Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

As much as regimental politics currently demands that everyone get an equal slice of pie, this is the worst possible way to mitigate. The geographic career stability of the current regimental system would be completely gone. The multi-capbadge structure of your armoured units would be prone to cohesion & disciplinary problems (not to mention the significant pain of requiring a geographic posting to move between sub-units). Accept that not every regiment gets every toy (this is optimal), merge regiments (ie one armoured regiment of three battalions), or design symmetric brigades.

Very fair criticism. It's important to keep in mind that 90% of the time the troops are not deployed and the basic quality of life during that time is a major factor in retention, etc.

 

[daftandbarmy]

As much as regimental politics currently demands that everyone get an equal slice of pie, this is the worst possible way to mitigate. The geographic career stability of the current regimental system would be completely gone. The multi-capbadge structure of your armoured units would be prone to cohesion & disciplinary problems (not to mention the significant pain of requiring a geographic posting to move between sub-units). Accept that not every regiment gets every toy (this is optimal), merge regiments (ie one armoured regiment of three battalions), or design symmetric brigades.

'Gegraphic career stability'. Is that a real thing?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

It used to be for the Maritimers in the Black Watch.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It used to be for the Maritimers in the Black Watch.

I assume they had DNA tests to ensure the gene pool was deep enough to ensure that they were Darwin proof?

 

[KevinB]

Well, at least a uneven bipod: The frigates are quite capable of defending themselves against air threats. And in that line, the Surface Combatant program can be seen as the second leg in full: They will be able to provide area air defence and even participate in BMD.

And the Army?

I mean I get that the RCAF doesn't like the idea of the army having dangerous (to them) toys - but...

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I

And the Army?

I mean I get that the RCAF doesn't like the idea of the army having dangerous (to them) toys - but...

I remember some of the discussions around the time of the birth of ADATS. To say that Air Command did not love the idea of a Sgt commanding a vehicle that could shoot down a fighter was an understatement….

 

[Kirkhill]

Hmmm. One Sergeant. 8 Captains.

 

[Kirkhill]

Hmmm. One Sergeant. 8 Captains.

View attachment 66433

You know, just looking at that picture, and thinking about the AD AT discussion. I get that there is a cost to ammunition. I get that Air Defence is indeed a specialization that requires particular skills.

But here is where I find myself bumping up against a problem.

How do the navies of the world manage to deal with surface threats, subsurface threats, aerial threats, missiles, boats and smugglers with an array of multiple caliber guns, missiles, torpedoes and troops transported by jackstay, boat and helicopter from one single room surrounded by all the systems and accessed from comfy seats?



And yet the army needs separate capbadges and colonels to perform similar jobs.

 

[Infanteer]

That's easy, those components of a Navy don't manouevre - the ship drives through water....

 

[Kirkhill]

But, hopefully, all those cap badges and colonels are flying in loose formation and maneuvering together, not working independently.

 

[Halifax Tar]

As much as regimental politics currently demands that everyone get an equal slice of pie, this is the worst possible way to mitigate. The geographic career stability of the current regimental system would be completely gone. The multi-capbadge structure of your armoured units would be prone to cohesion & disciplinary problems (not to mention the significant pain of requiring a geographic posting to move between sub-units). Accept that not every regiment gets every toy (this is optimal), merge regiments (ie one armoured regiment of three battalions), or design symmetric brigades.

Pardon me while I stray out of lanes...

Why do you think the CBT Arms folks couldn't deal with the geographical instability ?

Most other branches don't have that stability. Or perhaps they should ?

 

[FJAG]

The DRF breaks down a lot further than that. What you're looking at is the programs, but within the programs it's broken down further.

So "Ready Forces" breaks down into "Land Ready Forces" (Army) which breaks down into

Collective Training
Individual Training
Land Service Support
Land Readiness Management
Canadian Ranger Programs
Land History, Heritage, COMREL (seems kinda dishonest to include this in Land Ready Forces)
Support to Operations (aka Force Gen costs for an Op)

And all of those breakdown further.... it's like that for every "program." Without seeing how it's broken down there's not much useful information to be gained.

Then there's also the execution problem that affects data integrity..... the Army has been funding and capturing all of our PCF courses which are clearly an IT cost, as Collective Training, for years now.

