Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

I promised myself to stay off this forum for a few days so that I could finally get some book writing and model railroading done, but I'm just too much of a sucker for this thread.

I am not against Heavy Forces -- I just don't see the interest in the CF to pony up for them, and I do see the fact that Canada can save face by showing up early with well equipped light forces.

In 72hrs you could get the majority of a Light Bde anyway in the world with Canada's current fleet of available aircraft.

I'm sure that I'd disagree because not all of our aircraft are up and available at any given time and even a light brigade needs some key gear and if one is talking the whole light brigade then there's actually a fair amount of equipment in the various headquarters and the tail involved.

But, assuming you are correct then it would be even easier to get a heavy brigade deployed if its gear was prepositioned and only people have to move because both brigades have roughly the same number of folks.

One should not view Light Forces as mobile by Mk1 Combat Boot - sure the boot may be the first method to get into position - but there has to be mobility options for the Force.
The Light doesn't "Need" the Aviation Support, or other vehicles - they sure as heck help - but in terms of occupying initial ground - they are not required - the Bde Assets are needed (AD, AT, Deep Fire etc).
The supporting assets can arrive in follow on chalks, and so can heavier forces.

That puts you well outside the 72 hours envelope then.

I don't see Canada being able to move 1/10th of a Medium (let alone heavy) force anywhere in the world in 144hrs.

You go to war with the forces you have, not the ones you want to have -- so either you preposition a ton of equipment worldwide -- or you accept that to arrive "in time" you need to either have a vastly expanded Transport Wing(s) of the RCAF - or tailor the force to what you can get there quickly with what you have in terms of planes.

Probably the only quote of Rumsfeld I'm one hundred percent on board with. Particulalry from the point of view that if Canada had at least one "heavy" brigade it could still choose to deploy it as a "medium" or "light" brigade if circumstances demanded that. On the other hand, if you do not have a "heavy" brigade in peacetime then you will never be able to form, train and deploy it in any reasonable time frame whatsoever. That capability is gone for years, period.

That's what we saw happening in 2000. We could have put our heavy gear "into reserve" and dedicate a small core of full-time folks to keeping up the essential skills and leading and training reservists while keeping it maintained but the euphoria of creating an "agile and relevant future force" tuned to the new order of operating in failed states overcame common sense and we divested and divested and divested to save a few bucks here and there.

Yup. That Rumsfeld quote is the very reason I keep arguing so strongly that we need to maintain a portion of the force as a "heavy" one and my argument has always been that because it is less likely needed on a day-to-day basis it should be a smaller full-time portion than the "light" and "medium" force and heavily weighted towards one manned in large part by a reformed and revitalized reserve force.

If there's one lesson from Arnhem that's worth remembering it's what happens to a "light" forward deployed force when there's no "heavy" force to back them up on the ground.

 

[daftandbarmy]

If there's one lesson from Arnhem that's worth remembering it's what happens to a "light" forward deployed force when there's no "heavy" force to back them up on the ground.

Unless you need a 'sacrificial bunt' type of manoeuvre, of course

 

[Kirkhill]

A salient point. I recall seeing somewhere (I'd have to dig deeper to confirm) that a US Aviation Brigade to support an IBCT took more connectors to deploy than an ABCT.

A very salient point. And one that got me wondering about the inclusion of the UK's Combat Aviation Brigade Combat Team with its Global Response Force as it patently couldn't deploy rapidly in support of 16 Air Assault Brigade.

On the other hand Europe is part of the globe (not being facetious) and the CABCT can self-deploy it helicopters across the UK and continental Europe while its support personnel and vehicles deploy by RAF Chinooks, Hercs, A400s and C17s. On those grounds I felt that the CABCT was a better fit for the UK's eurocentric heavy 3rd div, adding to its two Heavy BCTs and its Deep Strike Recce BCT. In fact one multi-squadron regiment of Wildcats and Apaches does seem to be focused on that task,

But if the CABCT were a purely army asset then it would not recognize the value that the same assets have when deployed afloat in support of the RN and its Royal Marines. The RN's fleet makes the helicopters of the CABCT and the RAF a truly global response asset. The helicopters get the support and transport they need from the fleet's ships. Both the Big Honking variety and the Surface Combatants.

As to the Air Manouevre Brigade Combat Team, essentially the air deployable light infantry force assigned to the Global Response Force, it can be deployed by the RAF's fixed wing transport globally both in opposed and non-opposed environments. It can also be deployed with the Royal Marines on RN ships. Or it can be deployed and supported intra-theatre in Europe by both RAF fixed and rotary wing assets, the Chinooks, Hercs, A400s and C17s. Again, like the CABCT with whom it will find itself co-operating globally, in Europe it could deploy as an independent BCT or a reinforced BCT or as a mobile reserve for 3 UK Div resulting in 3 UK DIV comprising:

Div HQ
Div Log
7 Air Defence Gp
2x HBCT (Challengers and Boxers)
1x Deep Strike Recce BCT (Arty Brigade)
1x Combat Aviation Bde (Wildcats and Apaches)
1x Air Mobile Brigade (Paras, Gurkhas, Yorks, Chinooks, Hercs, A400s, C17s)

All of which take centre stage under NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps commanded and supported by the UK Army.

