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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

We’ll never know now that Force 2025 is dead.
Last Post Trumpet GIF

The problem is we don’t have enough PYs to man our existing Bns and training establishments.
The PYs are there. The people to fill the PYs on the other hand ...
Force 2025 for all its flaws was going to see one company per each Bn be a skeleton crew to be filled by reservists as needed. I don’t hate that idea. Use the saved PYs to fill out combat support, and the rifle companies.
Basically that's a 70/30 battalion in my construct.
I don’t disagree with your security task asssessment either. In my great restructure I’d have a Reserve Bn in each CBG to act as depth / fill all those tasks.
With RegF core leadership. I'm a lot more optimistic than most at what reservists can do given the right training but I just don't think that your average reservist will ever gather the experience to make a competent Coy Comd or CSM on part time service anymore.

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Last Post Trumpet GIF


The PYs are there. The people to fill the PYs on the other hand ...

It’s both. The Bns are only filled to 8 per section, the Mission Task postings cut into Bn NCO positions, ect. There’s no Mortar, Pioneer, or AT platoon, those need to be filled. Coupled with low retention and you’re already under strength Bn is now crippled.


Basically that's a 70/30 battalion in my construct.

Yeah I’ve come around in the idea.


I would essentially cut the infantry down to regular 7 Bns. 3 light Bns with full regular complements, and 4 mechanized with 70/30 constructs. The Mechanized Bdes would be supported by a motorized 10/90 Bn, and its armoured regiment would have admin control of two crew augmentation squadrons. A light Bde would have an augmenting 10/90 Bn as well. Artillery and Engineers would be 3 x 70/30. Once all that is established I think we can maybe create one more 10/90 Bde that is geographically dispersed.

With RegF core leadership. I'm a lot more optimistic than most at what reservists can do given the right training but I just don't think that your average reservist will ever gather the experience to make a competent Coy Comd or CSM on part time service anymore.

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Totally agree. I think the role of a CSM and OC (and branch equivalents) require a high degree of institutional knowledge that you only get for full time exposure. I think the reserves can do a lot, but I don’t know how much base level training we can get done on 34 days a year, and I’d rather have them good at one job.
 
I would essentially cut the infantry down to regular 7 Bns. 3 light Bns with full regular complements, and 4 mechanized with 70/30 constructs. The Mechanized Bdes would be supported by a motorized 10/90 Bn, and its armoured regiment would have admin control of two crew augmentation squadrons. A light Bde would have an augmenting 10/90 Bn as well. Artillery and Engineers would be 3 x 70/30. Once all that is established I think we can maybe create one more 10/90 Bde that is geographically dispersed.
I'm still playing with numbers from time-to-time. It's also based in part on current equipment holdings and trying to first formulate a coherent defence policy to build a structure to. Funny that you should mention seven battalions although I don't quite count it that way, I'm working off the equivalent of 21 RegF companies as the core together with 24 ResF rifle companies to build 7 x 30/70 mech bns (7 x RegF, 14 x ResF companies); 2 x 70/30 mech bns (4 x RegF, 2 x ResF companies); 2 x 100/0 light bns (6 RegF companies) and 4 x 30/70 light bns (4 x RegF 8 x ResF companies). Only the RegF Mech companies hold LAVs initially which uses up 10 of our companies of LAVs leaving 8 companies worth for prepositioning and spares.

I'm not sure I like it. It creates a 5 lean brigades plus 2 battle group structure rather than the prior 3 lean brigades, 2 fat brigades and 2 regiments I had. I did this to cull some 600 infanteer PYs to create more gunners - :ROFLMAO: - just kidding. I want them for logistics. I'm pretty sure that I could generate even more 10/90 rifle companies but don't have any extra RegF rifle companies to create more 30/70 bns to put them in. One solution might be to jack up each existing battalion with an extra 10/90 rifle company until I run out of ResF positions.

I need to puzzle that out some more.

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No PRes unit ever got Bisons - they where held at MTC's, until taken for the RegF.

The only Bisons's used as APC's where using RCMP as GIB's.
Check your info. Ran the MTC in Borden/Meaford. Saw pix only.
 
Then the Cal High was an absolute anomaly, as they were never supposed to have been released to units. In Ontario Bisons were held in Borden, Meaford, and Pet, and by RV 91 most had already been stolen for Reg Bde HQ’s and the rest followed shortly after.
I didn’t get to Calgary till 95, and we closed shop there in 97, and the Cal High lot had nothing then, as even the AVGP’s were stored at Currie then.
See my response earlier. Only Bison MTC Borden/Meaford saw was a pre production model fron GMD. Big truck!
 
Check your info. Ran the MTC in Borden/Meaford. Saw pix only.
I went to Borden to help ‘steal’ one circa ‘91, so some were in Borden - I had assumed at the MTC. It went there to Pet, and IIRC many went to Kingston

Most had already been stolen by Div HQ and Bde’s by/for RV92, I don’t think many where given back after RV92, as they became common CP’s and Medic transports during that.
 
