Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

I'll respond to this here so as to not further derail the C3 Replacement thread.

I think that we differ on how we envision the role of the Light Battalions. You seem to see them as raiders swooping in unexpectedly to strike where least expected. For these roles the ultra-light vehicles, aircraft and weapons you propose make sense for these types of distributed operation. In my opinion that is the role of CSOR rather than the Light Battalions.

To me, the role of the Light Battalions is to provide a force that can respond more quickly than our our heavier forces, or can operate more effectively in complex terrain where our LAVs aren't effective. Yes the Light Battalions need to trade protection for mobility to achieve their goals but they also need to arrive with enough "weight" (ammo, support weapons, numbers) to be able to effectively defend against heavier enemy forces.

For me then I'd look instead for vehicles that can transport a Section with their gear (and be mounted with support weapons with enough ammo to fight a heavier enemy) rather than Fire-Team sized ultra-light vehicles. So to me I'd look at a Bv-series/Bronco or JLTV or Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) class of land vehicle and a Medium Lift Utility Helicopter along the lines of a UH-60, AW-101 or one of the FVL contenders rather then a swarm of Griffons or other light helicopters.

My philosophy would be to purchase a proven, reliable, relatively common vehicle/aircraft - preferably one in service with the US or our other major allies - that will effectively carry an infantry Section and their gear, can be customized to mount a variety of support weapons/roles (indirect fire, UAV/Loitering Munitions/ATGMs/SHORAD/Ambulance/Command/Cargo, etc.) and is relatively simple to maintain. Let CSOR focus on the ultra-light, raiding end of the spectrum which is better suited to Company Group operations likely anyway.

The primary point of clarification: I don't see Light Battalions as dedicated raiders. I do see them as being able to conduct raids. Everyone should be able to conduct raids. Artillery raids are a thing.

I do see the Light Battalions as being able to deploy quickly AND HOLD. I do see the Light Battalions as being able TO SUSTAIN operations in complex terrain.

I don't think it is necessary for the infantry battalion on the ground to go in with a Wagon Train with a months worth of supplies when it should be able to rely on those supplies being pushed forwards by its supporting arms. It should be able to rely on rounds on target delivered by the arty's guns and rockets, the air force's helos and aircraft and whoever is going to take responsibility for operating intelligent munitions that have no pilots.

If there is one image that defines the Light Infantry to me it is this one



This is White City in Japanese occupied Burma. Originally held by the Chindits. The Chindits, although Special in their day, were replaced by line infantry battalions from all over the British world once the Specials proved that the Japanese could be beaten in the jungles and were not 10 feet tall.

The infantry was supplied by air with air crews of various nationalities. They did not possess their own supply system. They had to rely on their support.

They were operating in terrain where neither they, nor the Japanese, could make effective use of tanks.



Royal Welch Fusiliers Burma December 1944

Burma was no raid.



One of the longstanding discussions on this site is the utility of the Battle Group vice the Brigade Group and whether Battalions should train independently or as part of the Brigade.

Perhaps the lack of Brigade training is a problem. Perhaps it encourages the battalion to look inwards to solve its problems rather than looking outwards and learning to trust its allied, supporting arms.

 

[KevinB]

Lots of stuff of late.

I think there seems to be two significant issues (and two side to both of those issues).

At the crux is WHAT IS A LIGHT UNIT:

I think that we differ on how we envision the role of the Light Battalions. You seem to see them as raiders swooping in unexpectedly to strike where least expected. For these roles the ultra-light vehicles, aircraft and weapons you propose make sense for these types of distributed operation. In my opinion that is the role of CSOR rather than the Light Battalions.

Light Infantry is key to Multi Domain Distributed Operations -- CSOR isn't the asset for that, but CSOR can add expertise and assistance in some areas to assist the LIB tasks.