An Army backed up by the RN/RM Littoral Strike Groups in the Baltic, the RN's surface and subsurface assets with its guns, missiles and ICBMs, and by everything the RAF has available for sense, strike and support. The RN and the RAF also supply air defence.

I would love to see Canada commit to defence in the same way the UK and Singapore and Australia do. I believe we can afford it. But I am in the minority. As is virtually everybody reading this.

I believe that we can afford to supply all those capabilities the UK can. And I think we should. But, again, I am in the minority.

The reason I am in the minority is, in large part, strategic distance. Most Canadians don't perceive a threat and don't perceive a need for the capability. And that same strategic distance makes it a costly endeavour to both deploy forces and to sustain them once deployed. And Canadians understand the benefits of Child Tax Credits rather than those of a Forward Defence.

So I am trying to find ways to work within the constraints set by my fellow taxpayers.

They don't "Grok" heavy brigades in Poland and Latvia.

They, apparently, do "Grok" helicopters, aircraft and trucks loaded with soldiers and supplies in snowstorms, icestorms, floods and forest fires, or when the water plant breaks down.

From my perspective that is great news because those things that they want are precisely the things that will create a globally deployable force. Because Halifax is closer to London and the Caribbean than it is to Vancouver and Alert the same assets that allow the CAF to deploy to Vancouver and Alert to react to domestic crises would allow it to deploy to Europe and the Caribbean. And if it could deploy a brigade to Europe then it can add to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, to 3 UK Div or even to the RN/RM forces for global deployment. And the Canadian element can be as large or small, as heavy or light, as we like and our taxpayers will permit.

In the meantime our taxpayers seem to be a lot more tolerant of the dollars spent on the out-of-sight-out-of-mind RCN/RCAF/CANSOFCOM which operate domestically and globally everyday in peace and war. That is an area that I would fully exploit and ensure that all platforms were fully supplied with the full range of offensive capabilities. And that means buying lots and lots of missiles for the CSCs, the F18s and the CP140s, as well as for P8s, F35s and JUSTAS UAS's when and if.

I would also exploit the "unarmed" RCN - its AOPS, it MCDVs and the Asterix (with or without Obelix and the JSS's) for their ability to "rescue" Canadians. Vancouver, Victoria, Prince Rupert, St John's, Nain, Iqaluit, Inuvik, Churchill, Rankin, Resolute and Alert all need to know that when they get into trouble they can be rescued by the government. And that they have continual support. And that support requires the heavy logistic commitment that could also be applied globally.

We keep focusing on what we want to deploy and stumbling over the lack of logistical support. We should be focusing on selling the logistical support to the domestic market. That is the growth opportunity. And that is the group of key enablers in which we are most deficient. It is also the group of key enablers that the government could fund out of regional support, public safety and international aid. Not National Defence. Although they would be available to National Defence and the CAF to support their domestic and international operations.

By off loading those logistics (and some domestic surveillance and comms needs) then the taxpayers might permit the defence budget to be refocused to meet their low expectations while still permitting us to create effective offensive and defensive capabilities.

Like Kevin and GR66 I am not against Heavy Forces and especially not against Combat Aviation, which I consider to be an extremely versatile and useful Heavy Force, once it is in theatre, with very heavy logistical support requirements. I am just trying to figure out how to do the best we can with the purse, and constraints, given to us by our fellow taxpayers.

Slainte mhor to all.

 

[Kirkhill]

I promised myself to stay off this forum for a few days so that I could finally get some book writing and model railroading done, but I'm just too much of a sucker for this thread.

I'm sure that I'd disagree because not all of our aircraft are up and available at any given time and even a light brigade needs some key gear and if one is talking the whole light brigade then there's actually a fair amount of equipment in the various headquarters and the tail involved.

But, assuming you are correct then it would be even easier to get a heavy brigade deployed if its gear was prepositioned and only people have to move because both brigades have roughly the same number of folks.

That puts you well outside the 72 hours envelope then.

Probably the only quote of Rumsfeld I'm one hundred percent on board with. Particulalry from the point of view that if Canada had at least one "heavy" brigade it could still choose to deploy it as a "medium" or "light" brigade if circumstances demanded that. On the other hand, if you do not have a "heavy" brigade in peacetime then you will never be able to form, train and deploy it in any reasonable time frame whatsoever. That capability is gone for years, period.

That's what we saw happening in 2000. We could have put our heavy gear "into reserve" and dedicate a small core of full-time folks to keeping up the essential skills and leading and training reservists while keeping it maintained but the euphoria of creating an "agile and relevant future force" tuned to the new order of operating in failed states overcame common sense and we divested and divested and divested to save a few bucks here and there.

Yup. That Rumsfeld quote is the very reason I keep arguing so strongly that we need to maintain a portion of the force as a "heavy" one and my argument has always been that because it is less likely needed on a day-to-day basis it should be a smaller full-time portion than the "light" and "medium" force and heavily weighted towards one manned in large part by a reformed and revitalized reserve force.

If there's one lesson from Arnhem that's worth remembering it's what happens to a "light" forward deployed force when there's no "heavy" force to back them up on the ground.

But FJAG I think the key words separating us are would-could-should-if.

I can agree we should have kept the Leo 1's in running condition. With new technology they could be more effective. They could be lighter and deployable by air in troop numbers by C17s and, IF we had them, by squadron numbers by A400Ms. But we didn't keep them. We didn't upgrade them and we didn't buy A400s.

