Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

If you’ve sighted your TOW properly it’s should be like 1 k back and to the flank. Direct fire shouldn’t be a huge worry and by doctrine it should relocate rapidly after the first round. Can do that in a g ride easy enough. Let me add it’s not the ideal option, it’s just what we have in the cupboard right now.

It worked well enough during the 'Toyota War'.

Chad (aided by certain French associated forces) kicked Libyan ass, with Land Cruiser mounted Electric Dart Teams taking out alot of their armour:

In March 1987, the main Libyan air base of Ouadi Doum was captured by Chadian forces. Although strongly defended by minefields, 5,000 soldiers, tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft, the Libyans' base fell to a smaller Chadian attacking force led by Djamous equipped with trucks mounted with machine guns and antitank weapons. Observers estimated that, in the Chadian victories in the first three months of 1987, more than 3,000 Libyan soldiers had been killed, captured, or deserted. Large numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters were captured or destroyed. In some cases, Libya sent its own aircraft to bomb abandoned Libyan equipment to deny its use to the Chadians. It was reported that, in many cases, Libyan soldiers had been killed while fleeing to avoid battle. At Ouadi Doum, panicked Libyans had suffered high casualties running through their own minefields.[

Toyota War - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Kirkhill]

And while we were talking about Canadian AT solutions - in the Afghanistan era

The Strange Case of Echo Company, Lord Stratchona's Horse (Royal Canadians)

E COY LdSH(RC) PUTS THE LAV TUA TO THE TEST

The Light Armoured Vehicle TOW Under Armour (LAV TUA) is the first element of the Direct Fire Unit (DFU) to begin Initial Product Testing (IPT)...

www.strathconas.ca

In 2006, IIRC LAVs were already in Afghanistan. Missiles were already in use against fortified targets. Wireless TOWs were being built with Bunker Buster Warheads.

The US were using TUA Strykers.

Canada had already started building and fielding what was planned to be 66 TUA LAVs. Echo Company (from the TOW platoons of the PPCLI) had been rebadged, gone on initial conversion training from M113 to LAV and been issued their first 4 units of a planned 18.

And then the project died. TOW/TUA/ALT Turrets were stripped from hulls and replaced with Nanuk RWS turrets and shipped to Afghanistan along with the tanks. The TOW stocks were sold off. I believe the USMC bought them.

And then we have to buy new TOWs, to mount on tripods, for Latvia, to support infantry mounted in LAVs.

FJAG - our problem is not just a lack of money.

I am sure that those TUA LAVs would have been welcome additions to the LAVs in Afghanistan.

 

[GR66]

With regard to the Swedish-model Infantry Platoons, the TAPV could be used with an identical dismounted force structure (although with twice the vehicle requirements) for the Reserve Infantry Regiments.

TAPV #1: Section Leader with 2-man AT Team
TAPV #2: Section 2 I/C with 2-man MG Team

Standardization makes augmentation and interoperability easier.

Grouping the TAPVs into Carrier Companies so that you can also concentrate your maintenance resources would also make it easier to eventually transition some of the Reserve Carrier Companies to the LAV....if we ever replace some of the LAVs in the Reg Force Battalions with a tracked IFV/HAPC, or purchase additional tanks to convert more of them into Armoured Infantry Battalions.

 

[FJAG]

And while we were talking about Canadian AT solutions - in the Afghanistan era

The Strange Case of Echo Company, Lord Stratchona's Horse (Royal Canadians)

E COY LdSH(RC) PUTS THE LAV TUA TO THE TEST

The Light Armoured Vehicle TOW Under Armour (LAV TUA) is the first element of the Direct Fire Unit (DFU) to begin Initial Product Testing (IPT)...

www.strathconas.ca

In 2006, IIRC LAVs were already in Afghanistan. Missiles were already in use against fortified targets. Wireless TOWs were being built with Bunker Buster Warheads.

The US were using TUA Strykers.

