Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

You're starting to come to the dark side with me. Welcome.

My thoughts (as expressed before)

1) With a total of eight brigades, you can cut the divisions down to two (an eastern one based on 2 Div [with 5, 34, 36 Bdes and the CCSB] and a western one based on 3 Div [with 1, 2, 41, and 32 Bdes]). I would remove the two surplus div headquarters but keep all the div support establishments and reassign them to the two remaining divs as appropriate.

This idea was presented as a "step 1" for implementation for Force 2025. Consolidation of the Divisions may be something for Force 2030 or beyond but to be honest I don't know enough about what they bring to the table administratively to say how they should be dealt with.

2) I would reform two of the inf bns and the armoured reg't in 1 Bde into three combined arms battalions and retask the third inf battalion as a cavalry regiment/battalion)

I'm personally of the belief that almost all of the deployments we're likely to face will be similar to the ones we've faced in the post Korea era. Brush wars, counter-insurgencies, "stabilization" operations, etc. I believe these types of operations are well suited to our LAV-based infantry with varying levels of support by armour depending on the intensity of the operations.

I think that optimizing a significant portion of our forces for a specific type of high-intensity conflict will limit their utility in the most likely of deployment scenarios we are likely to face. At the same time, I'm not sure it gives us much advantage over the existing Brigade Group structure which can generate Battle Groups and Combat Teams in various configurations to face the specific threat types it might end up facing.

That being said, this is only true if the time and effort is put in for the Brigade to actively train in combined arms operations when it is not deployed so that tank-infantry-artillery cooperation is well practiced and understood by all elements when the time comes for a peer conflict.

3) I would also restructure 12 RBC as a cavalry regiment/battalion (essentially I see cavalry regiments as more robust combined arms organizations capable of much more than reconnaissance)

Same as my comment for point 2 above. My preference would be to have two identically organized Reg Force Brigade Groups. Ideally as we move into Force 2030, you'd equip 12 RBC with three tank squadrons the same as I'm proposing for LdSH. IF we get into a major war vs. Russia (or Iran or North Korea) we will armour. I believe we should expand the capability we have available rather than try to scramble to expand it at the last minute when we realize it is (again) required.

4) If one does restructure the third inf battalion in 1 Bde to cavalry, there will a few companies of LAVs surplus to repurpose.

Again back to point 2. Having three identical LAV infantry Battalions in each of 1 Bde and 5 Bde would allow each of those Brigades to rotate readiness between them to have one infantry Battle Group ready to deploy at a given time. I feel that our LAV Battalions are our most versatile deployment option (with augmentation as required) for the vast majority of our likely missions.

5) While you are right and can't expect to do much more by 2025, I think one should position for 2030 by earmarking significant numbers in both 36 Bde and 32 Bde to converting them to additional combat support and combat service support capabilities as the total force is too manoeuvre heavy and too light on support. In particular, Ontario has the capability of generating more reservists than anyone else so there is some scope there.

Agreed. I'd lean however to 36 Bde and 37 Bde (instead of 32 Bde) though. Keep the support capabilities co-located and near the most likely coast they will have to deploy from.

All that said, I'm not quite sure of what 2 Bde's role is to be in this structure. It strikes me we are creating two types of reserve brigades - 2 Bde with a Reg F HQs and res coys and 32, 34, 36 and 41 with Res F HQs and coys. It looks to me like you are wanting to create a brigade of mostly reservists which has the ability to generate deployable battle groups while the other reserve brigades are essentially hole fillers. I'm not sure if this two tier structure is workable. My expectation is that the Res F units assigned to 2 Bde will generate no more individual volunteers for deployments than any other Res F unit which means any 2 Bde battlegroup deploying will still need to recruit people from elsewhere.

My thought on 2 Bde stems from our inability to recreate in Canada what the US has been able to do with the Army National Guard which is to have fully deployment capable Reserve Brigades. One of the reasons sometimes cited for this is that our Reserve system has difficulty generating the required support trades required to properly support a Reserve Brigade.

By limiting the Reserve contribution to the Brigade to just the line infantry companies, armoured squadrons and artillery batteries and maintaining the existing Reg Force Brigade infrastructure and supporting elements you are greatly simplifying the Reserve task. Obviously this doesn't resolve any of the legislative issues around mobilization of the Reserves, but it at least provides a foundational structure for future mobilization if/when required.

The maintenance of the core structure of 2 Bde as Reg Force also provides a pool of trained members to be able to augment 1 Bde and 5 Bde during peacetime operations.

The three all-Reserve Brigade Groups (excluding the 36 Bde in the Atlantic - see point 5 above) have been restructured to match the same general structure as the Reg Force/Hybrid Brigades within their Division. The idea is to create the ability to have direct affiliation between Reg Force sub-units and the Reserve Regiments. For example, A Company, 1 PPCLI would be affiliated with the North Saskatchewan Regiment. Class B positions could be made available within the Company to allow N Sask R Reservists to participate in Reg Force exercises, etc. Augmentation requirements for the Company would be prioritized to the N Sask R to fill before being opened up to other units. This system could build up some trust and familiarity between the Reg Force and their affiliated Reserve units so that when deployments (and inevitable augmentation/casualty replacements are required) they system works more seamlessly.

Two issues I do see with my proposed Reserve restructuring are:
1) How should 2 Bde be equipped. A supposedly deployable Brigade is useless without actual equipment to deploy with. I think in an ideal world with unlimited funds you'd want to equip 2 Bde with exactly the same equipment as 1 Bde and 5 Bde (tanks for the Armoured Squadrons, LAVs for the Infantry Companies and whatever gun the Reg Force ends up with for the Artillery Batteries.

