to have another 20 year Army Transformation plan like the one that led us to where we are now.
End of rant.
Returning to writing about history
Precisely, I believe only the Americans (and really it's only the Rangers because of their dedicated air assets) can conduct a theatre entry against a near peer threat. Now, airmobile forces to facilitate NEOs is something we could do; especially if such a force regularly practiced with the units and agencies concerned.
My favourite thing about the ATGM / DFS capability in the CAF right now is that the subject matter experts in the capability are the Tor Scots and they don't even have LAVs, and they do it part time.
Good God, No! There must be a hundred or more posts on this website from me whinging constantly about the need for properly armoured, self propelled guns (tracked preferable, wheeled) for both brigade and battle group direct support. I mentioned an eighteen-gun regiment because its a real combat enabler (even if towed it can still support a light brigade well, a medium brigade poorly, and a heavy brigade hardly at all) where an eight-gun regiment which doesn't even train as a proper regiment is about as useful as a penny packet of tanks is.
ALWAS?
IMO too many members and some of the leadership of the CAF have FORGOTTEN what the CAF's primary purpose is.
Care to expand on this ?
I'd like to know who is "Chap from the shakies".
Shaky Boats Service.
www.dailystar.co.uk
Its a sad day when the Special Forces turns into Special Needs Children.'Shaky Boats' comes from the fact that they sometimes deploy by kayak/folboat. And apparently they're a little miffed about the banter
SAS and SBS at war over 'shaky boats' banter that's 'undermining morale'
EXCLUSIVE: Special Boat Service complained that SAS pals were undermining their reputation with constant jibes - and now they've been banned from using the terms
The SAS have been told to stop calling their sister regiment the Shaky Boats Service after SBS troops complained.
A senior SAS officer made the order after troopers said the name-calling was undermining morale and reputation.
Another nickname – Dope On A Rope, because the SBS abseil from helicopters on to ships – was also banned.
A source said teasing came to a head when a member of Seal Team Six – the US special forces unit which killed Osama bin Laden – asked an SBS operator why his regiment was called the Shaky Boats.
It is understood memos were then posted on noticeboards inside the SAS headquarters at Credenhill on the
outskirts of Hereford. One SAS soldier said: “When I heard about this I thought it was an early April Fools joke.
“The relationship between the SAS and the SBS has always been a bit tetchy, but trying to stop the SAS referring to the SBS as the Shaky Boats is nonsense.
“No-one in the SAS calls them the SBS. They are referred to as the Shaky Boats and an order like this is just going to enforce that.
“We know it winds them up, which is precisely why we do it. It’s a bit of banter. It’s just amazing that someone has complained.”
Relations between the two elite units have often been strained. Members of both regiments always like to claim theirs is the more professional force.
The latest animosity between them dates back to the early days of the Iraq War, when senior SAS non-commissioned officers accused their opposite numbers in the SBS of being unprofessional following a botched operation.
After the troops returned to the UK, one senior member of the SAS even accused them of being incompetent and lacking courage.
The claims related to an incident in which a small SBS force was ambushed by a 300-strong force of Iraqi insurgents.
Newspaper reports at the time said the SBS were forced to withdraw, leaving equipment and vehicles behind.
But the SBS said they remained in position and fought off the Iraqi force while firing more than 7,000 rounds in the process.
The row led to the then director of special forces ordering both units to end their rift.
The SBS dates back to 1940 and used to exclusively recruit men from the Royal Marines.
SAS and SBS at war over 'shaky boats' banter that's 'undermining morale'
EXCLUSIVE: Special Boat Service complained that SAS pals were undermining their reputation with constant jibes - and now they've been banned from using the terms
