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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

From your link: The turret’s flexible design allows it to be integrated with either 105/52 mm rifled or 120/45 mm smoothbore low recoil force guns.
The turret is a good three feet longer than the LAV turret - as it needs to make room for the low recoil force gun.


The AMX-10 has a "medium velocity" 105mm. Use of full pressure 105mm tank rounds will destroy the system in short order, can they be used in extremis - yes, but understanding that you are going to beat the system to death in a basic load -- which may be acceptable in the circumstances - but shouldn't be a goal.


The question I ask for proponents of this sort of system is what role do you see for them?

I offer General Bullivant's "Fustest with the mostest."

Do the jobs it can, where it can, when it can.

Kind of like those sniper types crawling around in the grass with the slugs and snails in the armoured battlefield. Outranged, outgunned, unarmoured and dead slow. And yet we still hire them. Why is that?
 

Nominally, per ministerial guidance ca 2020. Stipulating for discussion.

Regs - 23,000.

50% to Command and Support (Logistics and Training) - 11,500
30% to Medium Force - 6,900
15% to Light Force - 3,450
5% to Heavy Force - 1,150

6,900 yields two LAV brigade groups of 3,450.
3,450 yields one Light brigade of 3,450
1,150 yields one Heavy Cavalry regiment of 1,150

Make the brigades and the regiment F-Echelon heavy. Make Command and Support responsible for pushing all the forwards from national central to the field in a timely fashion. Put the Commissaries into the field with the troops after showing them this film clip from the Battle of Isandlhwana:
Lets say it take aprox 1k soldiers for a BN

3,500-5k/ per Brigade
10-15k / Division (depending if it is a 3 or 4 Bde Div)
20-45k / Corps (depending on 2-5 Div and Div size)

Those numbers include the staff and support, all that is needed on top of that is some recruiting, Advanced Schools and other ERE positions - as I would want One Station Training - lets budget 10% of the Army for that.

Now adding the PRes - the CA has 42,000 combined green suited personnel

Reducing that by 10%, it leaves 37,800 PY.

There should be enough PY for 1 Canadian Corps (lets say it is a static HQ for Peacetime constraints)
But that still allows for 2 good sized deployable Divisions or 3 smaller ones.

I'd be in favor of three smaller ones, as it allows a Heavy Div, Med Div, and Light Div, all organized by task.

1 CAD HQ Wainwright (Bde's in Edmonton AB, Saskatoon SK, and Brandon MB)
2 CMD HQ Valcartier (Bde's in Valcartier PQ, Montreal PQ, and Gagetown NB)
3 CLD HQ Thunder Bay (Bde's in Thunder Bay, Meaford ON, and Kelona BC)
BN/Reg't Units in surrounding areas (less than 4 hrs drive in SMPV) from the Bde, and some Coy level subunits further outlying.

1 CDN CORPS in Kingston.
 
I offer General Bullivant's "Fustest with the mostest."

Do the jobs it can, where it can, when it can.

Kind of like those sniper types crawling around in the grass with the slugs and snails in the armoured battlefield. Outranged, outgunned, unarmoured and dead slow. And yet we still hire them. Why is that?
In my later years, I have become a much greater adherer to Doctrine.

I've posted several rants about how the MPFV flies in the face of US Army Light Doctrine.
It smacks of another GWOT "Bad Take", as Light Doctrine is very specific that sort of need means that Light Forces aren't the force for that sort of operation. You just created a massive footprint and movement issue with Light Forces in adding that.
What else can do the envisioned "gap" and still conform to Light principles?
I'd argue that 84mm Carl G type Auto Loader in an RWS would be great tool to punch holes in fortification - and could be mounted on a light vehicle. Any additional mass and armor isn't required for that task -- and it encourages miss-employment of Light Forces.

The same with the issue of the "Medium Force", which originally was supposed to be a Light Protected Mobility Force for OOTW.
When your LAV/Stryker no longer fits in a Herc for rapid deployment, why do you have it?

