Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

Before you re-design the Reserves and their roles, I seriously suggest you hire a competent firm to do anonymous entrance, serving and exit surveys to find out why people in this generation are joining, staying and leaving. You can have the best designed plan from a military point of view but no one to implement it because you have alienated why people join and stay.

Easy:

- Why do they join? Money, personal challenge, team atmosphere, fun, patriotism.

- Why do they leave? Boring and poorly supported training disconnected from any higher purpose, inconsistent leadership, broken promises, probelms getting courses and zero deployments, and negligent administration.

 

[FJAG]

Easy:

- Why do they join? Money, personal challenge, team atmosphere, fun, patriotism.

- Why do they leave? Boring and poorly supported training disconnected from any higher purpose, inconsistent leadership, broken promises, probelms getting courses and zero deployments, and negligent administration.

Well, that's worth at least a $150,000 consultant's fee.

For a mere $5,000,000 more we'll provide DND/CAF with solutions.

 

[Kirkhill]

Well, that's worth at least a $150,000 consultant's fee.

For a mere $5,000,000 more we'll provide DND/CAF with solutions.

Are they supplying the watch? $5,000,000 sounds heavily discounted.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Are they supplying the watch? $5,000,000 sounds heavily discounted.

 

[suffolkowner]

On Air defence Corporal Frisk examines Finlands procurement plan. Sea Ceptor/Land Ceptor point defence commonality for Canada?

Finnish Land Ceptor – MBDA Aiming High in ITSUKO

After half a decade of talking fighters under the auspice of the HX-programme, much has already been said. Which meant that ironically enough, the most interesting piece of kit at the Kaivari 21 ai…

corporalfrisk.com

I think we might or someone is over complicating it.

IM-SHORAD just do it! Only question in my mind is the addition of a 30mm too much from a logistics standpoint for a small niche capability

NASAAMS2/3 or similar like the above Land Ceptor/CAMMER just do it!

 

[SeaKingTacco]

On Air defence Corporal Frisk examines Finlands procurement plan. Sea Ceptor/Land Ceptor point defence commonality for Canada?

Finnish Land Ceptor – MBDA Aiming High in ITSUKO

After half a decade of talking fighters under the auspice of the HX-programme, much has already been said. Which meant that ironically enough, the most interesting piece of kit at the Kaivari 21 ai…

corporalfrisk.com

I think we might or someone is over complicating it.

IM-SHORAD just do it! Only question in my mind is the addition of a 30mm too much from a logistics standpoint for a small niche capability

NASAAMS2/3 or similar like the above Land Ceptor/CAMMER just do it!

If it can be used on land, we should go for it. The RCN is already buying it, which means the ammunition will be qualified into Canadian service.

Sharing missile rounds between the Army and the Navy makes sense to me!

 

[GR66]

The same Moog RIwP RWS used on the IM-SHORAD can accommodate a wide variety of weapons. If you want commonality with our existing weapons it can be mounted with the same M242 Bushmaster 25mm as the LAV or you could go with .50 cal for more/cheaper ammo.

The IM-SHORAD uses a quad Stinger launcher and a dual Hellfire launcher, but we could go with the Stingers and a quad Coyote counter-drone interceptor instead to focus on smaller threats and go with a battery of the CAMM launchers mentioned above for the larger threats.

One thing I do hope though is that whatever SHORAD system we end up with we integrate it into a system of systems. We should have our own UAVs and counter-battery radars to identify enemy systems that seek to take our our SHORAD launchers and neutralize them with our own loitering munitions/precision fires/anti-radiation missiles/EW systems. No point spending all that money on an AD system just to see them knocked out 2 minutes after they start radiating.

 

[Kirkhill]

All of the Air Force inventory of missiles can be ground launched - A!M-120, AIM-9, CRV-7 (APKWS)
As can the RCN's ESSM.

NASAMS has got them covered.

I wonder if the real discussion is who is going to pay for the replacements when the RCA starts eating up RCAF and RCN inventory. Because the missiles have already been cleared for Canadian service and are in inventory and the supply chain.

 

[GR66]

I've been an advocate for quite a while in off loading such things as artillery and air defence on the reserves because these are capabilities that you do not need to use or even train on every day. On top of that the equipment is such that the procedures for the usage of these types of systems can be taught as easily repetitive drills that people can learn and master part-time (much of the job is ammo handling and moving and positioning the system after which target engagement is getting more and more automated) The key, however, is that such equipment is getting dreadfully expensive, needs full-time maintainers with fairly high skills, and need very well-trained and well experienced full-time leaders. This means it is not gear that you can buy at the last moment and hand out to people as the board the Airbus on the way overseas.