Canada had already started building and fielding what was planned to be 66 TUA LAVs. Echo Company (from the TOW platoons of the PPCLI) had been rebadged, gone on initial conversion training from M113 to LAV and been issued their first 4 units of a planned 18.

And then the project died. TOW/TUA/ALT Turrets were stripped from hulls and replaced with Nanuk RWS turrets and shipped to Afghanistan along with the tanks. The TOW stocks were sold off. I believe the USMC bought them.

And then we have to buy new TOWs, to mount on tripods, for Latvia, to support infantry mounted in LAVs.

FJAG - our problem is not just a lack of money.

I am sure that those TUA LAVs would have been welcome additions to the LAVs in Afghanistan.

E Coy was part of the overall redesign of the direct fire capability that was supposed to follow the demise of the tank in the early 2000s. The components were the LAV TUA manned by the infantry, the artillery's ADATS from 4 AD Regt in its anti-armour role and a new capability by way of the Mobile Gun System (MGS) to be manned by the armoured corps.

I'm not sure of the exact organization that these systems were to fall into but essentially there were supposed to be 71 TUAs (I've never seen the number 66 except with respect to the MGS), 30 Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles (the ADATS LAV III follow-on budgeted at $750 million - cancelled in Nov 2006) and 66 MGS for some $600 million which was cancelled in favour of the Leo 2 purchase.) That ought to translate into 3 regiments (albeit at the time we were thinking very much to forming battlegroups with coy sized attachments and started thinking of artillery and armour as regimental sized force generators but not force employers) so we would probably see some nine composite company-sized deployable groups.

There were several reasons why the projects died a painful death (not least of all in my mind that the idea was silly to start with) but essentially the MGS $s disappeared into the Leo 2, some of the TUAs were reconverted to infantry carriers and the MMEV outright cancelled with the ADATS holding on another half decade with 4 AD Regt as an air defence system.

I tend to agree that we should have kept the TUA with anti armour platoons but anti-armour was dying out in general. It's not the first capability divestment I've disagreed with. They would certainly be useful in Latvia now.

 

[KevinB]

E Coy was part of the overall redesign of the direct fire capability that was supposed to follow the demise of the tank in the early 2000s. The components were the LAV TUA manned by the infantry, the artillery's ADATS from 4 AD Regt in its anti-armour role and a new capability by way of the Mobile Gun System (MGS) to be manned by the armoured corps.

I'm not sure of the exact organization that these systems were to fall into but essentially there were supposed to be 71 TUAs (I've never seen the number 66 except with respect to the MGS), 30 Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles (the ADATS LAV III follow-on budgeted at $750 million - cancelled in Nov 2006) and 66 MGS for some $600 million which was cancelled in favour of the Leo 2 purchase.) That ought to translate into 3 regiments (albeit at the time we were thinking very much to forming battlegroups with coy sized attachments and started thinking of artillery and armour as regimental sized force generators but not force employers) so we would probably see some nine composite company-sized deployable groups.

There were several reasons why the projects died a painful death (not least of all in my mind that the idea was silly to start with) but essentially the MGS $s disappeared into the Leo 2, some of the TUAs were reconverted to infantry carriers and the MMEV outright cancelled with the ADATS holding on another half decade with 4 AD Regt as an air defence system.

I tend to agree that we should have kept the TUA with anti armour platoons but anti-armour was dying out in general. It's not the first capability divestment I've disagreed with. They would certainly be useful in Latvia now.

I'm am always amazed why the Infantry is willing to piss away combat forces that have been hard requirements and say "oh well, we don't need them right now..."
The Canadian Army seems to have an incredible power to be willfully ignorant.

 

[Kirkhill]

E Coy was part of the overall redesign of the direct fire capability that was supposed to follow the demise of the tank in the early 2000s. The components were the LAV TUA manned by the infantry, the artillery's ADATS from 4 AD Regt in its anti-armour role and a new capability by way of the Mobile Gun System (MGS) to be manned by the armoured corps.