IF I was grandmaster emporer of this shitshow, and given a just a little extra change for defence, I would invest it into growing Reg F and P Res infantry. Its kind of the cheapest and quickest option.
We know how to train infantry, both regulars and reserves. But without sufficient quantities of specialists, and I’m thinking especially RCEME, RCCS, C Int C, RCLS and RCMS — the army is a hollow shell. And those specialist capabilities are some of our most broken, and most difficult to generate either from the reserves or from the street in an emergency. This isn’t 1812 — all that gear is complex and needs to be maintained. And that’s been true for several wars — the Canadian contingent to Italy in WWII only consisted of about 25% infantry by numbers.

What we do need is the ability to generate infantry casualty replacements in quantity, which is a solid and achievable role for the reserves or for the light battalions, but that doesn’t eliminate the needs for the specialists.

Right now, I’d rather have 100 more Vehicle Techs than a 100 more RCRs.
 
Actually it would be an easy system to recreate - but it requires legislation, and willingness to make hard decisions and a lot of money.
And you just explained exactly why the US National Guard system is NOT an easy system to recreate in Canada.
  1. There is no political will to significantly change Reserve employment legislation. Canadians in general are willfully blind to the dangerous World around us and view "militarism" as a bad thing.
  2. Due to #1 there is not the political will to make hard decisions regarding the military in general and the Reserves in particular. Health Care, the Environment, Social Causes etc. will all continue to take priority over the military so long as the population in general feels those are higher priorities.
  3. I suspect the GOC will be forced by events (and the US) to increase the amount of money spent on the military, but after NORAD upgrades, F-35s, CSCs, P-8s, tanks, ATGMs, AD and Artillery upgrades can you honestly believe there will be "lots of money" still available to throw at the Army Reserves?
30/70, and 70/30 should be really easy.
It would require again an honest look at what is needed and where things are practical though.
Conceptually 30/70 and 70/30 are doable. Heck...our Reg Force units are already 70/0 units relying on Reserve augmentation and shuffling of Reg Force personnel from other units to deploy already.

The problem is that without a well trained, equipped and effective 30% Reserve component - which as noted above is highly unlikely to be achieved given the current political/economic climate - then a lot of strain is put on the 70% Reg Force component. The GOC and Army leadership do no honestly factor things like effective unit augmentation into its deployment decisions. The Army tries to create a readiness structure but its events that really drive deployments and as a result it becomes an ad hoc scramble to meet our personnel needs when we take on an operation.

I imagine that near continual state of being in an under-manned (and poorly equipped) Cluster-F*** is a major factor in our retention issues. 70/30 units will basically just formalize the current system while in my opinion 30/70 units will just make it worse. The Reg Force portions of those units will be taken out of the pool of personnel available to the 70/30 units adding to their stress and 30/70 units will basically be undeployable for regular peacetime ops under our current legislation, Reserve level of training and readiness.
So basically nothing that could not be done from Ground Zero mobilization anyway?


Not seeing the difference other than adding an extra month of training from a Day 0 Mobilization.
Is that really any different than what we have currently? Other than individual augmentation (with augmentees already requiring a significant work-up period to be brought up to readiness for deployment for combat operations) are the Reserves currently bringing any major expansion capability to the Army? The odd mortar platoon? Anything that legitimately reduces the stress on the Reg Force on an ongoing basis?
The Reg Force doesn’t even have the kit it needs, Nor the personnel.
A scarcely trained PRes won’t get anything, I joined in 1987 and got issued 1951 webbing - that sort of situation is FUBAR.


Canada can’t expand in crisis, it doesn’t have the resources to build equipment for what its current needs are.
The more you look into the situation, the more the situation in Canada is absolutely catastrophic.
Again, the above points seem to reinforce my arguments. We don't have the political will or the money to completely restructure the way the Reserves work and also equip them for an expansion of the Army. The Reg Force meanwhile is struggling and without the required Reserve overhaul doesn't really have a hope of improving its situation. Recruiting and retention issues only make the matter worse.

More and more I'm thinking that the only realistic workable approach is to consolidate and fix the Reg Force and focus the Reserves on effectively sustaining that force in a conflict rather than expanding the force.

I'm thinking something like one Light Brigade with 3 x Light Battalions and all the enablers (ideally an Arctic focused Brigade that can plug into the US 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as its 3rd maneuver Brigade) and one Mechanized Brigade with 4 x LAV Battalions and all the enablers (including a Tank Regiment). Reduce to a single Division and use the saved PYs from the consolidation to fully man the units as well as expanding the Army's training capacity.

The Reg Force would maintain a surplus of mid-to-higher level NCMs and Officers to staff the schools, staff positions and RSS positions without having to draw those personnel away from the combat units.

The Reserves would basically reorganize as geographic groupings of Companies/Batteries/Squadrons (grouped administratively into Battalions/Brigades but not intended as deployable formations). They would focus on Platoon/Company level training coordinated by Regional Reg Force training centers. They would still deploy for domestic ops as they do currently and also provide augmentees for Reg Force deployments - but by temporarily filling an existing Reg Force position rather than filling an "empty" position in the unit.

