Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[dapaterson]

Halifax Rifles were brought back into the Res F, not the Reg F.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Halifax Rifles were brought back into the Res F, not the Reg F.

But they are still 'Twice the Citizen', right?

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Just a small add on to the above on the SoB. To the best of my knowledge, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was not placed on the SoB. It was disbanded.

You are correct.

What's more is that there isn't a CAR perpetuation by any existant regiment today, SoB included. CSOR only perpetuates the First Special Service Force and then jumps to their formation in 2006.

 

[FJAG]

Halifax Rifles were brought back into the Res F, not the Reg F.

Of course they are. Damn typo. I need an independent proof-reader.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Army and the New Paradigm of Ground Combat: Lessons from Ukraine’s Failed 2023 Counteroffensive - Modern War Institute

The current battlefield is riddled with multiple forms of contact. The combination of indirect fires, efficient and increasingly shortened kill chains, electromagnetic interference, the proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—including, one-way attack UAS, thermal optics, mines, and...

mwi.westpoint.edu

Some interesting thoughts

The current paradigm of ground combat, made explicit by Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, suggests seven variables that will inform the future construct of offensive operations:

1. Battlefield Transparency. UAS and precision fires enable all belligerents to see, sense, and deliver effects well beyond the FLET/FLOT (forward line of enemy troops and forward line of own troops). This new tactical revolution and changing characteristic of war imposes a grave threat to massed formations. If we cannot mass, how we will breach? And if we cannot breach, how will we seize terrain?

2. Mobility. Mines have resurfaced as a major obstacle to offensive maneuver. Our current inventory of plows, rollers, mobile bridges, mine-clearing line charges, and other mobility platforms are not sufficient to reduce the density of mines employed by Russian defensive positions.

3. Combat Power Preservation. Military forces require meaningful ways to generate mass without expending high volumes of mounted platforms and lives. This observation lends further credence to the need for small, plentiful, and distributed drones that could serve as a contact layer across the tactical FLET/FLOT. This could be a way to preserve combat power until conditions are met to seize terrain—but only if the United States invests in the required number of stockpiles required to make this a reality.

4. Changes to the Operations Process. Tactical formations need methods to distribute orders and execute the operations process in faster planning cycles and across dispersed locations. The operations process must keep pace with the modern battlefield. Our current training paradigm conditions us to execute deliberate planning and troop-leading procedures across multiple hours or even days. We then rehearse the plan on a static terrain model before disseminating updates to static command posts. The current operational environment requires formations to execute the operations process through distributed locations and under constant observation. We must not allow the operations process to prevent us from gaining and maintaining the initiative.

5. Battlefield Geometry. UAS, including one-way attack UAS, along with electronic warfare capabilities, a variety of sensors, and weapons standoff will change the scope and scale of division, brigade, battalion, and company responsibilities. Legacy planning considerations for unit frontages and depths must account for extended sensing and strike ranges.

6. Resourcing at the Decisive Echelon. The Army’s transformation in contact initiative seeks to improve the lethality of brigade combat teams; however, as a force, we have not defined which echelon will be the decisive command. US Army divisions and brigades of the future will still lack the appropriate mass, resources, logistics, and communications to act independently of their higher headquarters within the emergent operational environment.

7. Information Flow and Decision-Making. We have yet to understand the impact UAS will have on the relationship between information flow and decision-making. Our Army employs a quality noncommissioned officer corps and demands calculated risk taking and initiative; however, an empowered tactical formation assuming independent action may unknowingly maneuver toward its own demise. Future offensive frameworks should define conditions in which tactical formations exercise prudent risk and initiative under the umbrella of a deliberate offensive framework.

Item 6 seems to suggest that in a large area war, like Ukraine, you need at least a Corps to be able to see the whole board and manage all the pieces. (US Corps - I Corps, III Corps, V Corps and XVIII Corps, MDTFs - 2 with I Corps, 1 with V Corps, 1 with III Corps and 1 with XVIII Corps (how many conflicts can the US manage concurrently?)). How about the Europeans? JEF? CANZUK? Canada?

