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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Kirkhill said:
The Brits have indeed pulled out of mainland Europe - and have moved definitively to a lighter force equipped with novel technologies, a more dispersed foot print and more reliant on special forces (special being extremely broadly defined).
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I don't know if I'd agree with "lighter force" per se. There has been a significant manpower reduction since 2000 (much more severe than ours which had to equate to unit cuts) Under Army 2020 Refine there were was an armoured division and still is. There are still two "heavy brigades" and a Strike brigade albeit these have been turned into BCTs to make them more self sufficient. The light elements were always a bit of a "mix and match and go" element to start with and have now been "modernized" with some going into "special" categories. Forgive me if after the outcome of Afghanistan I'm not a bit jaded about these new specialties as being designed to meet the problems of the last war. I don't doubt that we'll all stay in the capacity building game to some extent but I do think everyone right now is heavily rethinking the old three-block war/counterinsurgency models to a great extent and in particular their populations' tolerance for sending their boys off to those.
Kirkhill said:
They have retained some heavy capabilities but that seems to be the area in which there is the least amount of investment and the greatest divestment of legacy capabilities.
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The investments in heavy elements is quite robust and don't forget they consider Ajax an investment in heavy. As is Boxer. These are definitely not "light" capabilities and if "medium" they are on the high side of medium. We'll have to wait and see how the whole Ajax issue plays out.

So, while the Brits have reduced the overall side of the Army over the last two decades considerably, their ratio of heavy to light has changed very little.
Kirkhill said:
Tracks are displaced by wheels and wings, both fixed and rotary. Bullets are displaced by missiles.
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I don't buy those assumptions. Each of those has its role and IMHO, even considering our small size, putting all your eggs in one basket or the other is the wrong way to go. Mixing up your light and heavy eggs in one basket isn't the best thing either.

blacktriangle said:
I don't think it can under current conditions. I don't think we will ever deploy a true formed brigade again except under extreme duress (and with extreme delay) I'm also not convinced it would make much of a difference, anyways.
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Extreme duress is why the Army exists. We have three brigades of stuff; why not train and be prepared to use it as such.

Extreme delay is simply a matter of bad planning.
blacktriangle said:
Canada could help to counter some of the unconventional/hybrid operations that adversaries can and would conduct. Both kinetic and non-kinetic.
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Unconventional/hybrid operations are a phase of war (Infanteer can correct me; there's probably an authorized term for it now). But as a phase, there are other phases that follow it. Don't forget that the very term "hybrid" contemplates a mix of unconventional and conventional warfare. Why else would the Russian Army maintain 136 contractor manned Tactical Battalion Groups?

Kirkhill said:
Beyond moral comfort what, in practical terms, is the Canadian Army going to offer the Poles?

And, despite the heavy preponderance of heavy and mech forces, why do the Poles waste effort by retaining two light brigades? With whom the Brits regularly practice.

Yes. We could repeat 4 CMBG and relocate it forward to Poland. At considerable expense and with little practical value and permanently tied.
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Let me see if I have this right. The Poles have 11 heavy or mech brigades and one airborne and one airmobile brigade (a ratio of 5.5 heavy to 1 light) so we should send them something light because they're short on light?

Does their force structure not give us a a hint of what they expect will be needed in this theatre.

And yes. Moral comfort by deploying a credible deterrent force is something allies do. This is why we build military alliances. The key words here are "credible deterrent force". Not a meaningless speed bump.

This whole thing reminds me of President Kennedy's "Moon" speech.
We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, ...
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I'm not saying abandon light for heavy. They're both important. I'm saying NATO is our biggest military gig. And it requires "heavy" and in a serious showdown that means at least a brigade to be meaningful. If you want to bring an anti-little green men capability and airmobile battalion with whizz bang weapons and some form of cyber warfare stuff - bring it too once we finally figure out what we want and how to build it and how to use it. In the meantime stay "heavy", my friend.