The other piece of the puzzle is equipment. Modern military vehicles/weapons actually take longer to acquire than the time it takes to train a person to use that equipment. In many cases as well the ongoing recurring personnel cost of manning that equipment over time actually exceeds the original capital cost of the equipment itself. Because I don't see the political will to significantly expand the size of the Army through an increase in the overall number of Brigades (70/30 and 30/70) I think the logical alternative would be to simply increase the stock of equipment on hand so that its available IF the requirement comes to increase the size of the Army (or more likely to replace combat losses).

The Army should simply purchase more vehicles/weapon systems than is required for the Reg Force units and place it in long term storage in case replacement/expansion is required. You'd require a modest increase in the number of maintainers to keep the kit in good operating order, but you'd avoid the extra PYs required to man the equipment on an ongoing basis, provide the higher level training required to use it, upgrade the dispersed storage/maintenance and training facilities that would be required to have the Reserves access and use it on a regular basis.

It's certainly not an ideal solution by any means but frankly I think its a more realistically achievable solution than some of the other ideas that have been suggested.
 
And you just explained exactly why the US National Guard system is NOT an easy system to recreate in Canada.
  1. There is no political will to significantly change Reserve employment legislation. Canadians in general are willfully blind to the dangerous World around us and view "militarism" as a bad thing.
  2. Due to #1 there is not the political will to make hard decisions regarding the military in general and the Reserves in particular. Health Care, the Environment, Social Causes etc. will all continue to take priority over the military so long as the population in general feels those are higher priorities.
  3. I suspect the GOC will be forced by events (and the US) to increase the amount of money spent on the military, but after NORAD upgrades, F-35s, CSCs, P-8s, tanks, ATGMs, AD and Artillery upgrades can you honestly believe there will be "lots of money" still available to throw at the Army Reserves?
There are very few changes needed for the NDA - ss 294 and 295 need to be brought into the CSD. I'll take that back - major legislative change is needed for employee protection which IMHO should be a federal law brought under the NDA rather than a polyglot of wimpy provincial things.

The real problem is internal regulations which complicate reserve service and at the same time make the reserves toothless. These do not require political will, they require military leadership vision and spine.

I agree with much of the rest of what you say (again taking the focus off politicians and putting it onto military leadership) Structurally we disagree a bit as I support the light brigade idea but view the integration of RegF and ARes in the mech and heavy fields (with logistics) as the way to go to facilitate both mobilization and roto construction.

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There are very few changes needed for the NDA - ss 294 and 295 need to be brought into the CSD. I'll take that back - major legislative change is needed for employee protection which IMHO should be a federal law brought under the NDA rather than a polyglot of wimpy provincial things.

The real problem is internal regulations which complicate reserve service and at the same time make the reserves toothless. These do not require political will, they require military leadership vision and spine.

I agree with much of the rest of what you say (again taking the focus off politicians and putting it onto military leadership) Structurally we disagree a bit as I support the light brigade idea but view the integration of RegF and ARes in the mech and heavy fields (with logistics) as the way to go to facilitate both mobilization and roto construction.

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The problem with Federal job protection legislation is that there will be major push back from the business community so long as regular peacetime deployments are requiring significant Reserve augmentation. When you have a 70/30 force structure that means that companies are will have to back fill Reservists on a regular basis...making them less willing to hire Reservists who could be pulled away at any time.

I think it would be less of an issue for either natural disaster deployments (i.e.when the Winnipeg Rifles are called out to deal with Red River flooding) as it will be seen as a more local issue with a defined resolution timeline in sight. Call ups during a major crisis would likely be more widely supported as well, but covering a Reservists deployment for 6-12 months for a rotation in Latvia or a peacekeeping mission at random times will likely be less widely supported by many (especially smaller) companies. If the Reg Force could cover the bulk of the operational deployments with their own personnel then Federal Reserve job protection legislation would likely be more likely to be accepted.

Internal Army policy changes however that streamline the recruiting process and reduce the amount of time spent on administrative-type training and devoting more time to practical military training (i.e. treating Reservists more like "Militia" than Reg Force solders serving Part-Time) would likely help attendance, retention and recruiting.

The problem with integrating Reserve forces directly into "Heavy" units is, as is often pointed out on these forums, the issue of access to equipment and training areas, technical support/maintenance of the kit and the ability to maintain skills currency with a limited amount of training days. I believe it would take quite a large chunk of money and effort to create the infrastructure required to make such a system workable and based on previous (admittedly half-hearted) efforts there is the real possibility that the system would still result in Reservists that require significant work-up to be deployable. And would this work-up period be significantly shorter than the work-up for a "less integrated" type of Reservist? Would the cost of the system be worth the difference in work-up training delta between the two?

Additionally, does increasing the cost of running the Reserve system realistically reduce the likelihood of the Army being able to purchase the additional equipment required to supply an expanded Total Force? I'd argue that the overall pool of money available is still going to be limited and increased overall structural cost will almost certainly result in reduced equipment procurement.