I'm the guy who loves additional capabilities, but I am also very leery of adding capabilities without an honest look at what the intended role, or capability gap is of the equipment bringing this capability.

Heavy Forces are great for both pushing for breakthrough, and blunting attacks and counter attacks. Mediums Forces can conduct protected Mobility operations, and pursuit/exploitation - Light Forces can get there quick for deescalation purposes, or at least dig in an hold for heavier forces to arrive - as well as conduct operations in complex terrain, and rapid insertion missions.

No one type of force can do it all, and any attempt to make an all signing and dancing force is just folly.
 
In my later years, I have become a much greater adherer to Doctrine.

I've posted several rants about how the MPFV flies in the face of US Army Light Doctrine.
It smacks of another GWOT "Bad Take", as Light Doctrine is very specific that sort of need means that Light Forces aren't the force for that sort of operation. You just created a massive footprint and movement issue with Light Forces in adding that.
What else can do the envisioned "gap" and still conform to Light principles?
I'd argue that 84mm Carl G type Auto Loader in an RWS would be great tool to punch holes in fortification - and could be mounted on a light vehicle. Any additional mass and armor isn't required for that task -- and it encourages miss-employment of Light Forces.

The same with the issue of the "Medium Force", which originally was supposed to be a Light Protected Mobility Force for OOTW.
When your LAV/Stryker no longer fits in a Herc for rapid deployment, why do you have it?

I'm the guy who loves additional capabilities, but I am also very leery of adding capabilities without an honest look at what the intended role, or capability gap is of the equipment bringing this capability.

Heavy Forces are great for both pushing for breakthrough, and blunting attacks and counter attacks. Mediums Forces can conduct protected Mobility operations, and pursuit/exploitation - Light Forces can get there quick for deescalation purposes, or at least dig in an hold for heavier forces to arrive - as well as conduct operations in complex terrain, and rapid insertion missions.

No one type of force can do it all, and any attempt to make an all signing and dancing force is just folly.

Once again I'll propose that, as long as we have enough of the right artillery, we can try out any 'new fads' we want with the rest of the force.
 
Once again I'll propose that, as long as we have enough of the right artillery, we can try out any 'new fads' we want with the rest of the force.
I'll disagree there simply as for some areas Arty won't be appropriate, and secondly if the CA was to have Div and Corps Arty, it wouldn't get to theatre for months due to the limits of Canadian transportation, thirdly without an expansive AD bubble your Arty won't last.
 
The same with the issue of the "Medium Force", which originally was supposed to be a Light Protected Mobility Force for OOTW.
When your LAV/Stryker no longer fits in a Herc for rapid deployment, why do you have it?
So would you say that "Medium Forces" are really the the bloated overweight version of what should be a subset of light forces?
 
Lets say it take aprox 1k soldiers for a BN

3,500-5k/ per Brigade
10-15k / Division (depending if it is a 3 or 4 Bde Div)
20-45k / Corps (depending on 2-5 Div and Div size)

Those numbers include the staff and support, all that is needed on top of that is some recruiting, Advanced Schools and other ERE positions - as I would want One Station Training - lets budget 10% of the Army for that.

Now adding the PRes - the CA has 42,000 combined green suited personnel

Reducing that by 10%, it leaves 37,800 PY.

There should be enough PY for 1 Canadian Corps (lets say it is a static HQ for Peacetime constraints)
But that still allows for 2 good sized deployable Divisions or 3 smaller ones.

I'd be in favor of three smaller ones, as it allows a Heavy Div, Med Div, and Light Div, all organized by task.

1 CAD HQ Wainwright (Bde's in Edmonton AB, Saskatoon SK, and Brandon MB)
2 CMD HQ Valcartier (Bde's in Valcartier PQ, Montreal PQ, and Gagetown NB)
3 CLD HQ Thunder Bay (Bde's in Thunder Bay, Meaford ON, and Kelona BC)
BN/Reg't Units in surrounding areas (less than 4 hrs drive in SMPV) from the Bde, and some Coy level subunits further outlying.