...

Estimate properly situated

Based on observations of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, and informed by an understanding of these seven variables, we can establish a problem statement:

Given the high efficacy of enemy UAS, mines, and precision fires, how does the US Army manage high volumes of data across distributed locations, and then aggregate combat power in a method that enables operational endurance for follow-on operations while managing risk and preserving combat power?

Offered solution

Based on the variables and problem statement described above, we propose a framework, designed principally for armored brigade combat teams, that respects the defensive layers of the enemy, acknowledges the tactical revolution of UAS, and preserves our most valuable assets until conditions are set: Isolate, Suppress, Destroy.

Isolate

This phase requires the brigade to isolate battalion and company objectives. This phase does not attrit enemy formations, but degrades, dislocates, disintegrates, and disrupts key enemy systems (e.g., command-and-control nodes, electronic warfare platforms, fuel and ammunition stocks, and radar and other sensors). This phase requires the brigade to stabilize the FLET/FLOT and cover a frontage of over one hundred kilometers, compared to the legacy planning factors of three to eight kilometers. In this scenario, the brigade synchronizes and orchestrates a collection plan that leverages its organic assets as well as medium-range reconnaissance UAS and the family of UAS that reside at the squadron and battalion level. The brigade, concurrent with squadron security operations, will build the digital common operational picture of the isolated area. Simultaneously, the brigade dynamically retasks the squadron and battalions to deliver collection and fires tasks.

A 100 km Brigade vs an 8 km Brigade - Going to need more HIMARS at the Brigade level.

Mutually Suppress

This phase masses the effects of direct, indirect, UAS, and all forms of contact onto select enemy battle positions. The brigade and battalions continue isolation measures; however, this phase should see a commitment of brigade- and battalion-level assets against enemy objectives. The brigade will continue its effects against enemy command-and-control nodes, fire direction centers, and sensors while prioritizing enemy positions. This phase requires battalions to mutually mass on select objectives.

Selectively Destroy

This phase facilitates the point of penetration and offensive seizure. This phase also commits ground combat power—which incurs the greatest risk for the attacker. The brigade will continue to collect, disintegrate enemy counterattacks, destroy enemy command-and-control nodes and sensors, deny the enemy from reinforcing, and dynamically retask subordinate elements.

...

The author in item 4 upthread called for changes to operation processes, suggesting op tempo was too slow and that there was too much deliberation.

His prescription seems to me to be awfully slow and deliberate.

1 Brigade covers 100 km to stabilize it. Presumably then a Division will be stabilizing 300 km. Both the Brigade and the Division are going to have widely dispersed Battalions and Companies with limited opportunities for mutual support and rapid massing for quick reactions.

I can see why he wants the Corps. But if a Brigade is covering 100 km wide, presumably those Brigade systems in the hands of the enemy are going to keep the next Brigade 100 km to the rear. A tactical bound has now become 100 km and not 10 km. How far to the rear does that put the Corps reserve?

 

[KevinB]

A 100 km Brigade vs an 8 km Brigade - Going to need more HIMARS at the Brigade level.

That is insane as enemy forces could drive a Division through that zone - and the entire theory is based on UAS and other remote sensors that are susceptible to EW or other methods of degradation.

...

The author in item 4 upthread called for changes to operation processes, suggesting op tempo was too slow and that there was too much deliberation.

His prescription seems to me to be awfully slow and deliberate.

Yup.

1 Brigade covers 100 km to stabilize it. Presumably then a Division will be stabilizing 300 km. Both the Brigade and the Division are going to have widely dispersed Battalions and Companies with limited opportunities for mutual support and rapid massing for quick reactions.

I think you meant aith zero capability to mutually support or mass.

I can see why he wants the Corps. But if a Brigade is covering 100 km wide, presumably those Brigade systems in the hands of the enemy are going to keep the next Brigade 100 km to the rear. A tactical bound has now become 100 km and not 10 km. How far to the rear does that put the Corps reserve?

To me that article went to left field early and then just left the stadium.