Going back to my basic original assertion that major equipment is more difficult and takes longer to acquire than trained personnel and based on my belief that the Army will not be provided the money required for both increased ongoing structural costs AND increased equipment purchases, then to my mind the logical choice is to spend any available money up front on additonal equipment and then train the required personnel when required.

Cynical? Yes. But unfortunately likely also realistic.
 
We know how to train infantry, both regulars and reserves. But without sufficient quantities of specialists, and I’m thinking especially RCEME, RCCS, C Int C, RCLS and RCMS — the army is a hollow shell. And those specialist capabilities are some of our most broken, and most difficult to generate either from the reserves or from the street in an emergency. This isn’t 1812 — all that gear is complex and needs to be maintained. And that’s been true for several wars — the Canadian contingent to Italy in WWII only consisted of about 25% infantry by numbers.

Yup. The technical trades, Spawn of Woolwich, all need to be regulars.

What we do need is the ability to generate infantry casualty replacements in quantity, which is a solid and achievable role for the reserves or for the light battalions, but that doesn’t eliminate the needs for the specialists.

That hasn't changed from 1812. What has changed is that we can find drivers off the street just like we could find people who could tack and harness horses and mules and ride them or drive them.


Right now, I’d rather have 100 more Vehicle Techs than a 100 more RCRs.

Seen.

And you just explained exactly why the US National Guard system is NOT an easy system to recreate in Canada.
  1. There is no political will to significantly change Reserve employment legislation. Canadians in general are willfully blind to the dangerous World around us and view "militarism" as a bad thing.
  2. Due to #1 there is not the political will to make hard decisions regarding the military in general and the Reserves in particular. Health Care, the Environment, Social Causes etc. will all continue to take priority over the military so long as the population in general feels those are higher priorities.
  3. I suspect the GOC will be forced by events (and the US) to increase the amount of money spent on the military, but after NORAD upgrades, F-35s, CSCs, P-8s, tanks, ATGMs, AD and Artillery upgrades can you honestly believe there will be "lots of money" still available to throw at the Army Reserves?

And that is precisely the reason that I prefer the all volunteer route of the Danish Homeguard. You don't get highly qualified troops but you get willing volunteers - the role of the System then is to keep them willing and volunteering.

Ukraine continues to demonstrate the adage "a willing volunteer is worth a thousand conscripts".
 
Yup. The technical trades, Spawn of Woolwich, all need to be regulars.

All of them? Isn’t Wollwich the home of the Royal Artillery? I think we can handle reserve gun numbers and STA. Even dismounted FOOs.

That hasn't changed from 1812. What has changed is that we can find drivers off the street just like we could find people who could tack and harness horses and mules and ride them or drive them.
Yes but we have to ensure they can actually drive vs hold a liscense.
Seen.



And that is precisely the reason that I prefer the all volunteer route of the Danish Homeguard. You don't get highly qualified troops but you get willing volunteers - the role of the System then is to keep them willing and volunteering.

So the Home Guards, or Defence Leagues, seem to largely be a thing in countries with conscription already no? For example the Finnish Defence Associations are really for people who want to do more army stuff but can’t find a full time job in their army.
Ukraine continues to demonstrate the adage "a willing volunteer is worth a thousand conscripts".
Ahem
 
All of them? Isn’t Wollwich the home of the Royal Artillery? I think we can handle reserve gun numbers and STA. Even dismounted FOOs.

I'm going to defer to my other sparring partner FJAG on that. I think you are right. Especially on gun numbers. I'd like to think you are right on the STA and FOOs. Especially given that I believe that a good chunk of every manoeuvre element is going to be dedicated to calling in fires of one type or another.

Yes but we have to ensure they can actually drive vs hold a liscense.

True that. Even in 1812 they had to show civilians how to do things the army way.

So the Home Guards, or Defence Leagues, seem to largely be a thing in countries with conscription already no? For example the Finnish Defence Associations are really for people who want to do more army stuff but can’t find a full time job in their army.

Ahem

Also true that Denmark has conscription but in most of these countries they don't have to "conscript" because they get enough "volunteers" from the group of potential conscripts that they don't need to engage the unwilling and the unhappy.

The Homeguard are as you say by and large people that want to be able to do army stuff and hang out with army guys, and are willing to do it for free. Some may want a full time army position but can't find it. But I believe that many of them are happy being civilians but want to make themselves useful if the situation demands it.

The secret is not to ask more than they are willing to give. Sometimes you can engage some of them to assist on a full time basis for a short period. When Ukraine happens then you use them to the level of their skills.
 
The problem with Federal job protection legislation is that there will be major push back from the business community so long as regular peacetime deployments are requiring significant Reserve augmentation. When you have a 70/30 force structure that means that companies are will have to back fill Reservists on a regular basis...making them less willing to hire Reservists who could be pulled away at any time.
It depends very much of how you construct the reserve system. If we use the moronic construct that the ARes is today then yes you will not only have pushback but problems. There are very different ways of doing it. A system that loads most of the training up front while recruits are students looking for full summer employment will get you trained people before they are someone else's employees. If after that you make the training very limited and predictable - say one weekend per month for ten months and a two week period in the summer on fixed dates then the burden on employers (and the reservists family) is not that onerous. The important thing is that the reserve system has to find a balance as between the individual, his employer and his family and the military's needs.