🍻
 
In 1951, 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade arrived in Europe, to be succeeded by the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade in 1953, then 2 CIBG in 1955, then 4 CIBG in 1957. In 1959, when 4 CIBG's tour was due to end, a change was made in the reinforcement policy for Germany. Instead of whole brigades rotating every two years, the decision was made to keep 4 CIBG and its associated brigade units in place, instead rotating the major combat elements to Germany every three years.
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The division traces its origins to the activation of Headquarters No. 1 Air Division, Royal Canadian Air Force in Paris, France, on 1 October 1952. Air Division headquarters relocated to Metz, France in April 1953.[10] No. 1 Air Division was established to meet Canada's NATO air defence commitments in Europe. It consisted of four wings of twelve fighter squadrons located at four bases. Two bases were located in France (RCAF Station Marville (No. 1 Wing) and RCAF Station Grostenquin (No. 2 Wing)) and two were located in West Germany (RCAF Station Zweibrücken (No. 3 Wing) and RCAF Station Baden-Soellingen (No. 4 Wing)). ( No. 1 Wing was first located at RCAF North Luffenham, England and was moved to Marville some time after October, 1954). These wings were part of a group of bases which also included U.S. and French installations, all of which came under the jurisdiction of NATO's Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF) which, in turn, was commanded by Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE). Components located in Metz included Air Division Headquarters, an air traffic control centre, a telecommunications centre, a combat operations centre, and a support unit. From 1952 to 1963 the RCAF operated the 30 Air Materiel Base, at RCAF Langar (RAF Langar) in Nottinghamshire. RCAF Langar was Canada's last base in the U.K. and served as a primary supply station for No. 1 Air Division RCAF in Europe.

Canadian squadrons were originally equipped with Canadair Sabre day fighters. One squadron of each wing, however, would be replaced by the all-weather CF-100 in 1956. The Sabre squadrons were replaced by (nuclear) strike/reconnaissance CF-104 Starfighters in 1962.
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Which do we reckon bought Canada more political clout? 27 CIB/4CMBG or 1 Air Div RCAF ?

Which is more flexible and has greater domestic utility as well as forward presence?

And as for the RCN

15x CSC with 32 strike length Mk41 cells = 96 long range precision strike missiles (cruise, ballistic, loitering, hypervelocity.....) from each of five task groups of 3 vessels. And that would still leave 3x 8 NSMs and 2x24 Sea Ceptors for self defence.

What constitutes long range fire support?

WASHINGTON — By 2023, the U.S. Army will have begun delivering a portfolio of strategic, mid-range and short-range fires capabilities that will change the paradigm against near-peer adversaries Russia and China, according to Brig. Gen. John Rafferty, who is in charge of the service’s long-range precision fires modernization effort.

The Army wrapped up a strategic fires study earlier this year that found a gap in the service’s ability to reach enemy targets in the mid-range (about 500-2,000 kilometers), Rafferty told Defense News in a Sept. 4 interview.
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The HIMARS/MLRS system is already exceeding 400 km and the US Army has adopted the SM6 and Tomahawk missiles for the near term Mid-Range missiles (>1000 km). The USMC is also adopting the Tomahawk to revive the GLCM capabilities lost during the Greenham Common era.

I suggest our contribution will be measured not in how many rations we consume but in how many targets we eliminate and how quickly they disappear.
 
FJAG said:
I'm not saying abandon light for heavy. They're both important. I'm saying NATO is our biggest military gig. And it requires "heavy" and in a serious showdown that means at least a brigade to be meaningful.

🍻
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This.

Our CoG should be NATO, of course. And no one takes you seriously, as a nation, unless you (literally) bring out the big guns.
 
And...

Origins

The origins of Royal Navy Field Gun lay in 1899, in the Second Boer War, and in particular the epic 119-day Siege of Ladysmith. As the British Army was besieged by Boer fighters in the garrison town of Ladysmith, Natal, the Royal Navy landed guns from HM Ships Terrible and Powerful to help in the relief of the siege. Special carriages and mountings for these guns had been improvised by Percy Scott, before the Naval Brigade manhandled six field guns each weighing nearly half a metric tonne over rough terrain to assist their opposite numbers of the British Army.

