Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

Even though I've always been a 'light/airborne' Infantry type guy I'm sad to see too much time being wasted on this light stuff, in any western military.

The real decision maker has always been the 'heavy metal' crew.

But it's expensive and complicated so my guess is that the 'good idea merchants', who want a great performance review followed by a swift promotion, tend to focus on the light stuff because it's easier to get some kind of result within a fairly short timeframe - like their 2 year posting cycle.

True enough.

I think the start of this on the light side is based on two things: First the light side desperately needed fixing and secondly the work done there probably has more relevance to the ABCT as base information. It's a bit iterative because if one had started with the ABCT then not very much of what was learned there would apply to the IBCTs.

My biggest question is still as to whether or not the third brigade in each armored division will become an SBCT as originally forecast? It doesn't matter here because 1st Cavalry Division is earmarked to become an Armor Division (Reinforced) which will require some augmentation (such as an engineer brigade and a protection brigade).

I like the idea of giving an armored division a brigade with a higher infantry ratio for "follow-up" work on bypassed localities or for a temporary defensive foundation, but . . .

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The problem is that your site is static. Once identified via satellite or whatever it can be destroyed. It would need to be mobile which means it would likely have to be under armour to protect it on the move.

So is much of the Ukrainian frontline. The biggest issues with the older forts is the minimal protected firing positions. The role of engineering equipment and lightweight prefab bunker components and trench cover cannot be overstated.

In Kursk, much of the fighting was mobile defense, but eventually the Russians were able to fix and destroy light forces. The Light forces are a screen while you furiously dig in and prepare for the counter offensives with regular troops, then pull you light forces back to recoup and prepare for the next assault.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So is much of the Ukrainian frontline. The biggest issues with the older forts is the minimal protected firing positions. The role of engineering equipment and lightweight prefab bunker components and trench cover cannot be overstated.

In Kursk, much of the fighting was mobile defense, but eventually the Russians were able to fix and destroy light forces. The Light forces are a screen while you furiously dig in and prepare for the counter offensives with regular troops, then pull you light forces back to recoup and prepare for the next assault.

Or the light forces all just get slaughtered because they’ve been sacrificed in contact with a fully tooled up armoured division.

Mountainous terrain? Littoral operations? Behind enemy lines stuff? Sure… that can work with the right support.

 

[GK .Dundas]

The manuals have it wrong , light infantry in contact with heavy formations don't melt away ( fall back ) they just burn .

 

[Kirkhill]

Just doing some reading and came across two new terms (well at least new to me) in use in the US Army.

There has been a study ongoing on how to reorganize, equip and trial the IBCT within the new division constructs (Transforming-in-contact 1.0) . Three IBCTs have been involved in this, one each from the 101 Airborne, 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry (Hawaii).

The term MBCT (Mobile Brigade Combat Team) has been coined for the 2/101st going back to last August. It denotes an IBCT which has been equipped and is being trialled with the M1301 Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV). The 2/25th and 3/10th, OTOH are being designated and equipped and trialed as LBCTs (Light Brigade Combat Teams).



A similar experiment is starting up with the 2nd ABCT of the 1st Cavalry Divison to see how to restructure an armored brigade combat team.



The next phase (Transforming-in-contact 2.0) will look at the divisional structures.

I'm generally ambivalent, but never virulently opposed, to adopting American terminology. With respect to BCT, both our closest allies (yeah. I know) use the term which distinguishes the organizational structure from the simpler "brigade" to the more descriptive "mechanized brigade group" (which reflects back on a more tracked CFE model which no longer exists). Maybe its time to keep watch on what shakes out of these trials - I'm never opposed to letting someone else do the heavy lifting and copying them when the time comes.

Even though I've always been a 'light/airborne' Infantry type guy I'm sad to see too much time being wasted on this light stuff, in any western military.

The real decision maker has always been the 'heavy metal' crew.

But it's expensive and complicated so my guess is that the 'good idea merchants', who want a great performance review followed by a swift promotion, tend to focus on the light stuff because it's easier to get some kind of result within a fairly short timeframe - like their 2 year posting cycle.

Further to this discussion. On another thread I made an obscure pictorial reference to the 18th struggle between Gage's Light Americans and Dundas's Heavy Prussians. The debate is not new, nor is the struggle for funding and influence.

My sense is that Britain performed well over the last couple of hundred years because of the debate and not in spite of it. I am pretty sure I would get majority support for saying that there is need for both types of forces to manage the full spectrum of threats that may arise.

