Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Answering my own question.

14 to 21 Wiesel Tankettes in a C17 (6 Bv206s and 5 M113s - the M113s are mass limited rather than volume limited - by volume you could squeeze something like 10 of the original M113s into a C17 if they weighed half as much).

 

[Kirkhill]

Also, apparently, a C130 can carry 3 MH-6 Little Birds which can be in the air in 15 minutes of arrival and ramp down.

Presumably that means a C17 can lift an entire squadron?

Night Stalkers: 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)

books.google.ca

 

[KevinB]

In my experience MC-130's usually carry two plus FARP stuff and Security personnel.
I think three is fine for an administrative move - but wouldn't want to be trying to do three on the clock in a non fully permissive area.

 

[GR66]

Here's the latest Force 2025 recipe from the kitchen of GR66. It starts off with a healthy helping of KevinB, a dash of FJAG and a sprinking of Kirkhill and topped off with a few special ingredients of my own. Take a bite and let me know what ingredients you think should be changed...

Infantry

Starts with KevinB's idea of having both the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the RCR and PPCLI as Light Battalions and R22R as all LAV Battalions. I'd take it one step further and make 2 RCR a light battalion as well.

FJAG (and others) have noted "We're not committed to any rapid deployment interventionist or air-field seizing missions" but I agree with KevinB that a rapid reaction capability would be a contribution to our allies that would allow us to punch above our weight so to speak. It's a capability that only a handful of our allies have so would be highly valued. As for seizing airfields, etc. I agree that it's not a likely scenario, but like armour, AD, AT and SP artillery it's one of those capabilities that you'd greatly miss having if it is required. I don't think it means that we need to recreate the CAR, but if we continue with our current system of having one company in each Light Battalion as a parachute company, then we'd have 5 x jump companies available should the need arise.

Having 4 x LAV Battalions and 5 x Light Battalions (instead of the current 6 and 3) would allow us to manage readiness as follows:

LAV Battalions (4):
1 x Deployed
1 x High Readiness
1 x Road to High Readiness
1 x Reconstituting

Light Battalions (5):
1 x Deployed
1 x Rapid Reaction (72hr Standby)
1 x High Readiness
1 x Road to High Readiness
1 x Reconstituting

With this system we'd be able to have 2 x Battalions on Deployment (1 x LAV and 1 x Light), an additional two at High Readiness ready to replace them (or to deal with an emerging threat) and an additional Light Rapid Reaction Battalion on 72hr standby to deal with any rapidly developing threats.

Armour:

Personally I'd be in favour of retaining and upgrading the 82 x Leopards we have to a single variant. I agree that they are not as dominant on the battlefield as they once were, that an AH might provide more versatility and that there is a pretty high cost to maintain quite a small and difficult to deploy fleet. All that being said, we don't have an alternative platform to fulfill the role of the tank at the present time and it will be well beyond 2025/2030 before we have something coming online to replace them. So for now I'd keep them.

RCD
I'd have them switch locations with 2 RCR and co-locate them with the Armour School and concentrate all our tanks in the single Regiment. Here they would be closer to an embarkation point for shipping to Europe (the most likely place they'd be needed) and this is likely a skill that should be practiced annually.

12RBC
Loses the shared tank squadron and becomes a straight Recce Regiment. Moving forward I'd begin replacing some of the LAV Recce vehicles with LAV-based UAV launch platforms and LAV-based AT platforms.

LdSH
I'd give the Strathconas a similar mix of capabilities as 12RBC (recce/UAV/AT) but mounted on light, air-transportable vehicles to support our Light Battalions and to enable rapid deployment.

Artillery:

5 RALC & 1 RCHA
I'd re-equip these two Regiments with the same SP Artillery system that the US Army procures for its Stryker Brigades. Hopefully the reduced manning requirements for these guns would allow both Regiments to expand to 3 x Batteries and possibly even leave enough PYs left to be transferred to 2 RCHA.

2 RCHA
I'd keep the M777s for this Regiment and if enough PYs are saved by switching 5 RALC and 1 RCHA to a self-propelled platform then I'd either add a 3rd 4-gun battery or expand the existing batteries to 2 x 6-gun batteries. I'd have all of these batteries be jump qualified.

Engineers:

I'd have one jump qualified field squadron in each Regiment.

Equipment:

With the above changes to the structure of the Army, there would be 2 x Battalions of LAVs and 3 x Squadrons of Armoured Recce vehicles (plus more when additional Recce vehicles begin to be replaced with UAV-launch and AT variants).