In reality though, I can't see the government/CF coming up with the funding to do this. Perhaps then there could be a role for 2 Bde as a Light Brigade as envisioned by Kirkhill and others on here. Vehicle acquisition and maintenance costs would be less and the Army would be gaining a new/different capability beyond what it has now. Some may argue that it doesn't make sense to have your Light capability vested in the Reserves because due to their lightness they are inherently able to more quickly deploy by air than your Medium/Heavy forces. I'd argue that the Canadian situation is slightly different. Firstly, I question whether we have the airlift capability to rapidly deploy and sustain a light force of sufficient size to make a significant military difference in a major conflict. Secondly, I believe that the Canadian Government/population is too risk adverse to deploy Light forces into combat in anything less than a major conflict. Both of these factors make placing a Light capability within the Reserves less of an issue.

2) Are you potentially creating issues by having two different types of Reserve units. 2 Bde focused on being deployable in case of mobilization and the remaining Reserve Brigades being focused on augmentation. Will this create a situation where the Augmentation Brigades are even more starved of support and resources than they are now as limited Reserve resources are focused on 2 Bde? Can this be offset by the closer direct relationships between the Reg Force units and their affiliated Reserve units?

One factor here is that you are reducing the Res bdes from ten to four. Assuming that you are keeping the same RSS staff that means the number of RSS in each "new" Res F "Bde" and "battalion/regiment" will increase by a factor of 2.5. If you add to that the Reg F officers and NCMs being retained within 2 Bde and distribute them across all the Res F bdes and 2 Bde equally you could probably establish a very robust Reg F presence in every reserve unit across the board and create all Res Bdes into viable hybrid units (albeit more like 15-20/85-80 rather than 25-30/75-70)

(And yes D&B - I would put Reg F colonels and other senior Reg F staff into all Res F bde headquarters so that they too can deploy with appropriate augmentation when required and where appropriate. It's not like we have a shortage of Reg F colonels and staff and how much mileage do we really get out of the Res F colonels and BGens we have now?)

Which begs the question - what do we do with Petawawa besides give it all to CANSOFCOM?

 

[FJAG]

I'm personally of the belief that almost all of the deployments we're likely to face will be similar to the ones we've faced in the post Korea era. Brush wars, counter-insurgencies, "stabilization" operations, etc. I believe these types of operations are well suited to our LAV-based infantry with varying levels of support by armour depending on the intensity of the operations.

I think that optimizing a significant portion of our forces for a specific type of high-intensity conflict will limit their utility in the most likely of deployment scenarios we are likely to face. At the same time, I'm not sure it gives us much advantage over the existing Brigade Group structure which can generate Battle Groups and Combat Teams in various configurations to face the specific threat types it might end up facing.

That being said, this is only true if the time and effort is put in for the Brigade to actively train in combined arms operations when it is not deployed so that tank-infantry-artillery cooperation is well practiced and understood by all elements when the time comes for a peer conflict.

That's why I think we need two different brigades. Our current commitment to Latvia is in effect a bn headquarters and one company but the battalion is a combined arms battalion because several of the other nations are providing tank companies. Proper combined arms operations are a skill which is basically missing from most (but not all) of our Reg F and all of our Res F training. We need at least one brigade that is structured for it and practices it frequently. With 5 Bde structured as a medium infantry centric force we can meet all the other non-combined arms missions as well as develop the skills in that area.

Same as my comment for point 2 above. My preference would be to have two identically organized Reg Force Brigade Groups. Ideally as we move into Force 2030, you'd equip 12 RBC with three tank squadrons the same as I'm proposing for LdSH. IF we get into a major war vs. Russia (or Iran or North Korea) we will armour. I believe we should expand the capability we have available rather than try to scramble to expand it at the last minute when we realize it is (again) required.

Again back to point 2. Having three identical LAV infantry Battalions in each of 1 Bde and 5 Bde would allow each of those Brigades to rotate readiness between them to have one infantry Battle Group ready to deploy at a given time. I feel that our LAV Battalions are our most versatile deployment option (with augmentation as required) for the vast majority of our likely missions.

No matter which way you cut it, with the current SSE missions and only two force generating brigades (even if you roll 2 Bde into the mix) and six month tour rotations, folks will be meeting themselves coming and going on rotations. (That's one of the key reasons I suggest beefing up Res F brigade and bn headquarters with Reg F pers so that those organizations have the ability to also generate battle groups.

Agreed. I'd lean however to 36 Bde and 37 Bde (instead of 32 Bde) though. Keep the support capabilities co-located and near the most likely coast they will have to deploy from.

IMHO coasts don't matter. Central On is a two-day road move from a port and convoys can get there faster than the ships carrying them. Population and the ability to generate a constant sustainable supply of reservists is the critical factor. To create one viable CS or even CSS would take all the reservists in the Maritimes. Since there's always someone who wants to be a grunt or zipperhead, you need enough of a presence of those capabilities to absorb those volunteers leaving few for CS and CSS roles. Southern ON has that population (but is a little weak for nearby ranges for such things as armoured and artillery) and therefore more suited for building non combat units)

My thought on 2 Bde stems from our inability to recreate in Canada what the US has been able to do with the Army National Guard which is to have fully deployment capable Reserve Brigades. One of the reasons sometimes cited for this is that our Reserve system has difficulty generating the required support trades required to properly support a Reserve Brigade.

By limiting the Reserve contribution to the Brigade to just the line infantry companies, armoured squadrons and artillery batteries and maintaining the existing Reg Force Brigade infrastructure and supporting elements you are greatly simplifying the Reserve task. Obviously this doesn't resolve any of the legislative issues around mobilization of the Reserves, but it at least provides a foundational structure for future mobilization if/when required.

The maintenance of the core structure of 2 Bde as Reg Force also provides a pool of trained members to be able to augment 1 Bde and 5 Bde during peacetime operations.

Agree with all those points which is why I want to see all Res F units "beefed up". I want to see one effective Res F not a two-tiered system. Been there and did that in 1966 - it sucked. My concern with 2 Bde as you structure it is that there will be too many Reg F pers in those 2 Bde units who will be doing very little on a day-to-day basis. They'll be bouncing around from deployments to just preparing for summer camps. My preference is to spread them out, increase the ability to deploy all reserve units and increase the overall capability of all Res F brigades. I think that meets your overall objectives better.