1 CDN CORPS in Kingston.

Lets say it take aprox 1k soldiers for a BN

Stop right there!

1686246904522.png

In whose army? And what is the Battalion/Squadron/Regiment doing?

We are not manned and equipped as Heavy Armour. Nor are we manned and equipped as Infantry or even Mechanized Infantry.

We are manned and equipped as a force of Dragoons, Mounted Infantry, Mounted Rifles, LAR Battalion.

“The LAR [Light Armored Reconnaissance] battalion performs combined arms reconnaissance and security missions in support of the GCE [Ground Combat Element]. Its mission is to conduct reconnaissance, security and economy of force operations, and, within its capabilities, limited offensive or defensive operations that exploit the unit’s mobility and firepower.” (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-14, page 1-1)

LAR is not mechanized infantry. MCWP 3-14 states (page 2-1): “The LAR scouts are not employed the same way as infantry or mechanized infantry.”

These are the jobs we can do.

“The LAV should not be viewed as an infantry fighting vehicle or as an armored personnel carrier. This vehicle is an armored reconnaissance vehicle that lacks sufficient armor protection and troop density to perform missions normally assigned to a mechanized infantry unit.”

Chapter 1. Fundamentals
Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Fundamental Roles of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion . . . . . 1-2
Shape the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Provide Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Preserve Combat Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Light Armored Reconnaissance in Operational Maneuver From the Sea . . 1-2
Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
MAGTF Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Deep Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Close Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Rear Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4


Shape the Battlespace

The fundamental role of the LAR battalion in the
MARDIV is to shape the battlespace. The LAR
battalion performs this by conducting reconnaissance,
security, and other operations. In doing so,
the LAR battalion facilitates the supported commander’s
ability to maneuver his forces, to concentrate
superior combat power, and to apply it
against the enemy at the decisive point. The LAR
battalion helps to reduce the “fog of war” by
locating where the enemy is, where he is not,
where he is strong, and where he is weak.

Provide Information

To successfully execute maneuver, the supported
commander must have a high degree of
situational awareness.

Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space

The commander thinks and plans in terms of the
time and space that is required to maneuver and
concentrate subordinate units against enemy
weaknesses. The distance the LAR battalion
operates from the GCE and the amount of combat
power available determine how much time
and space the commander will have to react to
the enemy. The mobility that is provided by the
light armored vehicle (LAV) allows LAR units to
seize or retain the initiative and to create or
exploit opportunities as they occur in the course
of other operations.

Preserve Combat Power

The LAR battalion, by its role, can perform economy
of force missions. The flexible capabilities
of the LAR battalion allow the GCE commander
the ability to retain combat power of other tactical
units for engagement where he desires.

We could afford an all-singing, all-dancing Army if we wanted to. We don't want to.
The argument stops right there.

So what can we do with what we have?

We can contribute to any battlefield anywhere with the forces we have. We can't be everywhere on any one battlefield. That is not who we are.

We don't need 1000 bodies for a Mech Infantry Battalion.
We can build two Dragoon Battalions from those 1000 bodies.
We can build two Euro-style Combined Arms / Panzer Battalions from those bodies.

We need to stop thinking in terms of Arming the Man and start thinking in terms of Manning the Arms.
We have more Arms than Men (Sorry ladies, no slight intended).
We need to focus on putting machines into the field and not people.
The people we have can man a lot of machines at 3 people to the machine. And that machine can be armed with any weapon you like, from 5.56mm C9 to 155mm. From UAVs to SSMs.

And the troops in the back are adjuncts to the unit commander's vehicles. Kind of like the winch. Properly used to get you out of problems you shouldn't be in.

The Light Infantry on the other hand, still needs bodies. A Light Infantry Battalion can function with 3 rifle companies and a weapons company but it does better with more rifle companies, with more bodies.

A rifle battalion of three companies of three platoons of three sections of 9 people is viable. That is 243 Rifles to the Battalion
A rifle battalion of four companies of four platoons of four sections of 13 people is possible. That is 864 Rifles to the Battalion.