I'd use 1 x Battalion of the LAVs, 1 x Armoured Recce Squadron, 1 x Battery of M777s (hopefully to be eventually replace with the new SP-Artillery vehicle) and 1 x Squadron of the upgraded Leopards to create a pre-positioned Canadian Battle Group in Europe - equipment only - as part of our deterrence against Russia (and to reinforce our Latvia contingent if required). Personally, I'd likely choose to place this pre-positioned force in Germany. If we place it too close to the potential front then it might be targeted for destruction in place before we can get there, or we might have to fly into contested airspace in order to meet up with our equipment. In a more limited conflict initiated by Russia they would be less likely to attack targets in Germany in hopes of avoiding a full-scale NATO response to an attack with limited territorial goals.

The remaining LAV Battalion vehicles I'd place as training company vehicles in Gagetown, Meaford and Wainwright for use of both the Reg Force Light Battalions and the Reserve Infantry Regiments to use for familiarization training.

The extra LAV Recce vehicles could be either used as conversion hulls for new variant vehicles, or parceled out to the infantry Recce Platoons or Reserve Armoured Recce Regiments.

This FORCE 2025 would look something like this:

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's the latest Force 2025 recipe from the kitchen of GR66. It starts off with a healthy helping of KevinB, a dash of FJAG and a sprinking of Kirkhill and topped off with a few special ingredients of my own. Take a bite and let me know what ingredients you think should be changed...

Infantry

Starts with KevinB's idea of having both the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the RCR and PPCLI as Light Battalions and R22R as all LAV Battalions. I'd take it one step further and make 2 RCR a light battalion as well.

FJAG (and others) have noted "We're not committed to any rapid deployment interventionist or air-field seizing missions" but I agree with KevinB that a rapid reaction capability would be a contribution to our allies that would allow us to punch above our weight so to speak. It's a capability that only a handful of our allies have so would be highly valued. As for seizing airfields, etc. I agree that it's not a likely scenario, but like armour, AD, AT and SP artillery it's one of those capabilities that you'd greatly miss having if it is required. I don't think it means that we need to recreate the CAR, but if we continue with our current system of having one company in each Light Battalion as a parachute company, then we'd have 5 x jump companies available should the need arise.

Having 4 x LAV Battalions and 5 x Light Battalions (instead of the current 6 and 3) would allow us to manage readiness as follows:

LAV Battalions (4):
1 x Deployed
1 x High Readiness
1 x Road to High Readiness
1 x Reconstituting

Light Battalions (5):
1 x Deployed
1 x Rapid Reaction (72hr Standby)
1 x High Readiness
1 x Road to High Readiness
1 x Reconstituting

With this system we'd be able to have 2 x Battalions on Deployment (1 x LAV and 1 x Light), an additional two at High Readiness ready to replace them (or to deal with an emerging threat) and an additional Light Rapid Reaction Battalion on 72hr standby to deal with any rapidly developing threats.

Armour:

Personally I'd be in favour of retaining and upgrading the 82 x Leopards we have to a single variant. I agree that they are not as dominant on the battlefield as they once were, that an AH might provide more versatility and that there is a pretty high cost to maintain quite a small and difficult to deploy fleet. All that being said, we don't have an alternative platform to fulfill the role of the tank at the present time and it will be well beyond 2025/2030 before we have something coming online to replace them. So for now I'd keep them.

RCD
I'd have them switch locations with 2 RCR and co-locate them with the Armour School and concentrate all our tanks in the single Regiment. Here they would be closer to an embarkation point for shipping to Europe (the most likely place they'd be needed) and this is likely a skill that should be practiced annually.

12RBC
Loses the shared tank squadron and becomes a straight Recce Regiment. Moving forward I'd begin replacing some of the LAV Recce vehicles with LAV-based UAV launch platforms and LAV-based AT platforms.

LdSH
I'd give the Strathconas a similar mix of capabilities as 12RBC (recce/UAV/AT) but mounted on light, air-transportable vehicles to support our Light Battalions and to enable rapid deployment.

Artillery:

5 RALC & 1 RCHA
I'd re-equip these two Regiments with the same SP Artillery system that the US Army procures for its Stryker Brigades. Hopefully the reduced manning requirements for these guns would allow both Regiments to expand to 3 x Batteries and possibly even leave enough PYs left to be transferred to 2 RCHA.

2 RCHA
I'd keep the M777s for this Regiment and if enough PYs are saved by switching 5 RALC and 1 RCHA to a self-propelled platform then I'd either add a 3rd 4-gun battery or expand the existing batteries to 2 x 6-gun batteries. I'd have all of these batteries be jump qualified.