Which brings me to this article

Reconnaissance in the Light Brigade Combat Team

The Army’s Transformation in Contact (TiC) initiative leverages emerging technology and future-forward force design to transition existing brigade comba...

www.army.mil

In 2024, the 25th Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team transitioned from an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) to a light brigade combat team (LBCT-prototype).

The LBCT is designed to be a lethal and adaptable formation that can fight in heavily restricted terrain. Traditional enabling assets like the brigade engineer battalion (BEB), cavalry squadron, and brigade sustainment battalion (BSB) have been restructured or eliminated entirely to lighten the formation and unburden the brigade staff.

Building a more robust enabling capability at the division level facilitates the Army’s desire to return to it as a unit of action while allowing the brigade to focus on training and employing its rifle companies.

The rifle battalion has also not been immune to change. Battalion scouts and mortars were combined with the remnants of the cavalry troop to form battalion-level cross-domain effects companies (CDEs). ... CDEs combine robotics and autonomous systems with traditional reconnaissance platoons to form lethal and highly enabled teams.

The LBCT rifle company has more assets than ever to sense, see, and strike the enemy.

This statement was stryking.

Equipped with Infantry Squad Vehicles (ISVs), the LBCT’s infantry formations can rapidly move combat power around the battlefield while providing more off-road capability than legacy vehicles.

....

But

The transition from a brigade cavalry squadron to three battalion CDEs leaves the brigade commander short of intelligence capability.

This gap in manned reconnaissance also exists at the division level and has compounding effects in the LBCT construct.

To address this gap, both LBCT prototypes have stood up provisional reconnaissance companies to answer brigade PIRs directly. The 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team (MBCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has successfully tested a multi-functional reconnaissance company (MFRC), while 2/25 deployed its reconnaissance and strike company (RSC) at the most recent JPMRC iteration.3 These concepts mirror previous experimentation conducted by 2/25 during fiscal years 2022 and 2023 at Twentynine Palms, CA, and Japan. Combining electronic warfare (EW), UAS, and traditional human reconnaissance techniques can have a tremendous effect in the brigade fight. The Army should consider standardizing this structure across its TiC formations to speed the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the acquisition of equipment for reconnaissance companies.

Which leads to the author's thesis

In this article, I will articulate a structure for a multidomain reconnaissance company (MRC) that can answer PIRs in the brigade deep area while enabling rifle battalions to succeed in the close fight.

....

Are troops safer with the heightened awareness that comes from operating with no armour, as with the ISV, or does "light armour" (inadequate armour) give them a false sense of security that encourages rash decisions?

...

And in terms of fire support, it has always been a given that a gun will deliver the support, that a gun needs to be heavy, a heavy gun demands a vehicle and that any gun, and its crew, will be a target. That targeting has resulted in the impulse to protect the crew with armour.

The Author of the article joins with a lot of others in promoting the combination of ground launched LAMs and UAVs to take some of the strain off the guns.

I note that the current pause affects all the armoured weapons systems as well as the robotic vehicles.

Does the pause suggest that a longer look is being taken at the entire issue of fire support and what can be delivered with uncrewed aerial vehicles as well as uncrewed ground vehicles? Accepting that lack of crews may mean less resilience BUT not having to worry about crews may mean cheaper systems and ultimately more systems.

 

[IKnowNothing]

I am not sure what that means? What is 1+1?

Moved here because as you say- napkin territory.

1 Armoured Regiment + 1 Mech Bn, vice Armoured + 2 Mech Bn's.

Going full napkin:
1 Canadian Mechanized Division

1 CMBG - Edmonton

• LdSH - (Tank)
• 1PPCLI (LAV)
• current 1 CMBG CS and CSS assets and units @ 70% manning -Edmonton

2CMBG (Tank) - Gagetown

• RCD (Tank)
• 2RCR (LAV)
• current 2 CMBG CS and CSS assets and units @ 70% manning

5 CMBG - Valcartier

• 12 RBC (Recce)
• 1,2,3 R22e
• all other 5 CMBG assets and units

We pull tanks out of the eFP BG, and 5CMBG covers off the rotational infantry component. The 6th Bn set of LAV's get's prepositioned to Latvia, along with a Reg set of tanks (quick purchase pipedream). 1 and 2 CMBG take turns as the ready Bde doing semi-annual reforger style 2 week exercises.

2 & 3 PPCLI, 1 & 3 RCR, and the 30% from 1 and 2 CMBG used to stand up 3 Canadian Light Bde.