A full time Regular Battalion can function on some battlefields with 243 Rifles.
That same Regular Battalion should be able to manage an additional Company, with an additional Platoon in each Company, an additional Section in Each Platoon and an additional Team in each section supplied from national Reserves. That would mean that the Reserves would have to supply 621 Rifles with no field rank higher than Major, and possibly even Captain. The Garrison Commander is a Force Generator.

621 means 6 or so Garrison Companies. With 20,000 bodies authorized then we should be able to find enough of them to create a suitable Infantry force. And with a little help from the Transport Companies we could turn them into Motorized/Mechanized Infantry fairly easily.

We should do what we can with what we have rather than wasting time wishing for what we don't have.
The time, and budget wasted on wishing could be better spent on better equipping what we do have.
 
I see medium forces as basically the ordinary infantry formations, akin to the basic infantry formations of WWII. Light and heavy/armoured formations represent a couple of specialties.
 
In my later years, I have become a much greater adherer to Doctrine.

I've posted several rants about how the MPFV flies in the face of US Army Light Doctrine.
It smacks of another GWOT "Bad Take", as Light Doctrine is very specific that sort of need means that Light Forces aren't the force for that sort of operation. You just created a massive footprint and movement issue with Light Forces in adding that.
What else can do the envisioned "gap" and still conform to Light principles?
I'd argue that 84mm Carl G type Auto Loader in an RWS would be great tool to punch holes in fortification - and could be mounted on a light vehicle. Any additional mass and armor isn't required for that task -- and it encourages miss-employment of Light Forces.

The same with the issue of the "Medium Force", which originally was supposed to be a Light Protected Mobility Force for OOTW.
When your LAV/Stryker no longer fits in a Herc for rapid deployment, why do you have it?

I'm the guy who loves additional capabilities, but I am also very leery of adding capabilities without an honest look at what the intended role, or capability gap is of the equipment bringing this capability.

Heavy Forces are great for both pushing for breakthrough, and blunting attacks and counter attacks. Mediums Forces can conduct protected Mobility operations, and pursuit/exploitation - Light Forces can get there quick for deescalation purposes, or at least dig in an hold for heavier forces to arrive - as well as conduct operations in complex terrain, and rapid insertion missions.

No one type of force can do it all, and any attempt to make an all signing and dancing force is just folly.

If you really want to fight then you will get to the fight with whatever you can. That is the situation of which the Ukrainians remind us every day.
They are re-writing doctrine of necessity.

Just as our current platoon structure was re-written in 1916 of necessity.

Doctrine is a great planning tool. But it can't be allowed to restrict your choices in the face of reality. That is the situation of which the Russians remind us every day.

Some plans last decades. Some only last days. And some don't survive contact.

NATO armies have got used to preparing for THE BATTLE. The US has prepared to fight two or three types of Battles. Our enemies have noticed what we are good at, and what we are prepared for. So they are doing the other thing.
 
A mortar carrier with a direct fire capability with a round sufficient to penetrate soft/medium armour and fortifications would do. The problem is that a 120mm mortar round is also limiting for on-board ammo especially if it truly has a dual role of indirect fire support. There are issues here of location (you don't want radar attracting mortars too close to your manoeuvre elements - they attract counterfire) Similarly indirect fire resources generally work from areas where they can't quickly switch to direct fire support. You end up having to choose. And then there's the feeding of the beast with ammo.

🍻
The AMOS system carries 48 rounds of 120mm on board compared to 18 rounds on the Stryker M1128 MGS, 38 rounds for the RC10, 40 rounds for the Centauro, and 42 rounds for both the Leopard 2 and M1A2 Abrams.

You wouldn't have to have the same actual individual vehicles perform both the DFS and IDF roles...you'd just have the logistical bonus of using the same type of vehicle/ammo for each dedicated role.
 
So would you say that "Medium Forces" are really the the bloated overweight version of what should be a subset of light forces?

Or would you say that it is the over-weight, over-protected version of what should be a rapidly deployable, light cavalry force?
 