Engineers:

I'd have one jump qualified field squadron in each Regiment.

Equipment:

With the above changes to the structure of the Army, there would be 2 x Battalions of LAVs and 3 x Squadrons of Armoured Recce vehicles (plus more when additional Recce vehicles begin to be replaced with UAV-launch and AT variants).

I'd use 1 x Battalion of the LAVs, 1 x Armoured Recce Squadron, 1 x Battery of M777s (hopefully to be eventually replace with the new SP-Artillery vehicle) and 1 x Squadron of the upgraded Leopards to create a pre-positioned Canadian Battle Group in Europe - equipment only - as part of our deterrence against Russia (and to reinforce our Latvia contingent if required). Personally, I'd likely choose to place this pre-positioned force in Germany. If we place it too close to the potential front then it might be targeted for destruction in place before we can get there, or we might have to fly into contested airspace in order to meet up with our equipment. In a more limited conflict initiated by Russia they would be less likely to attack targets in Germany in hopes of avoiding a full-scale NATO response to an attack with limited territorial goals.

The remaining LAV Battalion vehicles I'd place as training company vehicles in Gagetown, Meaford and Wainwright for use of both the Reg Force Light Battalions and the Reserve Infantry Regiments to use for familiarization training.

The extra LAV Recce vehicles could be either used as conversion hulls for new variant vehicles, or parceled out to the infantry Recce Platoons or Reserve Armoured Recce Regiments.

This FORCE 2025 would look something like this:

View attachment 66232

Now if only we could figure out how to integrate TACHEL into the scheme....

 

[KevinB]

Now if only we could figure out how to integrate TACHEL into the scheme....

Agreed, as well the LIB's will need dedicated standby/support aircraft.

 

[Kirkhill]

Which leads me to the question: What authority, and budget, does Canadian Joint Operations Command possess?

Doesn't it seem reasonable that they are setting the terms of reference for the components and deciding how those components are going to work together, and the tools they need? Shouldn't they be deciding how TACHEL gets utilized and what the Army needs to have to be able to work with TACHEL, and what the RCAF needs to support those operations, and how many berths the RCN needs to keep clear on their vessels to embark a functional air-ground team?

Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC)​

What CJOC does​

CJOC leads most Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operations in Canada, North America, and around the world.
CJOC directs CAF missions from planning to closing, to meet national and international strategic goals. It ensures rapid responses in CAF operations by:

• planning for contingencies;
• establishing structures and processes that can be activated or expanded at short notice for:
  • command-and-control;
  • intelligence;
  • support.

Leadership​

Vice-Admiral J.R. (Bob) Auchterlonie

Related links​

CAF Operations and Exercises

CJOC structure and roles​

CJOC is made up of the following:

• CAF task forces deployed on operations in Canada and North America
• six standing regional Joint Task Force Headquarters across Canada
• a Canada-wide network of support units, the Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group
• CAF task forces deployed on operations in other countries
• CJOC headquarters staff that plan and direct CAF operations

CJOC is assisted by the:

• Joint Force Air Component Commander, based in Winnipeg
• Maritime Component Commanders, located in Esquimalt and Halifax
• 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, based in Kingston

The Component Commanders lead the:

• Royal Canadian Navy
• Canadian Army
• Royal Canadian Air Force

Component Commanders provide insight into the specifics of CAF operations. They take part in contingency planning and readiness activities. They also command and control CAF elements in operations. This is done under CJOC direction.
CJOC also works closely with partners in operations. These include:

• other Canadian government departments and agencies
• the armed forces of traditional allies and nations with shared defence goals
• multinational organizations like NATO and the United Nations (UN)

CJOC directs all CAF operations except those run solely by:

• Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
• NORAD

 

[FJAG]

Which leads me to the question: What authority, and budget, does Canadian Joint Operations Command possess?

Doesn't it seem reasonable that they are setting the terms of reference for the components and deciding how those components are going to work together, and the tools they need? Shouldn't they be deciding how TACHEL gets utilized and what the Army needs to have to be able to work with TACHEL, and what the RCAF needs to support those operations, and how many berths the RCN needs to keep clear on their vessels to embark a functional air-ground team?

CJOC is a force employer. They do not have the budget or authority to develop overarching doctrine (which includes pretty much everything from org to eqpt and trg) Essentially they focus on contingency and mission planning and execution albeit there is some provision for establishing structures and processes for intelligence, support and command and control.

JSOC might have an interest in the things you contemplate but is not the deciding agency. We've got to give some responsibility to the CDS, CLS, CAS and CNS, don't we? - otherwise why would we need all those generals and their staff?