Going back to my NEO example from before -
LIB forces jump onto an airfield to seize it -
JTF-2 assets operating as advance force have already inserted via low visibility insertion to either provide inextremis HR to to provide support to HRR teams in bound after airfield is secure.
CSOR seizes/controls actual airport - while LIB's secure the field / and provide cutoff forces.

JTF-2 HRR team lands and with CSOR conduct extractions.
The HRR team landing is the first time a CF AC is actually required to land - to disembark troops and vehicles.

* I can't emphasize how important it is for a nation to have their own capability here -- all you need to do it look to the current news and see that your allies goals are not always your own - and you want the ability to conduct these sorts of things flying solo - or are part of a coalition -- worst case with a partner or few you can control more airports - and this evac more people, or the same people in a shorter period of time.

To me, the role of the Light Battalions is to provide a force that can respond more quickly than our our heavier forces, or can operate more effectively in complex terrain where our LAVs aren't effective. Yes the Light Battalions need to trade protection for mobility to achieve their goals but they also need to arrive with enough "weight" (ammo, support weapons, numbers) to be able to effectively defend against heavier enemy forces.

Then it is not longer a Light Force - it is a Motorized Force - slightly lighter than the LAV force - but still tied to a cumbersome supply echelon.
Some Support Vehicles may be required - but the primary aspect of LIGHT forces needs to be its versatility - and not being tied to a platform:
Light Forces should be able to be deployed via Air (landing or parachute) Helicopter, truck, mule or "Mk1" boot etc.

Javelin etc type Anti Armor tools need to be added - so light forces are not reliant upon vehicle support weapons -

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The next major source of disagreement seems to be on entire force structure.

Frankly IF Canada had a significantly larger budget earmarked to Defense - it would be be so much of a $ and PY issue.

You could make the PPLCI 3 Light BN's and have 1 Light Brigade based in Edmonton
Suffield (are the Brits still using it significantly? Could become CTC - moving the Armor,
Recreate the Canadian Guard as a Reg Force Reg't - and base in Shilo as a Mechanized Force with the LdSH(RC) as a Heavy Armor Force and 1 CMBG
The RCR get collocated in Pet as Light Infantry - and 2 Light Bde
The Vandoos get LAV's as a Medium Infantry Bde
The Black Watch gets reconstituted in Gagetown as 2 CMBG

That gives you a Light DIv - and a Mechanized Div -, with the ability to plug the Medium Bde in as a sustainment force.


Since that won't happen - I think the best COA is to divest the PPCLI of the LAV's - as Edmonton isn't a LAV training area, Wainwright is okay, (but shuts down training across it for LAV's to do Live training at the Platoon level)- but Suffield is better, but a ways away.






FJAG - the book arrived from Amazon

 

[FJAG]

Lots of stuff of late.

I think there seems to be two significant issues (and two side to both of those issues).

At the crux is WHAT IS A LIGHT UNIT:

Light Infantry is key to Multi Domain Distributed Operations -- CSOR isn't the asset for that, but CSOR can add expertise and assistance in some areas to assist the LIB tasks.

Going back to my NEO example from before -
LIB forces jump onto an airfield to seize it -
JTF-2 assets operating as advance force have already inserted via low visibility insertion to either provide inextremis HR to to provide support to HRR teams in bound after airfield is secure.
CSOR seizes/controls actual airport - while LIB's secure the field / and provide cutoff forces.

JTF-2 HRR team lands and with CSOR conduct extractions.
The HRR team landing is the first time a CF AC is actually required to land - to disembark troops and vehicles.

* I can't emphasize how important it is for a nation to have their own capability here -- all you need to do it look to the current news and see that your allies goals are not always your own - and you want the ability to conduct these sorts of things flying solo - or are part of a coalition -- worst case with a partner or few you can control more airports - and this evac more people, or the same people in a shorter period of time.