So we were forced to go on the open market for 100 used tanks that the Dutch and Germans were divesting and ended up with a mixed fleet of 20x A6Ms, 20x A4Ms and 42x A4s. Some of them are the best equipped Leo2s in the world. Some, or all, of them, still have some 1970s technology systems on board. The logistics on that don't feel good. Let alone the specialist fleet of support variants for the EME and Eng types or the fact that they are separated by strategic distances in isolated packets across Canada. Which squadron do you want to preposition? The A4s are the only ones you could train on realistically in Canada so that the troopers could drop into the seats in Latvia.

I can agree we should have kept the M109 and tracked the American Paladin/A7/ELRC programmes. But we didn't and now we have to go buy new/used ones and their support and figure out how to deploy and use them all over again (our old drills won't work on the new kit).

Just like the Chinooks which we should also have kept and had to reacquire, in larger numbers.

I can agree we should also have held on to the M113s, even the Lynxs and Ferrets could have come in handy. We should have bought the 400 Bv206s. The Bisons should have been retained for the Militia. The mortars should have been retained when we bought the GMGs. The ADATs and Skyshield and Javelins should have been retained. The Milans should have been bought instead of the Eryx. They should have been replace by the Javelin or the Spike ATGMs. The Carl Gustav should have been upgraded to the A4 model with the Canadian designed CDC sights and a full slate of ammunition produced under licence in Montreal.

I can agree with you on all of that. But those decisions were made and we come up short on dam near everything. So yes, I like the idea of the Heavy, Medium, Light mix under a divisional structure with a full slate of divisional assets and a properly equipped and trained reserve force but I just don't see that happening with the budget, or the man-power given to us.

And the manpower is probably the biggest hurdle, even more than the budget.

The Canadian Armed Forces is comprised of approximately 68,000 Regular Force and 27,000 Reserve Force members, increasing to 71,500 and 30,000 respectively under Strong, Secure, Engaged − Canada's defence policy, as well as 5,200 Ranger Patrol Group members

68,000 full timers

Based on most evidence available, including the CBO primer and the UK white paper only 25% of those are going to be engaged in combat brigades, wings and naval task forces.

That means a total man-power supply of 17,000 full time personnel to man the frigates, the MCDVs, the AOPVs, the JSSs, the SSKs, the CF-18s, the CP140s, the CC130s, the C17s, the CH146s, 147s, 148s and 149s, as well as 3 CMBGs and a Divisional Support Group and CANSOFCOM.

17,000 people to man the Permanent Active Militia.

The other 51,000 are supposedly there to ensure that the Militia, both Permanent Active and Sedentary, are properly supported, trained and organized.

If there is one gross error it is that those 51,000 have been allowed to neglect their obligations to organizing the rest of their taxpaying citizens into a proper Home Guard designed to manage crises, of all sorts, and not just to fill the occasional hole in mythic Permanent Active Corps.

The target body for the 51,000 is not the 17,000 of the Permanent Active Militia but the approximately 17,000,000 men and women of military ages (16 to 60). Those are the people that are relying on the government to have a plan in place to employ them when things go pear-shaped in Canada.

There is a bunch of stuff I think we coulda woulda shoulda and that if but - but here we are.

So how do we get out of it?

I think we can't afford both a proper divisional support group of key enablers and a proper, modern heavy armoured team. I don't think our government will support both and probably not either. But I do think there is productive work to be done with what we have in terms of kit, people and dollars.

Cheers again FJAG.

 

[KevinB]

Yup. That Rumsfeld quote is the very reason I keep arguing so strongly that we need to maintain a portion of the force as a "heavy" one and my argument has always been that because it is less likely needed on a day-to-day basis it should be a smaller full-time portion than the "light" and "medium" force and heavily weighted towards one manned in large part by a reformed and revitalized reserve force.

This is where I can't see it working.
Sure Reserve units can be GIB's - but maintenance and training on Heavy gear is both time and $.
Pre-positioned gear needs a robust infrastructure to ensure it is ready - and the crews need to be at 100% for it they do a flyover they need to be ready to roll as soon as they are wheels down.

The other issue is - at least with a jump capable force - you can always drop some of it to secure your airhead - it allows for a lot more flexibility in reactive positioning - than needing to go to fixed spot - and gather gear.

Honestly to be properly prepared you need both options available - and they can mutually support - with the Light securing the area and then a relief in place occurs - and the Light forces can do more dispersed annoying Light things

If there's one lesson from Arnhem that's worth remembering it's what happens to a "light" forward deployed force when there's no "heavy" force to back them up on the ground.

Agreed - but that is why a 'Light' unit isn't just a bunch of Infantry guys out for a walk.



I think in the ideal world - the CF would have at LEAST 1 Heavy Div - and 2 Light (Medium capable) Div's
Unless the budget gets a major plus up I don't see that happening.

So the question comes back to what can you do with the money you have?

I just don't think 70 some odd Leo2's is a credible background for a Heavy Force, and the LAV 6.0 definitely is not a Heavy IFV -- it has ZERO Anti Tank Capability. At the very least it needs a ATGM system if it wants to play Heavy IFV.

 

[Good2Golf]

Unless you need a 'sacrificial bunt' type of manoeuvre, of course

Like Dieppe?