Operational duties are something else. In peace-time all such service, whether domestic or expeditionary could be voluntary as it is now. You would only "mobilize" in extreme cases. You can also build in incentives for employers of mobilized reservists.

In short the right system, with the right communications/education/incentive system will not be onerous.
Internal Army policy changes however that streamline the recruiting process and reduce the amount of time spent on administrative-type training and devoting more time to practical military training (i.e. treating Reservists more like "Militia" than Reg Force solders serving Part-Time) would likely help attendance, retention and recruiting.
Internal policy changes are within the military's control and are essential. Equally so is a force structure that puts whatever administrative burden is still necessary on full-time people is critical. Both in recruiting and training we need to ensure that every valuable minute that a reservist, his family and employer gives the military is used to the utmost and not wasted. The Army currently treats too many people as if their time doesn't matter. That needs to stop.
The problem with integrating Reserve forces directly into "Heavy" units is, as is often pointed out on these forums, the issue of access to equipment and training areas, technical support/maintenance of the kit and the ability to maintain skills currency with a limited amount of training days. I believe it would take quite a large chunk of money and effort to create the infrastructure required to make such a system workable and based on previous (admittedly half-hearted) efforts there is the real possibility that the system would still result in Reservists that require significant work-up to be deployable. And would this work-up period be significantly shorter than the work-up for a "less integrated" type of Reservist? Would the cost of the system be worth the difference in work-up training delta between the two?
Again, start with job hungry students. Train them locally on all the stuff that doesn't need heavy equipment and then take them to the equipment for their training on that. During the winter 10 weekends do training on things that can be done locally (small arms, dismounted tactics etc) and then take them to the equipment for their summer refresher exercises. I don't want to sound dismissive, but six out of the nine folks in a LAV do not need to be drivers or gunners. If you have one or two spares in the back that can drive and operate the weapon, so much the better. Ans I bet that while they are young students most of them would be happy to take driver and gunner courses during their summer breaks. You'll have enough trained folks.
Additionally, does increasing the cost of running the Reserve system realistically reduce the likelihood of the Army being able to purchase the additional equipment required to supply an expanded Total Force? I'd argue that the overall pool of money available is still going to be limited and increased overall structural cost will almost certainly result in reduced equipment procurement.
I look at this from a two phased point of view. Regardless we need to know what we want the Army to be. Assuming that we are going to be equipment neutral and stay with what we have then it absolutely vital that we integrate RegF units (with the current equipment) with ResF personnel so that the one set of equipment can be used to train both - let's say one RegF company and two ARes companies. That's phase 1 and can be done with the existing support personnel and maintenance system (although I would very much want to bump up the maintenance folks regardless) Phase 2 comes into play once we have established a core of solid ARes folks that can augment RegF units with minimal extra training. Phase 2 allows the choice of building a larger force by adding in equipment which will allow the "mobilization" of a bigger and more varied force than we have now. That obviously means that politically we want a bigger force worth spending the capital on. In short Phase 1 is use what we have but make it better. Phase 2 is grow the force if we want to do that.

The key point for politicians is that a true, part-time and trained ARes force is cheaper to run day-to-day than a full-time one. Roughly 1/6th to 1/3rd the cost of full-timers. Pay envelopes are a big part of the budget. If that can be credibly reduced (or switched to equipment procurement) it becomes a no-brainer for politicians while being looked at as a poison pill for our RegF leadership. This is why I keep drumming on heavy and esoteric forces, like artillery and tanks, as perfect for reserves because they are a force that does not need to be there day-to-day but only in an emergency. Light forces which can rapidly deploy and do a wide variety of tasks and have very special skills, on the other hand, you need to fill with full-timers.

This is why you need to fire all Class Bs or, at the very least account and pay for them against RegF full-time salaries. The ResF is by definition Class A once they complete their initial training.
Going back to my basic original assertion that major equipment is more difficult and takes longer to acquire than trained personnel and based on my belief that the Army will not be provided the money required for both increased ongoing structural costs AND increased equipment purchases, then to my mind the logical choice is to spend any available money up front on additonal equipment and then train the required personnel when required.

Cynical? Yes. But unfortunately likely also realistic.
The very first step is to define what you want your army to be capable of doing. Once you set those parameters you can define what risk you are prepared to accept in having a portion of that force part-time. That then moves on to a risk mitigation assessment of what training and equipment is needed to a) form the force and b) sustain the force and c) employ the force. We need to look less at will a LAV fit through an armoury door and more at when and where will we need to use a LAV some day and what can we do to get it there at the least all-in system cost. When life-cycle cost is factored into an "extreme circumstance" usage construct then ResF manning has to be seriously considered. When the life-cycle cost is for a capability that needs to be there ready to go at all times then ResF manning becomes a only limited possibility and the probable conclusion is it needs to be a full-time manning.