 

[Kirkhill]

So the simple solution is to hand the budget to CJOC and have them buy what they need from CLS, CAS and CNS? If the elements don't supply what their "customer" wants they don't get paid?

 

[FJAG]

Here's the latest Force 2025 recipe from the kitchen of GR66. ...

Sorry mate - not buying this one.

I'll stick with my general formula that in order to develop the proper doctrine and expertise we need to reorganize into what are essentially three brigades, one light, one medium and one heavy. Scattering these capabilities around the country and mix and matching them within a brigade accomplishes very little. Placing a tank regiment within what is essentially a light brigade so that it can be garrisoned in Gagetown close to a port is counterproductive at best. It needs to be collocated with mechanized infantry (even if only LAV 6.0) and the appropriate armoured engineer, artillery and support agencies. The Wainwright ranges are still the best for training combined arms forces.

I can buy 5GMBC as a full up medium LAV brigade but I'm still of the view that the light brigade and the medium brigade should be under one divisional headquarters which would become our centre of excellence for OOTW having both a rapid deployment capability and a medium weight follow-up force capability.

I'll stay with these two organizations where 3 PPCLI is transformed into a cavalry/strike regiment for the heavy brigade, the recce regiments into cavalry/strike regiments for the light and medium brigades and 3 RCR becomes a multi-disciplinary FSCB battalion under CANSOFCOM.




Effectively that targets one full-time brigade as the centre of excellence for all things NATO/Europe and two full-time brigades for everything else including OOTW.

As far as TacHel. Leave 1 Wing in Kingston and primarily responsive to 2 Cdn Div for joint training - (With the exception of 408 Sqn in Edmonton-which can continue to support 3 Div-everything else is already in the east.) In the same way the transport wing, 8 Wing in Trenton, can also be primarily responsive to 2 Div for joint training. Of course they respond, as tasked, to CJOC and 1 Div for operations.

3 Div on the other hand should be gaining expertise in all things rail and ship movement (both North America and Europe)

 

[GR66]

Sorry mate - not buying this one.

I'll stick with my general formula that in order to develop the proper doctrine and expertise we need to reorganize into what are essentially three brigades, one light, one medium and one heavy. Scattering these capabilities around the country and mix and matching them within a brigade accomplishes very little. Placing a tank regiment within what is essentially a light brigade so that it can be garrisoned in Gagetown close to a port is counterproductive at best. It needs to be collocated with mechanized infantry (even if only LAV 6.0) and the appropriate armoured engineer, artillery and support agencies. The Wainwright ranges are still the best for training combined arms forces.

Done. This is fixed fairly simply by switching around KevinB's LAV Brigade assignments. Instead of making the isolated Battalion locations the LAV units, make the co-located units the LAV Battalions. Make the Strathconas the Tank Regiment and you have your three flavours of Brigades...Light/Medium/Heavy.

2 Brigade becomes your Light Brigade with 3 x LIBs, 5e Brigade is your Medium Brigade (basically identical to our existing Medium Brigades but I'd still redesign the Armoured Recce Squadrons as I described) and 1 Brigade is your Heavy Brigade with LdSH (tanks) and 2 x LAV Brigades all co-located in Edmonton being your 3 x maneuver units for deployment with 2 PPCLI in Shilo becoming the Regiment's Light Battalion.

I can buy 5GMBC as a full up medium LAV brigade but I'm still of the view that the light brigade and the medium brigade should be under one divisional headquarters which would become our centre of excellence for OOTW having both a rapid deployment capability and a medium weight follow-up force capability.

No issues with breaking down the Divisions as you suggest.

I'll stay with these two organizations where 3 PPCLI is transformed into a cavalry/strike regiment for the heavy brigade, the recce regiments into cavalry/strike regiments for the light and medium brigades and 3 RCR becomes a multi-disciplinary FSCB battalion under CANSOFCOM.

View attachment 66236
View attachment 66237

Effectively that targets one full-time brigade as the centre of excellence for all things NATO/Europe and two full-time brigades for everything else including OOTW.

As far as TacHel. Leave 1 Wing in Kingston and primarily responsive to 2 Cdn Div for joint training - (With the exception of 408 Sqn in Edmonton-which can continue to support 3 Div-everything else is already in the east.) In the same way the transport wing, 8 Wing in Trenton, can also be primarily responsive to 2 Div for joint training. Of course they respond, as tasked, to CJOC and 1 Div for operations.