When you talk about "support trade" I suspect you mean service support trades because we're not too terrible at generating combat support trades (but admittedly could be much better). The problem with generating enough service support trades is we do not do it right. You need both full-time service support to actually support the day-to-day operations of the Res brigade (which requirement goes up as you start adding equipment to them) as well as part-time service support folks with specific roles who can be mobilized (or act as volunteer call ups) for emergencies. Since we are having problems generating full-time service support personnel for the current Reg F structures, the system is failing across the board and needs a major redesign. I've articulated a few ideas in the past but basically, like alcoholism, the Reg F first needs to admit that it has a serious problem that can't be cured by little band-aid fixes (and from what I can tell from this forum, this is not just an Army problem but one that hits the Navy and Air Force as well).

The three all-Reserve Brigade Groups (excluding the 36 Bde in the Atlantic - see point 5 above) have been restructured to match the same general structure as the Reg Force/Hybrid Brigades within their Division. The idea is to create the ability to have direct affiliation between Reg Force sub-units and the Reserve Regiments. For example, A Company, 1 PPCLI would be affiliated with the North Saskatchewan Regiment. Class B positions could be made available within the Company to allow N Sask R Reservists to participate in Reg Force exercises, etc. Augmentation requirements for the Company would be prioritized to the N Sask R to fill before being opened up to other units. This system could build up some trust and familiarity between the Reg Force and their affiliated Reserve units so that when deployments (and inevitable augmentation/casualty replacements are required) they system works more seamlessly.

I agree with that, mostly.

Two issues I do see with my proposed Reserve restructuring are:
1) How should 2 Bde be equipped. A supposedly deployable Brigade is useless without actual equipment to deploy with. I think in an ideal world with unlimited funds you'd want to equip 2 Bde with exactly the same equipment as 1 Bde and 5 Bde (tanks for the Armoured Squadrons, LAVs for the Infantry Companies and whatever gun the Reg Force ends up with for the Artillery Batteries.

In reality though, I can't see the government/CF coming up with the funding to do this. Perhaps then there could be a role for 2 Bde as a Light Brigade as envisioned by Kirkhill and others on here. Vehicle acquisition and maintenance costs would be less and the Army would be gaining a new/different capability beyond what it has now. Some may argue that it doesn't make sense to have your Light capability vested in the Reserves because due to their lightness they are inherently able to more quickly deploy by air than your Medium/Heavy forces. I'd argue that the Canadian situation is slightly different. Firstly, I question whether we have the airlift capability to rapidly deploy and sustain a light force of sufficient size to make a significant military difference in a major conflict. Secondly, I believe that the Canadian Government/population is too risk adverse to deploy Light forces into combat in anything less than a major conflict. Both of these factors make placing a Light capability within the Reserves less of an issue.

My thoughts are that all 2025 plans have to be equipment neutral for the reasons that you cite. If you take a look at the National Guard, most of the ARNG BCTs are still IBCTs with limited equipment. This is not for lack of equipment - there's plenty in desert storage - but because of the ongoing maintenance and training burden. It currently costs 130 million less each year to support an ARNG IBCT than an ABCT and even 60 million less than an SBCT. And that's before you factor in the capital costs to bring the stored equipment up to standard and periodically upgraded.

However, we need a long term doctrine which should include a long term equipment plan which absolutely has to include a coherent upgrade of the reserves capability with appropriate equipment. Whether or not that plan is to create a peacetime-only force employment program which accepts the risk that the force will be underequipped in time of emergency or whether it equips the force for a potential full war-time role with the required increase in capital and maintenance costs is immaterial to me so long as the strategy/doctrine is clearly articulated and the force structure and training oriented towards achieving it. Let's be honest with ourselves and the government and stop this ridiculous fiction that we are an agile, medium force capable of full-spectrum peer conflict. Whatever posture we take in 2025 should be a stepping stone to the country's long-term goals for its military.

2) Are you potentially creating issues by having two different types of Reserve units. 2 Bde focused on being deployable in case of mobilization and the remaining Reserve Brigades being focused on augmentation. Will this create a situation where the Augmentation Brigades are even more starved of support and resources than they are now as limited Reserve resources are focused on 2 Bde? Can this be offset by the closer direct relationships between the Reg Force units and their affiliated Reserve units?

Yup! Yup! and no!

Don't get me wrong though. I think it is vital (essential) that we create a closer direct relationship between the Reg F and the Res F. I believe in hybrid units as I've articulated before. I just not fond of the 2 Bde construct you put forward.

In my previous examples of hybrid structures I generally tend to have at least one sub-unit be Reg F as well while both the regimental/battalion headquarters and service support company have Res F positions to fill out positions not needed for day-to-day peacetime needs (e.g additional transport, medical, or signals personnel for a full war-time establishment). I do this so that the Reg F part of the unit has the ability to train as a unit at all levels (albeit at reduced scales) during their day-to-day operations and therefore become proficient at all their skill levels from the individual soldier on up and to also have the structure and designated Res F personnel in place to expand in an emergency. A headquarters and service support company alone do not have this ability. More importantly, for hybrid specialist units (such as rocket or air defence artillery, military intelligence, cavalry regiments, electronic warfare regiments etc etc) it is vital that there is a proper core of full-timers from the bottom to the top to develop and practice doctrine at all levels and even be able to immediately deploy a quick reaction element if required. 2 Bde as proposed can't do this.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I personally think discussing anything to do with force composition and structure and not looking at it from a Joint perspective is a waste of time.

I just participated in Exercise TALISMAN SABRE off the coast of Australia and the combined arms effects in the Land, Air, Sea, SOF and Cyber domains the ANZAC are able to bring to bear is very impressive.

Any FEC for our Army should be carefully considered with support to and from the other services in mind.

 

[Infanteer]

Any FEC for our Army should be carefully considered with support to and from the other services in mind.

Like, say, a Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept?

 

[FJAG]

The latest from the Thin Pinstripped Line:

At the heart of this tragedy is perhaps a deeper question – why, after decades of focus on globally deployable militaries, and trying to send troops abroad to carry out operations, does the West still seem stretched to deliver a sustainable outcome to a military operation, and is the price paid worth the investment in the military forces acquired?...