 

[Kirkhill]

That is insane as enemy forces could drive a Division through that zone - and the entire theory is based on UAS and other remote sensors that are susceptible to EW or other methods of degradation.

Yup.

I think you meant aith zero capability to mutually support or mass.



To me that article went to left field early and then just left the stadium.

Quote by Frederick the Great : “He who defends everything, defends nothing.”


The problem with everything is it all comes down to risk management. Everything comes down to the throw of the dice. And you better be able to lose.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

The problem with the author's model is that is accounts very little for geography and physics having their say.

That 100km AO is a lot different if it's urban or rural, flat or mountainous, foiliage or grassland. Thinking from a CIS standpoint, range and signal path care not what your frontage and depth are; they have a limit range based on frequency and all are susceptible to EW and DF.

These factors, I assume, come front and centre as well to the logisticians, HSS, and maint folks who have to support these lone Battalions across a massive AO.

Teeth need tail, but the distance and speed factor much more into how far apart they can be.

 

[KevinB]

The problem with the author's model is that is accounts very little for reality.

FIFY.
OPFOR will use Low Yield Devices and the EMP from them to cause all sort of issues with the vaunted sensor net.

That 100km AO is a lot different if it's urban or rural, flat or mountainous, foiliage or grassland. Thinking from a CIS standpoint, range and signal path care not what your frontage and depth are; they have a limit range based on frequency and all are susceptible to EW and DF.

These factors, I assume, come front and centre as well to the logisticians, HSS, and maint folks who have to support these lone Battalions across a massive AO.

Teeth need tail, but the distance and speed factor much more into how far apart they can be.

That 100km AO is RTFO simply from Artillery support aspects.
I was expecting to start reading about robot dogs, and fighting humanoid robots in that article - because the lack of density he suggest is mind boggling to think of trying to tackle with todays technology in a non permissive environment.



His arguments on mining and breaching is pretty poor given the way the ABCT's are setup - but I do think any new MBT should have a dedicated breaching vehicle variant -- Plow, MICLIC with trailer, and some sort of recovery tools.

 

[Halifax Tar]

OPFOR will use Low Yield Devices and the EMP from them to cause all sort of issues with the vaunted sensor net.

I think if Churchill were PM now this is what would keep him awake at night.

 

[KevinB]

I think if Churchill were PM now this is what would keep him awake at night.

It keeps a lot of folks up at night and also some "out in the night"...

 

[ytz]

That is insane as enemy forces could drive a Division through that zone - and the entire theory is based on UAS and other remote sensors that are susceptible to EW or other methods of degradation.

We're past drones these days. Especially near-peer. We're now talking satellites and mesh networked MEMS acoustics along with things like AI analysis of social media to detect forces and develop intent. The MDTF was designed to detect this kind of signature and to counter our emissions of such. It's going to be very difficult to move an entire division these days undetected. Few passes from a satellite with some coherent change detection and they will be found.

All you need is one private sending his girlified a message before turning off his phone at the Line of Departure......

 

[KevinB]

We're past drones these days. Especially near-peer. We're now talking satellites and mesh networked MEMS acoustics along with things like AI analysis of social media to detect forces and develop intent. The MDTF was designed to detect this kind of signature and to counter our emissions of such. It's going to be very difficult to move an entire division these days undetected. Few passes from a satellite with some coherent change detection and they will be found.

All you need is one private sending his girlified a message before turning off his phone at the Line of Departure......

There are also ways to counter satellites as well, as if you are willing to launch a low yield device on the battlefield, you might just consider doing the same to a chunk of space to get stuff in LEO

 

[Kirkhill]

We're past drones these days. Especially near-peer. We're now talking satellites and mesh networked MEMS acoustics along with things like AI analysis of social media to detect forces and develop intent. The MDTF was designed to detect this kind of signature and to counter our emissions of such. It's going to be very difficult to move an entire division these days undetected. Few passes from a satellite with some coherent change detection and they will be found.

All you need is one private sending his girlified a message before turning off his phone at the Line of Departure......