3 Div on the other hand should be gaining expertise in all things rail and ship movement (both North America and Europe)

I didn't include Reserve Brigades in my structure but I think we both agree that the units need to be consolidated into Brigades/Battalions that realistically reflect their actual size and capabilities. I think we also agree that the Reserves are potentially a good place to invest in some of those capabilities that are most likely to be required only in a major conflict and focus the full-time PYs on fulfilling the more likely ongoing missions the Army will be asked to participate in.

There are a couple of areas where we disagree however. You would structure your Heavy Brigade using the "Optimal" Battle Group concept with one Tank-heavy combined arms Battalion and two Infantry-heavy combined arms Battalions. I on the other hand believe that a major NATO/Russia military conflict with a full-scale conventional war remains a fairly low probability event. Yes, we should be prepared and equipped to deal with it IF it should come to pass, but I believe that specifically tailoring 1/2 of our Reg Force specifically for that particular mission is a mis-allocation of our limited resources. My proposed structure would have a Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions co-located in Edmonton. There is nothing preventing the Brigade from exercising them in Battle Groups of the configuration you suggest, but in my opinion there is no reason to self-limit our options by formalizing specific force structures for the Battalions.

The other area where we disagree is with your assumptions for the next steps for 2030. I honestly just don't see any hope that the money will be available to transition our Heavy Brigade forces to tracked IFVs and begin equipping our Reserves with IFVs, Tanks, etc.

I also think it's unrealistic to believe that the many structural, monetary and legislative issues that stand in the way of creating an Army Reserve that is capable of fielding operational units any time in the near future. In my opinion it will take a national crisis for there to be the will to make the changes that would be required to make this happen. So I think then it would be folly to base our plans on the assumption that magically this will somehow happen.

Group the Reserve Regiments into Battalions. Provide them with as much cheap, but effective equipment as we can. Get them training together as larger formation. Create better relations between Reserve units and Reg Force units by formalizing relationships between them for augmentation. Create the LAV Training Companies (and Class B positions during the Reg Force exercise season) to better prepare Reservists to augment Reg Force units on deployment. There is lots of room for improvement while we continue to push for more fundamental changes.

 

[CBH99]

Done. This is fixed fairly simply by switching around KevinB's LAV Brigade assignments. Instead of making the isolated Battalion locations the LAV units, make the co-located units the LAV Battalions. Make the Strathconas the Tank Regiment and you have your three flavours of Brigades...Light/Medium/Heavy.

2 Brigade becomes your Light Brigade with 3 x LIBs, 5e Brigade is your Medium Brigade (basically identical to our existing Medium Brigades but I'd still redesign the Armoured Recce Squadrons as I described) and 1 Brigade is your Heavy Brigade with LdSH (tanks) and 2 x LAV Brigades all co-located in Edmonton being your 3 x maneuver units for deployment with 2 PPCLI in Shilo becoming the Regiment's Light Battalion.

No issues with breaking down the Divisions as you suggest.

I didn't include Reserve Brigades in my structure but I think we both agree that the units need to be consolidated into Brigades/Battalions that realistically reflect their actual size and capabilities. I think we also agree that the Reserves are potentially a good place to invest in some of those capabilities that are most likely to be required only in a major conflict and focus the full-time PYs on fulfilling the more likely ongoing missions the Army will be asked to participate in.

There are a couple of areas where we disagree however. You would structure your Heavy Brigade using the "Optimal" Battle Group concept with one Tank-heavy combined arms Battalion and two Infantry-heavy combined arms Battalions. I on the other hand believe that a major NATO/Russia military conflict with a full-scale conventional war remains a fairly low probability event. Yes, we should be prepared and equipped to deal with it IF it should come to pass, but I believe that specifically tailoring 1/2 of our Reg Force specifically for that particular mission is a mis-allocation of our limited resources. My proposed structure would have a Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions co-located in Edmonton. There is nothing preventing the Brigade from exercising them in Battle Groups of the configuration you suggest, but in my opinion there is no reason to self-limit our options by formalizing specific force structures for the Battalions.

The other area where we disagree is with your assumptions for the next steps for 2030. I honestly just don't see any hope that the money will be available to transition our Heavy Brigade forces to tracked IFVs and begin equipping our Reserves with IFVs, Tanks, etc.

I also think it's unrealistic to believe that the many structural, monetary and legislative issues that stand in the way of creating an Army Reserve that is capable of fielding operational units any time in the near future. In my opinion it will take a national crisis for there to be the will to make the changes that would be required to make this happen. So I think then it would be folly to base our plans on the assumption that magically this will somehow happen.