A key lesson from Afghanistan is perhaps that for all the talk of nation states deploying on coalition operations, there is little ability to operate in a large scale in distant countries without the US being present. It remains the key provider of support, enablers and the ability to not just ‘kick the door in’ but also rebuild the door and put the military presence on a long-term footing to support government policy outcomes.

There are a small number of western countries that can deliver a medium scale effort abroad – the UK and France are chief in this regard, where it is possible to deploy and sustain a military force that can both operate and be credible, and not just a flag on a PowerPoint chart. ...

The public will support or tolerate risks where a quick win is at stake. They seem to rarely mind, or understand low level training or mentoring, or even limited presence where it has a clear rationale. There is though little interest or support in getting involved in someone else’s long-term affairs, particularly when prior expeditions have had such limited success.

The era we are now entering in the West is maybe better defined as that of aggressive deterrence – namely possession of military forces used to deter and coerce others into acting in a manner we judge fit – be it by training, presence or support to multi-national activity, and in extremis used to enforce outcomes in support of international rules-based system as a message to third parties of the risks of conflict with the West. The US will continue to act as the lead for this sort of activity, supported by other parties, but there will be declining interest or value seen in long term presence after the conflict is over.

Perhaps the time is approaching when there will be fundamental shifts in force structures and capabilities – away from a model optimised to deploy divisions with support, which in turn generates sustainable brigades on long term peacekeeping/enforcement missions like Iraq or Afghanistan, to one that instead focuses on the very small scale and the very large scale and little in between. ...

No Longer Paying for Breakages - Western Intervention Post Afghanistan

Defence blog focusing on 21st century analysis of Cold War defence, security and continuity of government problems.

thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Like, say, a Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept?

Yes but it would take an act of God to make it actually happen in Canada.

 

[McG]

I personally think discussing anything to do with force composition and structure and not looking at it from a Joint perspective is a waste of time.

…

Any FEC for our Army should be carefully considered with support to and from the other services in mind.

Will we ever get to true joint capability development when the strongest voices are defending what each service sees as its identity?

 

[GR66]

That's why I think we need two different brigades. Our current commitment to Latvia is in effect a bn headquarters and one company but the battalion is a combined arms battalion because several of the other nations are providing tank companies. Proper combined arms operations are a skill which is basically missing from most (but not all) of our Reg F and all of our Res F training. We need at least one brigade that is structured for it and practices it frequently. With 5 Bde structured as a medium infantry centric force we can meet all the other non-combined arms missions as well as develop the skills in that area.

No matter which way you cut it, with the current SSE missions and only two force generating brigades (even if you roll 2 Bde into the mix) and six month tour rotations, folks will be meeting themselves coming and going on rotations. (That's one of the key reasons I suggest beefing up Res F brigade and bn headquarters with Reg F pers so that those organizations have the ability to also generate battle groups.

Two different issues here. One is the asymmetrical structure of the Brigades you propose. There's 17 pages of discussion here of the relative benifits/problems of Optimal vs. Affiliated Battle Groups. I personally come down on the side of Affiliated Battle Groups (and Brigades) and there's a good article in a back issue of the Canadian Army Journal (starting on page 202 (here) that makes what I feel is a pretty good argument in their favour. Those that fought in WWII and maintained the current Brigade Structure through the Cold War seemed to feel that the structure worked well for a major, mechanized conflict. If the issue is a lack of training in combined operations and re-grouping of forces within the Brigade then fix the training.

If you are worried that having only two force generating Brigades (although the number of LAV Infantry Battalions isn't changing) to meet our deployment commitments, then wouldn't optimizing 2 Bde with combined arms Battalions mean that all of those deployments that don't call for a heavy, armoured force (almost certainly to be the vast majority of deployments) would all fall on 5 Bde? I agree that deployable Reserve Battle Groups would be an ideal way to take the pressure off the Reg Force Battalions, but realistically with out current legislation, equipment and training for the Reserves we are very far away from that point (if the political will would ever even be there to mobilize Reserves for overseas deployments - short of a major war).

IMHO coasts don't matter. Central On is a two-day road move from a port and convoys can get there faster than the ships carrying them. Population and the ability to generate a constant sustainable supply of reservists is the critical factor. To create one viable CS or even CSS would take all the reservists in the Maritimes. Since there's always someone who wants to be a grunt or zipperhead, you need enough of a presence of those capabilities to absorb those volunteers leaving few for CS and CSS roles. Southern ON has that population (but is a little weak for nearby ranges for such things as armoured and artillery) and therefore more suited for building non combat units)

Reasonable point. No reason the breakdown of Brigade/Battalion locations couldn't be adjusted.

Agree with all those points which is why I want to see all Res F units "beefed up". I want to see one effective Res F not a two-tiered system. Been there and did that in 1966 - it sucked. My concern with 2 Bde as you structure it is that there will be too many Reg F pers in those 2 Bde units who will be doing very little on a day-to-day basis. They'll be bouncing around from deployments to just preparing for summer camps. My preference is to spread them out, increase the ability to deploy all reserve units and increase the overall capability of all Res F brigades. I think that meets your overall objectives better.

An alternative form of 25/75 structure for 2 Bde could be to maintain a single Reg Force Battalion and 2-3 Reserve Battalions. Basically the same number of Reg Force positions would still be freed up to beef up support for the rest of the Reserve units.

When you talk about "support trade" I suspect you mean service support trades because we're not too terrible at generating combat support trades (but admittedly could be much better). The problem with generating enough service support trades is we do not do it right. You need both full-time service support to actually support the day-to-day operations of the Res brigade (which requirement goes up as you start adding equipment to them) as well as part-time service support folks with specific roles who can be mobilized (or act as volunteer call ups) for emergencies. Since we are having problems generating full-time service support personnel for the current Reg F structures, the system is failing across the board and needs a major redesign. I've articulated a few ideas in the past but basically, like alcoholism, the Reg F first needs to admit that it has a serious problem that can't be cured by little band-aid fixes (and from what I can tell from this forum, this is not just an Army problem but one that hits the Navy and Air Force as well).