I agree that something like a CAMM-based AD system that targets larger UAVs, helicopters and fast air would be well suited to the Reserves, but I think an argument could be made that AD capability against smaller UAVs might be required for any deployment so should be a Reg Force capability (with the ability for the Reserves to expand the capability in a major conflict).

It may not require full vehicle-borne AD batteries, but perhaps at least a hand-held (microwave?) capability might be needed for the CS Companies or even in the Platoon "weapons locker". Or maybe with the low cost and easy availability of small UAVs that can even be used as loitering munitions does require something more robust for all deployments.

 

[Kirkhill]

Given what we're seeing on TV these days I am inclined to go back and revisit our discussion about Big Honking Ships / RoRo Ferries / Joint Support Ships / Floating Warehouses-Hotels-Garages-Hospitals-Command Centres.

And I know the JSS won't float in Bagram.


But how about the Baltics? Black Sea? North Sea? Med? Taiwan-Japan-Korea? Singapore-Malaysia? Aden? Qatar? Oman?

Just how much can we rely on our allies? How do we control our own timings? Our own deployments?

Some shade was cast on the notion of having a Plan B for withdrawal. I am more inclined to see a necessity for maintaining a national ability to withdraw a field force in a timely manner at the hour of our choosing.


Operational Support Hubs (Jamaica, Germany, Dakar, Kenya, Oman, Singapore, and Korea was it?)
Joint Support Ships and iAORs
More C17s (if they can be rebuilt from the boneyard)
CC150 replacements

And a ROBUST NEO plan.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Given what we're seeing on TV these days I am inclined to go back and revisit our discussion about Big Honking Ships / RoRo Ferries / Joint Support Ships / Floating Warehouses-Hotels-Garages-Hospitals-Command Centres.

And I know the JSS won't float in Bagram.


But how about the Baltics? Black Sea? North Sea? Med? Taiwan-Japan-Korea? Singapore-Malaysia? Aden? Qatar? Oman?

Just how much can we rely on our allies? How do we control our own timings? Our own deployments?

Some shade was cast on the notion of having a Plan B for withdrawal. I am more inclined to see a necessity for maintaining a national ability to withdraw a field force in a timely manner at the hour of our choosing.


Operational Support Hubs (Jamaica, Germany, Dakar, Kenya, Oman, Singapore, and Korea was it?)
Joint Support Ships and iAORs
More C17s (if they can be rebuilt from the boneyard)
CC150 replacements

And a ROBUST NEO plan.

Based on what the Navy used to tell me, the pre-requisite for having any kind of shipping roaming around freely in these 'bathtubs', fairly constrained watery areas, is overwhelming air superiority. This means lots of either land or carrier based aircraft.

As the Repulse and Prince of Wales discovered in WW2 Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse - Wikipedia

 

[Kirkhill]

Seen. But in the absence of a navy, or even a ship, then you are looking at Hong Kong and Singapore. The navy lost ships at Crete and Dunkirk. But at least some of the army got off.

If the army is going to be put at risk going into situations that can turn sour on 36 hours notice, in the absence of air cover, doesn't it make sense to keep a back door open? Or are soldiers less valuable than sailors?

 

[GR66]

Canada is essentially an island. As much as my heart is with the Army, the bulk of our defence budget should be focused on the RCAF and RCN.

 

[Kirkhill]

Canada is essentially an island. As much as my heart is with the Army, the bulk of our defence budget should be focused on the RCAF and RCN.

No problem. Don't send troops. Send planes. And drones. And lots of isr assets.

And keep the navy out of the world's bathtubs.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Canada is essentially an island. As much as my heart is with the Army, the bulk of our defence budget should be focused on the RCAF and RCN.

We tried that before.

Then they had to create a 'super heavy' casualty rate to describe what our Infantry was experiencing.

 

[Dale Denton]

Not sure if this belongs in this thread, please re-direct if it doesn't.

I've been reading up on the UKs Very High Readiness response in Kabul, and Canada sending SOF there as well and I have some questions. Are we using SOF too often, and for too many varying jobs? Would the subdelegation and divestment from SOF to a very high readiness light infantry unit be of better use? Frees up SOF for the many other skills they need to continue to hone.

A non-SOF unit that acts more like a PARA/OSONS-ish/Pathfinder/Ranger/Raider elite light infantry unit to spearhead operations. Designate an existing battalion with the job, keep it small at first, equip it for a lite-SOF job. Give them OSONS patches and pair them with the many similar existing units for training. Netherlands Marine Corps, RM, US Rangers, Pathfinders, LRRP - whomever.