I'm not sure of the exact organization that these systems were to fall into but essentially there were supposed to be 71 TUAs (I've never seen the number 66 except with respect to the MGS), 30 Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles (the ADATS LAV III follow-on budgeted at $750 million - cancelled in Nov 2006) and 66 MGS for some $600 million which was cancelled in favour of the Leo 2 purchase.) That ought to translate into 3 regiments (albeit at the time we were thinking very much to forming battlegroups with coy sized attachments and started thinking of artillery and armour as regimental sized force generators but not force employers) so we would probably see some nine composite company-sized deployable groups.

There were several reasons why the projects died a painful death (not least of all in my mind that the idea was silly to start with) but essentially the MGS $s disappeared into the Leo 2, some of the TUAs were reconverted to infantry carriers and the MMEV outright cancelled with the ADATS holding on another half decade with 4 AD Regt as an air defence system.

I tend to agree that we should have kept the TUA with anti armour platoons but anti-armour was dying out in general. It's not the first capability divestment I've disagreed with. They would certainly be useful in Latvia now.

Funny how "Anti-Armour" was dying out but every Anti-Armour missile manufacturer started manufacturing Anti-Structure/Bunker-Busting warheads for their missiles - particularly popular with the troops since at least 1982 when the Brits were using Milans on bunkers at 2 km.

We disagree on the silliness of the Direct Fire Unit. I like the idea of a Direct Fire Company (Heavy) in every Infantry Battalion. Some mounted on LAVs to the engineering limits of the vehicle. Some mounted on Airportable UTVs to the limits of those vehicles.

We agree on the utility of the TUA Platoon in the infantry.

You are right on the 66/71 issue. My error.

 

[KevinB]

Funny how "Anti-Armour" was dying out but every Anti-Armour missile manufacturer started manufacturing Anti-Structure/Bunker-Busting warheads for their missiles - particularly popular with the troops since at least 1982 when the Brits were using Milans on bunkers at 2 km.

We disagree on the silliness of the Direct Fire Unit. I like the idea of a Direct Fire Company (Heavy) in every Infantry Battalion. Some mounted on LAVs to the engineering limits of the vehicle. Some mounted on Airportable UTVs to the limits of those vehicles.

We agree on the utility of the TUA Platoon in the infantry.

You are right on the 66/71 issue. My error.

While the 152mm LV gun on the M551 Sheridan never really worked to a useful point with the Shillelagh thru barrel ATGM - I always thought that method would have been more useful than the 105mm LAV MGS - but honestly I still don't understand why the LAV 6.0 never considered adding a Bradley turret - there are Hellfire Bradley turret prototypes - and you wouldn't need a TUA platoon at that point.

To me that makes more sense as you aren't not needing more PY - and there are a variety of Hellfire options that make it a replacement for a DFS gun as well.

You don't need every LAV in the fleet to have that turret (ideally yes, but dealing with budget issues - you could make it 1-2 / Platoon -- plus if you have a link to a UAV you can launch NLOS and have the UAV do acquisition for you.
The Hellfire can do limited (very limited) SHORAD as well if you want (I don't think the RCAF would be keen - as it doesn't have an IFF setup like the Stinger etc).

 

[Kirkhill]

While the 152mm LV gun on the M551 Sheridan never really worked to a useful point with the Shillelagh thru barrel ATGM - I always thought that method would have been more useful than the 105mm LAV MGS - but honestly I still don't understand why the LAV 6.0 never considered adding a Bradley turret - there are Hellfire Bradley turret prototypes - and you wouldn't need a TUA platoon at that point.

To me that makes more sense as you aren't not needing more PY - and there are a variety of Hellfire options that make it a replacement for a DFS gun as well.

You don't need every LAV in the fleet to have that turret (ideally yes, but dealing with budget issues - you could make it 1-2 / Platoon -- plus if you have a link to a UAV you can launch NLOS and have the UAV do acquisition for you.
The Hellfire can do limited (very limited) SHORAD as well if you want (I don't think the RCAF would be keen - as it doesn't have an IFF setup like the Stinger etc).