Let me add in one final comment on maintainers. The Army has royally screwed the logistics system over the years. Canada has bought ever more complex equipment and has kept the logistics system to support that on a shoe string. Do reservists have a role in fixing that. I think yes they do but not to look after equipment on a part-time basis. I'm a big fan of community colleges and apprentice ship programs for technical trades. If I were king, here's what I would do with ResF maintainers.

1. on recruiting run them through a recruit and basic Army field craft course during their first summer.

2. the first winter pay their tuition at a community college to take a basic mechanics course while they do one weekend per month to earn a bit of cash, keep tied to the military and improve some general military skills.

3. the second summer run them through a 3-4 month DP1 conversion course that builds on what they learned in community college, applies it to basic military wheeled vehicles and gives them summer's full of pay.

4. the second winter pay their tuition for an advanced diesel mechanics program while they do one weekend a month to keep their general military skills up and keep them connected with their unit;

5. the third summer run them through a 3-4 month DP2 conversion course that builds on what they learned at community college and applies it to heavy military vehicles and again gives them a summer's full of pay.

6. the third winter put them on a one year Class B contract to work as apprentice mechanics at various base workshops in their local region to maintain existing equipment under supervision so as to gain experience, earn money, create a resume of value on the civilian market, and to provide a labour force to repair vehicles needing servicing.

7. keep them on a two to three year ResF obligatory service contract with a ResF unit on a one weekend a month two weeks a year basis so as to be able to surge trained and experienced mechanics in an emergency. Thereafter offer them a bonus for further service contracts with obligatory service.

There are numerous trades we can do that with from cooks to health care professionals. It's an easy sell to politicians because not only do we build a strong part time force that can be surged in an emergency but we also provide opportunities for young people to learn a civilian transferable trade. The point is that one needs to see the value in creating a pool of stand-by folks for emergencies rather than ones to fluff out the already bloated full-time administrative structure that seems to be the military's raison d'etre for reservists.

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And on the UAS/C-UAS wars


Smaller, better, cheaper seems to be something of a growing mantra - and, following the standard two out of three rule, smaller and cheaper are more important than better.

On the same theme of smaller, better, cheaper.....


The CEO of Taiwan-based company Tron Future, whose counter-drone radars are already used by the Taiwanese Army, says the systems are ready for mass deployment, eying a production rate of 100 per month for 2023 based on increased demand.

Tron Future is only four years old, but its T.Radar Pro technology has already found an extensive market both in Taiwan but also in the Middle East and South Asia. The active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar has a drone detection range up to 5 kilometers and a weight of only 15 kilograms, which is what CEO Yu-Jiu Wang says has appealed the most to customers.

Its development followed four tenets, he explained: keeping it lightweight and small; equipping it with a 4D micro-doppler function to differentiate between multirotor drones and birds; low cost; and performance against small and low-flying targets in urban environments.

Initially, the radars went into the service with the Taiwanese Army and were deployed above key islands, which is a challenging environment because the movement of waves in the ocean can create false targets.



If we tie that together with this from an article I already posted....


The Mounted Assured Positioning, Navigation and Timing System, or MAPS GEN II, “improved situational awareness” and helped facilitate mock reconnaissance and casualty-evacuation missions, all while GPS signal was jeopardized, the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation said in a public report released last month.

MAPS GEN II is designed to ensure troops understand where they are and where they are headed, even in environments where GPS signal is compromised and other systems are being harassed. The tech will be set into a slew of armored platforms, including Abrams tanks and Paladin artillery, as well as lighter options, such as Stryker combat vehicles and Humvees.


Small cheap sensors mounted on vehicles that know where they are even when RF frequencies are contested if not compromised.

A reason for even small, light units to have "mules" to carry the toys with them.
 
We know how to train infantry, both regulars and reserves. But without sufficient quantities of specialists, and I’m thinking especially RCEME, RCCS, C Int C, RCLS and RCMS — the army is a hollow shell. And those specialist capabilities are some of our most broken, and most difficult to generate either from the reserves or from the street in an emergency. This isn’t 1812 — all that gear is complex and needs to be maintained. And that’s been true for several wars — the Canadian contingent to Italy in WWII only consisted of about 25% infantry by numbers.

What we do need is the ability to generate infantry casualty replacements in quantity, which is a solid and achievable role for the reserves or for the light battalions, but that doesn’t eliminate the needs for the specialists.

Right now, I’d rather have 100 more Vehicle Techs than a 100 more RCRs.
That kind of goes along with my thought where you employ local shops to fix the equipment. You get a bit of surge capacity in the event of a actual need for trained/ qualified, competent Techs.
 
It depends very much of how you construct the reserve system. If we use the moronic construct that the ARes is today then yes you will not only have pushback but problems. There are very different ways of doing it. A system that loads most of the training up front while recruits are students looking for full summer employment will get you trained people before they are someone else's employees. If after that you make the training very limited and predictable - say one weekend per month for ten months and a two week period in the summer on fixed dates then the burden on employers (and the reservists family) is not that onerous. The important thing is that the reserve system has to find a balance as between the individual, his employer and his family and the military's needs.