The gallant defenders were helped enormously by the arrival at the last minute, of Captain the Hon Hedworth Lambton of the Naval Brigade with his 280 Blue-Jackets, four 12 pounders and two 4.7 inch guns. After the siege of Ladysmith was finally lifted on 28 Feb 1900, Her Majesty Queen Victoria I sent a telegram: ‘Pray express to the Naval Brigade my deep appreciation of the valuable services they have rendered with their guns'’. Displays of this magnificent feat began in London that year.

History of the Competition

Each year since 1907, this teamwork, leadership, and moral and physical courage has been commemorated in the form of annual Field Gun competitions. In June 1907, what was to become the Inter-Command Competition began in Olympia, between Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. Two months later, on 28 August 1907, the Brickwoods Competition, which was to become the Royal Navy Field Gun Tournament for the Brickwoods Trophy, began for Portsmouth crews. The first winners were the Royal Marines Light Infantry Field Gun Crew from Forton.
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HMS Temeraire | RN Field Gun | Royal Navy

www.royalnavy.mod.uk www.royalnavy.mod.uk
 
1989

1 British Corps[edit]​

The area 1 BR Corps had to defend lay between Hanover to the north and Kassel to the south and extended from the Inner German Border to the Upper Weser Valley. In case of war, the Corps first line of defense would have been a screening force of 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards, 16th/5th The Queen's Royal Lancers and 664 Squadron Army Air Corps, which would have become an ad hoc brigade formation under command of BAOR's Brigadier Royal Armoured Corps. Behind the screening force 1st Armoured and 4th Armoured Division would form up. 3rd Armoured Division was to the rear of the two forward deployed division as reserve. 2nd Infantry Division was to defend the Corps Rear Area and prepare a last line of defence along the Western bank of the Weser river.

NORTHAG wartime structure in 1989 is located in FRG and West Berlin
1 British Corps

1 British Corps
1 Armoured

1 Armoured
7 Armoured

7 Armoured
12 Armoured

12 Armoured
22 Armoured

22 Armoured
3 Armoured

3 Armoured
4 Armoured

4 Armoured
6 Armoured

6 Armoured
33 Armoured

33 Armoured
4 Armoured

4 Armoured
11 Armoured

11 Armoured
20 Armoured

20 Armoured
1 Artillery

1 Artillery
1st British Corps units 1989
Units in italics were based in the UK and would join parent organization upon mobilization

note 1: December 1989.

1st Armoured Division[edit]​

1st Armoured Division was the corps' Northern forward deployed division.

2nd Infantry Division[edit]​

2nd Infantry Division was based in the North East of the United Kingdom and was planned to have joined I British Corps in Germany within 72 hours of mobilization. The division was tasked with defending the Corps Rear Area and prepare a last line of defense along the Western bank of the Weser River. Therefore, the 29th Engineer Brigade was added to the division and was tasked with route maintenance and preparation of defensive positions on the western bank of the Weser River in the Upper Weser Valley.

3rd Armoured Division[edit]​

3rd Armoured Division was the corps' reserve formation.

note 2: units in italics were based in the UK and would join 1st Armoured Division upon mobilization.

4th Armoured Division[edit]​

4th Armoured Division was the Corps' Southern forward deployed division. As the division's area of operation was hilly and woody, 19th Infantry Brigade was added to it.

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The Brits, in accordance with virtually everybody else, including the Americans and the Germans, have downsized, if not eliminated, their heavy forces. Two brigades, with two regiments of Challengers, originally built in 1991 - 30 years ago. 446 were originally ordered. 148 of them are to be retained and upgraded to supply those two regiments.