Heck one ATGM turreted platoon per company would be useful. There are lots of strap-on ATGM systems for turrets. Use the same missile for both mounted and dismounted work.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm am always amazed why the Infantry is willing to piss away combat forces that have been hard requirements and say "oh well, we don't need them right now..."
The Canadian Army seems to have an incredible power to be willfully ignorant.

Right now they're hiding all their Cbt Sp Coys in the militia.

And we're not doing such a good job keeping them going, sadly.

 

[FJAG]

We disagree on the silliness of the Direct Fire Unit. I like the idea of a Direct Fire Company (Heavy) in every Infantry Battalion. Some mounted on LAVs to the engineering limits of the vehicle. Some mounted on Airportable UTVs to the limits of those vehicles.

Don't get me wrong, I firmly believe in direct fire (anti-armour) capabilities in the infantry battalion whether as a support platoon/company in its own right or distributed amongst rifle companies.

It's the early 2000s experimentation with brigading all heavy direct fire capabilities (TOW/MGS/ADATS(MMEV)) in one unit and then using modularity to create DFS teams in Tactical Self-Sufficient Units (TSSUs)

As an aside I found a thread going back to 2005 on this board discussing the then ongoing trials. Some of you were participants - it seems many of you shared my views.

Successul trials held for direct fire system

Interesting and maybe informative read for all you TOW qualified people out there (RCR,VanDoo, & PPCLI). ;) http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_1_1.asp?id=367 Exert While the infantry and armour troops were fairly familiar with each other in the field, the air defence gunners were the...

army.ca

 

[Kirkhill]

Don't get me wrong, I firmly believe in direct fire (anti-armour) capabilities in the infantry battalion whether as a support platoon/company in its own right or distributed amongst rifle companies.

It's the early 2000s experimentation with brigading all heavy direct fire capabilities (TOW/MGS/ADATS(MMEV)) in one unit and then using modularity to create DFS teams in Tactical Self-Sufficient Units (TSSUs)

As an aside I found a thread going back to 2005 on this board discussing the then ongoing trials. Some of you were participants - it seems many of you shared my views.

Good Lord! You're not going to start quoting me back at me are you? That is most ungentlemanly. Besides, I change my mind.

 

[markppcli]

Right now they're hiding all their Cbt Sp Coys in the militia.

And we're not doing such a good job keeping them going, sadly.

We’ll TOW is part of the Light Bn DFS platoon, and each mechanized company is allowed one system. It’s just not employed properly, to the point I’ve been told we’re anchoring our defence on the tow.

@KevinB the Italians run it that way. Two Freccia with Spike as part of the company support platoon, with a few more in the Battalion Support Company. Let’s you give those guys freedom to set up good atgm spots while not worrying to much about momentum and all that. If I recall they have dismounted stands in the back.

 

[GR66]

Again expanding on the Swedish model, how would that look for our Armoured Regiments? Presumably, RCD would provide the Tank Squadrons for the Armoured Infantry Brigade. What could the Strathconas and 12 RBC look like?

Sticking with the 4 x Squadrons/Companies per Regiment, each with the 3 x Platoons/Troops of three vehicles model you could do something like:

2 x Recce Squadrons/Companies. Each Platoon/Troop with 2 x LAV LRSS and 1 x LAV w/tube launched UAVs/loitering munitions
2 x AT Squadrons/Companies. Each Platoon/Troop with 3 x LAV ATGM vehicles

That would give each Armoured Recce Regiment a total of 12 x LAV LRSS, 6 x LAV-UAV and 18 x LAV-ATGM. Using a non-LOS capable missile on the LAV-AT vehicles would allow targeting from the Regiment's own Recce vehicles/UAVs, the Brigade Recce Squadron vehicles, or the Infantry Battalion's Recce Platoon vehicles.

Presuming a crew of 4 for each vehicle (Commander, Driver, Gunner, Loader/Systems Operator) that's a total of 144 personnel manning the Troop-level vehicles which I believe is roughly the current establishment strength for a single Recce Squadron. At these numbers you could likely have all of the Reg Force Armoured elements manned at full Establishment strength and have a fully manned separate Recce Squadron for each Reg Force Brigade as well.