Correct...CSS trade support for the Reserve Brigades. I don't see much hope for transforming the Reserves without giving them more CSS support. Better in my mind to have less combat trades with better support than a lot of combat trades without sufficient support.

I agree with that, mostly.

My thoughts are that all 2025 plans have to be equipment neutral for the reasons that you cite. If you take a look at the National Guard, most of the ARNG BCTs are still IBCTs with limited equipment. This is not for lack of equipment - there's plenty in desert storage - but because of the ongoing maintenance and training burden. It currently costs 130 million less each year to support an ARNG IBCT than an ABCT and even 60 million less than an SBCT. And that's before you factor in the capital costs to bring the stored equipment up to standard and periodically upgraded.

Perhaps this is an alternate model to be explored? If we don't seem to be able to generate the capability to equip and train Reserve Brigades due to lack of training time/facilities/instructors/technical support, then maybe we should instead focus on building up a stock of extra equipment to have on hand in case a major conflict requires expansion of the Army. Modern equipment takes a very long time to acquire and doing so in the middle of a conflict might be impossible. However, if we have a store of equipment on hand we could then take our Reserves which are trained in the important basic military skills and give them the extra training they need before they deploy. Pay up front for additional equipment (and a relatively small annual cost for maintenance staff) and defer the much larger annual training bill for only when it is needed in an emergency.

However, we need a long term doctrine which should include a long term equipment plan which absolutely has to include a coherent upgrade of the reserves capability with appropriate equipment. Whether or not that plan is to create a peacetime-only force employment program which accepts the risk that the force will be underequipped in time of emergency or whether it equips the force for a potential full war-time role with the required increase in capital and maintenance costs is immaterial to me so long as the strategy/doctrine is clearly articulated and the force structure and training oriented towards achieving it. Let's be honest with ourselves and the government and stop this ridiculous fiction that we are an agile, medium force capable of full-spectrum peer conflict. Whatever posture we take in 2025 should be a stepping stone to the country's long-term goals for its military.

Yup! Yup! and no!

Don't get me wrong though. I think it is vital (essential) that we create a closer direct relationship between the Reg F and the Res F. I believe in hybrid units as I've articulated before. I just not fond of the 2 Bde construct you put forward.

In my previous examples of hybrid structures I generally tend to have at least one sub-unit be Reg F as well while both the regimental/battalion headquarters and service support company have Res F positions to fill out positions not needed for day-to-day peacetime needs (e.g additional transport, medical, or signals personnel for a full war-time establishment). I do this so that the Reg F part of the unit has the ability to train as a unit at all levels (albeit at reduced scales) during their day-to-day operations and therefore become proficient at all their skill levels from the individual soldier on up and to also have the structure and designated Res F personnel in place to expand in an emergency. A headquarters and service support company alone do not have this ability. More importantly, for hybrid specialist units (such as rocket or air defence artillery, military intelligence, cavalry regiments, electronic warfare regiments etc etc) it is vital that there is a proper core of full-timers from the bottom to the top to develop and practice doctrine at all levels and even be able to immediately deploy a quick reaction element if required. 2 Bde as proposed can't do this.

 

[FJAG]

I hadn't come across the optimized v affiliated thread before (before my time on this forum) and I'll read it in due course. In short I agree totally with Bobbitt for all the reasons he gives. I make two exceptions to this.

First I believe in combined arms battalions where armoured infantry and tanks are grouped into one battalion. That doesn't negate the ability to rejuggle companies when required but does give you three manoeuvre battalions which are thoroughly integrated and practiced in combined arms operations.

The second is cavalry regiments. I think cavalry regiments will in short order be morphing into something much more complex than our current reconnaissance regiment and as such will need a group of skills permanently assigned such as recce, anti-armour, UAVs, loitering munitions, possibly some infantry and engineers and ready access to long range artillery. While some of these (like FOOs, JTACs, could and should be under artillery control for training and certification and affiliated with the cavalry regiment) others may need to be organic. I really fail to understand how, with ADO, we haven't already reformed these units a long time ago. I like the CAJ article on Asymmetric brigades where the author collocates the Cavalry regiments with artillery regiments on the same bases.

I liked the direction that Leslie was taking the Army of the Future concept in 2007. Its unfortunate that the Family of Land Combat Systems initiative went so far off the rails as it did after 2007. Without something like what FLCS was foreshadowing, ADO becomes a pipe dream regardless of how you organize the teams.

We might be a "people" oriented army but IMHO, equipment is the trump card.

 

[GR66]

Of course all of this Force 2025 thought experiment assumes that we are committed to maintaining traditional, Infantry-heavy Brigades that are designed to take and hold ground against a peer enemy.

There are other models that have been suggested (Cavalry Brigades, Recce-Strike Brigades, Light Brigades of various flavours, etc.) which would totally change the way we look at our force structure.

While traditionalists would argue that the ability to take and hold ground is the fundamental requirement of success in land warfare, perhaps Canada is in a fairly unique position to adopt a different model. The direct threats against our homeland are best dealt with by air, sea, cyber and security forces as the threat of direct invasion is virtually non-existent. We don't have any overseas territories to defend and by definition any military action we undertake overseas in defence of our allies will be by definition fought alongside allies.

If our peer fights are always going to be expeditionary and part of a coalition and all of our coalition partners have traditional Infantry-heavy Brigades to take and hold the ground, then does that give Canada the opportunity to focus on those other roles and types of structures?

To be honest, I'm not sold one way or the other. I see definite opportunities for major contributions that could be made by non-traditional formations but at the same time I fear that those same forces would face serious risk due to their lack of "weight" in a major conflict.

This I think is a fundamental question that needs to be asked and answered before any rational decisions on force structure can be made.

 

[Infanteer]

Taking and holding ground is a fundamental of success in land tactics, but you're talking about Canada's approach to strategy. Two different things.

I thought the Dandourand strategy ("Canada lives in a fireproof house") was discredited long ago? If you wish to promote a rules-based international order (a foundational policy of Canada stated again and again) you can't hide behind an ocean.