 

[Infanteer]

Moved here because as you say- napkin territory.

1 Armoured Regiment + 1 Mech Bn, vice Armoured + 2 Mech Bn's.

Going full napkin:
1 Canadian Mechanized Division

1 CMBG - Edmonton

• LdSH - (Tank)
• 1PPCLI (LAV)
• current 1 CMBG CS and CSS assets and units @ 70% manning -Edmonton

2CMBG (Tank) - Gagetown

• RCD (Tank)
• 2RCR (LAV)
• current 2 CMBG CS and CSS assets and units @ 70% manning

5 CMBG - Valcartier

• 12 RBC (Recce)
• 1,2,3 R22e
• all other 5 CMBG assets and units

We pull tanks out of the eFP BG, and 5CMBG covers off the rotational infantry component. The 6th Bn set of LAV's get's prepositioned to Latvia, along with a Reg set of tanks (quick purchase pipedream). 1 and 2 CMBG take turns as the ready Bde doing semi-annual reforger style 2 week exercises.

2 & 3 PPCLI, 1 & 3 RCR, and the 30% from 1 and 2 CMBG used to stand up 3 Canadian Light Bde.

You do realize that a Mechanized Division is more than just 3x manoeuvre brigades?

 

[IKnowNothing]

You do realize that a Mechanized Division is more than just 3x manoeuvre brigades?

You'll note I didn't actually plan for a division scale deployment. The division would be tasked with force generating for an expanded Latvia commitment to make the Canadian lead MNB both more potent and more Canadian than not, plus have a wholly Canadian followup Bde.

Pair the provincially local PRes units with the Bde's to provide sustainment depth at the sub-sub unit and individual level.

Do the same with the remnants of PPCLI and RCR (plus Saskatchewan and BC)

Go from 4 geographically based administrative divisions to 2 task based ones.

 

[daftandbarmy]

You'll note I didn't actually plan for a division scale deployment. The division would be tasked with force gene daftandbarmy rating for an expanded Latvia commitment to make the Canadian lead MNB both more potent and more Canadian than not, plus have a wholly Canadian followup Bde.

Pair the provincially local PRes units with the Bde's to provide sustainment depth at the sub-sub unit and individual level.

Do the same with the remnants of PPCLI and RCR (plus Saskatchewan and BC)

Go from 4 geographically based administrative divisions to 2 task based ones.

My guess is that you'll be expecting the Reserves to provide depth to the Regs but, in reality, it might actually turn out to be the opposite

 

[KevinB]

You'll note I didn't actually plan for a division scale deployment. The division would be tasked with force generating for an expanded Latvia commitment to make the Canadian lead MNB both more potent and more Canadian than not, plus have a wholly Canadian followup Bde.

Pair the provincially local PRes units with the Bde's to provide sustainment depth at the sub-sub unit and individual level.

Do the same with the remnants of PPCLI and RCR (plus Saskatchewan and BC)

Go from 4 geographically based administrative divisions to 2 task based ones.

The issue is that the backbone of the Division is what is needed, some of the CS and CSS elements that don’t exist outside of higher formations, or if existing aren’t found at the same scope, scale below Division.

Anyone can send Maneuver elements, but the bones of the formation from the HQ on down is important.

 

[Kirkhill]

You do realize that a Mechanized Division is more than just 3x manoeuvre brigades?

Would you believe.....?

A C5ISR Unit/Group
A Service Brigade
An Artillery Brigade
2 Manoeuvre Brigades of 3 CABs each
An Aviation Unit/Group.

Establish a strong skeleton to which other units and brigades can be attached.

 

[Ostrozac]

We pull tanks out of the eFP BG, and 5CMBG covers off the rotational infantry component.

Pulling tanks out of Latvia I could live with, as they may not be supportable in the long term, but rotational infantry can’t be easily tied to a single brigade, or a single regiment. It risks burning out one part of the army while the rest is underemployed. Plus, specific to 5 brigade, 80% of our reserve infantry speak English, so wouldn’t be readily available to augment Latvia.

Like it or not, the Canadian Army is now deeply committed to Latvia, just as we were to West Germany back in the day, so the structure of the army needs to be able to support Latvia in a sustainable way.

Now, there’s lots of ways to skin that cat. Replicating the Lahr/Baden 4 Brigade model is one, but not the only one. Rotations can also work in the long term, but there needs to be enough depth in Canada to support those rotations, and the structure to spread the impact of the rotos widely across the army.