Disbandment of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) and Royal Air Force Germany (RAFG) in 1994, following the end of the Cold War and the Options for Change defence review in the early 1990s, reduced the strength of the British Armed Forces in Germany by almost 30,000 with just one division (1st Armoured) remaining by the late 1990s,[7] concentrated in North Rhine-Westphalia. The British presence was estimated to have been contributing 1.5 billion euros annually to the German economy in 2004.[7] Following a further spending review, one brigade was withdrawn and Osnabrück Garrison closed in 2009.[8]

Administrative support for British service personnel in Germany and across continental Europe was delegated to United Kingdom Support Command (Germany), (UKSC(G)). The four Army garrisons in Germany were under the direct administrative control of UKSC(G).[1] The General Officer Commanding UKSC(G) also functioned as head of the British Forces Liaison Organisation (Germany), which was responsible for liaising and maintaining relations with German civil authorities.[9]

Under the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, it was decided that British military units would cease to be permanent deployed in Germany by the end of 2019. This led to a scaling down of the British military presence, and a restructuring of command and support structures.[10]

HQ British Forces Germany was formed in January 2012 replacing the UKSC(G) and the Germany Support Group (GSG).[11] Rhine Garrison, which principally comprised HQ British Forces Germany in the Rheindahlen Military Complex and Elmpt Station, also reduced in size; the HQ moved to Bielefeld in July 2013 and other units returned to the UK.[12] The two central garrisons - Gütersloh and Paderborn - combined to form a single "super garrison" called Westfalen Garrison in April 2014.[13]

With the departure of Major General John Henderson in March 2015, the Commanding Officer of British Forces Germany became a brigadier's post, with Brigadier Ian Bell assuming command.[14]

In autumn 2019, British Forces Germany effectively closed,[15] with the last military base handed back to the German Bundeswehr in February 2020.[16] However, some training will still be undertaken in Germany with regard to NATO capability.[17]
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We can contribute another heavy brigade to Europe - to add to those of the frontline states - Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, (Ukraine), Romania and Bulgaria and Turkey if you like. Or, we can figure out some other way to contribute in a timely, effective and welcome manner.
 
Kirkhill said:
The Brits, in accordance with virtually everybody else, including the Americans and the Germans, have downsized, if not eliminated, their heavy forces. Two brigades, with two regiments of Challengers, originally built in 1991 - 30 years ago. 446 were originally ordered. 148 of them are to be retained and upgraded to supply those two regiments.



We can contribute another heavy brigade to Europe - to add to those of the frontline states - Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, (Ukraine), Romania and Bulgaria and Turkey if you like. Or, we can figure out some other way to contribute in a timely, effective and welcome manner.
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You do not need to be heavy to Fight.
I'm admitted lost on the concept of those who feel that a commitment to NATO needs to be a Heavy Bde.

NATO is defensive - if you are willing to play the complex terrain game on the defense - you don't need the heavy armor/IFV assets.
I can guarantee you a Light Strike BN with Javelin (AT) and J model Stingers can put a dent in any attacker using terrain as an asset, add some thermobaric rounds for Mk19 and AT-4 and you can clobber houses too.
Now add Armed UAV's and Deep Strike Capability from Bde - and you have a significantly more lethal force than a bunch of LAV 6.0 and Leo 2A6/7's
 
KevinB said:
You do not need to be heavy to Fight.
I'm admitted lost on the concept of those who feel that a commitment to NATO needs to be a Heavy Bde.
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NATO disagrees with you unfortunately, they have requested a heavy brigade from Canada. Which of course we presently cannot fulfill.
 
MilEME09 said:
NATO disagrees with you unfortunately, they have requested a heavy brigade from Canada. Which of course we presently cannot fulfill.
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Was the answer to NATO, "You can't get blood from a Stone"?

I suspect if the CDN GOV went to NATO and said, we can't give you a Heavy Bde - but we can give you a Light Bde with asskicking gear and a bunch of high level enablers, NATO would pass out from shock and when they wake up gladly accept.

I've seen M1A2's knocked out in Iraq - sure it there where only mobility kills - but they where some single insurgents with advanced anti-armor tools.
 