Group the Reserve Regiments into Battalions. Provide them with as much cheap, but effective equipment as we can. Get them training together as larger formation. Create better relations between Reserve units and Reg Force units by formalizing relationships between them for augmentation. Create the LAV Training Companies (and Class B positions during the Reg Force exercise season) to better prepare Reservists to augment Reg Force units on deployment. There is lots of room for improvement while we continue to push for more fundamental changes.
View attachment 66238

Both of your proposals make a lot of sense, even if they differ in slight yet fundamental ways.

I am curious, and I imagine there are a few others who have followed this thread and enjoy reading these proposals who are also curious or at least wondering as we read -

how does the CAF currently deploy heavy vehicles en-masse for deployments or exercises? (Afghanistan being a good example, or Latvia.)


I am under the impression the vehicles are shipped to Montreal by rail, then loaded onto a ship, which then offloads the vehicles/cargo at it’s destination port?

Is this the case for vehicles based out west also? Or would vehicles belonging to units out west be loaded onto a ship in BC?



(Seeing as we are discussing the structure and capabilities of what we want our military to do by 2025, having a firm idea on how these vehicles are physically transported out of the country would help me big time in terms of what types of units are based where.

 

[Kirkhill]

My preference for GR66's solution is the greater emphasis on Light Battalions, which I will continue to offer, provides more flexibility. I have no problem with a 2 Division structure. I have no problem with a heavier brigade with a heavy division support group. Fill yer boots.

But I do prefer GR66's 4 LAV Bn structure with a Prepositioned Kit. and 5 Light Bns. I might settle for 4 Light Bns.

1 Heavy Bde with 2 LAV Bns, an ISR Unit and an MBT Unit. No Probs.
Combine with the Div Suppt Groups and the Cbt Spt Bde under a single deployable Div HQ. No Probs.

Other Div HQ responsible for two Light Brigades each with 2x LIBs and 1x LAV and a Div Spt Bde with a ISR Unit, a Fd Arty Regt and a GS Regt.

TAC Hel to continue in location but with tighter associations with the Light Bdes and a bigger training budget.

LIBs to be properly financed, equipped and trained.

A Div

LAV, LAV, MBT
ISR, Fd Arty, GS Arty,
Cbt Spt Bde

A Nudder Div

LIB, LIB, LAV, TACHEL
LIB, LIB, LAV, TACHEL
ISR, Fd Arty, GS Arty
Cbt Spt Bde, TACHEL

Locations to be sorted out by politicians.

 

[FJAG]

Done. This is fixed fairly simply by switching around KevinB's LAV Brigade assignments. Instead of making the isolated Battalion locations the LAV units, make the co-located units the LAV Battalions. Make the Strathconas the Tank Regiment and you have your three flavours of Brigades...Light/Medium/Heavy.

2 Brigade becomes your Light Brigade with 3 x LIBs, 5e Brigade is your Medium Brigade (basically identical to our existing Medium Brigades but I'd still redesign the Armoured Recce Squadrons as I described) and 1 Brigade is your Heavy Brigade with LdSH (tanks) and 2 x LAV Brigades all co-located in Edmonton being your 3 x maneuver units for deployment with 2 PPCLI in Shilo becoming the Regiment's Light Battalion.

I like this concept much more.

I like the idea of a battle group in Europe albeit at the moment we have a battle group headquarters with a LAV company and a battery and an NSE and some other elements, so your force is bigger than what we are committed to.

I note that your heavy brigade does not have either a recce squadron nor a cavalry squadron. You do have three infantry battalions though and with the tank regiment that makes four manoeuvre battalions. That's why I turned the PYs for the light battalion into a cavalry "bn" that is a combination of recce, infantry, anti-armour and (sometime soon) guided UAV systems. An armoured regiment and two mech infantry battalions (whether pure or mixed combined arms) are sufficient as the manoeuvre elements of a heavy brigade.

No issues with breaking down the Divisions as you suggest.

I didn't include Reserve Brigades in my structure but I think we both agree that the units need to be consolidated into Brigades/Battalions that realistically reflect their actual size and capabilities. I think we also agree that the Reserves are potentially a good place to invest in some of those capabilities that are most likely to be required only in a major conflict and focus the full-time PYs on fulfilling the more likely ongoing missions the Army will be asked to participate in.

Yup. We agree.

There are a couple of areas where we disagree however. You would structure your Heavy Brigade using the "Optimal" Battle Group concept with one Tank-heavy combined arms Battalion and two Infantry-heavy combined arms Battalions. I on the other hand believe that a major NATO/Russia military conflict with a full-scale conventional war remains a fairly low probability event. Yes, we should be prepared and equipped to deal with it IF it should come to pass, but I believe that specifically tailoring 1/2 of our Reg Force specifically for that particular mission is a mis-allocation of our limited resources. My proposed structure would have a Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions co-located in Edmonton. There is nothing preventing the Brigade from exercising them in Battle Groups of the configuration you suggest, but in my opinion there is no reason to self-limit our options by formalizing specific force structures for the Battalions.