The other point is that drones are cheap and EMPs are expensive. The EMP is, as the name suggests, a pulse. It is an instant in time. It only affects those devices in range and active at that instant. After the pulse you can activate new devices. At which point you have to detonate a new device.

You might effectively detonate one EMP device but how many can you afford? What is the risk of unintended radiation effects? How long before the enemy catches on to keeping spares powered down?

 

[ytz]

There are also ways to counter satellites as well, as if you are willing to launch a low yield device on the battlefield, you might just consider doing the same to a chunk of space to get stuff in LEO

That's well up the escalation ladder into global conflict. Doing what you suggest creates a legitimate risk of Kessler Syndrome.

That aside. Modern surveillance isn't just drones. And it isn't just satellites. Signatures happens across multiple domains. And that means collection is multi-domain too. And even in the physical, just read up on how Ukraine is using acoustic sensors on land. The idea that a division can drive through easily anywhere because there's no soldier there to spot them within a few kilometers is substantially outdated.

 

[GR66]

I finally had a chance to read the article and think I have an alternate take on what he's taken from the Ukrainian lessons.

1. He's concluded that unit frontages will have to dramatically increase due to the "transparent battlefield" created by the proliferation of drones and satellite imagery. As a result there is no longer the possibility of massing forces along traditional frontages.
   1. I don't think that this is reflected by the reality on the ground in Ukraine. I haven't seen anything that suggests to me that Brigades are being spread out along 100km frontages.
   2. There are a number of countermeasures that can be taken to reduce the effectiveness of enemy recce efforts to locate forces (engineer prepared positions, cammo, decoys, EW and AD)
   3. It is possible to disperse units enough (even fairly close to the front) to ensure that they are not vulnerable to mass fires from the enemy but only really vulnerable to more expensive (and less plentiful) precision fires.
2. He seems to suggest that increased firepower, uncrewed systems, etc. deployed by units will be enough to compensate for their lack of point mass on the objective.
   1. The level of dispersion that he envisions prevents units from being close enough to support adjacent units without stripping away the remote fires they require to support their own offensive efforts and at the same time present the opportunity for the enemy to envelope and defeat isolated units if their efforts to isolate and suppress the enemy fails.

I would counter that concentration of forces is still possible within traditional frontages but agree that enemy AO that needs to be isolated and suppressed has been greatly increased (as a result of the increased range of enemy sense and destroy capabilities). So while a Brigade may still operate on a traditional 3-8km front the area they need to isolate and suppress may be the 100km front suggested by the author.

In order to achieve this I believe there needs to be a fundamental shift in the weight between Combat and Combat Support (and Combat Service Support) elements of a force. For example I envision needing:

• More engineering assets to prepare defensive and decoy positions along the front and the muster areas to both hide and protect allied forces from enemy recce and strike assets.
• Dedicated decoy/deception units in order to deceive the enemy as to the actual location and status if allied troops (decoys, smoke, engineered dummy positions, EM deception, smoke, etc.)
• Much more robust EW assets to interfere with enemy recce efforts and communications.
• Significantly greater AD assets of all ranges (both ground-based and airborne) to interdict aircraft of all types (from FPV's to fighters).
• Allied recce assets (ground, air, space, electronic, etc.) capable of identifying targets within the entire 100km isolation/suppression zone
• Enough precision strike assets to effectively target enemy assets throughout the isolation area.
• Enough mass fires to suppress enemy forces at/near the objective

Given the ability to provide the level of protection/deception to allow you to mass your Brigade along the 3-8km front and then isolate and suppress the enemy's 100km front there would be enough mass to seize the objective.

Furthermore, I believe the widely dispersed long-range precision recce and strike elements that make the front lines "transparent" require quite extensive central coordination to be effective and are much more effective against a fairly static front than against highly mobile forces. Once the enemy's 100km front is isolated/suppressed and an initial breakthrough is achieved, I'm guessing that the opportunity for maneuver warfare in the disrupted rear areas of the enemy would become possible.

$0.02