KevinB said:
Was the answer to NATO, "You can't get blood from a Stone"?

I suspect if the CDN GOV went to NATO and said, we can't give you a Heavy Bde - but we can give you a Light Bde with asskicking gear and a bunch of high level enablers, NATO would pass out from shock and when they wake up gladly accept.

I've seen M1A2's knocked out in Iraq - sure it there where only mobility kills - but they where some single insurgents with advanced anti-armor tools.
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Essentially yes because we do not have heavy IFVs, GBAD, SPG, etc...
 
FJAG said:
I'm not saying abandon light for heavy. They're both important. I'm saying NATO is our biggest military gig. And it requires "heavy" and in a serious showdown that means at least a brigade to be meaningful. If you want to bring an anti-little green men capability and airmobile battalion with whizz bang weapons and some form of cyber warfare stuff - bring it too once we finally figure out what we want and how to build it and how to use it. In the meantime stay "heavy", my friend.

🍻
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I guess the highlighted part is what I'm not sold on. If you're correct (and many will agree with you) that the threat of Russian hard force aggression against our Eastern European allies is the primary military threat that we face, then I get where you are coming from with your focus on heavy forces forward deployed to counter a Russian attack.

I just don't see the traditional Cold War-type scenario playing out. A Russian invasion of a NATO member will trigger a Chapter 5 response and I will contend that a full-scale war between Russia and NATO is unwinnable by Russia without the use of nuclear weapons (and no number of Canadian Brigades/Divisions/Corps will make any difference in that situation). In fighting NATO the Russians face Operation Barbarossa in reverse...invading a more populous enemy with no clear physical final objective as an end goal.

That does not mean that I don't believe there are serious military threats from Russia....just not full-scale invasion of a NATO member. Russia is not stupid. They can count. They don't want full-scale open war with NATO because they know that whatever initial advantage they might have on the battlefield, ultimately they are out manned, out gunned and outclassed economically by NATO. They will ultimately lose.

Their alternative then is to undertake actions which will support their goals without their ending up in a war they cannot win. Frankly I'm more worried about them stirring up discontent among ethnic Russians in the Baltics than I am about Armata tanks surging across the border. What good are Leopard tanks and Javelin missiles against protesting Russo-Latvian citizens? I'm also more concerned about increasingly illiberal governments in places like Hungary and Poland shifting further away from Western ideals and deciding that other illiberal states like Russia have policies more in line with their own thinking than their NATO allies.

We would probably be better off spending the money we'd put into a European-based heavy Brigade Group into economic development in the Baltic States so that the ethnic Russians in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are the happiest, wealthiest ethnic Russians East of the Oder. That way the Russian government would have no wedge to generate discontent in the Baltics...in fact it might even make Russian citizens begin to question their own government.

All that being said, I don't discount the fact that heavy forces MAY be needed at some point. And it might even be in Europe that they are needed. I also understand the importance of clearly signalling to our European allies that we are serious about defending them if they are ever invaded. That's why I don't recommend eliminating our heavy(-ish) forces. I support our role in eFP Latvia and would support pre-positioning the equipment for an additional Battle Group in Europe as a concrete symbol of our commitment.

The reality is that just like during the Cold War, the majority of the actual combat by Canadian troops will not be against Russian (or Chinese) invaders of the West. It will be in developing world countries supporting pro-Western forces against pro-Russian/Chinese forces. Armoured Brigades may not be as useful in those conflicts as lighter forces. NATO in my opinion (at least in terms of direct defence of Europe against Russian invasion vs broader coalition defence of our collective interests worldwide) is NOT our biggest military gig.
 
KevinB said:
You do not need to be heavy to Fight.
I'm admitted lost on the concept of those who feel that a commitment to NATO needs to be a Heavy Bde.