Also all the Base Maintenance, Transport, Supply, etc. functions fall under program 6, the sustainable bases one..... so that should probably be all captured under Land Ready Forces for a Base like Edmonton, Pet, Gagetown since all that money is actually going towards sustaining the Land Ready Forces stuff but hey.....

I thought it would probably be something like that. That's a doable method when you count cash but becomes somewhat strained when dealing with PYs where a given individual may straddle several programs (or could be interpreted amongst several programs).

I'm not generally a great fan of performance measurement because unless well designed and scrupulously implemented (which most are not) they tend to provide fuzzy data and frequently aren't worth the effort. Industries that have a variety of cost inputs to measure against an incoming cash flow generally do much better with it than organizations that are just input consumers with no real measurable outputs.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thinking more on the naval analogy

One Lt Colonel (Commander)
225 Under Command (Small Battalion or Reinforced Company Combat Team)

Own Base

Responsible for

Base Maintenance
Base Engineering
Hotel (Room and Board)
Continuous Surveillance of Surface (Land), Air, and Subsurface (Underground)
Relocating Base constantly

Conducting constabulary and combat duties

Preparing for peer on peer high intensity warfare

Assets on hand, in addition to the vessel and its boats

Armament	24 × Honeywell Mk 46 torpedoes 16 × Evolved Sea-Sparrow SAM 8 × RGM-84 Harpoon SSM 1 × 57 mm Bofors Mk2 gun 1 × 20 mm Vulcan Phalanx CIWS 6 × .50 caliber machine guns
Aircraft carried	1 × CH-148 Cyclone

I remember reading that the Absalom crew of 100 was divided in roughly 4 equal parts.

One to drive the ship
One to power the ship
One to supply room and board
One to fight the ship.

And there, again, we have that 3:1 ratio of Tail to Tooth.

But the tooth covers a large variety and number of targets in three dimensions over a very large area. And most of its day job is actually spent in surveillance, observation and reconnaissance. Delivering ordnance happens so infrequently as to be risible.


Now why can't a soldier be more like a sailor? Pace Henry Higgins.

 

[quadrapiper]

You know, just looking at that picture, and thinking about the AD AT discussion. I get that there is a cost to ammunition. I get that Air Defence is indeed a specialization that requires particular skills.

But here is where I find myself bumping up against a problem.

How do the navies of the world manage to deal with surface threats, subsurface threats, aerial threats, missiles, boats and smugglers with an array of multiple caliber guns, missiles, torpedoes and troops transported by jackstay, boat and helicopter from one single room surrounded by all the systems and accessed from comfy seats?

View attachment 66437

And yet the army needs separate capbadges and colonels to perform similar jobs.

How would a deployed Army HQ handling similar responsibilities (say, loosely, a single site defended to an equivalent degree to a CSC's capabilities, with a similar degree of comms, log, etc. self-sufficiency, and a large patrol area) compare as far as rank/size?

Betting it's not a LCol and a handful of majors with captain watchkeepers.

 

[Good2Golf]

Well, at least a uneven bipod: The frigates are quite capable of defending themselves against air threats. And in that line, the Surface Combatant program can be seen as the second leg in full: They will be able to provide area air defence and even participate in BMD.

…perhaps one day the Army will stop with its incessant internal bickering and resolve the “AD/AT/LF/gloves” conundrum…

…perhaps…

 

[Kirkhill]

How would a deployed Army HQ handling similar responsibilities (say, loosely, a single site defended to an equivalent degree to a CSC's capabilities, with a similar degree of comms, log, etc. self-sufficiency, and a large patrol area) compare as far as rank/size?

Betting it's not a LCol and a handful of majors with captain watchkeepers.

How many Lt Cdrs, Lt(N) and POs are there in the Halifax?

 

[Kirkhill]

And.....

What would it take to organize the army into 15 deployable "Stone Frigate" Combat Teams with exactly the same assets as a CSC but mounted on pallets deployable by truck, helos, planes .... and ships?

It strikes me that they would create great bases for stabilizing the unstabilized and providing sally ports for larger elements, or special and OGD elements.

And, in a peer on peer effort they could be grouped in Task Forces supplying mutual cover and defending a large operational area in which a mech brigade could manoeuvre, light or heavy.

15x 225 = 3,375

Or one small Brigade.


Edit - and the Brigade is getting smaller

Number under command being reduced from 225 to 204 for a Brigade reduction from 3,375 to 3,060 for a saving of 315, or another 1.5 commands.