I see medium forces as basically the ordinary infantry formations, akin to the basic infantry formations of WWII. Light and heavy/armoured formations represent a couple of specialties.

I see the medium force in the Boer War context as being manoeuvre forces countering Commando style Boer Light Horse with Canadian Mounted Rifles, Strathcona's, Aussie Light Horse and Imperial Yeomanry.

And, in WWI, waiting for the Great Breakout.
 
Imagine the annoyance of physics being a thing right ;)

The recoil forces of cannons are massive.
For smaller vehicles to mount them, they need to be able to manage the recoil energy differently than tanks.
Both in terms of limiting the arc of fire to ensure that the forces don’t tip a vehicle over - but also lengthen the time of the transfer of the energy —- so they need a much longer cycle of operations and thus a longer recoil system which requires a longer turret and can often then limit gun elevation and depression (or you need a huge tall turret) as well as an effective muzzle brake.

Just look at the platform rock on a 60+ ton MBT when the gun fires, and why some SPA have spades and arc limits.

There is no free lunch or physics defying abilities in platform designs.

Most smaller platforms use lower velocity cannons, or smaller diameter less energy cannons.
Recoil plus overpressure.
 
Recoil plus overpressure.
The muzzle brake and bore evacuator ensure that the pressure is all on the outside, and the fact the breach isn’t unlocked until the pressure has subsided.

One never wants to be a dismount around tanks or IFV’s though as not only will they jockey right over you if they get spooked by an anti tank system - but sabots will do a nasty job on top of the concussion from the muzzle brakes.
 
What are we arguing about? :confused:
European or African swallows and coconuts.
king john GIF
 
The muzzle brake and bore evacuator ensure that the pressure is all on the outside, and the fact the breach isn’t unlocked until the pressure has subsided.

One never wants to be a dismount around tanks or IFV’s though as not only will they jockey right over you if they get spooked by an anti tank system - but sabots will do a nasty job on top of the concussion from the muzzle brakes.
Umm OK, was on the firing point duringbthe initial trial shoot. GM and the Fr team put all sorts of sensors both external and internal but would only allow remote fire. Maybe the engrs knew what might happen, Doors blew open, hull deformed.
 

Veteran reservist says forces are being stretched too thin​

National Post - 10 Jun 2023
  • This is a conversation series by Donna KennedyGlans, a writer and former Alberta cabinet minister, featuring newsmakers and intriguing personalities. This week: Army Reserve veteran Mike Vernon.
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MCPL GENEVIEVE LAPOINTE, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA, CANADIAN ARMED FORCESMembers of the 41 Canadian Brigade Group work with Alberta Wildfire and local firefighters in a fire prevention operation in Drayton Valley, Alberta.

Fighting fires, shovelling heavy snowfall, delivering vaccines; it’s all become part of the mandate of the Canadian Armed Forces. But when does the combination of dwindling resources (both equipment and people), and a growing call on soldiers “as a force of last resort” to deal with extreme weather events, compromise the military’s preparedness as a combat-ready force?

To find out, I reach out to Mike Vernon. Not the hockey player, the “other” Mike Vernon — recently retired commander of the 41 Canadian Brigade Group, a 1,600- member army reserve formation with units in Alberta and the Northwest Territories. Unlike regulars in the CAF, reservists have civilian jobs and volunteer for deployments at home and abroad.

“For a number of reasons — cultural reasons, readiness reasons, equipment — it’s a weekly topic of conversation,” Mike reports. In his world, people are questioning if this is a credible force, and the war in Ukraine has made those questions all the more evident. His assessment?

“It’s a tenuous system backstopped by a lot of committed people who will make it work.”

We agree to meet at Calgary’s Military Museums. Before Mike takes me behind the public- facing walls of the museum — to a nondescript meeting room buried in a warren of offices where he and other military archivists toil — he walks me to an enormous mural identifying by name the more than 500 Alberta reservists who volunteered to serve in Afghanistan. As a civilian journalist, Mike covered the war in Croatia and reported from Afghanistan for CBC. He has produced two documentaries, one set in Kandahar and one profiling army reservists; both put a human face on war.