 

[Kirkhill]

Like Dieppe?

Hong Kong?

 

[Kirkhill]

And speaking of Hong Kong.....

Global Britain has despatched two unprovocative, "unarmed" lowly OPVs to carry the Union flag throughout the Indo-Pacific. These two vessels seeking innocent passage among Global Britain's trading partners are named for two rivers. One of them, the Spey, is a river on the east coast of Scotland better known for the whiskeys of Glenlivet, Glefiddich, Cardhu, Dufftown and Macallan. It it also the heart of 45 Commando's recruiting area.

The other ship, the other river, is more interesting. It is the river that divides the foreigners of Cornwall from the decent Saxon English of Devon. It flows through the city of Plymouth and the Royal Naval Base of Devonport. Devonport is the home of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, in particular 42 Commando.

So, seeking innocent passage in the South China Seas we have HMS Spey, associated with Scotland, Whiskey and the Royal Marines accompanying HMS Tamar associated with England, Drake, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines.

HMS Tamar, like many other British ships, is not the first of that name. She has a predecessor. The earlier "HMS Tamar, was a 3,650 ton British troopship laid down in 1862[5] and launched in 1863."

"In 1897 HMS Tamar arrived in Victoria City, Hong Kong on 11 April [1] She was stationed permanently in the harbour from 1897 to 1941, when she was scuttled during the Battle of Hong Kong during World War II, to avoid being used by the invading Japanese Imperial forces." However HMS Tamar continued in use from 1945 to 1997 as the Hong Kong Shore Station.

HMS Tamar doused her colours on July 1, 1997.

But now she is back. Flying the Union flag and the White Ensign in the South China Seas. Accompanied by a Scots boat from the Whisky Trail.

I can only hope that there is an Astute or Trafalgar in company.

 

[blacktriangle]

As others have pointed out, we currently lack the resources to be truly "heavy", and there appears to be an aversion to going "light".

Given the ongoing investment in the LAV 6.0, I would suggest that a medium weight Cavalry force is probably what we can provide at this time. I think it was Tango2Bravo that suggested providing a Cavalry BG for another NATO formation. I think that is doable, especially if we address some of the most glaring capability deficiencies. You could provide that, and still set aside enough resources and personnel to form a high-readiness Light Inf BG for global/territorial response.

Regardless of what force "weight" one favours, there's still something critical missing - a backbone of firepower & technological enablers.

 

[FJAG]

Oh God my day is blown again isn't it. Luckily I got some pool maintenance in.

But FJAG I think the key words separating us are would-could-should-if.

Just an aside, the Leo C1s had just come off a recent rebuild, the M109s were still capable (and would still be today) and I think we still have the TLAVs. The Leo C1s were suitable as a stopgap in Afghanistan but their lack of IED resistance was a problem. The M109s didn't have the "precision fire" capability that modernists were looking for. Both systems were eminently suitable for a reserve training role and even certain levels of combat operations. TLAVs from the '60s are still running around the world in their 10s of thousands.

The issue is nothing more or less that maintenance ... and that is nothing more or less than a question of full-time PY allocation priorities. The money is there for the people and the spare parts -- IF -- its not used up for administrative overhead and other things. We would rather put 4,000 Class B's to work in headquarters shuffling paper around then allocating a 1,000 of those PYs or Class Bs on turning wrenches - and I doubt we actually need that many in the Army although the Air Force and Navy could all use a few.

You are right though. It is a matter of would-could-should. An right now we do have 100 Leo 2 gun tanks, and we do have six battalions of LAV 6.0s and getting another 400+ support LAVs. We also still have all those Bisons and TLAVs kicking around which someone will undoubtedly want to dispose of. As junior NCO I was taught to think of "must knows, should knows, and could knows". I consider financial allocation within DND as "must dos, should dos, and could dos". Since DNDs aim is to be an organization that can bring violence to bear in an emergency then the "must do" is to build a well rounded capable force that can react to a full-spectrum of threats.

Abandoning necessary capabilities due to full-time manpower restrictions when you have tens of thousands of unequipped and poorly trained reservists makes absolutely zero sense to me.

Spending half of DND's annual budget on personnel costs when even critical front -line equipment can't be maintained makes zero sense to me.

And having an Army that presents three poor options for reorganizing itself but which in each option ensures that useless div hqs are maintained (even adding one in one case) while complaining that we are short of trainers makes zero sense to me.

So how do we get out of it?

I think we can't afford both a proper divisional support group of key enablers and a proper, modern heavy armoured team. I don't think our government will support both and probably not either. But I do think there is productive work to be done with what we have in terms of kit, people and dollars.

It's really just a game of personnel numbers and equipment. With 40,000 plus Reg F and Res F personnel we easily have the numbers. It becomes problematic if decade after decade you continue to segregate the force with very minor exceptions (Class Bs filling into HQs and RSS bolstering reserve units) You are absolutely right though. If we continue to ignore the true potential of a reserve force then we do not have the numbers. We absolutely need to apply Gibbs Rule # 5 - "Don't waste good!"