An alternative to rotations might be a Special Force brigade drawn from individual volunteers (Regulars, PRes, SuppRes) on 12 month deployments but with the option to extend in Latvia for “the duration” — year by year up to the Treasury Board limit of 7 years. Target younger unattached troops looking to build up tax free cash to enter the housing market and older NCOs and Officers that need that same cash to pay for their divorces. But this might be too radical an idea — not only does it sound too much like a bad foreign legion movie, but it flouts the regimental system.

 

[PrairieFella]

We can support tanks, we just need to make the tours a year or make it a three year posting, one squadron at a time. What's killing the Strats is the turnover, which is burning their troops out, especially the NCOs like candles.

 

[Kirkhill]

A survey of Gen Z in the UK may have some relevance to this discussion.

How do you establish, and maintain, the pipeline?

Gen Z want schools and universities to prepare them for war

More young Britons value military opportunities amid rising geopolitical tensions

www.telegraph.co.uk

Nearly half of Generation Z want schools and universities to do more to prepare them for a career in defence.

According to a new poll, 48pc of 18 to 24-year-olds want more military opportunities during their schooling, as they respond to rising geopolitical tensions.

The survey, carried out by Boston Consulting Group (BCG), also found that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, more than three quarters of the general public want the Government to grow its defence industry.

The findings come months after Lord Hammond, a former defence secretary, argued that young men were totally unprepared to fight a war for Britain.

“There is no point spending lots of money on defence equipment if you haven’t got any men to press the buttons, and we are unable to recruit even to the rather paltry scale army that we currently have,” he said.

The BCG findings showed that while a fifth of Gen Z think working in the defence sector is a strong and meaningful career, around half see it as a good career, but an ethically complicated one.

The results have been published as the defence industry battles a recruitment crisis, with the Royal Air Force forced to close stalls at university job fairs earlier this year following student protests.

However, Diana Dimitrova, the head of UK Defence at BCG, said that in reality, “many Gen Z graduates are exploring specialist careers in the sector – particularly in emerging fields such as AI, cyberwarfare and space defence”.

However, the Government is seeking to attract more recruits, with veterans minister Colonel Alistair Carns this year claiming that unemployed young people should join the Army instead of sitting at home.

“You don’t need to march up and down a parade square getting yelled at by a sergeant major,” ( ) he said. “You can do anything from engineering on a fighter jet all the way through to being a chef.”

 

[Blackadder1916]

An alternative to rotations might be a Special Force brigade drawn from individual volunteers (Regulars, PRes, SuppRes) on 12 month deployments but with the option to extend in Latvia for “the duration” — year by year up to the Treasury Board limit of 7 years. Target younger unattached troops looking to build up tax free cash to enter the housing market and older NCOs and Officers that need that same cash to pay for their divorces. But this might be too radical an idea — not only does it sound too much like a bad foreign legion movie, but it flouts the regimental system.

The "PANDA" battalions of 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade lasted little more than two years before the existing regular regiments, and those that rose from the Militia to be Regular (and the Guards), overtook the Special Force notion. The addition of families and camp followers didn't take even that long.

 

[KevinB]

Pulling tanks out of Latvia I could live with, as they may not be supportable in the long term, but rotational infantry can’t be easily tied to a single brigade, or a single regiment. It risks burning out one part of the army while the rest is underemployed. Plus, specific to 5 brigade, 80% of our reserve infantry speak English, so wouldn’t be readily available to augment Latvia.

Like it or not, the Canadian Army is now deeply committed to Latvia, just as we were to West Germany back in the day, so the structure of the army needs to be able to support Latvia in a sustainable way.

Now, there’s lots of ways to skin that cat. Replicating the Lahr/Baden 4 Brigade model is one, but not the only one. Rotations can also work in the long term, but there needs to be enough depth in Canada to support those rotations, and the structure to spread the impact of the rotos widely across the army.

An alternative to rotations might be a Special Force brigade drawn from individual volunteers (Regulars, PRes, SuppRes) on 12 month deployments but with the option to extend in Latvia for “the duration” — year by year up to the Treasury Board limit of 7 years. Target younger unattached troops looking to build up tax free cash to enter the housing market and older NCOs and Officers that need that same cash to pay for their divorces. But this might be too radical an idea — not only does it sound too much like a bad foreign legion movie, but it flouts the regimental system.