NATO is defensive - if you are willing to play the complex terrain game on the defense - you don't need the heavy armor/IFV assets.
I can guarantee you a Light Strike BN with Javelin (AT) and J model Stingers can put a dent in any attacker using terrain as an asset, add some thermobaric rounds for Mk19 and AT-4 and you can clobber houses too.
Now add Armed UAV's and Deep Strike Capability from Bde - and you have a significantly more lethal force than a bunch of LAV 6.0 and Leo 2A6/7's
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Counterattacks are part of a defence. A light Strike battalion (whatever that turns out to be once everyone finishes fiddling with it) is not the force to do that.

A combined arms battalion with Javelins and Stingers with some thermobarics, AT-4, armed UAVs and deep strike capability (by which I presume you are talking indirect fire support can do all that too AND can counterattack which your lighter force can't.

I think one has to keep in mind that the brigade has been and remains a "close combat" force. Its primary weapons operate within limited ranges unless you add manoeuvre. Even if you upgrade a CS artillery regiment's range capabilities, the deep battle it might participate in is not the BCT's battle but that of other formations assigned specifically to the deep battle. Some of those may be specialized forms of BCTs (such as the UK Deep Strike Brigade) others may be lay-behind special forces or satellite ISR systems or passive/active sensor systems directing deep strike missiles etc, etc. Quite frankly we don't know what shape those organizations will be yet. Just for the fun of it, here's a fairly recent US publication about the Army's thoughts on BCT's Cross-domain Manoeuvre concepts. They see utility in all forms of BCTs and I'm sure as future weapon system mature these roles will be refined.

BCTs conduct cross-domain maneuver primarily in the Close Area, that portion of the MDO operational framework where friendly and enemy formations, forces, and systems are in imminent physical contact and will contest for control of physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive space in support of campaign objectives.17 As part of the Joint Force, airborne- and air assault-capable InfantryBCTs(IBCT) contribute to forcible entry operations. Airborne-capable IBCTs are unique in that they have the capability to be projected and delivered over strategic distances into the Deep Maneuver Area to surprise an enemy force, seize a lodgment, and gain the initiative. Armored BCTs (ABCT) and Stryker BCTs (SBCT) may also be used to defeat an enemy’s A2/AD capabilities Cross-domain maneuver is the synchronization and employment of forces and capabilities through movement in combination with converged lethal and nonlethal capabilities across multiple domains, the EMS, and the IE. Cross-domain maneuver creates synergistic effects in the physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive realms that increase relative combat power and provide the overmatch necessary to destroy or defeat enemy forces, control land areas and resources, and protect populations. AFC Pam 71-20-2 10 when employed from offset objectives, creating multiple dilemmas for the enemy. BCTs also operate in the tactical support area where they conduct area security
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Let me add one thing. There's no such thing as a "light" airborne or "light" air mobile force. The delivered portion might be "light" but the delivery means are very heavy, very complex, tremendously expensive and very vulnerable. Without those delivery system you are not only "light" but also "practically static".

I've never argued that there isn't a role for the type of forces you and others suggest; I'm merely saying that the argument that one doesn't need heavy systems is a fallacy. It was a fallacy when we designed our Future Force in 2000-2003. We quickly learned in combat against a very unsophisticated but resourceful enemy that suddenly we needed to heavyize our force with modern precision artillery, tanks and much heavier double hulled LAVs that almost rank up there with IFVs.

Things are changing, yes they are, but things have been changing since the end of WW2 and there hasn't been a decade where some new weapon development hasn't resulted in a flurry of pundits announcing the death of the tank (and by association "heavy" forces) and yet they are still here and, at least in the US Army's eyes, will be around for quite a while yet.

🍻
 
www.forbes.com

Army Signals The Abrams Tank Is Here To Stay

The Abrams tank is destined to outlive many of the warfighting systems that appeared following its debut in 1980.
www.forbes.com www.forbes.com

The Army has leveraged these emerging technologies to upgrade Abrams capabilities several times, resulting in the latest version, officially designated M1A2SEPV4.