There are new and essential weapon systems coming on line which we will have to incorporate. There wont be a choice. As long as we keep dividing the force the way that we do we will continue to have to give up Reg F capabilities in order to generate the PYs for them (just like we did with infantry mortars, half of our artillery and all of our air defence)

Just as a thought. Take the existing tanks, two battalions of existing LAV6.0s, leave them 105mmC3s for the time being and some TLAVs, TAPVs and a good bit of a service battalion and 300 maintainers and maybe 500 trainer/operators/leaders. Form a reserve brigade around that using 4,000 reservists and the 500 RSS they already have. The annual cost to operate that brigade will go down by 70% per year on Reg F PYs alone. The equipment wear and tear will be reduced as will annual operating costs for fuel and ammo (And yes we need to sharpen up the Res F system but we should have done that decades ago.) That will leave you an armoured brigade in reserve that you can fall back to if and when needed and give you close to 4,000 PYs that you can reallocate to new weapon systems (like GBAD, loitering munitions, ISR and Cyber operators, you name it) as enablers to a brigade or division and still leave you a Reg F light and medium brigade to do whatever day-to-day things need doing.

This is where I can't see it working.
Sure Reserve units can be GIB's - but maintenance and training on Heavy gear is both time and $.

That's where I have disagreed with my Reg F peers for decades.

Reservists can be more than GIBs, if you create the conditions for them to succeed. The Canadian Army has been meticulous since the 1960s, at least, in ensuring that the conditions were continuously sub-optimal. There have been short bursts of Reg F champions in the system but at best the system is one of benign neglect and much more often malicious neglect. Rather than fix the problem an general attitude of condescension permeates the system from bottom to, unfortunately, the top.

That maintenance is required to maintain a heavy force is a given. The fact that the equipment is used less frequently also means that there is less maintenance to be done and more extended time to do it in. It's part of the Reg F mentality problem that they say that "we can't give you heavy equipment because you do not have the full-timers to maintain it." When you sit back and think about it it's easy to see that's just a stupid statement but reflects the fact that they also do not put as much effort into maintaining Reg F equipment as is necessary. If keeping an equipped reserve brigade maintained requires full-time maintainers then that's what the system needs to supply.

I sometimes get the feeling that we give equipment to the Reg F so that they'll have something to do day-by-day rather than that they and their equipment together are a necessary capability that the country may need some day. When it comes to the difference between a Res F capability and a Reg F capability the only real difference that there should be is readiness and that can be compensated for by having hybrid units with a Reg F sub-unit and several Res F sub units.

You are right about training being a factor. There are some jobs where one simply needs to practice one's skills on a day-to-day basis to keep them sharp. Those are clearly full-timer jobs. SOF is a good example. Others where you need a quick reaction force. Full-timers again. But wherever there is time to develop skills and no need to react quickly reservists can do the job. The vast majority of positions in a heavy brigade, or most brigades including CS and CSS brigades for that matter, can be part-timers. You just need the right organization and the right training and it can be done. It takes an effort to get going but once operating pays huge dividends in reduced cost and expanded capabilities.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Like Dieppe?

Like the Battle of the Somme?

 

[Kirkhill]

Human resources planning summary for Core Responsibilities and Internal Services​

Core Responsibilities and Internal Services	2017–18 Actual full-time equivalents	2018–19 Actual full-time equivalents	2019–20 Actual full-time equivalents	2020–21 Planned full-time equivalents	2021–22 Planned full-time equivalents	2022–23 Planned full-time equivalents
Operations	N/A	4,884	4,923	2,860	2,886	2,910
Ready Forces	N/A	45,566	46,016	46,489	46,917	47,280
Defence Team	N/A	20,123	20,243	20,838	21,025	21,180
Future Force Design	N/A	2,421	2,669	2,223	2,228	2,233
Procurement of Capabilities	N/A	2,420	2,339	2,176	2,182	2,189
Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and Infrastructure	N/A	13,209	13,363	14,843	14,913	14,971
Subtotal	N/A	88,623	89,553	89,429	90,151	90,763
Internal Services	N/A	3,347	4,039	5,293	5,308	5,321
Total	N/A	91,970	93,592	94,722	95,459	96,084

Spending and human resources - Canada.ca

www.canada.ca

I presume you have seen this.

One thing that jumps out at me is the 15,000 PYs/FTEs or so in Sustainable Bases, IT and Infrastructure.

I'm going to suggest that vehicles and mechanical systems are infrastructure. Once they have been used they should be returned to stores at the base to be refurbished and reshelved for reissue.

Reduce the number of bases and armouries and transfer those bricks and mortar maintenance PYs to mechanical system PYs.

But that is an old idea that has occurred to many others.

 

[daftandbarmy]

View attachment 66419

Human resources planning summary for Core Responsibilities and Internal Services​

Core Responsibilities and Internal Services	2017–18 Actual full-time equivalents	2018–19 Actual full-time equivalents	2019–20 Actual full-time equivalents	2020–21 Planned full-time equivalents	2021–22 Planned full-time equivalents	2022–23 Planned full-time equivalents
Operations	N/A	4,884	4,923	2,860	2,886	2,910
Ready Forces	N/A	45,566	46,016	46,489	46,917	47,280
Defence Team	N/A	20,123	20,243	20,838	21,025	21,180
Future Force Design	N/A	2,421	2,669	2,223	2,228	2,233
Procurement of Capabilities	N/A	2,420	2,339	2,176	2,182	2,189
Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and Infrastructure	N/A	13,209	13,363	14,843	14,913	14,971
Subtotal	N/A	88,623	89,553	89,429	90,151	90,763
Internal Services	N/A	3,347	4,039	5,293	5,308	5,321
Total	N/A	91,970	93,592	94,722	95,459	96,084

Spending and human resources - Canada.ca

www.canada.ca

I presume you have seen this.