Mike has volunteered as a reservist to assist civilian authorities respond to emergencies, including joining 900 other reservists from across Western Canada to fight wildfires in B.C. for six weeks in 2003. What does he think of the recent calls on the CAF to show up to fight fires across Canada?

“We shouldn’t be the first organization that gets called to help, domestically,” Mike replies. Then he explains: “The provinces are responsible and should get help from the feds, then reach out to the military. That’s the way it should roll out. But increasingly … the military is getting called earlier and earlier. The senior leaders in the military, I know from the discussions, they find that a bit frustrating. Because the provinces have the equipment and the infrastructure and the experience and the budgets.”

“When the military does this,” Mike concludes, “it’s basically downing tools and everything else it is doing to switch gears and go to communities.”

It doesn’t have to be this way, Mike suggests; just across the border, the American model is different. There, the army has contracts with national guardsmen and commanders can activate regiments of reservists as needed. In Canada, Mike couldn’t compel volunteer reservists to show up. It was a mad scramble to “beat the bushes” and ask members whether they could leave their civilian job for two weeks or two months and go to Drayton Valley to fight fires.

Last June, this question of military preparedness was put squarely on the table by Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre, in a sweeping directive to “reconstitute” Canada’s military. Eyre calls for a serious rethink of how the military does its work including the possibility of transferring tasks and capabilities from CAF to Department of National Defence employees or contractors.

What does Mike make of Eyre’s stern warning that the military we have today is not the one we need for the future? Mike agrees but questions the political resolve to change.

‘ When I first started my career,” Mike shares, “we had armoured vehicles in the reserves here in Calgary. Right now, when the Calgary Highlanders go on a training exercise to Wainwright or Suffield, it’s a mixture of civilian vehicles, military vehicles, pickup trucks, nothing lethal in that mix of vehicles. We just look like some kind of Gypsy caravan going to the field.

“We could be projecting more power, more influence — or good — around the world and yet there doesn’t seem to be a coherent vision for that,” Mike suggests.
Instead, we have two conflicting tracks of messaging out there; a strong sense of patriotic duty competing with the need to be seen as a woke nation. Having the prime minister privately say we have no intention of actually trying to hit our promised spending targets in NATO, is also demoralizing.

“And it’s not just the military. I think about CBC and Radio- Canada International in the old days; why isn’t the CBC like the BBC in terms of what it could be putting out to the world?”

Meantime, the CAF is short 10,000 people in the regular force. Calls to defund the police make recruiting more difficult for the RCMP, the police and the military, Mike observes.

“All these paramilitary organizations seem to be struggling to connect with young Canadians and … with diverse communities.”

And ponderous medical and security screening procedures make the CAF recruiting process exasperating for those who want to join. Mike’s son, Liam, recently graduated from the University of Alberta. Following in the steps of his grandfather and father, he applied to join the infantry but after six months of no contact from the recruiters, he pulled his application. Instead, Liam chose a corporate finance position with a Calgary- based energy company.

Mike doesn’t hide his frustration: “He would have gone straight in, he wasn’t looking for a free education at RMC.”

Tamping down hot spots and evacuating communities at risk in wildfire season is serious business. No doubt the federal government will continue to smash the “break in case of emergency” glass and when there’s a genuine need, regular soldiers and reservists will show up. Yet there’s a lot riding on a tenuous system. The fight in Ukraine remains a challenge, and Canada has a moral and strategic imperative to keep pushing back Russia, but there are scarier threats on the horizon.

Donna Kennedy- Glans is active in the energy business and a multi- generational family farm. Her latest book is Teaching the Dinosaur to Dance: Moving Beyond Business as Usual ( 2022).
 
Umm OK, was on the firing point duringbthe initial trial shoot. GM and the Fr team put all sorts of sensors both external and internal but would only allow remote fire. Maybe the engrs knew what might happen, Doors blew open, hull deformed.
So clearly the gun’s breach was opening while still pressurized. That is a major safety issue in any vehicle -
 
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