Then it is not longer a Light Force - it is a Motorized Force - slightly lighter than the LAV force - but still tied to a cumbersome supply echelon.
Some Support Vehicles may be required - but the primary aspect of LIGHT forces needs to be its versatility - and not being tied to a platform:
Light Forces should be able to be deployed via Air (landing or parachute) Helicopter, truck, mule or "Mk1" boot etc.

Javelin etc type Anti Armor tools need to be added - so light forces are not reliant upon vehicle support weapons -

I agree with those basic concepts - a light force should not be special ops force but should be capable of operating dismounted in various scenarios but should also have the capabilities to be moved by vehicles when required. Essentially three light companies can be moved by a dozen or so 2.5 - 3 ton trucks which would be preferable to a slew of 72 fire team or 36 section carriers with all the maintenance, supply and driver burden that those add. That used to be one of the roles that the brigade's supply and transport company was tasked with before 3/4 ton and M113 section carriers came into vogue.

The next major source of disagreement seems to be on entire force structure.

Frankly IF Canada had a significantly larger budget earmarked to Defense - it would be be so much of a $ and PY issue.

You could make the PPLCI 3 Light BN's and have 1 Light Brigade based in Edmonton
Suffield (are the Brits still using it significantly? Could become CTC - moving the Armor,
Recreate the Canadian Guard as a Reg Force Reg't - and base in Shilo as a Mechanized Force with the LdSH(RC) as a Heavy Armor Force and 1 CMBG
The RCR get collocated in Pet as Light Infantry - and 2 Light Bde
The Vandoos get LAV's as a Medium Infantry Bde
The Black Watch gets reconstituted in Gagetown as 2 CMBG

That gives you a Light DIv - and a Mechanized Div -, with the ability to plug the Medium Bde in as a sustainment force.

Since that won't happen - I think the best COA is to divest the PPCLI of the LAV's - as Edmonton isn't a LAV training area, Wainwright is okay, (but shuts down training across it for LAV's to do Live training at the Platoon level)- but Suffield is better, but a ways away.

The objective of a light division and a heavy/mechanized division is the direction I tend to take as well. We differ in the idea of adding PYs to the personnel budget which IMHO isn't in the cards under any Canadian government during peacetime. As a result, I put my emphasis on a vastly improved and equipped reserve force to fill the blank files. With the current size of the Reg F Army and the Res F Army we have enough positions to man two divisions plus a central command, control and training cadre.

For me the division of labour vis a vis the regs and reserves is simple: if the position or unit is required for quick reaction or entails such complexity that it requires full-time training to be effective then the position/unit should be Reg F. If on the other hand it is a position that is neither and can be maintained through a reserve status then it should be Res F. In many cases there can be a mix of a full-time individuals where needed for leadership or complexity or a quick reaction element but also less skilled reservists for the bulk of the unit and who all work out of hybrid units (the appropriate ratios must be determined on a case-by-case basis)

Heavy forces-because of the fact they are only deployed in narrow circumstances usually in extreme situations-should be staffed by a larger ratio of reservists. In my view one heavy Reg F brigade to be quickly available, to develop and exercise doctrine, and to provide training and leadership to the heavy reserve components.

Lighter forces-because they are more frequently deployed on a day-to-day basis during OOTW and on short notice-should have a much larger full-time force component.

In my book I put the heavy elements (1 Reg F brigade and 2 Res F brigades plus a reserve sustainment brigade) in the western part of the country (which includes ON less Petawawa) primarily because of the three ranges Wainwright, Suffield and Shilo (and yes, that means some travel for the ON reservists who would fly onto equipment in the west for training (albeit I consider Camp Grayling MI an option) The lighter division is in the east and based on 2 Light brigade and 5 mechanized brigade. The Reserves provide an artillery and manoeuvre enhancement brigade but there are also sufficient reserve infantry battalions in Quebec and the Maritimes to reinforce 1 and 5 brigade. I didn't want to create an additional res light brigade because IMHO there is a necessity for an artillery brigade and the east cannot generate enough reservists to merit an additional light brigade. Besides I wasn't sure whether we strategically needed another light/mech brigade (5 manoeuvre and two support brigades seem enough)

FJAG - the book arrived from Amazon

Good. Hope you find it though provoking at least.