What that nomenclature indicates is that today’s Abrams is the A2 upgrade of the original version, incorporating a “system enhancement package” now approaching its fourth iteration.

The centerpiece of the latest variant is a third-generation “forward looking infrared” sensor system that enables the tank crew to detect, identify and target hostile forces at greater range with greater precision—even in the presence of obscurants such as smoke and fog.

The system integrates passive signals from two different infrared frequencies to deliver high-fidelity color resolution, which when combined with the tank’s sophisticated fire control computer virtually guarantees a kill of any enemy within range.

However, that idea of being “within range” is about to undergo a transformation, because the next variant of Abrams after V4 will likely be part of a resilient tactical network that can see threats dozens of kilometers away, and loitering tank rounds with pop-out wings will enable the tank to engage those targets.

The next iteration of Abrams may also have 360-degree situational awareness thanks to a new generation of sensors, reactive armor that defeats incoming antitank rounds both kinetically and non-kinetically (through jamming), and an autoloader for its main gun that removes crew from the turret and thus allows a weight-saving reduction in armor.

Saving weight is important, because at over 60 tons, the Abrams can’t use all the bridges and other infrastructure in places where it may need to fight.

Composite armor of the kind Abrams carries provides great protection, but it makes the tank heavier than any other vehicle in the joint arsenal.

Reducing weight, which probably requires taking a crew member out of the turret, would enhance the flexibility of the vehicle in combat.

The Army and General Dynamics (a contributor to my think tank) are considering a raft of other potential upgrades to Abrams—everything from hybrid electric drive to controlling robotic vehicles on the battlefield.

As the digital revolution unfolds, the array of options for further improving Abrams is nearly endless.

And the pool of potential customers may be too: Taiwan has recently confirmed plans to buy over a hundred of the tanks, and Poland looks poised to do the same thing.

Other countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific may do likewise.

So if you thought the era of tank warfare was drawing to a close, you might want to revisit that assumption.

The Army’s main battle tank is becoming more versatile than anyone could have imagined when it debuted in 1980, and the return of great-power military rivalry has reminded planners that there are some missions only a tank can accomplish.
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The Abrams tank thus is destined to outlive many of the other battlefield innovations that have appeared in the years since it first saw service.
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Except that by that time it will be differently armed, differently armoured, differently powered and differently employed with or without a crew and be lighter. But it will still be a tank.

Just like Conservatives are liberal and Liberals are democrats. It gets awfully hard to keep up with the definitions in a world where words matter so much.
 
KevinB said:
You do not need to be heavy to Fight.
I'm admitted lost on the concept of those who feel that a commitment to NATO needs to be a Heavy Bde.

NATO is defensive - if you are willing to play the complex terrain game on the defense - you don't need the heavy armor/IFV assets.
I can guarantee you a Light Strike BN with Javelin (AT) and J model Stingers can put a dent in any attacker using terrain as an asset, add some thermobaric rounds for Mk19 and AT-4 and you can clobber houses too.
Now add Armed UAV's and Deep Strike Capability from Bde - and you have a significantly more lethal force than a bunch of LAV 6.0 and Leo 2A6/7's
Click to expand...

That all sounds good until you realize what we'd be up against from the opposition's indirect fire assets.

For example:

 
FJAG said:
Let me add one thing. There's no such thing as a "light" airborne or "light" air mobile force. The delivered portion might be "light" but the delivery means are very heavy, very complex, tremendously expensive and very vulnerable. Without those delivery system you are not only "light" but also "practically static".
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A salient point. I recall seeing somewhere (I'd have to dig deeper to confirm) that a US Aviation Brigade to support an IBCT took more connectors to deploy than an ABCT.
 
daftandbarmy said:
That all sounds good until you realize what we'd be up against from the opposition's indirect fire assets.

For example:

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FJAG said:
Counterattacks are part of a defence. A light Strike battalion (whatever that turns out to be once everyone finishes fiddling with it) is not the force to do that.