 

[dapaterson]

Yeah, but Canada has three oceans to hide behind.

 

[GR66]

Taking and holding ground is a fundamental of success in land tactics, but you're talking about Canada's approach to strategy. Two different things.

I thought the Dandourand strategy ("Canada lives in a fireproof house") was discredited long ago? If you wish to promote a rules-based international order (a foundational policy of Canada stated again and again) you can't hide behind an ocean.

Clearly Sen. Dandurand was wrong in his assertion that Canada is “a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.”. Numerous events in the last decades have clearly shown that to be untrue.

However, the tools required to fight fires in our "house" (direct threats to Canada) may be different than the tools required to fight fires in our "neighbourhood" (threats to our broader interests).

Are traditional Infantry Brigades required for the direct defence of Canada? Or are the threats we realistically face best countered by the RCAF, RCN, BMD, Security forces, cyber defence, political action, etc.?

For broader threats against our national interests, some situations may suite lighter, non-traditional forces. Many would argue that counter-insurgencies are better handled by Special Forces, Security Assistance forces and specific enablers rather than our own boots on the ground. Other situations (North Korea and Ukraine for example) however do require the ability to take and hold ground. The question then is it necessary that Canada provide that specific capability, or could Canada instead provide valuable other capabilities that support and enable our coalition partners to successfully fulfill that role?

A refocusing of our capabilities toward non-traditional Brigade structures doesn't mean that we have to abandon the traditional capability altogether, but perhaps that specific role could be shifted to our Reserve forces for use when absolutely required.

I think these are important fundamental questions to ask.

 

[Kirkhill]

While we debate how we are going to organize our World War 1 technologies by 2025

Aug. 12 (UPI) -- The U.S. Army says it's developed a combat-capable prototype of a high-energy laser weapon.

The laser, which has been 24 months in the making, can be mounted on a Stryker military vehicle and used to defend troops against drones as well as rockets, artillery and mortars, according to an Army press release this week.

The Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office said it expects to deliver a platoon of four laser-equipped Strykers in fiscal year 2022.

The shoot-off was a competition between defense contractors Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, which had both developed two 50-kilowatt laser weapons, Task & Purpose reported.

The Directed Energy-Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense laser prototype

Last year, the Navy broke ground on a facility to test, fire and evaluate complete laser weapons systems in maritime settings.

Earlier this year, the Air Force said it would continue tests of its High Energy Laser Weapon System 2, made by Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, that would also be used against drones.

The military had originally hoped to use laser-equipped Strykers in Iraq and Syria against explosive-laden drones but now plans to use the technology in Europe where military planners short-range air defense gap.

The Army is also working on a larger 300 kilowatt truck-mounted laser to defend against cruise missiles that it hopes to have ready by 2024.

Army successfully tests high-energy laser weapon - UPI.com

The U.S. Army says it's developed a combat-capable prototype of a high-energy laser weapon.

www.upi.com

Littoral Combat Regiments

500 km battalions

Microwave and Laser Air Defence Systems

Mature Precision Strike Environments

Swarms of 40mm UGL Drones with 20 km ranges


And we're not sure about Carl Gustavs, ATGMs and Helicopters.

Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR)

A Marine Littoral Regiment will be a self-deployable, multi-domain force optimized for the contact and blunt layers. It will persistently operate across the competition continuum to support the Joint

www.marines.mil

Laser directed energy weapons likely to receive the most investment

Verdict has conducted a poll to assess the form of directed energy weapons that is likely to receive the most investment going forward.

www.airforce-technology.com

Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles and the U.S. Marine Corps: Options Available - Naval News

Peter Ong reports on the Land-Based Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM) options on the table for the USMC and US Army ground forces to use against threatening enemy ships, with the latest from Virtual Modern Day Marine Expo 2020.

www.navalnews.com

Air | DEFENDTEX

www.defendtex.com

And the RCAF has to contend with not just a pilotless air force but a runway free air force. A 4000 km, pilotless "fighter-bomber-ISR" that, together with its launcher, fits inside a Sea-Can.

This Containerized Launcher For The XQ-58A Valkyrie Combat Drone Could Be A Game Changer

The system would be air, rail, road, or sea transportable, allowing for long-range, hard-hitting drone swarms to make unpredictable attacks.

www.thedrive.com

Containerized Launcher for XQ-58A Valkyrie – UAS VISION

www.uasvision.com

Air Force's Secretive XQ-58A Valkyrie Experimental Combat Drone Emerges After First Flight

The QX-58 may lead to a whole new class of highly-flexible and affordable unmanned combat air vehicles that could revolutionize how the USAF fights.

www.thedrive.com

The prototype has already been retired and the factory in Indiana Oklahoma City has opened.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Yeah, but Canada has three oceans, and the greatest military power in history who happens to be a close neighbour, to hide behind.

There, FTFY

 

[Kirkhill]

Clearly Sen. Dandurand was wrong in his assertion that Canada is “a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.”. Numerous events in the last decades have clearly shown that to be untrue.

However, the tools required to fight fires in our "house" (direct threats to Canada) may be different than the tools required to fight fires in our "neighbourhood" (threats to our broader interests).

Are traditional Infantry Brigades required for the direct defence of Canada? Or are the threats we realistically face best countered by the RCAF, RCN, BMD, Security forces, cyber defence, political action, etc.?

For broader threats against our national interests, some situations may suite lighter, non-traditional forces. Many would argue that counter-insurgencies are better handled by Special Forces, Security Assistance forces and specific enablers rather than our own boots on the ground. Other situations (North Korea and Ukraine for example) however do require the ability to take and hold ground. The question then is it necessary that Canada provide that specific capability, or could Canada instead provide valuable other capabilities that support and enable our coalition partners to successfully fulfill that role?

A refocusing of our capabilities toward non-traditional Brigade structures doesn't mean that we have to abandon the traditional capability altogether, but perhaps that specific role could be shifted to our Reserve forces for use when absolutely required.

I think these are important fundamental questions to ask.