Quite frankly my views as to the structure of the force has changed a bit - as you can see from the above ORBATs I put out since this thread started. Fundamentally though my basic premise is that we need to develop our reserve force structure as a force expander - our reserve force must provide us with something more than individual augmentees - it must provide a larger field force then what the Reg F alone can provide. While I do not find the US National Guard as perfect, I do find it a worthwhile example of what the basic idea of a reserve force should be - an equipped, annually less expensive, part-time force that can provide more and wider capabilities than what the full-time force alone can provide.

 

[daftandbarmy]

For me the division of labour vis a vis the regs and reserves is simple: if the position or unit is required for quick reaction or entails such complexity that it requires full-time training to be effective then the position/unit should be Reg F. If on the other hand it is a position that is neither and can be maintained through a reserve status then it should be Res F. In many cases there can be a mix of a full-time individuals where needed for leadership or complexity or a quick reaction element but also less skilled reservists for the bulk of the unit and who all work out of hybrid units (the appropriate ratios must be determined on a case-by-case basis)

Devil's advocate here...

The readiness levels of reserve units can be quite high.

In the UK, for example, the TA units of my regiment were tasked to the 'Central Front' and, as a result, were ready to parachute into battle on 24 hours notice, which they practised regularly by jumping a full battalion into Germany for weekend exercises. Over 400 troops would deploy on such exercises.

They were better equipped than we were as out main role was 'Out of NATO area' operations and, as a result, we had older radios and more dated anti-armour weapons as our most likely opponents would be 'developing world' types.

When the Falklands War blew up they had to strip the TA battalions of all their gucci kit to send off to the South Atlantic which, for example, is why 2 & 3 PARA were equipped with the battle winning MILAN firing posts that helped them to defeat superior enemy ground forces.

 

[KevinB]

Without a meaningful legislation that protects Reservists - and a entire reconfiguring of the system - the augmented system is all one can get.

I think a 10/90 (and I have nightmares of that) is the only way to incorporate any sort of equipment to reserve units - beyond light trucks etc.
As well a large robust regular force maintenance force.

More to follow

 

[Colin Parkinson]

When we were "Ops Tasked" our unit had our own vehicle tech with a 5/4 ton fitted with tools and parts. Our vehicle serviceability rates were excellent. Vehicle heavy Reserve units should have a Class B vehicle tech position with an allotment of tools and parts. they are should also be expected to help each other on larger repairs. Local Svc Battalions should have Class B vehicle techs, with mobile shop truck with hiab crane. anyone with a Civilian mechanic certification should be automatically allowed to repair Milcots with a short familiarisation course and have a budget to source parts locally with a accounting through the repair logs.

 

[KevinB]

I agree with those basic concepts - a light force should not be special ops force but should be capable of operating dismounted in various scenarios but should also have the capabilities to be moved by vehicles when required. Essentially three light companies can be moved by a dozen or so 2.5 - 3 ton trucks which would be preferable to a slew of 72 fire team or 36 section carriers with all the maintenance, supply and driver burden that those add. That used to be one of the roles that the brigade's supply and transport company was tasked with before 3/4 ton and M113 section carriers came into vogue.

The objective of a light division and a heavy/mechanized division is the direction I tend to take as well. We differ in the idea of adding PYs to the personnel budget which IMHO isn't in the cards under any Canadian government during peacetime. As a result, I put my emphasis on a vastly improved and equipped reserve force to fill the blank files. With the current size of the Reg F Army and the Res F Army we have enough positions to man two divisions plus a central command, control and training cadre.