While the assets under command are increasing

Sensors and processing systems	Command and control Lockheed Martin Canada CMS 330 Combat System with AEGIS Fire Control Loop USN Cooperative Engagement Capability (sensor netting) Surveillance & weapon sensors Lockheed Martin Canada AN/SPY-7(V)1[3] Solid State 3D AESA radar MDA Solid State AESA Target Illuminator X & S Band navigation radars Electro-optical and infrared systems Underwater warfare systems Hull-mounted sonar: Ultra Electronics Sonar S2150-C[4] Towed sonar: Ultra Electronics TFLAS[5] (variable depth)
Electronic warfare & decoys	Lockheed Martin Canada RAVEN electronic countermeasures[10] Ultra Electronics SEA SENTOR S21700 towed torpedo countermeasures
Armament	Missiles 2 × quad box launchers: 8 × Naval Strike Missile[2] 2 × 3-cell ExLS: 24 × Sea Ceptor (CAMM) CIADS, quad-packed[6] 1 × 32-cell Mk 41 VLS: RIM-162 ESSM Block II[7] RIM-66 SM-2 Block IIIC[8] BGM-109 Tomahawk Torpedoes 2 × twin 324 mm (13 in) torpedo tubes (auto-loaded): Mk 54 MAKO torpedo Guns 1 × Leonardo OTO 127 mm (5 in)/64 LW Vulcano naval gun[9] 2 × BAE 30 mm (1.2 in) autocannons 6 × 12.7 mm (0.50 in) M2 machine guns
Aircraft carried	Helicopters 1 × CH-148 Cyclone armed with: 2 × Mk 54 MAKO Torpedo 1 × C6 FLEX 7.62 mm (0.300 in) GPMG
Aviation facilities	Indal Technologies Beartrap Large Chinook-capable flight deck Enclosed hangar Facilities for UAVs
Notes	Flexible Mission Bay Rolls-Royce Mission Bay Handling System Modular mission support capacity for sea containers and vehicles 2 × 9–12 m (30–39 ft) multi-role boats 1 × 9 m rescue boat

and we haven't talked about the 390 sailors in their 6 Arctic Patrol Bases (65 each), the 212 in their 4 Subsurface Patrol Bases (53 each) and the 402 reservists manning their Patrol Bases (37 each).

If you add the whole bunch together (3060 + 390 + 212 + 402) you get a total strength of 4064. Or one Brigade Gp of rations (including 10% part-timers).

What does the Army deliver for a comparable investment in manpower?

 

[Kirkhill]

Systems	Bases	Units/Base	Units/Fleet
Naval Strike Missile[2]	15​	8​	120​
Sea Ceptor (CAMM) CIADS, quad-packed[6]	15​	24​	360​
RIM-162 ESSM Block II[7]	15​	32​	480​
RIM-66 SM-2 Block IIIC[8]	15​	16​	240​
BGM-109 Tomahawk	15​	8​	120​
Mk 54 MAKO torpedo	15​	24​	360​
Leonardo OTO 127 mm (5 in)/64 LW Vulcano naval gun[9]	15​	1​	15​
BAE 30 mm (1.2 in) autocannons	15​	2​	30​
12.7 mm (0.50 in) M2 machine guns	15​	6​	90​
CH-148 Cyclone armed with:	15​	1​	15​

 

[KevinB]

And.....


What does the Army deliver for a comparable investment in manpower?

It doesn't sink?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I see what you are driving at, Kirkhill, but it is unfair to compare manpower of the Navy vs what it delivers by looking only at the crewing of the ships. The very large and manpower intensive industrial bases that support those ships, particularly on the naval architecture/engineering/maintenance side of things must be included, and that just doubled your manpower requirement, without providing for training and staffing ashore. The Navy produces its effect with the totality of its manpower, not just the sea going personnel.

Moreover, at action station, everyone has a duty/secondary duty to perform and everybody is up for the duration, duties which no one performs "full time". In an Army/land situation, wouldn't all of the above things have to be manned at all times? That requires more personnel.

And being on land, with surface threats that can hide and crawl up to you undetected form multiple directions at once, unlike at sea where there is no hiding on the surface and approaches are more limited in numbers and watched over by sensors, wouldn't you need a much larger number of "basic" (read infanteer) personnel for force protection?