It would appear to me with only 1 tank Regiment that the idea of rotations is going to kill the Armoured Corps (or at least the Strathcona's), as well as a lot of CSS Red trades, and some of the low PY trades, even if those rotations are a 1 year period.

I believe that 12 month deployments are about the worst of all worlds since they are effectively IR postings.
The Infantry seem to be about the only trade that won't be in total dire straights with 6 LAV BN's and 3 Light BN's.

To me it would make sense if the current force structure is to be retained that the Bde HQ, CS and CSS positions be 3 year posting.
Ideally the same everyone else - but the LAV BN's could continue the 6 month rotation - and the Fly Over LIB if necessary.

I don't see the Tanks, Engineers, and Artillery being able to continue 6 months rotations -- and realistically the Fly Over should be another LAV BN - which would leave the LIB's to be available as NEO/IRU in a rotational basis.

The Special Force option I don't see as viable/necessary - as you can do pretty much the same with Class C augmentees and volunteers.
Put the Canadian Guards back on the OOB, with 2 Inf BN's and a Tank Squadron - and have everyone in Latvia be part of the Canadian Guard Bde. You can fill it from augmentees from the various units across Canada as a 3 year posting, and stager the rotations on offsetting APS cycles.

Ideally making the Infantry BN's in Latvia a tracked formation with CV-90, that leave the LAV's available in Canada for domestic, as well as non European deployments as necessary. A third BN's worth of CV-90 and related CS and CSS variants in Canada would provide work up equipment for the rotating in replacements along with one of the tank Squadrons.

 

[Ostrozac]

Put the Canadian Guards back on the OOB, with 2 Inf BN's and a Tank Squadron - and have everyone in Latvia be part of the Canadian Guard Bde.

Ha! You must be feeling the same frustration with the regimental system’s inability to meet our actual needs that some senior planner felt in 1970 when he came up with the idea for the 3rd Mechanized Commando.

Fiddling with infantry capbadges and unit names is fun, emotive and, as you rightly pointed out, utterly irrelevant, as we will run out of CSS (and tank crews, and gunners, and signallers, and intelligence operators, etc…) long before we run out of infanteers. And we need a structure to fix that, soon, before we break those other capabilities, and therefore the entire army, including the forces in Latvia.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Ha! You must be feeling the same frustration with the regimental system’s inability to meet our actual needs that some senior planner felt in 1970 when he came up with the idea for the 3rd Mechanized Commando.

Fiddling with infantry capbadges and unit names is fun, emotive and, as you rightly pointed out, utterly irrelevant, as we will run out of CSS (and tank crews, and gunners, and signallers, and intelligence operators, etc…) long before we run out of infanteers. And we need a structure to fix that, soon, before we break those other capabilities, and therefore the entire army, including the forces in Latvia.

Soldiers tend to respond well to a well articulated plan and mission statement, led and resourced by strong and united leadership, with cap badges rapidly fading into the rear view mirror as things of importance.

Right now we're probably seeing too much of the opposite.

 

[FJAG]

The "PANDA" battalions of 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade lasted little more than two years before the existing regular regiments, and those that rose from the Militia to be Regular (and the Guards), overtook the Special Force notion. The addition of families and camp followers didn't take even that long.

IMHO that is a mistake we continue to live with. There is such a thing as too much professional army when you pay for it at the cost of equipment in general and capabilities in particular. The army is currently living the whirlwind that generations of the CAF have sown.

@KevinB I can buy a lot of what you say above, but not the forming two new units for it. We already have enough. We simply used to “post” an existing battalion there, rotate the battalions or eventually rotate individuals. Your plan calls for 1,200 new PYs or units in Canada with 1,200 blank files. We simply need to get the RegF living within their allocated means with some units living out of country. A Special Force does work for short durations. That takes planning that our current mindset isn’t built for.

 

[KevinB]

IMHO that is a mistake we continue to live with. There is such a thing as too much professional army when you pay for it at the cost of equipment in general and capabilities in particular. The army is currently living the whirlwind that generations of the CAF have sown.

@KevinB I can buy a lot of what you say above, but not the forming two new units for it. We already have enough. We simply used to “post” an existing battalion there, rotate the battalions or eventually rotate individuals. Your plan calls for 1,200 new PYs or units in Canada with 1,200 blank files. We simply need to get the RegF living within their allocated means with some units living out of country. A Special Force does work for short durations. That takes planning that our current mindset isn’t built for.

Actually I would form an entire new Bde
I was envisioning around 6k new PY.