For me the division of labour vis a vis the regs and reserves is simple: if the position or unit is required for quick reaction or entails such complexity that it requires full-time training to be effective then the position/unit should be Reg F. If on the other hand it is a position that is neither and can be maintained through a reserve status then it should be Res F. In many cases there can be a mix of a full-time individuals where needed for leadership or complexity or a quick reaction element but also less skilled reservists for the bulk of the unit and who all work out of hybrid units (the appropriate ratios must be determined on a case-by-case basis)

Heavy forces-because of the fact they are only deployed in narrow circumstances usually in extreme situations-should be staffed by a larger ratio of reservists. In my view one heavy Reg F brigade to be quickly available, to develop and exercise doctrine, and to provide training and leadership to the heavy reserve components.

I started to address this before I got distracted -- I agree in principle - but the maintenance issues of a heavy force will be taxing on a Reserve unit - more so, because the larger equipment will be pooled at a larger CFB.
10/90 flopped because there was no method of compelling reservists to do things.
The Can Gov needs to take a realistic approach to both job security - and activation of reservists.

Frankly to me - the LAV GIBs can be reservists - the crews can be regular or a mix. The LAV requires a little less maintenance than tracked vehicles - and I just don't see wheeled vehicles as a substitute for an actual armored vehicle.

Lighter forces-because they are more frequently deployed on a day-to-day basis during OOTW and on short notice-should have a much larger full-time force component.

Agreed entirely

In my book I put the heavy elements (1 Reg F brigade and 2 Res F brigades plus a reserve sustainment brigade) in the western part of the country (which includes ON less Petawawa) primarily because of the three ranges Wainwright, Suffield and Shilo (and yes, that means some travel for the ON reservists who would fly onto equipment in the west for training (albeit I consider Camp Grayling MI an option) The lighter division is in the east and based on 2 Light brigade and 5 mechanized brigade. The Reserves provide an artillery and manoeuvre enhancement brigade but there are also sufficient reserve infantry battalions in Quebec and the Maritimes to reinforce 1 and 5 brigade. I didn't want to create an additional res light brigade because IMHO there is a necessity for an artillery brigade and the east cannot generate enough reservists to merit an additional light brigade. Besides I wasn't sure whether we strategically needed another light/mech brigade (5 manoeuvre and two support brigades seem enough)

I am honestly not tracking the desire to place the Heavier BDE in the West -- while I agree Shilo, and Suffield are good training locations. Wainwright is not for vehicles, or at least vehicle live fire beyond a .50.
I think the Mountains in the West are a great training tool that can be used by Light forces -

Perhaps the better option is moving 2 CMBG/ all three RCR to Shilo - leaving Petawawa to CANSFOCOM

Suffield can become CTC-West (or Ideally CTC) - as it offers a lot more than Lawfield Corridor for fire and maneuver training.

Good. Hope you find it though provoking at least.

It just arrived on Saturday - and I haven't been able to find time to do more than open the cover -- I am hoping my wife, kids, and dogs give me some time this evening.

Quite frankly my views as to the structure of the force has changed a bit - as you can see from the above ORBATs I put out since this thread started. Fundamentally though my basic premise is that we need to develop our reserve force structure as a force expander - our reserve force must provide us with something more than individual augmentees - it must provide a larger field force then what the Reg F alone can provide. While I do not find the US National Guard as perfect, I do find it a worthwhile example of what the basic idea of a reserve force should be - an equipped, annually less expensive, part-time force that can provide more and wider capabilities than what the full-time force alone can provide.

Honestly pre 9/11 I didn't have much faith in the National Guard - but one Federalized - the ability to deploy in Afghanistan and Iraq showed it was truly a robust capability - that many other nations do not have.



Regardless, I don't think it matter much - unless the CF as a whole entity sits down and takes a realistic look at the $ and PY that are available - and matches them to the mission requirements dictate by the GoC. Personally I have little hope in that, as I think without a very strong Minister running DND no one will care about breaking through the Regimental stranglehold that exists in allocations, or base structure -- let along the inter service support requirements that exist and are constantly ignored.