Taking and holding ground is a fundamental of success in land tactics, but you're talking about Canada's approach to strategy. Two different things.

I thought the Dandourand strategy ("Canada lives in a fireproof house") was discredited long ago? If you wish to promote a rules-based international order (a foundational policy of Canada stated again and again) you can't hide behind an ocean.

Taking Ground. Holding Ground.

Surely we are talking about two different things here?

And is infantry the right tool? Or, another way of looking at that is, "are we giving our infantry the right tools".



I'm going to focus on the Defence. After all, it is the Department of National Defence that holds the cards here. Not the Department of National Offence or even the Department of War.

Defence is all about Holding Ground.

If the ground is held by an Anti-Aircraft Battery is it held?

"The defending Argentine forces (at Goose Green), known as Task Force Mercedes, consisted of two companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Piaggi's 12th Infantry Regiment (12IR); his third company (Company B) was still deployed on Mount Kent as "Combat Team Solari" and only re-joined 12IR after the fall of Goose Green airfield.[15] The task force also contained a company of the ranger-type 25th Infantry Regiment (25th Special Infantry Regiment or 25IR).[16] Air defence was provided by a battery of six 20 mm Rheinmetall anti-aircraft guns, manned by air force personnel and two radar-guided Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns from the 601st Anti-Aircraft Battalion. Both the 20mm and 35mm anti-aircraft cannon could also be used in a direct fire ground support role, and this was the case in the last stages of the fighting. There was also one battery of three OTO Melara Mod 56 105 mm pack howitzers from the 4th Airborne Artillery Regiment.


If we are in the business of Defending, both our allies and ourselves, shouldn't we be focusing more on those systems that can be rapidly deployed in the run up to a crisis and employed to discourage the crisis?

Things that are designed not so much to retake that which is lost but designed to prevent the other chap taking it in the first place?

Things that are designed to break up the attacking forces and render them less capable? Less of a threat regardless of their intentions?
It is debated what the actual ratio of attackers to defenders should be, and at Goose Green the numbers favoured the defenders. It is also argued that offensive action is a vital component of any defence and that defence should not be static but based on manoeuvre.

But.

Inherently defence requires fewer bodies and enjoys the advantages of prepositioning, internal lines of communications, netting and good logistics. And supplying a solid base for short range sallies.



I was thinking of disparaging Colin's suggestion for a small calibre auto-cannon for reserve Anti-Air troops. Now I am re-thinking that rapid judgement.

A VSHORAD battery of 35mm, or even 25mm emplaceable cannons, supplementing an Anti Air element (Missiles and Direct Energy Systems) would be a very useful core around which to build a light infantry battle group.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Before you re-design the Reserves and their roles, I seriously suggest you hire a competent firm to do anonymous entrance, serving and exit surveys to find out why people in this generation are joining, staying and leaving. You can have the best designed plan from a military point of view but no one to implement it because you have alienated why people join and stay.

 

[FJAG]

... "The defending Argentine forces (at Goose Green), known as Task Force Mercedes, consisted of ... Air defence was provided by a battery of six 20 mm Rheinmetall anti-aircraft guns, manned by air force personnel and two radar-guided Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns from the 601st Anti-Aircraft Battalion. Both the 20mm and 35mm anti-aircraft cannon could also be used in a direct fire ground support role, and this was the case in the last stages of the fighting.

It's not surprising that the Argentinians would be using Air Force anti-aircraft organizations. They took their cue from the Prussian and German armies over the years and during WW2 much of the German anti-aircraft resources were part of the German Luftwaffe. These were principally units tied to airfields, industrial areas and other more stationary strategic installations while army air defence resources were more oriented towards the tactical mobile field force. Argentina still divides its air defence resources as between the army and air force (and for that matter the navy whose ships provide air defence). It seems like Canada's Air Force finds spending money on ground based air field and strategic air defence beneath it. (But so does the Army - go figure - at least the Cdn Navy still cares.)

Before you re-design the Reserves and their roles, I seriously suggest you hire a competent firm to do anonymous entrance, serving and exit surveys to find out why people in this generation are joining, staying and leaving. You can have the best designed plan from a military point of view but no one to implement it because you have alienated why people join and stay.

That's working it ass backwards. What people want to join is secondary to what is needed. The overarching question should always be: what do we need that could be provided by way of reservists? You then structure the system so that it becomes desirable for individuals to join and serve (and yes a good survey and study will help with that) in these newer units.

I agree with you though that we currently have a lot of folks in trades that they enjoy and want to stay with. That should be catered to as well and that shouldn't be too difficult because everyone that we have in the reserves is in a trade that we will undoubtedly have to keep.

The difficulty is organization and unit affiliation. Simply put we no longer have a need to keep 100 man infantry battalions with everything that entails. We need to figure out a way to consolidate battalions in a way that allows the creation of the efficiency of consolidated units while leaving vestiges of historical connections - perhaps something as inelegant as a named infantry battalions and armoured/cavalry regiments with companies/squadrons that each retain the title, uniforms and customs of their predecessors but without a need for their own CO, RSM and honouraries. Artillery was always built around numbered batteries and can be consolidated into fewer regiments based on the retention of the more senior batteries in each geographic region.

I agree that willy-nilly reorganization does not make sense. There must be a plan and a purpose that clearly guides the way. For Force 2025 to be successful in general, there needs to be a clear path drawn to the force structure beyond 2025. Even if we won't have the equipment for cavalry regiments or loitering munitions or precision rocket units or whatever capabilities we see as necessary, organizational groupings overall and the doctrinal role of the reserves needs to be clearly articulated to show the ultimate structure and the path that Force 2025 will take to get us there.

Force 2025's greatest failure will be if it looks specifically at concrete changes for the Reg F and leaves the Res F in limbo in its current morass as an add-on project at a later date.

I do wonder if Gen Eyre's promotion will rob the Army of a visionary or help the Army by having him in a position where actual change can be effected.

 

[CBH99]

Question for those far more familiar with force structure than I am.