A combined arms battalion with Javelins and Stingers with some thermobarics, AT-4, armed UAVs and deep strike capability (by which I presume you are talking indirect fire support can do all that too AND can counterattack which your lighter force can't.

I think one has to keep in mind that the brigade has been and remains a "close combat" force. Its primary weapons operate within limited ranges unless you add manoeuvre. Even if you upgrade a CS artillery regiment's range capabilities, the deep battle it might participate in is not the BCT's battle but that of other formations assigned specifically to the deep battle. Some of those may be specialized forms of BCTs (such as the UK Deep Strike Brigade) others may be lay-behind special forces or satellite ISR systems or passive/active sensor systems directing deep strike missiles etc, etc. Quite frankly we don't know what shape those organizations will be yet. Just for the fun of it, here's a fairly recent US publication about the Army's thoughts on BCT's Cross-domain Manoeuvre concepts. They see utility in all forms of BCTs and I'm sure as future weapon system mature these roles will be refined.



Let me add one thing. There's no such thing as a "light" airborne or "light" air mobile force. The delivered portion might be "light" but the delivery means are very heavy, very complex, tremendously expensive and very vulnerable. Without those delivery system you are not only "light" but also "practically static".

I've never argued that there isn't a role for the type of forces you and others suggest; I'm merely saying that the argument that one doesn't need heavy systems is a fallacy. It was a fallacy when we designed our Future Force in 2000-2003. We quickly learned in combat against a very unsophisticated but resourceful enemy that suddenly we needed to heavyize our force with modern precision artillery, tanks and much heavier double hulled LAVs that almost rank up there with IFVs.

Things are changing, yes they are, but things have been changing since the end of WW2 and there hasn't been a decade where some new weapon development hasn't resulted in a flurry of pundits announcing the death of the tank (and by association "heavy" forces) and yet they are still here and, at least in the US Army's eyes, will be around for quite a while yet.

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Infanteer said:
A salient point. I recall seeing somewhere (I'd have to dig deeper to confirm) that a US Aviation Brigade to support an IBCT took more connectors to deploy than an ABCT.
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I don't know about you guys - but the one thing I learned in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last 20 years - is next war, I am so being an insurgent.
Nice weather - meh I am going to the beach
Crappy weather - I am off to setup an EFP or snipe someone - as the enemy Helicopters and UAV's don't work too well in sandstorms etc.

I would prepare for defense in depth - and bleed out the opponent. The Light Force is there to deter - not to launch counter attacks into defensive positions. Layback/Staybehind missions and partisan link ups used to be a CF Infantry task/skill - it doesn't take a dude with a dinner plate to organize -- I don't see that as a SOF specific mission -- larger CW yes - but anyone with some experience in Afghan and Iraq can see how to exploit conventional forces - in a non conventional way.

If you are put into a ring with a championship boxer -- you don't box him for you will lose, you fight dirty and mean, and use things he won't expect. "The only fair fight, is the one you win"

I am not against Heavy Forces -- I just don't see the interest in the CF to pony up for them, and I do see the fact that Canada can save face by showing up early with well equipped light forces.

In 72hrs you could get the majority of a Light Bde anyway in the world with Canada's current fleet of available aircraft.

One should not view Light Forces as mobile by Mk1 Combat Boot - sure the boot may be the first method to get into position - but there has to be mobility options for the Force.
The Light doesn't "Need" the Aviation Support, or other vehicles - they sure as heck help - but in terms of occupying initial ground - they are not required - the Bde Assets are needed (AD, AT, Deep Fire etc).
The supporting assets can arrive in follow on chalks, and so can heavier forces.

I don't see Canada being able to move 1/10th of a Medium (let alone heavy) force anywhere in the world in 144hrs.

You go to war with the forces you have, not the ones you want to have -- so either you preposition a ton of equipment worldwide -- or you accept that to arrive "in time" you need to either have a vastly expanded Transport Wing(s) of the RCAF - or tailor the force to what you can get there quickly with what you have in terms of planes.
 
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