 

[KevinB]

When we were "Ops Tasked" our unit had our own vehicle tech with a 5/4 ton fitted with tools and parts. Our vehicle serviceability rates were excellent. Vehicle heavy Reserve units should have a Class B vehicle tech position with an allotment of tools and parts. they are should also be expected to help each other on larger repairs. Local Svc Battalions should have Class B vehicle techs, with mobile shop truck with hiab crane. anyone with a Civilian mechanic certification should be automatically allowed to repair Milcots with a short familiarisation course and have a budget to source parts locally with a accounting through the repair logs.

Again there is a significant difference between a unit that have a few 5/4's, and MLVW's as opposed to a companies worth of LAV's.
Also in my experience "vehicle serviceability" in the reserves can mean a significantly different thing - and rarely did it really mean a 100% mission ready - it usually meant it could probably get to the closest training area and back.

The fact that again the CF went down to the 1 ton route with the MILCOT (after the debacle of the 1 ton and the CUCV) again speaks to the idea of a paper capability being acquired as opposed to an actual vehicle.

 

[FJAG]

Without a meaningful legislation that protects Reservists - and a entire reconfiguring of the system - the augmented system is all one can get.

I think a 10/90 (and I have nightmares of that) is the only way to incorporate any sort of equipment to reserve units - beyond light trucks etc.
As well a large robust regular force maintenance force.

More to follow

There are basically two types of reservist - students and not students. Students can get by with the system we have. Not students are critical to a healthy reserve and they definitely need employment protection legislation.

Sometimes when I'm at my most cynical I tend to believe that the reason the Army has not "fixed" the reserve system is that it is scared that a properly configured and trained reserve force would end up creating a realization within the political masters that they could get by with a lot less full-timers during peacetime.

When I crunch a few numbers (I'm retired; I have time) I think that you could pull 7,500 Reg F PYs out of the field force and still have three equipped and manned brigades that could fulfill our current peacetime missions as set out in the SSE. Note by field force I mean the three brigades and the divisional headquarters) Divisional support and training establishments across the country remain untouched.

Basically a brigade right now is 5,000 folks so 15,000 for the field force. We have roughly 20,000 authorized and paid reservists on a good day.

So, if you fire 7,500 Reg F full timers you are left with 7,500.

Put 5,000 of those into one fully manned and equipped brigade. They're your quick reaction force; your Roto 0 force; and your doctrine and training establishment which develops and maintains the Army's high end professional cadre.

The Res F already has some 500 RSS.

Of the 2,500 remaining Reg F PYs, you assign another 500 to the RSS to fill a total of 1,000 key full-time leadership and training positions in the Res F.

The remaining 2,000 Reg F PYs are primarily service support and training personnel to provide for the maintenance of the two remaining brigades' worth of equipment which will be manned and operated primarily by reservists. Their training function is to train additional reserve service support personnel.

Your 20,000 reservists are consolidated into a three to four reserve force brigades greatly reducing brigade headquarters and unit headquarters requirements (Hell, we could cut out all but one divisional headquarters). The key here is to keep enough position in a BTL/ATL-both trainers and trainees-to keep generating personnel through individual training without putting an individual training burden on the units. The units receive personnel trained to DP1 standards and concern themselves solely with continuation and collective training.

Effectively when we need to meet operational peacetime missions, we send a Roto 0 from the Reg F brigade and start forming Rotos 1 and thereafter from the Reg F and volunteer Res F personnel of the other brigades. If we ever get to a point where there are not enough volunteers we place enough non-volunteering reservists on active service as are needed to fill the roto. (The legislation already allows us to do that)

If we need to "mobilize" for something big, we can mobilize two Res F brigades to accompany the Reg F brigade and still have 10,000 reservists as backups. We already have the equipment for three brigades. We will also continue to have a BTL/ATL organization left behind to generate new troops.

Such a system would save the Army roughly $3/4 of a billion per year to roll into more reservists or equipment or training.