One thing that jumps out at me is the 15,000 PYs/FTEs or so in Sustainable Bases, IT and Infrastructure.

I'm going to suggest that vehicles and mechanical systems are infrastructure. Once they have been used they should be returned to stores at the base to be refurbished and reshelved for reissue.

Reduce the number of bases and armouries and transfer those bricks and mortar maintenance PYs to mechanical system PYs.

But that is an old idea that has occurred to many others.

We could save a bunch of wasted fixed costs by getting rid of the bases and having the troops live in the community. They can then concentrate on a daily basis at a local facility, with a much smaller and cheaper footprint, for training.

Like, you know, the Reserves.

 

[Kirkhill]

We could save a bunch of wasted fixed costs by getting rid of the bases and having the troops live in the community. They can then concentrate on a daily basis at a local facility, with a much smaller and cheaper footprint, for training.

Like, you know, the Reserves.

Whit? You mean turn up at the office on the daily? Like regular fowks? You're hauvin' a laugh, Wull!

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's another thought

Buy all our new support weapons on pallets or in containers and buy lots of MSVS SMP Load Handling Systems. The civvy's would go nuts for the extra assistance during the next power outage, icestorm, flood, fire or evacuation. You could probably talk them into an extra 1000 to manage civil emergencies.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Whit? You mean turn up at the office on the daily? Like regular fowks? You're hauvin' a laugh, Wull!

It seemed to work for this mob

STRENGTH BORN FROM WEAKNESS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RAIDING CONCEPT AND THE BRITISH COMMANDOS​

Once the men were selected, the next requirement was to get them organized and trained. Much like the former Independent Companies, the commandos were not put in barracks, but, rather, each man was given a subsistence allowance, and was required to find his own accommodation and food. Commanding officers touted this practice to be of great value because it increased a man’s self-reliance, made him available for training at any time of the day or night, and eliminated the loss of manpower due to the perennial demands of administrative duties and tasks inherently associated with any garrison setting.24 The commando troops appreciated this aspect as well. “It is the greatest job in the Army that one could possibly get, and it is a job that, if properly carried out, can be of enormous value,” asserted Major Geoffrey Appleyard. He added: “No red tape, no paper work ...just pure operations, the success of which depends principally on oneself and the men one has oneself picked to do the job with you... it’s revolutionary.”25 Many agreed. That is why the RTU assessment (Return To Unit) became the CO’s most powerful punishment.26

Strength Born from Weakness: The Establishment of the Raiding Concept and the British Commandos - Canadian Military Journal

Strength Born from Weakness: The Establishment of the Raiding Concept and the British Commandos

www.journal.forces.gc.ca

 

[Kirkhill]

It seemed to work for this mob

STRENGTH BORN FROM WEAKNESS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RAIDING CONCEPT AND THE BRITISH COMMANDOS​

Once the men were selected, the next requirement was to get them organized and trained. Much like the former Independent Companies, the commandos were not put in barracks, but, rather, each man was given a subsistence allowance, and was required to find his own accommodation and food. Commanding officers touted this practice to be of great value because it increased a man’s self-reliance, made him available for training at any time of the day or night, and eliminated the loss of manpower due to the perennial demands of administrative duties and tasks inherently associated with any garrison setting.24 The commando troops appreciated this aspect as well. “It is the greatest job in the Army that one could possibly get, and it is a job that, if properly carried out, can be of enormous value,” asserted Major Geoffrey Appleyard. He added: “No red tape, no paper work ...just pure operations, the success of which depends principally on oneself and the men one has oneself picked to do the job with you... it’s revolutionary.”25 Many agreed. That is why the RTU assessment (Return To Unit) became the CO’s most powerful punishment.26

Strength Born from Weakness: The Establishment of the Raiding Concept and the British Commandos - Canadian Military Journal

Strength Born from Weakness: The Establishment of the Raiding Concept and the British Commandos

www.journal.forces.gc.ca

It was also a great recruiting tool. My dad learned to fire an automatic pistol at age 13 by borrowing the pistol belonging to the Commando billeted with his family in Troon. The Commando was recovering from his exertions at Narvik. The local constabulary was not impressed with my father's enthusiasm. Nor with his schoolmate's experimentation with some kinetic Home Guard formulations in amongst the dunes at the beach.

One thing that did stand out well was intelligence gathering. If the Commandos wanted find out what they were going to be doing next they went down to talk to the fishwives at the market.

 

[FJAG]

View attachment 66419

Human resources planning summary for Core Responsibilities and Internal Services​

Core Responsibilities and Internal Services	2017–18 Actual full-time equivalents	2018–19 Actual full-time equivalents	2019–20 Actual full-time equivalents	2020–21 Planned full-time equivalents	2021–22 Planned full-time equivalents	2022–23 Planned full-time equivalents
Operations	N/A	4,884	4,923	2,860	2,886	2,910
Ready Forces	N/A	45,566	46,016	46,489	46,917	47,280
Defence Team	N/A	20,123	20,243	20,838	21,025	21,180
Future Force Design	N/A	2,421	2,669	2,223	2,228	2,233
Procurement of Capabilities	N/A	2,420	2,339	2,176	2,182	2,189
Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and Infrastructure	N/A	13,209	13,363	14,843	14,913	14,971
Subtotal	N/A	88,623	89,553	89,429	90,151	90,763
Internal Services	N/A	3,347	4,039	5,293	5,308	5,321
Total	N/A	91,970	93,592	94,722	95,459	96,084

Spending and human resources - Canada.ca

www.canada.ca

I presume you have seen this.