Operational duties are something else. In peace-time all such service, whether domestic or expeditionary could be voluntary as it is now. You would only "mobilize" in extreme cases. You can also build in incentives for employers of mobilized reservists.
You're talking about training here and I have no problems with that. We're both looking at the same thing...getting people trained as quickly as possible to a useful standard level of military competency.

The problem is the Operational duties...which as you admit are "something else". This is where I see the problem with a 70/30 (or our current 70/0) Reg Force structure. Once the student has used his/her free summers to become trained in their particular trade and are now presumably gainfully employed in the workforce, where do we get the extra 30% of the troops from for both our ongoing deployment commitments and any new commitments the government makes? Either you're having to fill those positions with Reservists (resulting in the employer pushback I was suggesting) or by pulling Reg Force personnel from other already under-strength units (presumably leaving those positions now unfilled).

And what about the 30/70 units? Do you simply pull those units out of the deployment rotations to avoid having to fill 70% of the positions each time? What extra burden does that put on the Reg Force members in the 70/30 units? We can't pretend that our units are all just sitting around waiting for a major conflict to get mobilized. There are regular ongoing as well as special deployments that happen on a regular basis (even excluding domestic ops).
In short the right system, with the right communications/education/incentive system will not be onerous.

Internal policy changes are within the military's control and are essential. Equally so is a force structure that puts whatever administrative burden is still necessary on full-time people is critical. Both in recruiting and training we need to ensure that every valuable minute that a reservist, his family and employer gives the military is used to the utmost and not wasted. The Army currently treats too many people as if their time doesn't matter. That needs to stop.
Agreed. This is why I'm suggesting that Reservists focus more on their basic trades skills and less on the "career" type training that pretends they are the same as Reg Force career soldiers just doing the job part time.
Again, start with job hungry students. Train them locally on all the stuff that doesn't need heavy equipment and then take them to the equipment for their training on that. During the winter 10 weekends do training on things that can be done locally (small arms, dismounted tactics etc) and then take them to the equipment for their summer refresher exercises. I don't want to sound dismissive, but six out of the nine folks in a LAV do not need to be drivers or gunners. If you have one or two spares in the back that can drive and operate the weapon, so much the better. Ans I bet that while they are young students most of them would be happy to take driver and gunner courses during their summer breaks. You'll have enough trained folks.
Firstly, I'd love to hear from those currently serving in the Reserves how many of their members fall into that summer student category. With many students living away from home for school I wonder how many are actually active with either their school location or home location Reserve unit during the academic year and staying active with the unit when they return home for the summer?

Agreed that this is the ideal time and schedule for quick training of young recruits but I wonder what the current actual active pool of these personnel actually is. For them a program more like the US ROTC might work better with a pool of students/recruits from across the country attending the same school receiving some training (and ideally academic credit for elective courses related to their training) locally during the school year and collective training at centralized training centers during the summer.
I look at this from a two phased point of view. Regardless we need to know what we want the Army to be. Assuming that we are going to be equipment neutral and stay with what we have then it absolutely vital that we integrate RegF units (with the current equipment) with ResF personnel so that the one set of equipment can be used to train both - let's say one RegF company and two ARes companies. That's phase 1 and can be done with the existing support personnel and maintenance system (although I would very much want to bump up the maintenance folks regardless) Phase 2 comes into play once we have established a core of solid ARes folks that can augment RegF units with minimal extra training. Phase 2 allows the choice of building a larger force by adding in equipment which will allow the "mobilization" of a bigger and more varied force than we have now. That obviously means that politically we want a bigger force worth spending the capital on. In short Phase 1 is use what we have but make it better. Phase 2 is grow the force if we want to do that.
Agreed that Phase 1 is augmentation and agree that ideally maintenance (and support) personnel need to be increased. I guess it's more a question of when that augmentation is required. With a fixed 70/30 structure that augmentation is required basically daily right from day one. Reg Force units are not at manning levels which enable them to deploy as a complete unit. That means that your Reserve system is daily required to have a pool of personnel that are trained up to the level required for deployment and available (and supported by legislation and their employers) to be deployed for significant periods of time throughout the year.

If however the Reg Force units are at sufficient strength to fulfill their peacetime deployment requirements without ongoing daily Reserve augmentation then the Reserves only need to focus on their ongoing training and if required for mobilization can be brought up to a deployable level of readiness for augmentation of the Reg Force.

That certainly doesn't mean that Reservist that are willing and able to deploy during peacetime to augment the Reg Force in deployments wouldn't be encouraged to do so. Any time you can take a Reservist and give them the opportunity to increase their skills and knowledge through deployment and bring those skills and knowledge back to their home unit (and at the same time take some pressure off the Reg Force members) should be strongly encouraged. I just see serious problems with making this the regular situation for 30% of every deployment.