Obviously we need to make changes to the reserves but that's actually easier than you think. What's going to be hard is to pry another 10,000 full-timers out of their cubicles in Ottawa.

Like I said: when I'm cynical.

 

[KevinB]

Like I said: when I'm cynical.

One man's cynic is another's realist...

 

[FJAG]

... I am honestly not tracking the desire to place the Heavier BDE in the West -- while I agree Shilo, and Suffield are good training locations. Wainwright is not for vehicles, or at least vehicle live fire beyond a .50. ...

My preference comes from 7 of my years in the Reg F spent in Shilo including exercise where we had Centurions in Wainwright and Leo 1s with the German Army in Shilo (including doing numerous live fire battle group battle runs). Was out in Suffield for two arty exercises but never tank. I had four years in Petawawa and way too many courses in Gagetown. Never actually spent any time on the ranges in Valcartier.

Of the three ranges I'd rate Suffield the best for live-fire BG level combined arms battle runs, Wainwright second and Shilo third. Suffield is almost 1,600 sq km, Wainwright is almost 600 sq km and Shilo is roughly 400 sq km. All three are relatively open rolling prairie terrain which has much more open useable terrain than Petawawa (300 sq km) or Valcartier (roughly 300 sq km) or even Gagetown (1,100 sq km) which is both overpopulated by the schools and at the same time limited in open terrain.

That's basically why I put the heavy force there. Res F manpower is a problem in the west. The three western brigades can barely muster 4,500 individuals so barely a brigade. That's one of the key reason I add most of ON to the Army of the West. It can easily generate a brigade plus but that's with the intent (in the book) of creating two heavy reserve brigades). ON and QC are probably the worst place for training a heavy brigade because of their limited ranges. Camp Grayling in MI (at 590 sq km) does offer a nearby facility but the ranges are not as open as the Prairie ones.

The trade off is that to deploy the brigade requires a rail move to either an east or west or southern coast port.

 

[KevinB]

My preference comes from 7 of my years in the Reg F spent in Shilo including exercise where we had Centurions in Wainwright and Leo 1s with the German Army in Shilo (including doing numerous live fire battle group battle runs). Was out in Suffield for two arty exercises but never tank. I had four years in Petawawa and way too many courses in Gagetown. Never actually spent any time on the ranges in Valcartier.

Of the three ranges I'd rate Suffield the best for live-fire BG level combined arms battle runs, Wainwright second and Shilo third. Suffield is almost 1,600 sq km, Wainwright is almost 600 sq km and Shilo is roughly 400 sq km. All three are relatively open rolling prairie terrain which has much more open useable terrain than Petawawa (300 sq km) or Valcartier (roughly 300 sq km) or even Gagetown (1,100 sq km) which is both overpopulated by the schools and at the same time limited in open terrain.

That's basically why I put the heavy force there. Res F manpower is a problem in the west. The three western brigades can barely muster 4,500 individuals so barely a brigade. That's one of the key reason I add most of ON to the Army of the West. It can easily generate a brigade plus but that's with the intent (in the book) of creating two heavy reserve brigades). ON and QC are probably the worst place for training a heavy brigade because of their limited ranges. Camp Grayling in MI (at 590 sq km) does offer a nearby facility but the ranges are not as open as the Prairie ones.

The trade off is that to deploy the brigade requires a rail move to either an east or west or southern coast port.

I think realistically that only Gagetown and Suffield offer a true Mechanized training area -
Wainwright has a number of oil and gas leases (which IIRC Gagetown did too) - as well as cattle etc - the Life fire area for a LAV Platoon there is significantly restricted (and a total cluster for larger training) - but my main point was Edmonton has absolutely nothing for ranges other than small arms KD ranges.
I'd suggest that even Petawawa with the restricted areas it has offers a Mechanized formation more than Edmonton.
*which brings to the point that really non of the Bde bases are significantly useful for training of mechanized forces, but Edmonton is the least Mech friendly location.