Fair enough although the Army already has a history of mixing companies from one battalion into other battalions on deployment so one could easily deploy an infantry heavy combined arms battalion without its tanks and add a rifle company from somewhere else if needed. Whether the brigade is combined arms or the battalions is combined arms is a matter of doctrine that we should settle by design and experimentation. In this respect we should be open to new ideas, new weapon system, new organizations and new TTPs. Regimental traditions be damned.

The other area where we disagree is with your assumptions for the next steps for 2030. I honestly just don't see any hope that the money will be available to transition our Heavy Brigade forces to tracked IFVs and begin equipping our Reserves with IFVs, Tanks, etc.

Understood. The idea is to show asperation. I, like KevinB, do not think that the LAV 6.0 makes a proper IFV for combined arms warfare. Effectively with the proposed structure, for the cost of about one hundred IFVs, you have one fully equipped heavy brigade and can reallocate five companies of LAV 6.0s to the east to provide additional equipment to strengthen the medium force with another battalion plus. In the meantime we bumble along with the LAVs we do have and which are coming on line.

I also think it's unrealistic to believe that the many structural, monetary and legislative issues that stand in the way of creating an Army Reserve that is capable of fielding operational units any time in the near future. In my opinion it will take a national crisis for there to be the will to make the changes that would be required to make this happen. So I think then it would be folly to base our plans on the assumption that magically this will somehow happen.

There are no structural or legislative changes that can't be easily overcome ... if ... we ... develop ... the ... will ... to ... do ... so.

Concentrating/consolidating reserve units is a money saver through removing numerous unnecessary headquarters and their high end staff. There is clearly a cost issue with equipping the reserves but let's face the truth, there is critical equipment needed for the Army as a whole: AD, Anti-armour, armed UAVs, artillery etc etc. At some point money has to be spent on this equipment in any event and if much of it is manned by hybrid units with a large reserve component then there is a substantial annual personnel costs savings. When we talk dollars here, having much of this necessary equipment manned by low cost reservists should make money available for more equipment.

That said, I agree with you that if we haven't seriously addressed this issue in the last seventy years we probably never will and will continue to bumble along the way we do until there is a major crisis by which time it's too late.

This reminds me of my tour with an Italian mountain artillery regiment. The regiment had a core of regular force full-timers but the bulk of the regiment was made up by draftees. I asked the RSM which element of the regiment took the longest time to train and without the bat of an eye he said the mules ... first you had to get a horse and a donkey together in a field, then wait through the natural gestation period of a mule, then wait for it to grow to a useable size and then get it together with a mule driver and train them both how to haul guns up a mountain - all that take years. Draftee 2nd lieutenants and sergeants they could turn out in six months.

If Rumsfeld was right about anything it's that "you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time". Right now, the army that we have has only the equipment for one half of the soldiers that we have. We need a plan to acquire more equipment and to organize and train the people we have on it in a comprehensive way in accordance with whatever doctrine we develop.

Group the Reserve Regiments into Battalions. Provide them with as much cheap, but effective equipment as we can. Get them training together as larger formation. Create better relations between Reserve units and Reg Force units by formalizing relationships between them for augmentation. Create the LAV Training Companies (and Class B positions during the Reg Force exercise season) to better prepare Reservists to augment Reg Force units on deployment. There is lots of room for improvement while we continue to push for more fundamental changes.

That's definitely my target for 2025.

 

[FJAG]

Both of your proposals make a lot of sense, even if they differ in slight yet fundamental ways.

I am curious, and I imagine there are a few others who have followed this thread and enjoy reading these proposals who are also curious or at least wondering as we read -

how does the CAF currently deploy heavy vehicles en-masse for deployments or exercises? (Afghanistan being a good example, or Latvia.)


I am under the impression the vehicles are shipped to Montreal by rail, then loaded onto a ship, which then offloads the vehicles/cargo at it’s destination port?

Is this the case for vehicles based out west also? Or would vehicles belonging to units out west be loaded onto a ship in BC?



(Seeing as we are discussing the structure and capabilities of what we want our military to do by 2025, having a firm idea on how these vehicles are physically transported out of the country would help me big time in terms of what types of units are based where.

Generally through 4th Canadian Movement Control Unit in Montreal which is now part of the Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group.