I realize a true integrated AD network involves a lot of radars, targeting information, redundancy of systems, ability to project false targets to aircraft, potentially complicated C2, and the weapon systems themselves. It isn’t as simple as some folks imagine.

That being said…are we over complicating this??

- Do we need any kind of high altitude AD system like Patriot, or can we safely assume that level of AD capability will be present? (While true we don’t want to rely on allies for everything, we also don’t want to replicate capabilities, nor acquire a capability we won’t use because someone else has that covered.)

- Are we defending our forces from helicopters? Drones? Fighter aircraft? I’d reckon all 3.

Should we keep it as simple as possible and acquire a modern, easy to use system that can engage helicopters and drones, and the odd unlucky low flying fighter? Or should we pursue a layered capability that includes Patriot type capabilities, right down to a radar guided gun to swat away drones?

Personally I think we should buy a modern, lethal, easy to use MANPAD system so our troops can engage low flying aircraft. Use the same system in a mounted role on a vehicle designed for AD. (Even if it’s a LAV with a radar, a few missiles and a gun system.)


Something in the air that isn’t ours? Take it out. Keep it simple.

Whoever controls the air really does control the battle. And if the enemy can’t use helicopters to transport their troops, or use drones to target/engage us, it makes life for us far easier.

High flying & fast jets will be an Air Force problem anyway. Airfield AD could be done by something already in service and proven, like Iron Dome.



Are we over complicating this?

 

[FJAG]

Question for those far more familiar with force structure than I am.

I realize a true integrated AD network involves a lot of radars, targeting information, redundancy of systems, ability to project false targets to aircraft, potentially complicated C2, and the weapon systems themselves. It isn’t as simple as some folks imagine.

That being said…are we over complicating this??

Not really. Think back again to the system which we had. ADATS was a laser guided missile with a range of about 6 miles, It was complimented by the shoulder launched Javelin command link guided missile with a range of around 3 miles. (Forget about the Oerlikon gun systems which were really only static airfield air defence albeit good at it)

That system is barely sufficient to cover a brigade area with a large enough bubble/barrier to deal with attack helicopters and some air to ground attack aircraft. Most air to surface missiles, even then, could be launched and guided from well outside that stand-off range.

- Do we need any kind of high altitude AD system like Patriot, or can we safely assume that level of AD capability will be present? (While true we don’t want to rely on allies for everything, we also don’t want to replicate capabilities, nor acquire a capability we won’t use because someone else has that covered.)

Our air defence capability always assumed that we would be working as a low level component of a higher level system provided by the US or Germans.

- Are we defending our forces from helicopters? Drones? Fighter aircraft? I’d reckon all 3.

In the past helicopters and fighter/bomber aircraft. Drones were never a big issue. The current GBAD system deals with all three as well as incoming missiles (whether air or ground launched) which will undoubtedly require either one piece of equipment with different weapon systems that are tailored to meet various threats with an economy of effort or several differing systems each designed to deal with a specific threat. You do not want to waste the very few high end missiles on low cost/low capability drones which can be engaged by less expensive systems.

Should we keep it as simple as possible and acquire a modern, easy to use system that can engage helicopters and drones, and the odd unlucky low flying fighter? Or should we pursue a layered capability that includes Patriot type capabilities, right down to a radar guided gun to swat away drones?

Simple is good but it ain't that simple. AD is heavily dependent on sophisticated target acquisition systems that can pick up various threats and quickly analyze them as friend/foe, then link to gun/missile/laser/etc systems that are within the target envelope and can engage rapidly before the enemy threat either exits the envelope or completes its attack. That requires 1) sophisticated airspace management and control structures; 2) sophisticated target acquisition systems; 3) sophisticated target engagement capabilities; and 4) a reliable and hack/suppression proof data link backbone.

Personally I think we should buy a modern, lethal, easy to use MANPAD system so our troops can engage low flying aircraft. Use the same system in a mounted role on a vehicle designed for AD. (Even if it’s a LAV with a radar, a few missiles and a gun system.)

Manpads have their role but are too expensive for small threats which nonetheless can cause catastrophic damage. (By expensive I mean not so much the cost - although that is a factor - but I mean that you have too few of these systems and therefore will likely run out of them before the enemy runs out of attack systems) I'm no air defence expert - during my day we gunners dabbled in air defence (with blowpipe and Boffin) and I transferred out before we started getting serious about it - but to me air defence capabilities will consist of a suite of defence systems with a common target acquisition and command and control system.

You can't simply hand air defence systems out like M72s to everyone as things are now - at least not for helicopters, fast air and missiles. At some point we might have a defensive - probably vehicle borne - weapon system that will effectively engage drones on close in surveillance or attack runs but we don't have them now.

Something in the air that isn’t ours? Take it out. Keep it simple.

Whoever controls the air really does control the battle. And if the enemy can’t use helicopters to transport their troops, or use drones to target/engage us, it makes life for us far easier.

That's the objective. The road to that objective is far from simple.

High flying & fast jets will be an Air Force problem anyway.

Don't count on the air force - they have their own problems. You need guaranteed 100% response - that's one thing that the air forces can't provide.

Airfield AD could be done by something already in service and proven, like Iron Dome.

Airfields are a much simpler problem because they occupy very little space compared to a field formation, don't move, and can be defended with heavy sophisticated machinery that generally isn't too suitable for manoeuvre formation employment.

Are we over complicating this?

Nope. We aren't. Drone technology, long range precision guided weapons and the such have greatly complicated the problem since the 1980s to the 2010s when we had the kit.

I've been an advocate for quite a while in off loading such things as artillery and air defence on the reserves because these are capabilities that you do not need to use or even train on every day. On top of that the equipment is such that the procedures for the usage of these types of systems can be taught as easily repetitive drills that people can learn and master part-time (much of the job is ammo handling and moving and positioning the system after which target engagement is getting more and more automated) The key, however, is that such equipment is getting dreadfully expensive, needs full-time maintainers with fairly high skills, and need very well-trained and well experienced full-time leaders. This means it is not gear that you can buy at the last moment and hand out to people as the board the Airbus on the way overseas.