Similar in the way the Australians designated 2RAR for amphibious operations, but make it a fast moving VHR unit instead.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Not sure if this belongs in this thread, please re-direct if it doesn't.

I've been reading up on the UKs Very High Readiness response in Kabul, and Canada sending SOF there as well and I have some questions. Are we using SOF too often, and for too many varying jobs? Would the subdelegation and divestment from SOF to a very high readiness light infantry unit be of better use? Frees up SOF for the many other skills they need to continue to hone.

A non-SOF unit that acts more like a PARA/OSONS-ish/Pathfinder/Ranger/Raider elite light infantry unit to spearhead operations. Designate an existing battalion with the job, keep it small at first, equip it for a lite-SOF job. Give them OSONS patches and pair them with the many similar existing units for training. Netherlands Marine Corps, RM, US Rangers, Pathfinders, LRRP - whomever.

Similar in the way the Australians designated 2RAR for amphibious operations, but make it a fast moving VHR unit instead.

Like say, and I'm just spit balling here, a Light Infantry centred Battle Group?

 

[FJAG]

I've been an advocate of an asynchronous army tiered into light, medium and heavy components for a long time. In all my permutations of such a force, the light force is located in Petawawa for exactly the reason that it should be organized and trained in conjunction with both TF-2 and the CSOR. I'm not to the point where they are part of the same command, or what roles go to whom, as I'm still of the view that a light brigade has value separate and apart from a special operations organization (and to continue to be a model for reserve light brigades). They should, however, be organized and trained in such a way that they can rapidly reinforce a special ops mission with additional and heavier equipped elements if and when the need arises.

That still leaves the question of whether or not we need a Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) capability. LCol Peterson in his recent article on an asynchronous army suggests that 2 RCR in Gagetown be converted and reorganized into a multi-disciplinary SFCB battalion which he locates in Gagetown under the CCSB (and thereby collocated with the Combat Arms School which is a terrific idea for many reasons). If we haven't already learned the lesson then the outcome of Afghanistan should teach us that capacity building is a specialized task that needs to be in the hands of people who are trained and organized for it and who can develop the doctrine for such missions. It should not be a secondary or tertiary duty for other units albeit other units, both regular and reserve can be tasked to augment such missions from time to time.

While he leaves the light brigade with three light battalions, I see nothing wrong with the idea that such a brigade could be reduced to two or even one regular force battalion while the remaining components are reserves. The key is knowing exactly how large a force the brigade will need to deploy as a rapid reaction capability and having enough ready, full-time elements to meet that need. It may be that ordinarily all that is needed is a combat team while in extreme circumstances a battle group is required.

Yup. I think you are in the right thread. All of these ideas should be in play and be considered for Force 2025.

 

[Kirkhill]

Agreed that it is the right thread. And agree with FJAG, D&B and GR66. The Robust NEO role is certainly up there as far as a critical requirement is concerned and it should be collocated and associated with CANSOFCOM while still part of the Army.

That takes care of one "independent" brigade.

For the other two. I note that the WW2 UK/Cdn Armoured Divisions were 2 Brigade Divisions (one 3 regiment Armoured and one 3 battalion motorized infantry). Each division also had its Divisional Support troops.

CANSOFCOM associated Army Light Brigade
1x Mechanized Division of 2 Mech Brigades and a Cbt Spt Bde.

Add reserves to suit.

Now for the next question - who would we send to maintain support in the field for the Northern Alliance for the next 20 years? And how many?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed that it is the right thread. And agree with FJAG, D&B and GR66. The Robust NEO role is certainly up there as far as a critical requirement is concerned and it should be collocated and associated with CANSOFCOM while still part of the Army.

That takes care of one "independent" brigade.

FWIW, our 'NEO Brigade' structure was quite large and was based on the worst case assumption that you would have to do a non-permissive 'break and enter' operation to gain access to a failing/failed state, usually via an airport.

2 x Parachute Battalions were to capture the immediate airfield by parachute assault, then up to three other Infantry bns (plus a wide range of atts and dets including arty) would fly in and take charge of the 'footprint'. There are those here who know alot more than I do about this bit, but it's the oval shaped area around the airport that might be used to fire SAMs at aircraft. This is a huge area.

Following, company group sized task forces (with light armour etc) would deploy to various places to extract the UK nationals. Helicopters or host nation transport would be available, in theory anyways. Where a hostage situation was in progress, SOF would be attached to help deal with that.

All that to say it's probably a bigger commitment than just one standard Brigade, and it's probably not a SOFCOMM led thing.