While LAV's can self deploy to Wainwright from Edmonton - tanks cannot - and the wear and tear on the LAV's to me isn't worth it, and it just takes crossing the road in Pet.

I think the Army needs to address that little elephant first.

 

[Kirkhill]

Res F manpower is a problem in the west. The three western brigades can barely muster 4,500 individuals so barely a brigade. That's one of the key reason I add most of ON to the Army of the West.

No argument. Just a point of reference. Back in the Dark Ages a regiment of my acquaintance wished to open a adjunct platoon in Drumheller. The request was denied. This despite there being adjunct platoons scattered hither and yon in BC, Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes. Some within a couple of traffic lights of each other.

Perhaps Ottawa still has unpleasant memories of Gabriel Dumont and the Northwest Mounted Rifles of Duck Lake. If only they had remembered to pay him and not disbanded his unit.

North West Mounted Rifles

We have pickups and don't mind driving a bit for a hamburger but it still takes time to get from town to town.

 

[dapaterson]

The Army has multiple elephants they refuse address; the biggest being the maintenance of the Regimental Balance Of Terror in terms of equipment and (god forbid) number of badged Reg F battalions. It's impossible to have serious discussions when the conclusions must support three battalions each of three regiments, with everyone getting the same manning and equipment, as if it's kindergarten and each of the precious little five year olds has to be given the same treat.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Army has multiple elephants they refuse address; the biggest being the maintenance of the Regimental Balance Of Terror in terms of equipment and (god forbid) number of badged Reg F battalions. It's impossible to have serious discussions when the conclusions must support three battalions each of three regiments, with everyone getting the same manning and equipment, as if it's kindergarten and each of the precious little five year olds has to be given the same treat.

... and seven regiments of recce (or so I'm told)

 

[KevinB]

The Army has multiple elephants they refuse address; the biggest being the maintenance of the Regimental Balance Of Terror in terms of equipment and (god forbid) number of badged Reg F battalions. It's impossible to have serious discussions when the conclusions must support three battalions each of three regiments, with everyone getting the same manning and equipment, as if it's kindergarten and each of the precious little five year olds has to be given the same treat.

Come on, you forgot the same problem occurs elsewhere in the Army - the Infantry hardly have a monopoly on the candy bowl.

 

[MilEME09]

Realistically Suffield has a rail head, expanding that would solve the tank transport issue. I have advocated a couple times for expanding Suffield, we can run Force on Force training with the British in summer, medicine hat is right there, and calgary is 3 hours away, 2 hours to lethbridge. The housing market isn't crazy either.

 

[KevinB]

Realistically Suffield has a rail head, expanding that would solve the tank transport issue. I have advocated a couple times for expanding Suffield, we can run Force on Force training with the British in summer, medicine hat is right there, and calgary is 3 hours away, 2 hours to lethbridge. The housing market isn't crazy either.

IIRC Wainwright has a railhead as well - I was admittedly drunk during most of the Wainwright portion of RV92 - but I recall that vehicles came in and out by rail.

Honestly due to the Brits - Suffield should be a fantastic training area *other than their absolutely nasty habit of crapping in cut out old road wheels and leaving it for people to find latter.

Of course I am the guy who's still wondering WTF on getting rid of the runway in Edmonton and the why of moving CABC to Trenton (and rebrand it) as opposed to the main base when Greisbaugh (spelling) was shuttered. Because the Mountain Ops side of CABC does so much better in Trenton I guess (sarcasm). Admittedly I have been shaking my head for 25 years on that and still never gotten a good answer on that logic.

 

[MilEME09]

Having read the latest F2025 information available on the DWAN, all I can say is which of you buggers is on the project? It reads as if they are taking our ideas.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Having read the latest F2025 information available on the DWAN, all I can say is which of you buggers is on the project? It reads as if they are taking our ideas.