One thing that jumps out at me is the 15,000 PYs/FTEs or so in Sustainable Bases, IT and Infrastructure.

I'm going to suggest that vehicles and mechanical systems are infrastructure. Once they have been used they should be returned to stores at the base to be refurbished and reshelved for reissue.

Reduce the number of bases and armouries and transfer those bricks and mortar maintenance PYs to mechanical system PYs.

But that is an old idea that has occurred to many others.

I've looked at these charts over the years and continue to wonder at whether or not those categories are designed to deliberately obscure what the money is spent on or whether that's just a biproduct of an attempt by someone to give what they considered relevant data.

With my own biased way of interpreting things I do note that total planned full time equivalents are rising by 4,078 but that the Ready Forces is only rising by 1,714. On the other hand Internal services, sustainable bases etc and Defence Team (whatever that is) is rising by 4,793. The difference is made up by Operations, Future Force design and procurement losing 2,393.

I'm not quite sure where the dividing line between PYs allocated to operations and those allocated to Ready Team but I'm guessing that the increase in Ready Force PYs is probably significantly related to and offset by the decrease in Operations. Assuming I'm right with that than we're seeing a reduction of what I'll call the Army, Navy and Air Force "field force" of give or take 260 while the CFs administrative overhead is rising by the aforesaid 4,793.

Sigh!

Someone with better departmental financial analysis skills than me let me know if my fears are rational or irrational.

 

[KevinB]

Just an aside, the Leo C1s had just come off a recent rebuild, the M109s were still capable (and would still be today) and I think we still have the TLAVs. The Leo C1s were suitable as a stopgap in Afghanistan but their lack of IED resistance was a problem. The M109s didn't have the "precision fire" capability that modernists were looking for. Both systems were eminently suitable for a reserve training role and even certain levels of combat operations. TLAVs from the '60s are still running around the world in their 10s of thousands.

The M113/TLAV is a deathtrap -- I don't know who doctored the story to suggest it faired better against IED's than a LAV - but an aluminum box isn't something anyone wants to be in. It has neither the design (Box) nor the material construction (Aluminum) to be protective vehicle - it is tracked - so it has some decent terrain qualities to it.

I wonder how it would do as a Gun Tractor? Actually serious there - as it can tow - sure the dismount action rear (or right etc) would be a bit of a goat rope with troops needing to go through the door vice the ramp (unless there was a releasable shackle that one could drop/lower the gun - drive forward and then drop the ramp.

The issue is nothing more or less that maintenance ... and that is nothing more or less than a question of full-time PY allocation priorities. The money is there for the people and the spare parts -- IF -- its not used up for administrative overhead and other things. We would rather put 4,000 Class B's to work in headquarters shuffling paper around then allocating a 1,000 of those PYs or Class Bs on turning wrenches - and I doubt we actually need that many in the Army although the Air Force and Navy could all use a few.

You are right though. It is a matter of would-could-should. An right now we do have 100 Leo 2 gun tanks, and we do have six battalions of LAV 6.0s and getting another 400+ support LAVs. We also still have all those Bisons and TLAVs kicking around which someone will undoubtedly want to dispose of. As junior NCO I was taught to think of "must knows, should knows, and could knows". I consider financial allocation within DND as "must dos, should dos, and could dos". Since DNDs aim is to be an organization that can bring violence to bear in an emergency then the "must do" is to build a well rounded capable force that can react to a full-spectrum of threats.

Abandoning necessary capabilities due to full-time manpower restrictions when you have tens of thousands of unequipped and poorly trained reservists makes absolutely zero sense to me.

Spending half of DND's annual budget on personnel costs when even critical front -line equipment can't be maintained makes zero sense to me.

And having an Army that presents three poor options for reorganizing itself but which in each option ensures that useless div hqs are maintained (even adding one in one case) while complaining that we are short of trainers makes zero sense to me.

100% there

It's really just a game of personnel numbers and equipment. With 40,000 plus Reg F and Res F personnel we easily have the numbers. It becomes problematic if decade after decade you continue to segregate the force with very minor exceptions (Class Bs filling into HQs and RSS bolstering reserve units) You are absolutely right though. If we continue to ignore the true potential of a reserve force then we do not have the numbers. We absolutely need to apply Gibbs Rule # 5 - "Don't waste good!"