 

[McG]

I still don't understand why the LAV 6.0 never considered adding a Bradley turret

Probably because GDLS offers its own TOW equipped LAV turret in both the 25 mm and 30 mm cannon configurations. Why drum up business for BAE?

 

[MilEME09]

Probably because GDLS offers its own TOW equipped LAV turret in both the 25 mm and 30 mm cannon configurations. Why drum up business for BAE?

Wonder how much it would be to retrofit out turrets like this?

 

[SeaKingTacco]

We’ll TOW is part of the Light Bn DFS platoon, and each mechanized company is allowed one system. It’s just not employed properly, to the point I’ve been told we’re anchoring our defence on the tow.

@KevinB the Italians run it that way. Two Freccia with Spike as part of the company support platoon, with a few more in the Battalion Support Company. Let’s you give those guys freedom to set up good atgm spots while not worrying to much about momentum and all that. If I recall they have dismounted stands in the back.

Since when is penny-packetting TOW doctrine?

Siting TOW used to be part of the Bde Anti-Armour plan…

 

[KevinB]

Probably because GDLS offers its own TOW equipped LAV turret in both the 25 mm and 30 mm cannon configurations. Why drum up business for BAE?

Would you accept Bradley TYPE turret - seems that would have been a no brainer for 6.0

 

[daftandbarmy]

Since when is penny-packetting TOW doctrine?

Siting TOW used to be part of the Bde Anti-Armour plan…

Oh, I'll go!

Is the answer: since 'being fair' became more important than 'being effective'?

 

[FJAG]

Since when is penny-packetting TOW doctrine?

Siting TOW used to be part of the Bde Anti-Armour plan…

I'm not sure what rationale there is these days other than we have limited equipment and need to spread it around.

You're right about the way things used to be when we had weapons each with its specific envelope. Depending on the size of that envelope depends on where it is placed in the organization and tactically deployed. In my days that was LAW, MAW and TOW period. Things changed a bit when Eryx came on the scene but not much as it filled a small niche above MAW. Remember that LAWs and MAWs and even Eryx fell fairly much within the same envelope as a battalions other weapons which, at the time didn't exceed a .50.

These days we are into a whole new regime. A battalion's rifles and machine guns still have the same range, but the LAV adds an ability to reach out further as do newer ATGMs, drones and loitering munitions. Quite frankly, I think it's time to throw out the old rulebooks and rewrite them for what we have and - most importantly - what we should have to properly fight.

I can't help but think that if we are focused on dispersed operations (as we should be) then we really need to build a very robust cavalry capability that can provide a screen, a guard and fill in the the gaps and flanks. In a light or medium brigade we may only need two infantry battalions in favour of converting the recce regiment and the third battalion to two cavalry regiments consisting of a mix of recce and direct fire vehicles, primarily ATGM equipped infantry, maybe a UAV/loitering munitions capability and a solid core of FOOs/JTACs. In effect a brigade with an ability to create some hard points and some fluid forces to manoeuvre around them. Just spitballing here.

 

[FJAG]

Probably because GDLS offers its own TOW equipped LAV turret in both the 25 mm and 30 mm cannon configurations. Why drum up business for BAE?

There's also this:

https://www.gdls.com/images/pdf/stryker/ATGM.pdf

Meanwhile the Poles have added a Spike to a turret:

Polish Company HSW Unveils Its Turret RCTS-30 With Spike Anti-tank Guided Missiles - MilitaryLeak.COM

Recently, the Polish Company Huta Stalowa Wola S.A (HSW) has conducted trial tests with its Remote Controlled Turret System (RCTS-30) with double SPIKE

militaryleak.com

The possibilities are endless. All that's needed is some vision, a plan and some cash.

Incidentally, does anyone have a breakdown of the variants coming down the ramp of the most recent LAV VI Combat Support Vehicle project. It strikes me from what I read that it's C&C and CSS vehicle and anything but actual combat support.