I think where we also differ is our concept of Phase 2. You see it as using the Reserves for Force Expansion, while I see it more as Force Sustainment. As Ukraine has shown us any major conflict will result in significant personnel and equipment losses. I think you'd agree that there are real limits on the amount of equipment and vehicles that we can expect to be provided to the Army. You would choose to use those vehicles and equipment to expand the size of the Army when required. I would choose to use them to maintain the size of the Army in a conflict in the face of losses. I guess I'd prefer to deploy three Brigades and keep them combat effective through the conflict rather than have six Brigades and have to rotate them and reorganize them as they each take losses and become degraded.

The above I'm mainly applying to the Infantry, Armoured units and tube Artillery. I believe that there are opportunities with lower manpower requirements and simulated training aids for some specialized trades like Rocket Artillery, etc. to be able to train up to a deployable level of skill on a part-time basis and could be used for force expansion rather than just augmentation.
The key point for politicians is that a true, part-time and trained ARes force is cheaper to run day-to-day than a full-time one. Roughly 1/6th to 1/3rd the cost of full-timers. Pay envelopes are a big part of the budget. If that can be credibly reduced (or switched to equipment procurement) it becomes a no-brainer for politicians while being looked at as a poison pill for our RegF leadership. This is why I keep drumming on heavy and esoteric forces, like artillery and tanks, as perfect for reserves because they are a force that does not need to be there day-to-day but only in an emergency. Light forces which can rapidly deploy and do a wide variety of tasks and have very special skills, on the other hand, you need to fill with full-timers.
The problem is that it's not just Light forces that we're deploying on a regular basis. Latvia is our heavy "esotoric" force. Likely any other major deterrent operation will be with heavy, not light forces. We typically use heavy forces for our peacekeeping deployments because we are casualty adverse. Your logic only really works if it's constantly our Light Battalions that are going out the door, but more often than not it's our LAVs.
This is why you need to fire all Class Bs or, at the very least account and pay for them against RegF full-time salaries. The ResF is by definition Class A once they complete their initial training.
Agreed
The very first step is to define what you want your army to be capable of doing. Once you set those parameters you can define what risk you are prepared to accept in having a portion of that force part-time. That then moves on to a risk mitigation assessment of what training and equipment is needed to a) form the force and b) sustain the force and c) employ the force. We need to look less at will a LAV fit through an armoury door and more at when and where will we need to use a LAV some day and what can we do to get it there at the least all-in system cost. When life-cycle cost is factored into an "extreme circumstance" usage construct then ResF manning has to be seriously considered. When the life-cycle cost is for a capability that needs to be there ready to go at all times then ResF manning becomes a only limited possibility and the probable conclusion is it needs to be a full-time manning.
Agreed. However with a smaller full-time force than during the Cold War the amount that the Reg Force is called on for regular deployments has increased so there is little of the Reg Force that is sitting around waiting for "extreme circumstance" usage.
Let me add in one final comment on maintainers. The Army has royally screwed the logistics system over the years. Canada has bought ever more complex equipment and has kept the logistics system to support that on a shoe string. Do reservists have a role in fixing that. I think yes they do but not to look after equipment on a part-time basis. I'm a big fan of community colleges and apprentice ship programs for technical trades. If I were king, here's what I would do with ResF maintainers.

1. on recruiting run them through a recruit and basic Army field craft course during their first summer.

2. the first winter pay their tuition at a community college to take a basic mechanics course while they do one weekend per month to earn a bit of cash, keep tied to the military and improve some general military skills.

3. the second summer run them through a 3-4 month DP1 conversion course that builds on what they learned in community college, applies it to basic military wheeled vehicles and gives them summer's full of pay.

4. the second winter pay their tuition for an advanced diesel mechanics program while they do one weekend a month to keep their general military skills up and keep them connected with their unit;

5. the third summer run them through a 3-4 month DP2 conversion course that builds on what they learned at community college and applies it to heavy military vehicles and again gives them a summer's full of pay.

6. the third winter put them on a one year Class B contract to work as apprentice mechanics at various base workshops in their local region to maintain existing equipment under supervision so as to gain experience, earn money, create a resume of value on the civilian market, and to provide a labour force to repair vehicles needing servicing.

7. keep them on a two to three year ResF obligatory service contract with a ResF unit on a one weekend a month two weeks a year basis so as to be able to surge trained and experienced mechanics in an emergency. Thereafter offer them a bonus for further service contracts with obligatory service.

There are numerous trades we can do that with from cooks to health care professionals. It's an easy sell to politicians because not only do we build a strong part time force that can be surged in an emergency but we also provide opportunities for young people to learn a civilian transferable trade. The point is that one needs to see the value in creating a pool of stand-by folks for emergencies rather than ones to fluff out the already bloated full-time administrative structure that seems to be the military's raison d'etre for reservists.

🍻
No issues with the above at all. We definitely need more maintainers and tech specialists, both full time and part time.
 
Want more reserve techs ? Let them access Veterans Education Benefit if they join the reserves after their 6/12 years. Boom I just increased reserve recruiting 25 percent.

(Shocking though it may be, the prospect of loosing 40 gran in education / cost of living benefits isn’t a great draw)
 
The rules changed enough to make that possible - if they go to the Supp Res they can draw on the benefits, while being att posted to a P Res unit. Not optimal, but a workaround.
 
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