There are new and essential weapon systems coming on line which we will have to incorporate. There wont be a choice. As long as we keep dividing the force the way that we do we will continue to have to give up Reg F capabilities in order to generate the PYs for them (just like we did with infantry mortars, half of our artillery and all of our air defence)

Just as a thought. Take the existing tanks, two battalions of existing LAV6.0s, leave them 105mmC3s for the time being and some TLAVs, TAPVs and a good bit of a service battalion and 300 maintainers and maybe 500 trainer/operators/leaders. Form a reserve brigade around that using 4,000 reservists and the 500 RSS they already have. The annual cost to operate that brigade will go down by 70% per year on Reg F PYs alone. The equipment wear and tear will be reduced as will annual operating costs for fuel and ammo (And yes we need to sharpen up the Res F system but we should have done that decades ago.) That will leave you an armoured brigade in reserve that you can fall back to if and when needed and give you close to 4,000 PYs that you can reallocate to new weapon systems (like GBAD, loitering munitions, ISR and Cyber operators, you name it) as enablers to a brigade or division and still leave you a Reg F light and medium brigade to do whatever day-to-day things need doing.


That's where I have disagreed with my Reg F peers for decades.

Reservists can be more than GIBs, if you create the conditions for them to succeed. The Canadian Army has been meticulous since the 1960s, at least, in ensuring that the conditions were continuously sub-optimal. There have been short bursts of Reg F champions in the system but at best the system is one of benign neglect and much more often malicious neglect. Rather than fix the problem an general attitude of condescension permeates the system from bottom to, unfortunately, the top.

I started as a reservist - I think there are enormous unrealized potential in the reserves.
However - that requires significant changes to the Res Structure - and given the CF has been resistant for years - as well as no parliamentary support for legislation with teeth for the reserves - I don't see the Reserves as currently viable unless that changes.

That maintenance is required to maintain a heavy force is a given. The fact that the equipment is used less frequently also means that there is less maintenance to be done and more extended time to do it in. It's part of the Reg F mentality problem that they say that "we can't give you heavy equipment because you do not have the full-timers to maintain it." When you sit back and think about it it's easy to see that's just a stupid statement but reflects the fact that they also do not put as much effort into maintaining Reg F equipment as is necessary. If keeping an equipped reserve brigade maintained requires full-time maintainers then that's what the system needs to supply.

Years ago in Cyprus a buddy and I where drinking - he said if he was king (this was in 92 keep in mind) all the CBT ARMS pers would be reservists - and the only full time forces would be Maintenance and Supply -- I thought he was crazy - he did allow to retain the CAR and support in the Reg's - but he suggested that if the res was structured correctly - then it would serve the CF's needs fine.

I think he was a lot more right now than I did then.

BUT - it requires a massive change in the CF -- I don't see the Senior Leaders or Political support for something like that.

I sometimes get the feeling that we give equipment to the Reg F so that they'll have something to do day-by-day rather than that they and their equipment together are a necessary capability that the country may need some day. When it comes to the difference between a Res F capability and a Reg F capability the only real difference that there should be is readiness and that can be compensated for by having hybrid units with a Reg F sub-unit and several Res F sub units.

Agreed

You are right about training being a factor. There are some jobs where one simply needs to practice one's skills on a day-to-day basis to keep them sharp. Those are clearly full-timer jobs. SOF is a good example. Others where you need a quick reaction force. Full-timers again. But wherever there is time to develop skills and no need to react quickly reservists can do the job. The vast majority of positions in a heavy brigade, or most brigades including CS and CSS brigades for that matter, can be part-timers. You just need the right organization and the right training and it can be done. It takes an effort to get going but once operating pays huge dividends in reduced cost and expanded capabilities.

See we agree on a lot of things as well

 

[KevinB]

I've looked at these charts over the years and continue to wonder at whether or not those categories are designed to deliberately obscure what the money is spent on or whether that's just a biproduct of an attempt by someone to give what they considered relevant data.

With my own biased way of interpreting things I do note that total planned full time equivalents are rising by 4,078 but that the Ready Forces is only rising by 1,714. On the other hand Internal services, sustainable bases etc and Defence Team (whatever that is) is rising by 4,793. The difference is made up by Operations, Future Force design and procurement losing 2,393.

I'm not quite sure where the dividing line between PYs allocated to operations and those allocated to Ready Team but I'm guessing that the increase in Ready Force PYs is probably significantly related to and offset by the decrease in Operations. Assuming I'm right with that than we're seeing a reduction of what I'll call the Army, Navy and Air Force "field force" of give or take 260 while the CFs administrative overhead is rising by the aforesaid 4,793.

Sigh!

Someone with better departmental financial analysis skills than me let me know if my fears are rational or irrational.

The charts are so muddled it seem intentional.

• 42%, $9,760,714,328 for Ready Forces; - I assume this is Salaries?

• 15%, $3,444,253,339 for Defence Team; - ? I would have thought the entire CAF was the Defense Team...

• 16%, $3,680,697,534 for Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and Infrastructure; I find it interesting the "Green Base" spending is Lumped with IT - and no real breakdown,

• 17%, $3,910,791,611 for Procurement of Capabilities; Capital Acquisition I would assume - but no break down of programs than I can see.

• 5%, $699,552,288 for Operations; Broken down on follow on link

• 4%, $845,220,905 for Future Force Design; ?

• 3%, $699,552,288 for Internal Services; Administration costs?

It doesn't really get any clearer with either of the two supporting links

Although you can see where Operations Funds are spent by location in this.

Planned Costs for Major Canadian Armed Forces Operations - Canada.ca

www.canada.ca

Then more muddy water.

Consolidated Future-Oriented Statement of Operations (unaudited) - Canada.ca

The plan’s focus is on the work the Defence team will do in the year ahead to serve Canada.

www.canada.ca