Operational Support in Canada - Canada.ca

The operational support framework of Canadian Joint Operations Command is designed for maximum flexibility to satisfy widely varying requirements of task forces deployed on continental and expeditionary operations.

www.canada.ca

Just as an example when 2 CMBG from Petawawa was tasked to form a brigade headquarters and battle group for Kabul in 2004, they were just finishing off an exercise in Wainwright Alberta. Personnel and equipment were designated while in Wainwright and designated equipment was moved to Montreal by rail, road convoy and flat bed truck to 4 CMCU where some of it was repacked into shipping containers and the containers and non containerized vehicles were then loaded on a ship to SE Asia where it was received and prepositioned by the Canadian Theatre Activation Team. Troops subsequently flew from Canada to Camp Mirage and from there by Hercules into Kabul where they spent days rooting around shipping containers looking for their gear.

 

[GR66]

Now if only we could figure out how to integrate TACHEL into the scheme....

Question regarding Attack Helicopters vs. Armed Helicopters. Presumably in a peer fight (e.g. Russia) enemy AD systems will preclude using an AH in any type of line-of-site type attack using it's gun systems. Instead, I assume you would use NLOS missile attacks using either a mast-mounted sight on the helicopter itself or by having the targets identified by other units.

Perhaps a cheaper 80% alternative to attack helicopters (because as Canadians that's what we always look for with regard to our military ) we make one of the criteria for any new medium lift helicopter we purchase be that it can be fitted with weapons (including ATGMs) similar to the armed Blackhawk.

 

[Good2Golf]

We could shoot M982 Excalibur.

 

[dapaterson]

We could shoot M982 Excalibur.

View attachment 66245

But what would the recoil do to the CH147?

 

[Kirkhill]

Question regarding Attack Helicopters vs. Armed Helicopters. Presumably in a peer fight (e.g. Russia) enemy AD systems will preclude using an AH in any type of line-of-site type attack using it's gun systems. Instead, I assume you would use NLOS missile attacks using either a mast-mounted sight on the helicopter itself or by having the targets identified by other units.

Perhaps a cheaper 80% alternative to attack helicopters (because as Canadians that's what we always look for with regard to our military ) we make one of the criteria for any new medium lift helicopter we purchase be that it can be fitted with weapons (including ATGMs) similar to the armed Blackhawk.

In a peer fight I would be standing off as far as possible with all our weapons systems. Close with and destroy is the last phase. Not the first phase.

Helicopters I perceive as transport devices. Just like trucks. And just the way I perceive LAVs. Their function is to get troops quickly into blocking positions to constrain enemy movement and to create bases, or even FUPs, from which offensive operations can be undertaken. Ideally offensive operations will be artillery led.

The purpose of transport is to get troops and their gear as quickly as possible, as close as possible, as safely as possible, to the enemy. Heavy emphasis on the "As Possible" bit. Reality intrudes in all operations and, in my opinion, there are no magic solutions, light or heavy, that are not subject to the "As Possible" rule.

Let's just suppose we do get into a punch up with Russia or China. Does anybody really anticipate our LAVs and Leos rolling down the streets or Beijing or Moscow? On the other hand I can foresee opportunities for light forces to whittle away at Russian and Chinese control of Siberia, Xinjiang, Tibet and Afghanistan. Or assisting in the border zones.

In those areas there is more opportunity to pick the fight, the location, the timing and the means.

As a transport system the helicopter should, by all means, have the ability to transport weapons, and to employ them while in transit. I think that arming Utility Helicopters and providing the 80% solution makes more sense than dedicating scarce dollars to specific solutions.

As to the ISR capabilities - apparently the term of art these days is MUM-T (Manned UnManned - Teaming?). Greater reliance on pumping out 40mm drones with 10 km ranges from a hand-held M320 in the cabin of the helo than playing sneak and peek with mast mounted systems.

My sense is that the Army should train and equip to do tasks that make it useful most of the time. It should certainly plan for the peer fight. It should prepare to contribute to that fight as effectively as possible within the scope set by the capabilities we possess at the time.

But nobody can be under any illusion that we will be defeating Russia or China on our own. At least not on their turf.

On the other hand we should be able to do that on our own turf.

The Finns were able to do just that. With light forces.

Edit - and the Vietnamese have beaten the French, the Americans and the Chinese. Maybe we should be taking lessons from them.

 

[Kirkhill]

You know, the more I think about it, why not just get Bell Textron to pump out another couple of hundred cheap Griffons? And perhaps a few dozen Jet Rangers?

In the event it is always about working with what you have. And adjusting your plans to the capabilities of the kit available.